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#21
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![]() I meant back on that original drawing board in the early 1970s. Take the crew cabin and "augment" the design so that it then becomes a functional crew escape module. We've already seen how the "unaugmented" (if you will) crew cabin has served as a means of crew separation from a disintegrating STS stack. ~ CT The ORIGINAL design called for that and was cut for weight budget reasons ![]() But they didnt downgrade the structure so the crew structure survives very well. |
#22
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From Derek Lyons:
(Stuf4) wrote: We've already seen how the "unaugmented" (if you will) crew cabin has served as a means of crew separation from a disintegrating STS stack. We've also seen that in both cases it was not possible to detect the damage early enough to ensure a clean seperation. On the contrary, what both cases have shown that is that no pre-failure detection was necessary for crew cabin separation. In both cases, the orbiter disintegrated while the crew cabin remained intact while gaining physical separation from the rest of the debris. ~ CT |
#23
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From Dan Foster:
wrote: Just how do you practice bailing out of a space shuttle? The CAIB report addresses exactly that point with a nice photograph of someone fully suited up with lanyard attached to the bailout pole along the side of a C-141 cargo plane at altitude, in the progress of bailing out, while upside-down. It's a pretty nice photograph. See page 215 of the CAIB report. That is not an astronaut in that photo. It is a test jumper with hundreds of jumps experience. I expect that NASA would duly repremand any astronaut who got caught in such high risk activity. And no astronaut would have the cool presence of mind to maintain a thumbs-up (see photo) while sliding down that pole. Ha! A C-141 may not be a Space Shuttle, but the conditions were certainly equivalent: level flight altitude, 20,000 feet or less, etc. (The procedure starts at no earlier than 40,000 feet but IIRC, jumps don't actually start until about 20,000 feet or so?) I don't know if Shuttle crews are actually expected to do that practice bailout for real, or if they normally go through the motions but not actually jump. Certainly an element of risk if they went through it for a realistic practice that may not ordinarily be commensurate with the number of times they're likely to need to do this for real at the end of a mission. (These points are addressed in my response to Jonathan above.) I'm sure that the reason why there is no NASA requirement to practice actual bailout is that the training poses a much higher risk than any possible benefit that would come out of the small chance of needing to use that training. ~ CT |
#24
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From Greg Moo
Imagine a car company that does a study and determines that it is too expensive to build a vehicle with airbags and even seatbelts, and that the performance of that vehicle will be degraded by this safety equipment. So they build it. And there is a long line of people who still want to buy it and drive it. When those vehicles crash (and they will crash) and their occupants take their final ride through the front windshield, I can guarantee you that the NTSB would hold that car company accountable for willful negligence. History has proven you wrong. I probably overreached with that verbiage of "...I can guarantee you that the NTSB would...", but I expect you see the point I was making. ~ CT |
#25
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This is a vital role of government: to step in and set safety
standards where an uninterfered market will trend toward an unsafe solution. ....or, in the case of the USA, an oversafe solution up to and including wiping every manufacturer off the market...market forces here including the judicial system with juries adjudicating complicated technical issues and all. Jan |
#26
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From Jan Vorbrüggen:
This is a vital role of government: to step in and set safety standards where an uninterfered market will trend toward an unsafe solution. ...or, in the case of the USA, an oversafe solution up to and including wiping every manufacturer off the market...market forces here including the judicial system with juries adjudicating complicated technical issues and all. The current incarnation of the US government is a monstrosity that none of the founding fathers would approve of. King George looks impotent in comparison. An interesting novel could be written where Independence Hall has a crystal ball. What would those famous men have done differently had they been able to see into the future to the results of what they were creating. It's possible that they may all have decided to go home to dig through their closet for their bottle of "Royal Crown Polish"! ~ CT |
#27
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You are making blanket assertions that don't hold up to serious
analysis. (Not to mention the implied comment that judges are capable of adjudicating compmlicated technical issues; just how much litigation and trial experience do YOU have?) Enough. Hereabouts, there are specialised groups of judges who handle certain classes of cases exclusively; they usually are well respected by their "customers". And surely Lipobay (or whatever it was called in the US) is an example of this in action. Or the alledged "poisoning" of apples by Alar. Jan |
#28
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In article ,
Jan C. Vorbruggen wrote: You are making blanket assertions that don't hold up to serious analysis. (Not to mention the implied comment that judges are capable of adjudicating compmlicated technical issues; just how much litigation and trial experience do YOU have?) Enough. Sure. As a jurist? Juror? Counsel? Witness? Hereabouts, there are specialised groups of judges who handle certain classes of cases exclusively; they usually are well respected by their "customers". Tell me again how that would work in a country of 260 million people (plus no doubt several million illegal residents), comprised of 51 semi-sovereign jurisdictions (including D.C. but not including any U.S. territories or protectorates), each with about four hundred years of jurisprudential precedent to rely on/depend on/comply with, not to mention various state and federal Constitutional guarantees of right to trial by jury in nearly all matters. (And the very reason such provisions were placed in those Constitutions was to prevent historical abuses of power by judges). And surely Lipobay (or whatever it was called in the US) is an example of this in action. Baycol? The medical evidence is pretty compelling, your insinuation to the contrary notwithstanding. And I don't see Bayer planning bankruptcy any time soon (which just belies your rationale for bringing it up in the first place). Or the alledged "poisoning" of apples by Alar. How many apple growers/distributors/retailers were financially ruined or bankrupted? None? Gee, what a surprise. And how many manufacturers of alar (or any other apple pesticide) were bankrupted by the public hue and cry? You need to come up with some better examples. Jan -- Herb Schaltegger, B.S., J.D. Reformed Aerospace Engineer "Heisenberg might have been here." ~ Anonymous |
#29
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In summary, it would have been easy to design the shuttle with crew escape
capability covering the vast majority of ascent/entry I didn't think you could answer my question. I didn't ask about ascent. I specifically asked about the stage at where Columbia was lost. The fact remains, that if the thermal protection system fails (tiles, heat shield, whatever you want to call it) during reentry, the spacecraft is toast. Nothing can save it, or the crew. Bill Harris Sci-Fi Quote of the month: "We will never forgive and we will never forget." - Stilgar, "Dune" |
#30
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From Bill Harris:
In summary, it would have been easy to design the shuttle with crew escape capability covering the vast majority of ascent/entry I didn't think you could answer my question. I didn't ask about ascent. I specifically asked about the stage at where Columbia was lost. I have addressed -107 type entry scenarios. If you don't like my analysis, there are specialists within the field who can give you their analysis as to how easy it could have been done. I was at the library yesterday and was surprised to find the AvWeek article titled "Crew Module Separated" (Sep-1-03,p31). This led me to go back to the CAIB report to find the section where crew module integrity was discussed: p77(of248) titled "STS-107 CREW SURVIVABILITY". The report is very clear in the fact that it was well after vehicle breakup that aerothermal loads finally caused the loss of integrity of the crew module. This tells me that a module designed for aerodynamic stability and given adequate thermal protection would have survived (or at least *could* have survived). It was deeply saddened to read... "The death of the crew members was due to blunt trauma and hypoxia." Death by hypoxia?! I hope this is referring to crew members who weren't wearing their gloves/helmet. Now if it was a fully suited crewmember who died from hypoxia, then I would find that exceptionally disturbing. The report does not say how close anyone came to surviving, but death by hypoxia requires a certain length of *time*, which tells me that they (or at least, someone) may have survived the debris of cabin breakup. I am wondering about the possibility that following cabin breakup, someone gets ejected out of their seat to go into a freefall. Imagine then that after the long hot-to-cold freefall an altitude sensor in the ACES automatically deploys their chute, to minutes later touch down softly in a Texas field... only to find that this crewmember died of *hypoxia*. The fact remains, that if the thermal protection system fails (tiles, heat shield, whatever you want to call it) during reentry, the spacecraft is toast. Nothing can save it, or the crew. We agree that the spacecraft is toast. As to the crew, CAIB stops well short of saying what could have saved them. But they do say this: "The Working Group's results significantly add to the knowledge gained from the loss of Challenger in 1986. Such knowledge is critical to efforts to improve crew survivability when designing new vehicles and identifying feasible improvements to the existing Orbiters." (p77of248) They do NOT say... "Spacecraft and crew are toast so we aren't going to bother making efforts toward designing a way to save future astronauts in similar situations." ~ CT |
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