7 myths about the Challenger shuttle disaster

7 myths about the Challenger shuttle disaster

It didn't explode, the crew didn't die instantly and it wasn't inevitable

http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/11031097/

By James Oberg, NBC News space analyst // Special to MSNBC

Updated: 11:39 p.m. ET Jan. 25, 2006

HOUSTON - Twenty years ago, millions of television viewers were horrified
to

witness the live broadcast of the space shuttle Challenger exploding 73
seconds

into flight, ending the lives of the seven astronauts on board. And they
were

equally horrified to learn in the aftermath of the disaster that the faulty

design had been chosen by NASA to satisfy powerful politicians who had
demanded

the mission be launched, even under unsafe conditions. Meanwhile, a major
factor

in the disaster was that NASA had been ordered to use a weaker sealant for

environmental reasons. Finally, NASA consoled itself and the nation with the

realization that all frontiers are dangerous and to a certain extent, such a

disaster should be accepted as inevitable.

At least, that seems to be how many people remember it, in whole or in
part.

That's how the story of the Challenger is often retold, in oral tradition
and

broadcast news, in public speeches and in private conversations and all
around

the Internet. But spaceflight historians believe that each element of the

opening paragraph is factually untrue or at best extremely dubious. They are

myths, undeserving of popular belief and unworthy of being repeated at every

anniversary of the disaster.

The flight, and the lost crewmembers, deserve proper recognition and
authentic

commemoration. Historians, reporters, and every citizen need to take the
time

this week to remember what really happened, and especially to make sure
their

memories are as close as humanly possible to what really did happen.

If that happens, here's the way the mission may be remembered:



Few people actually saw the Challenger tragedy unfold live on television.



The shuttle did not explode in the common definition of that word.



The flight, and the astronauts' lives, did not end at that point, 73
seconds

after launch.



The design of the booster, while possessing flaws subject to improvement,
was

neither especially dangerous if operated properly, nor the result of
political

interference.



Replacement of the original asbestos-bearing putty in the booster seals
was

unrelated to the failure.



There were pressures on the flight schedule, but none of any recognizable

political origin.



Rationalizations that the disaster was the unavoidable price to be paid
for

pioneering a new frontier were self-serving cover-ups of those responsible
for

incompetent engineering management - the disaster should have been
avoidable.





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