Msnbc (Oberg): Why NASA's making the right decision

Msnbc (Oberg): Why NASA's making the right decision

Analysis, not wishful thinking, guiding shuttle officials

http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/8700458/

COMMENTARY By James Oberg //NBC News space analyst

Special to MSNBC // 2:40 p.m. ET July 25, 2005



HOUSTON - At first glance, NASA's decision to possibly launch even if a
sensor glitch reappears suggests that the space agency was wrong two weeks
ago to postpone the launch. However, the two decisions actually are very
different, and indicate how much NASA's safety culture has improved.

Had NASA decided two weeks ago to ignore the glitch, it would have been
a decision based on instinct alone. Had that instinct proved right (that is,
nobody dies), it would have begun the process of betraying the hard lessons
of Challenger and Columbia. The odds are that the hardware flaws would not
have had disastrous consequences - but the decision to fly anyway, in the
face of them, could well have.

The decision to launch this time, in the event of a sensor "hiccup" of a
very specific type, will be made in the full sunlight of massive amounts of
investigation, analysis, and cold-blooded calculations of safety principles.
It may or may not have happy consequences (anything can happen, especially
in space), but it will be fully consistent with the best practices of
hazardous operations. These standards have in the past led to safe space
flights, and past occurrences of forgetting such principles have been at the
root of NASA's worst space disasters.

Jim Oberg wrote:

The decision to launch this time, in the event of a sensor "hiccup" of a
very specific type, will be made in the full sunlight of massive amounts of
investigation, analysis, and cold-blooded calculations of safety principles.
It may or may not have happy consequences (anything can happen, especially
in space), but it will be fully consistent with the best practices of
hazardous operations. These standards have in the past led to safe space
flights, and past occurrences of forgetting such principles have been at the
root of NASA's worst space disasters.

JimO, just wondering about this:

Columbia's foamstrike was debated and analyzed pretty extensively. The
conclusion drawn (based on inconclusive data and unrealistic analyses)
was that there was no risk, and nothing could be done about it anyway. LOCV.

Challenger's O-ring fragility and the cold temps were discussed and
analyzed extensively before launch. The conclusion drawn (based on
inconclusive data and unrealistic analyses) was that there was no risk.
LOCV.

So what's different this time? Sounds to this observer like the exact
same brand of Go Fever. And the exact same scheduling pressure as the
driving force.

And it will only get worse. They'll get away with it this time, and
Discovery will fly a "perfect" mission.

Then several missions down the road when the comfort factor has crept
back up and the pressure to fly out the manifest is exponentially
stronger than it is today, the exact same "we got away with it last
time, nothing will happen this time" rationalization will lead to a
third LOCV event.

I'm sorry, but I see no evidence whatsoever that NASA has learned
anything at all from any of their fatal accidents. And I see no evidence
whatsoever that the culture will ever change one bit.


--
Terrell Miller


"Suddenly, after nearly 30 years of scorn, Prog is cool again".
-Entertainment Weekly

I for one amseriously concerned. If you dont know what the problem is
then you shouldnt launch. The intermittent nature of the trouble makes
it worse.

The problem might well be bad wiring in a bad spot. Cold might generate
a intermittent short or bad connection.

All the clues are there, roll back to the VAB and do it right.

If we lose another vehicle and crew will you Jim O REALLY believe this
was the right way?

Problems that werent understood have cost us 2 vehicles and 14 dead.

Lets not go there again

Jim Oberg wrote:

Had NASA decided two weeks ago to ignore the glitch, it would have been
a decision based on instinct alone.

(. . .)

The decision to launch this time, in the event of a sensor "hiccup" of a
very specific type, will be made in the full sunlight of massive amounts of
investigation, analysis, and cold-blooded calculations of safety principles.

The problem with this analysis is that it appears that the reason they
have moved to a "launch anyway" position is because they ran out of
things to try, and not because they came up with any significant new
information. At some point two weeks ago (before the reset) they made
a decision that there were too many risks to launch without
understanding the root cause of the failure; having failed to find the
root cause they have now decided this risk is worth taking. Yes, a
massive amount of work has been done, but that doesn't mean that a
large amount of new knowledge has been gained, or that the risk that
was previously assessed as too great before has lessened any.

Of course, it's more complex than this, and puckering up and accepting
this problem may indeed be the less risky course in the long run vs. a
rollback and disassembly, but to say this is "full sunlight" is, I
think, missing the point.

JGM

JGM wrote:
The problem with this analysis is that it appears that the reason they
have moved to a "launch anyway" position is because they ran out of
things to try, and not because they came up with any significant new
information. At some point two weeks ago (before the reset) they made
a decision that there were too many risks to launch without
understanding the root cause of the failure;


Two weeks ago, when they got a red blinking light on a console, they stopped
the launch because they didn't have any idea if this was an isolated problem
or something which was just an indication of an even bigger collection of
problems that would surface at or after launch.

*IF* in the two weeks since, they gained assurance/confidence that it is
really just this one sensor and that other sensors and other ET systems are
functioning perfectly, and *IF* they are confident that with 3 working
reliable sensors, they still have enough redundancy, and they know they can
isolate/disable the flaky sensor if need be, then it is quite different from 2
weeks ago.

In the end, in a mattere of hours now, they'll fill the tanks, see how the
sensors react, and that is when we'll know what NASA's real intentions are.

I suspect that the crew will be made aware of sensor glitches and would be
part of the decision loop on whether to launch or not launch. I doubt that
NASA would keep a sensor glitch secret. If it happens , let NASA make it quite
public their discussions with crews and let NASA make the convincing arguments
of why it is still safe to launch.

On Tue, 26 Jul 2005 06:38:26 GMT, gcash wrote:

Local Orlando NBC affiliate WESH Ch 2 just had an article interviewing Story
Musgrave, Jim Wetherbee, and one of the mission specialists saying the exact
opposite.

Musgrave says "anyone that saw the Colombia impact video knew in their gut
there was major damage, it was a 'real bad day' on launch, and we couldn't get
management to deal with it. They said a spacewalk was too dangerous which was
bull, and they also said a rescue by Atlantis was impossible. So people died
and we lost a vehicle. This decision with the tank sensor is more of the same
old NASA."

This has no bearing on anything, but I happened upon a rerun of the U.S. ABC-TV's
"Home Improvement" series a few days ago. The crew of a shuttle Hubble repair
mission was featured. Sorry- not sure if it was the first one or a later one, and I've
been too lazy to check. Musgrave was in the crew, and on the show. I was taken
aback by what a wooden actor he was (especially since he was playing himself .

Did he really play an active part in trying to intervene during STS-107? He separated
from NASA long before, didn't he? His use of "we" seems odd.

Dale

John Doe wrote:

*IF* in the two weeks since, they gained assurance/confidence that it is
really just this one sensor and that other sensors and other ET systems are
functioning perfectly, and *IF* they are confident that with 3 working
reliable sensors, they still have enough redundancy, and they know they can
isolate/disable the flaky sensor if need be, then it is quite different from 2
weeks ago.

Agreed, but only to the extent that it is. The main issue remains
unresolved, though. Pruning away the fault tree can be a misleadingly
reassuring process, because even though you seem to have eliminated a
lot os scary possibilities, at the end, *something happened and you
still don't know why*. Sometimes you can eliminate causes from the
equation, but you can't assess the risk of what *is* there without
knowing root cause.

In the end, in a mattere of hours now, they'll fill the tanks, see how the
sensors react, and that is when we'll know what NASA's real intentions are.

Yes, it seems to be a moot point now, and hopefully will remain so
(note, though, that none of the work done in the past weeks was aimed
at *fixing* the problem, so delcaring victory here is difficult). But
based on statements made in the last few days, they'd already decided
to go if the same error had come up in the same way.

Again, I'm not claiming that anybody at NASA has had bad judgement
about this issue, just taking issue with Jim Oberg's "sunlight"
analysis. Despite all the hand-wringing and changes made in the past 2
year, it's a risky business, and the gremlins seem to have conspired to
remind us of this.

JGM

Jim Oberg ) wrote:
: Msnbc (Oberg): Why NASA's making the right decision

: Analysis, not wishful thinking, guiding shuttle officials

: http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/8700458/

: COMMENTARY By James Oberg //NBC News space analyst

: Special to MSNBC // 2:40 p.m. ET July 25, 2005



: HOUSTON - At first glance, NASA's decision to possibly launch even if a
: sensor glitch reappears suggests that the space agency was wrong two weeks
: ago to postpone the launch. However, the two decisions actually are very
: different, and indicate how much NASA's safety culture has improved.

: Had NASA decided two weeks ago to ignore the glitch, it would have been
: a decision based on instinct alone. Had that instinct proved right (that is,
: nobody dies), it would have begun the process of betraying the hard lessons
: of Challenger and Columbia. The odds are that the hardware flaws would not
: have had disastrous consequences - but the decision to fly anyway, in the
: face of them, could well have.

: The decision to launch this time, in the event of a sensor "hiccup" of a
: very specific type, will be made in the full sunlight of massive amounts of
: investigation, analysis, and cold-blooded calculations of safety principles.
: It may or may not have happy consequences (anything can happen, especially
: in space), but it will be fully consistent with the best practices of
: hazardous operations. These standards have in the past led to safe space
: flights, and past occurrences of forgetting such principles have been at the
: root of NASA's worst space disasters.



Right, what good is a "process" if no one actually follows it? And
processes are what is done. So,...

Eric

Terrell Miller wrote:
Jim Oberg wrote:

The decision to launch this time, in the event of a sensor "hiccup" of a
very specific type, will be made in the full sunlight of massive amounts of
investigation, analysis, and cold-blooded calculations of safety principles.
It may or may not have happy consequences (anything can happen, especially
in space), but it will be fully consistent with the best practices of
hazardous operations. These standards have in the past led to safe space
flights, and past occurrences of forgetting such principles have been at the
root of NASA's worst space disasters.

JimO, just wondering about this:

..
Columbia's foamstrike was debated and analyzed pretty extensively. The
conclusion drawn (based on inconclusive data and unrealistic analyses)
was that there was no risk, and nothing could be done about it anyway. LOCV.

Challenger's O-ring fragility and the cold temps were discussed and
analyzed extensively before launch. The conclusion drawn (based on
inconclusive data and unrealistic analyses) was that there was no risk.
LOCV.

So what's different this time? Sounds to this observer like the exact
same brand of Go Fever. And the exact same scheduling pressure as the
driving force.

The 'nothing could be done about it anyway' was not correct and
resulted in less analysis than was reasonable and prudent, especially
with regards to investigating with national assets, etc. This was
caused by lack of top-level intervention with regard to the possibility
of Shuttle damage from the foam strike--on the contrary, top levels did
not even know of the danger. In many ways, decisions were made at a
lower paygrade than warranted.

That is exactly what JimO is talking about. The risks with Discovery
have been analysed and considered to a far different level than with
Challenger / Columbia.

Tom










And it will only get worse. They'll get away with it this time, and
Discovery will fly a "perfect" mission.

Then several missions down the road when the comfort factor has crept
back up and the pressure to fly out the manifest is exponentially
stronger than it is today, the exact same "we got away with it last
time, nothing will happen this time" rationalization will lead to a
third LOCV event.

I'm sorry, but I see no evidence whatsoever that NASA has learned
anything at all from any of their fatal accidents. And I see no evidence
whatsoever that the culture will ever change one bit.


--
Terrell Miller


"Suddenly, after nearly 30 years of scorn, Prog is cool again".
-Entertainment Weekly

"Jim Oberg" wrote in message
...
Msnbc (Oberg): Why NASA's making the right decision

Analysis, not wishful thinking, guiding shuttle officials

http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/8700458/

COMMENTARY By James Oberg //NBC News space analyst

Special to MSNBC // 2:40 p.m. ET July 25, 2005



HOUSTON - At first glance, NASA's decision to possibly launch even if a
sensor glitch reappears suggests that the space agency was wrong two weeks
ago to postpone the launch. However, the two decisions actually are very
different, and indicate how much NASA's safety culture has improved.

Had NASA decided two weeks ago to ignore the glitch, it would have been
a decision based on instinct alone. Had that instinct proved right (that is,
nobody dies), it would have begun the process of betraying the hard lessons
of Challenger and Columbia. The odds are that the hardware flaws would not
have had disastrous consequences - but the decision to fly anyway, in the
face of them, could well have.

The decision to launch this time, in the event of a sensor "hiccup" of a
very specific type, will be made in the full sunlight of massive amounts of
investigation, analysis, and cold-blooded calculations of safety principles.



Collective intelligence is orders of magnitude greater than that of
any one. At launch time the decision was in the hands of a few, as it
was with the dictatorship of the o-rings, and the reentry.
The delay and the 'spotlight' reduces the risk enormously even if
the exact solution is never found.






It may or may not have happy consequences (anything can happen, especially
in space), but it will be fully consistent with the best practices of
hazardous operations. These standards have in the past led to safe space
flights, and past occurrences of forgetting such principles have been at the
root of NASA's worst space disasters.