Msnbc (Oberg): Why NASA's making the right decision

Msnbc (Oberg): Why NASA's making the right decision

Analysis, not wishful thinking, guiding shuttle officials

http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/8700458/

COMMENTARY By James Oberg //NBC News space analyst

Special to MSNBC // 2:40 p.m. ET July 25, 2005



HOUSTON - At first glance, NASA's decision to possibly launch even if a
sensor glitch reappears suggests that the space agency was wrong two weeks
ago to postpone the launch. However, the two decisions actually are very
different, and indicate how much NASA's safety culture has improved.

Had NASA decided two weeks ago to ignore the glitch, it would have been
a decision based on instinct alone. Had that instinct proved right (that is,
nobody dies), it would have begun the process of betraying the hard lessons
of Challenger and Columbia. The odds are that the hardware flaws would not
have had disastrous consequences - but the decision to fly anyway, in the
face of them, could well have.

The decision to launch this time, in the event of a sensor "hiccup" of a
very specific type, will be made in the full sunlight of massive amounts of
investigation, analysis, and cold-blooded calculations of safety principles.
It may or may not have happy consequences (anything can happen, especially
in space), but it will be fully consistent with the best practices of
hazardous operations. These standards have in the past led to safe space
flights, and past occurrences of forgetting such principles have been at the
root of NASA's worst space disasters.

Jim Oberg wrote:

The decision to launch this time, in the event of a sensor "hiccup" of a
very specific type, will be made in the full sunlight of massive amounts of
investigation, analysis, and cold-blooded calculations of safety principles.
It may or may not have happy consequences (anything can happen, especially
in space), but it will be fully consistent with the best practices of
hazardous operations. These standards have in the past led to safe space
flights, and past occurrences of forgetting such principles have been at the
root of NASA's worst space disasters.

JimO, just wondering about this:

Columbia's foamstrike was debated and analyzed pretty extensively. The
conclusion drawn (based on inconclusive data and unrealistic analyses)
was that there was no risk, and nothing could be done about it anyway. LOCV.

Challenger's O-ring fragility and the cold temps were discussed and
analyzed extensively before launch. The conclusion drawn (based on
inconclusive data and unrealistic analyses) was that there was no risk.
LOCV.

So what's different this time? Sounds to this observer like the exact
same brand of Go Fever. And the exact same scheduling pressure as the
driving force.

And it will only get worse. They'll get away with it this time, and
Discovery will fly a "perfect" mission.

Then several missions down the road when the comfort factor has crept
back up and the pressure to fly out the manifest is exponentially
stronger than it is today, the exact same "we got away with it last
time, nothing will happen this time" rationalization will lead to a
third LOCV event.

I'm sorry, but I see no evidence whatsoever that NASA has learned
anything at all from any of their fatal accidents. And I see no evidence
whatsoever that the culture will ever change one bit.


--
Terrell Miller


"Suddenly, after nearly 30 years of scorn, Prog is cool again".
-Entertainment Weekly

Terrell Miller wrote:
Jim Oberg wrote:

The decision to launch this time, in the event of a sensor "hiccup" of a
very specific type, will be made in the full sunlight of massive amounts of
investigation, analysis, and cold-blooded calculations of safety principles.
It may or may not have happy consequences (anything can happen, especially
in space), but it will be fully consistent with the best practices of
hazardous operations. These standards have in the past led to safe space
flights, and past occurrences of forgetting such principles have been at the
root of NASA's worst space disasters.

JimO, just wondering about this:

..
Columbia's foamstrike was debated and analyzed pretty extensively. The
conclusion drawn (based on inconclusive data and unrealistic analyses)
was that there was no risk, and nothing could be done about it anyway. LOCV.

Challenger's O-ring fragility and the cold temps were discussed and
analyzed extensively before launch. The conclusion drawn (based on
inconclusive data and unrealistic analyses) was that there was no risk.
LOCV.

So what's different this time? Sounds to this observer like the exact
same brand of Go Fever. And the exact same scheduling pressure as the
driving force.

The 'nothing could be done about it anyway' was not correct and
resulted in less analysis than was reasonable and prudent, especially
with regards to investigating with national assets, etc. This was
caused by lack of top-level intervention with regard to the possibility
of Shuttle damage from the foam strike--on the contrary, top levels did
not even know of the danger. In many ways, decisions were made at a
lower paygrade than warranted.

That is exactly what JimO is talking about. The risks with Discovery
have been analysed and considered to a far different level than with
Challenger / Columbia.

Tom










And it will only get worse. They'll get away with it this time, and
Discovery will fly a "perfect" mission.

Then several missions down the road when the comfort factor has crept
back up and the pressure to fly out the manifest is exponentially
stronger than it is today, the exact same "we got away with it last
time, nothing will happen this time" rationalization will lead to a
third LOCV event.

I'm sorry, but I see no evidence whatsoever that NASA has learned
anything at all from any of their fatal accidents. And I see no evidence
whatsoever that the culture will ever change one bit.


--
Terrell Miller


"Suddenly, after nearly 30 years of scorn, Prog is cool again".
-Entertainment Weekly

"Tom Cuddihy" wrote:
The 'nothing could be done about it anyway' was not correct

Yes, it was correct. Later analysis showed that Columbia would have
had to have started powering down and conserving on flight day 1 in
order to have a chance at survival/rescue. Hard to do when the
anomaly wasn't clearly understood until some days later.

resulted in less analysis than was reasonable and prudent, especially
with regards to investigating with national assets, etc.

Incorrect. Management asked the engineers for a formal written
request for imagery - and the engineers declined to do so. The onus
for not using national assets lies with the individuals who so
declined - not with a nebulous attitude.

D.
--
Touch-twice life. Eat. Drink. Laugh.

-Resolved: To be more temperate in my postings.
Oct 5th, 2004 JDL

"Derek Lyons" wrote in message
...
"Tom Cuddihy" wrote:
resulted in less analysis than was reasonable and prudent, especially
with regards to investigating with national assets, etc.

Incorrect. Management asked the engineers for a formal written
request for imagery - and the engineers declined to do so. The onus
for not using national assets lies with the individuals who so
declined - not with a nebulous attitude.

You're not a Vogon, are you Derek?

Luckily, most of the time when I run into a bureaucratic roadblock like
this, my manager takes care of filling out the necessary forms. He does
this because it's a waste of an engineer's time and talent to get bogged
down in paperwork.

Jeff
--
Remove icky phrase from email address to get a valid address.

"Jeff Findley" wrote:


"Derek Lyons" wrote in message
...
"Tom Cuddihy" wrote:
resulted in less analysis than was reasonable and prudent, especially
with regards to investigating with national assets, etc.

Incorrect. Management asked the engineers for a formal written
request for imagery - and the engineers declined to do so. The onus
for not using national assets lies with the individuals who so
declined - not with a nebulous attitude.

You're not a Vogon, are you Derek?

No, I'm not. I merely point out that the myths that have arisen over
the issue of imagery and role of management in the accident are just
that - myths.

Luckily, most of the time when I run into a bureaucratic roadblock like
this, my manager takes care of filling out the necessary forms. He does
this because it's a waste of an engineer's time and talent to get bogged
down in paperwork.

Generally that's true (about waste of time). But it doesn't change
the facts of dropped the ball. The engineers were tasked by their
bosses (bosses can do that you know), and they neglected to complete
the task.

D.
--
Touch-twice life. Eat. Drink. Laugh.

-Resolved: To be more temperate in my postings.
Oct 5th, 2004 JDL

On Wed, 27 Jul 2005 13:16:26 -0400, Jeff Findley wrote:


"Derek Lyons" wrote in message
...
"Tom Cuddihy" wrote:
resulted in less analysis than was reasonable and prudent, especially
with regards to investigating with national assets, etc.

Incorrect. Management asked the engineers for a formal written
request for imagery - and the engineers declined to do so. The onus
for not using national assets lies with the individuals who so
declined - not with a nebulous attitude.

You're not a Vogon, are you Derek?

Luckily, most of the time when I run into a bureaucratic roadblock like
this, my manager takes care of filling out the necessary forms. He does
this because it's a waste of an engineer's time and talent to get bogged
down in paperwork.

The engineers formally requested imagery quite early through the proper
and formal chain of command. Lambert Austin, representing a group of
engineers, went to Ron Dittemore with the request. At some point during
the meeting, Lambert changed his mind leaving the engineers out in the
cold with respect to getting imagery through formal channels. Lambert had
put on his "Management" hat. As far as Ron Dittemore was concerned, there
was nothing they could do about a damaged heat shield so imagery was
unnecessary. They were in the "best possible position" without imagery. Go
figure. As Linda Ham said, it's not a "safety of flight" issue is it?
Only a maintenance problem.

That's about as formal as it gets at NASA. Up though the proper chain of
command, with the request being denied. That's why an engineer went around
the formal chain of command, and requested imagery on his own. After
management found out about his request, he was reprimanded and made to
send an apology letter for having made the request.


--
Craig Fink
Courtesy E-Mail Welcome @

Tom Cuddihy wrote:

That is exactly what JimO is talking about. The risks with Discovery
have been analysed and considered to a far different level than with
Challenger / Columbia.

and were glossed over and wishcasted away on *precisely* the same level

--
Terrell Miller


"Suddenly, after nearly 30 years of scorn, Prog is cool again".
-Entertainment Weekly

Terrell Miller wrote:

Tom Cuddihy wrote:

That is exactly what JimO is talking about. The risks with Discovery
have been analysed and considered to a far different level than with
Challenger / Columbia.

and were glossed over and wishcasted away on *precisely* the same level

Right. Which is why Challenger is on the pad for STS-300, they
grounded the fleet until the O-ring issues were worked out...

Oh, right. They didn't.

D.
--
Touch-twice life. Eat. Drink. Laugh.

-Resolved: To be more temperate in my postings.
Oct 5th, 2004 JDL

Derek Lyons wrote:

That is exactly what JimO is talking about. The risks with Discovery
have been analysed and considered to a far different level than with
Challenger / Columbia.

and were glossed over and wishcasted away on *precisely* the same level


Right. Which is why Challenger is on the pad for STS-300, they
grounded the fleet until the O-ring issues were worked out...

Oh, right. They didn't.

gee derek, you think that might have a little bit to do with the fact
that there had been no fatal accidents in the shuttle program to that
point, and almost zero press coverage of the O-ring blowby on earlier
flights?

Or to put it bluntly: do you think NASA swept the O-ring issue under the
carpet that morning simply ebcause nobody was watching closely? As
opposed to now?


--
Terrell Miller


"Suddenly, after nearly 30 years of scorn, Prog is cool again".
-Entertainment Weekly