Risks

http://www.floridatoday.com/columbia...ory2A5725A.htm

Yes I know your tired of me. Well get over it!

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Jul 12, 8:49 PM

Lurking land mines endanger shuttle

Cost crunch delays critical safety upgrades

By John Kelly and Todd Halvorson
FLORIDA TODAY

CAPE CANAVERAL -- Leaking toxic rocket fuel triggered a fire during a shuttle
landing.

Sensor failures prompted perilous engine shutdowns.

Hot gases burned through the shuttle's heat shield during atmospheric re-entry,
even before the Columbia disaster.

Florida Today uncovered serious lurking problems with high-risk shuttle systems
whose failure could destroy another ship and kill astronauts.

A review of more than two decades worth of NASA documents revealed the systems
most likely to cause another disaster are the shuttle's auxiliary power units,
heat-shield components and liquid-fueled main engines.

Potential failures within those three systems alone represent 75 percent of the
catastrophe risk that is accepted each time the shuttle flies, internal NASA
studies show.

Florida Today's computer-assisted analysis also shows NASA has identified many
of the problems. But key safety upgrades that would reduce the risk have been
put off because of technological and financial barriers, including a $5 billion
cost overrun on the International Space Station.

The Columbia Accident Investigation Board is urging NASA to put more effort
into ferreting out and fixing apparent and hidden hazards within the three
remaining shuttles. The agency now plans to fly the ships until at least 2020.

"We feel that if you're going to continue to fly this thing for twice as long
as it's already flown, there has to be an aggressive program out there looking
for what we call the 'unknown unknowns,' " board chairman Harold Gehman said at
a public hearing.

"In other words, you've got to look for trouble."

By almost all accounts, NASA's shuttle is the most complex flying machine ever
built.

A fully assembled shuttle has more than 2.5 million parts, including 230 miles
of wiring, more than 1,060 plumbing valves and connections, some 1,440 circuit
breakers, and about 27,000 insulating tiles and thermal blankets.

And a leak in something as simple as a rubber O-ring seal can lead to
catastrophe. In fact, a NASA review after the 1986 Challenger disaster
identified some 1,584 components whose failure could lead to the destruction of
an orbiter and the death of its crew.

One of the most troublesome then and now: the auxiliary power units, or APUs.
They provide the hydraulic power needed to steer the shuttles' main engines
during launch and control the wing flaps, wheels and brakes during landing.


Power units: The greatest threat

The auxiliary power units are dangerous because they are powered by a highly
toxic, corrosive and flammable rocket fuel called hydrazine.

Three of them are crammed into the rear-engine compartment where leaks of the
nasty fuel can spawn fires and wreak other havoc.

NASA engineers have long targeted the hydrazine-powered APUs for replacement
with ones that would run on electricity.

Florida Today's examination found at least 190 in-flight problems with the
power units and related systems, including the cooling and hydraulic subsystems
that must work for the power units to do their job.

At least 20 of the problems, which NASA calls "in-flight anomalies," involved
leaks of gases, water, hydraulic fluid or that dangerous toxic fuel. At least
eight premature power-unit shutdowns have been recorded.

NASA prefers all three power units operate during launches and landings. At
least one must work to climb into orbit or touch down safely.

Two units failed on Columbia during a hair-raising 1983 landing.

During that mission, two shuttle computers and a key guidance and navigation
device failed before re-entry. Backup systems were pressed into service. The
APUs sprang a hydrazine leak, sparking a fire in the engine compartment. Two
units shut down as the orbiter landed.

Technicians found "substantial" fire damage in the engine compartment. NASA
said back then, the orbiter and crew were not in danger.

An internal part was redesigned afterward. But the power units still represent
up to 30 percent of the risk of catastrophe on each shuttle mission.

In the late 1990s, NASA launched an effort to develop a battery-powered
electric APU. The idea was to eliminate the deadly hydrazine as well as
high-speed turbo-machinery.

The development of necessary battery technology, however, proved more difficult
than expected. Project cost estimates ballooned from $182 million to $667
million, according to a July 2002 NASA Inspector General report.

NASA deferred the upgrade in June 2001.

The electric-powered units could have been completed in two years, an
independent safety expert told Columbia investigators.

Finishing them "would eliminate the single largest risk to orbiter flight
safety," former astronaut Michael McCulley told Congress in September 2001. At
the time, McCulley was chief operating officer of shuttle contractor United
Space Alliance. This year, he was made the company's CEO.

The power unit upgrade remains high on NASA's list of crucial shuttle safety
improvements.


Perilous engine problems persist

The more obvious danger is in the shuttles' three main engines.

A 1995 NASA contractor study showed that more than one-third of the risk of a
catastrophe on any shuttle mission could be traced to dozens of potential
engine failures.

Florida Today's review uncovered at least 170 in-flight problems involving
main-engine components, including defects with sensors designed to detect
engine troubles.

There also have been at least 84 more problems with the maze of plumbing that
delivers explosive liquid propellants from the giant external fuel tank to the
three engines.

The agency's 1995 study cited 20 scenarios most likely to destroy a shuttle and
kill its astronauts. Ten involved the failure of engine components -- broken
turbines, weak welds in critical structures or other problems that could cause
premature shutdown of engines.

The potential consequence: A catastrophic explosion in flight.

An engine shutdown also could lead to an unprecedented emergency landing
attempt at Kennedy Space Center or an overseas runway. At best, a shuttle would
limp into a lower-than-intended orbit.

Challenger and a crew of seven did just that in July 1985 when a sensor problem
prompted an engine shutdown 5 minutes and 45 seconds into flight. Nevertheless,
the astronauts still accomplished their intended science mission.

But valve and sensor problems also have triggered five engine shutdowns that
led to perilous launch-pad aborts.

In each of those cases, astronauts were left inside an orbiter after
flame-belching engines shut down ahead of the ignition of the shuttle's twin
solid rocket boosters. NASA in the past 17 years has spent more than $1 billion
to reduce risk associated with the engines. But a key upgrade that would have
eliminated dangerous engine-failure scenarios was put on hold in September
2001.

The agency spent $7.5 million developing a state-of-the-art computer that would
instantaneously detect component failures in flight and automatically cut off
engines before inadvertent -- and potentially catastrophic -- shutdowns could
occur.

The computer also would automatically throttle back engines if internal
temperatures or pressures threatened to trigger a component failure.
Additionally, it would allow the engine to continue operating if faulty sensor
readings made an engine susceptible to a shutdown.

Project cost estimates escalated from $55 million to $179 million before the
effort was postponed for lack of money.


Heat shield fraught with peril

The Feb. 1 Columbia disaster is being blamed on shuttle wing-panel damage that
allowed hot gasses to penetrate the ship, triggering its destruction over east
Texas. All seven astronauts aboard were killed.

Still, other problems remain with the shuttle's patchwork heat shield, a
delicate network of thermal blankets, hardened carbon panels and more than
20,000 individual heat-resistant tiles.

Together, the thermal armor protects shuttles and their crews from intense heat
encountered during atmospheric re-entry.

Florida Today's analysis found evidence that superhot gases burned through the
heat shield and damaged the structure beneath it on at least 20 missions before
Columbia's ill-fated flight.

In three cases, hot gases penetrated the front edge of shuttle wings -- the
same type of failure that doomed Columbia and its five-man, two-woman crew.

Fragile thermal tiles also have dropped off orbiters after they were poorly
bonded or struck by debris in flight.

Ice and other debris have hit shuttles' heat shields during all 113 launches.
The resulting damage has included scars, melting and even holes in underlying
structure.

Superhot gasses blew past wing panels on NASA's second and fifth shuttle
missions -- both of them Columbia flights -- in November 1981 and November
1982, respectively.

Improper installation of a seal between wing panels allowed hot gasses to flow
into the left wing of shuttle Atlantis during a fiery atmospheric re-entry in
May 2000.

Sistership Discovery returned from a 1985 mission with "significant structural
damage." Hot gases melted parts of one of its wing flaps, which help maneuver
the shuttle through a safe re-entry and landing.

At least twice, plasma penetrated tiles covering landing gear wells, buckling
the aluminum doors.

And the carbon-composite panels that protect shuttle wings were damaged by
launch debris or micrometeorite strikes on at least nine flights between April
1991 and March 2001.

NASA long has considered tile damage a maintenance problem, but never a safety
concern. Studies commissioned by the agency question that rationale.

The 1995 NASA contractor study says failure of the heat shield represents 15
percent of the risk of disaster on any given mission.

In 1990 and 1994, two university professors said that the risk is higher for
certain tiles. The researchers said NASA should pay close attention to tiles
that run between the nosewheel and main landing gear doors. They get hit more
often by debris and cover critical systems.

They also said the orbiter's survival with missing tiles in the past was "good
fortune."

"Similar losses in different locations could have been far more costly," the
1990 study said.

Columbia accident investigators have recommended more rigorous inspection of
shuttle wing panels and toughening the tiles. They also want NASA to reduce the
debris slamming into the heat shield during launch.

NASA is already at work on the $800,000 panels. Engineers are working on new
heat-resistant tiles that will be less vulnerable to damage, although NASA has
not committed to widespread replacement of the existing tiles.

But some still question whether the agency is investing enough in shuttle
safety upgrades.



The dangerous road ahead

Space station cost overruns and uncertainty over how long the shuttles would
fly have conspired to postpone critical upgrades.

Richard Blomberg, former chairman of NASA's Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel,
said dwindling budgets forced NASA to be shortsighted in its approach to
improving a space vehicle designed in the 1970s.

"Every cent they had, just about, was going into meeting short-term
requirements with Band-Aid solutions," he said.

With no replacement vehicle in sight, NASA decided to fly the shuttles through
2020 instead of the planned retirement in 2012. An agency study last year
showed it would cost an extra $8.7 billion to upgrade the fleet and fly it
safely for that long.

NASA Administrator Sean O'Keefe said last month the shuttles will never be
completely safe. It's impossible, he said, to identify and eliminate every
potential problem.

"I'm not confident that we can ever erect a procedure, a process, a system, a
capability to detect every single thing that could possibly pose a risk to
operations," O'Keefe said.

"It is not humanly possible. We will not ever be able to achieve perfection at
this. We'll strive to it. We'll do our best to achieve it. But I'm confident we
will never attain it. I think I'm just being a realist on this point."

"Hallerb" wrote in message
...
http://www.floridatoday.com/columbia...ory2A5725A.htm

Yes I know your tired of me. Well get over it!

Well I am not tired of you Bob, like it matters though:-(

snip ad

By John Kelly and Todd Halvorson
FLORIDA TODAY

CAPE CANAVERAL -- Leaking toxic rocket fuel triggered a fire during a
shuttle
landing.

The STS 9 information was pretty well covered by AvWeek back in 83. What
was not well covered was that the OMS pods were not used again until
Challenger STS 51-L. Now that Columbia has been lost, all of her is gone.
I don't know if Columbia was flying with Challenger's OMS pods. Obviuosly
if true then all of Challenger is gone also. Sorry if this sounds a little
depressing, but it is for me in a sentimental sort of way.

Sensor failures prompted perilous engine shutdowns.

STS 51-F. Nothing new there.

Hot gases burned through the shuttle's heat shield during atmospheric
re-entry,
even before the Columbia disaster.

Okay that repeats this week's story. It was a bit if a shock, though given
Dittemore's first statement following the accident.

Florida Today uncovered serious lurking problems with high-risk shuttle
systems
whose failure could destroy another ship and kill astronauts.

If you just did a search of the Aerospace Safety Advsiory Panel Reports and
their minutes, you'd pick up quite a lot.

A review of more than two decades worth of NASA documents revealed the
systems
most likely to cause another disaster are the shuttle's auxiliary power
units,
heat-shield components and liquid-fueled main engines.

I alluded to this issue just yesterday.

Potential failures within those three systems alone represent 75 percent
of the
catastrophe risk that is accepted each time the shuttle flies, internal
NASA
studies show.

This statement is inconsistent with the NASA reports on "Space Shuttle
Program Safety and Supportability Upgrades" to which Jorge has tied how best
to spend safety upgrade money--at least what I have been given.

See attachment 2 of this document:
http://legislative.nasa.gov/hearings/gregory4-18.pdf

So I would be curious to what the Florida Today is talking about. If true,
it would certainly make it clear that something is either quite mixed up at
NASA or the Florida Today.

The Columbia Accident Investigation Board is urging NASA to put more
effort
into ferreting out and fixing apparent and hidden hazards within the three
remaining shuttles. The agency now plans to fly the ships until at least
2020.

http://www.nasa.gov/pdf/9123main_2020_assessment.pdf

"We feel that if you're going to continue to fly this thing for twice as
long
as it's already flown, there has to be an aggressive program out there
looking
for what we call the 'unknown unknowns,' " board chairman Harold Gehman
said at
a public hearing.

See above link, kind of a Homer Simpson like "doh".

"In other words, you've got to look for trouble."

It goes a little farther than looking for trouble, it includes anticipating
trouble IMO.

By almost all accounts, NASA's shuttle is the most complex flying machine
ever
built.

snip

One of the most troublesome then and now: the auxiliary power units, or
APUs.
They provide the hydraulic power needed to steer the shuttles' main
engines
during launch and control the wing flaps, wheels and brakes during
landing.

Power units: The greatest threat

The auxiliary power units are dangerous because they are powered by a
highly
toxic, corrosive and flammable rocket fuel called hydrazine.

Three of them are crammed into the rear-engine compartment where leaks of
the
nasty fuel can spawn fires and wreak other havoc.

NASA engineers have long targeted the hydrazine-powered APUs for
replacement
with ones that would run on electricity.

snip

Finishing them "would eliminate the single largest risk to orbiter flight
safety," former astronaut Michael McCulley told Congress in September
2001. At
the time, McCulley was chief operating officer of shuttle contractor
United
Space Alliance. This year, he was made the company's CEO.

Okay here is a Congressional hearing review.

The power unit upgrade remains high on NASA's list of crucial shuttle
safety
improvements.


Perilous engine problems persist

The more obvious danger is in the shuttles' three main engines.

A 1995 NASA contractor study showed that more than one-third of the risk
of a
catastrophe on any shuttle mission could be traced to dozens of potential
engine failures.

Florida Today's review uncovered at least 170 in-flight problems involving
main-engine components, including defects with sensors designed to detect
engine troubles.

There also have been at least 84 more problems with the maze of plumbing
that
delivers explosive liquid propellants from the giant external fuel tank to
the
three engines.

The agency's 1995 study cited 20 scenarios most likely to destroy a
shuttle and
kill its astronauts. Ten involved the failure of engine components --
broken
turbines, weak welds in critical structures or other problems that could
cause
premature shutdown of engines.

This predates the SIAT report so its not a valid document to report on.
Frankly it is a bit unfair to NASA. They should have used the SIAT report
to more accurately reflect where NASA is today on the SSME's.

http://www.hq.nasa.gov/osf/shuttle_assess.html

snip

Heat shield fraught with peril

The Feb. 1 Columbia disaster is being blamed on shuttle wing-panel damage
that
allowed hot gasses to penetrate the ship, triggering its destruction over
east
Texas. All seven astronauts aboard were killed.

Still, other problems remain with the shuttle's patchwork heat shield, a
delicate network of thermal blankets, hardened carbon panels and more than
20,000 individual heat-resistant tiles.

Together, the thermal armor protects shuttles and their crews from intense
heat
encountered during atmospheric re-entry.

Florida Today's analysis found evidence that superhot gases burned through
the
heat shield and damaged the structure beneath it on at least 20 missions
before
Columbia's ill-fated flight.

Now this is disturbing. Hell the "orbiter" had a tick in her eye if she
winked that much and NASA missed its significance? Isn't the TPS a
criticality 1 issue?

In three cases, hot gases penetrated the front edge of shuttle wings --
the
same type of failure that doomed Columbia and its five-man, two-woman
crew.

Fragile thermal tiles also have dropped off orbiters after they were
poorly
bonded or struck by debris in flight.

Ice and other debris have hit shuttles' heat shields during all 113
launches.
The resulting damage has included scars, melting and even holes in
underlying
structure.

Superhot gasses blew past wing panels on NASA's second and fifth shuttle
missions -- both of them Columbia flights -- in November 1981 and November
1982, respectively.

Improper installation of a seal between wing panels allowed hot gasses to
flow
into the left wing of shuttle Atlantis during a fiery atmospheric re-entry
in
May 2000.

Sistership Discovery returned from a 1985 mission with "significant
structural
damage." Hot gases melted parts of one of its wing flaps, which help
maneuver
the shuttle through a safe re-entry and landing.

At least twice, plasma penetrated tiles covering landing gear wells,
buckling
the aluminum doors.

****. This is bad, very bad. It reflects no serious effort to track and
identify potential criticality 1 showstoppers.

And the carbon-composite panels that protect shuttle wings were damaged by
launch debris or micrometeorite strikes on at least nine flights between
April
1991 and March 2001.

NASA long has considered tile damage a maintenance problem, but never a
safety
concern. Studies commissioned by the agency question that rationale.

The 1995 NASA contractor study says failure of the heat shield represents
15
percent of the risk of disaster on any given mission.

They were told. Knowledge raises the bar of NASA management responsibility,
the question is how far?

In 1990 and 1994, two university professors said that the risk is higher
for
certain tiles. The researchers said NASA should pay close attention to
tiles
that run between the nosewheel and main landing gear doors. They get hit
more
often by debris and cover critical systems.

We have seen reports like these too.

They also said the orbiter's survival with missing tiles in the past was
"good
fortune."

I'd like to see that report, it reminds me of Feynman's line;

"For a successful technology, reality must take precedence over
public relations, for nature cannot be fooled."

Rereading Feynman's report in its entirety, you can see what has happened
since 1986.

http://science.ksc.nasa.gov/shuttle/...Appendix-F.txt

snip

But some still question whether the agency is investing enough in shuttle
safety upgrades.

Hey they talked to me. ;-)

Richard Blomberg, former chairman of NASA's Aerospace Safety Advisory
Panel,
said dwindling budgets forced NASA to be shortsighted in its approach to
improving a space vehicle designed in the 1970s.

Jorge, care to comment on this comment? I'd say Congress and the President
need a mirror if they want to know where some of the blame lies. Wouldn't
it be interesting if the CAIB actually pointed out that Congress mismanaged
NASA's budget?

"Every cent they had, just about, was going into meeting short-term
requirements with Band-Aid solutions," he said.

And we laugh at the Russian's program?

With no replacement vehicle in sight, NASA decided to fly the shuttles
through
2020 instead of the planned retirement in 2012. An agency study last year
showed it would cost an extra $8.7 billion to upgrade the fleet and fly it
safely for that long.

Yep, they are stuck in 1972.

NASA Administrator Sean O'Keefe said last month the shuttles will never be
completely safe. It's impossible, he said, to identify and eliminate every
potential problem.

"I'm not confident that we can ever erect a procedure, a process, a
system, a
capability to detect every single thing that could possibly pose a risk to
operations," O'Keefe said.

True, but if safety is given the budget it deserves, it can be made close to
an order of magnitude safer. That might be enough to make it to 2020 with
three potential museum pieces still intact.

"It is not humanly possible. We will not ever be able to achieve
perfection at
this. We'll strive to it. We'll do our best to achieve it. But I'm
confident we
will never attain it. I think I'm just being a realist on this point."

"Nothing works perfectly", Richard Feynman said that in 1986.

Daniel

"Charleston" wrote in
news:fHgQa.11280$zy.8099@fed1read06:

"Hallerb" wrote in message
...

http://www.floridatoday.com/columbia...ory2A5725A.htm

Richard Blomberg, former chairman of NASA's Aerospace Safety Advisory
Panel,
said dwindling budgets forced NASA to be shortsighted in its approach
to improving a space vehicle designed in the 1970s.

Jorge, care to comment on this comment? I'd say Congress and the
President need a mirror if they want to know where some of the blame
lies. Wouldn't it be interesting if the CAIB actually pointed out
that Congress mismanaged NASA's budget?

I would agree with it, at least partially. The pressure to reduce the
shuttle budget in the 90's forced a harsher prioritization of upgrades than
would otherwise have been necessary, resulting in some items being dropped
off the list. Bringing the Russians into the space station program didn't
help, because the 51.6 degree inclination required by the Russians resulted
in shuttle upgrades being focused on performance enhancement, not safety.
Subsequently, the shuttle budget was repeatedly raided to cover ISS cost
overruns.

NASA should bear part of the blame, however. Some of the major upgrades
such as electric APUs were cancelled due to cost overruns exceeding 300-
400%. So NASA has a major problem estimating the cost of upgrades, and
preventing overruns. Part of this is due to the lack of standardized
accounting, which IFMP will hopefully address (though not without growing
pains, as we are seeing).

But part is also due to how projects are budgeted and managed. The project
manager is only nominally in charge of the project; the money actually
flows through the center directors. So the project manager has little
control over how many people are working the project and where the money
goes. If I were king/dictator, I'd centralize both authority and
accountability with the project managers, including personnel decisions,
and give them sufficient accounting tools to actually track where the money
is going. That will add some necessary rigor and discipline to the process.

Of course, this is not my original idea - the IMCE (Young Committee) made
exactly the same findings and recommendations two years ago with regard to
ISS budget overruns. The same problem exists in the shuttle program, of
course. And NASA has made some important baby steps in this direction. But
fully implementing this will not be easy; the field centers have a large
amount of political clout and can be expected to resist strongly.

--
JRF

Reply-to address spam-proofed - to reply by E-mail,
check "Organization" (I am not assimilated) and
think one step ahead of IBM.

Actually, a lot of us were hoping *you* would get over it. Between you and
your incessant whining about risk, Maxson and his incessant delusions, and
the jerk who keeps cluttering up the newsgroup with forged e-mails,
s.s.shuttle is totally worthless. As is your opinion about risk and
spaceflight.

-Kim-

Some of us are tired of people beating up on Hallerb and others. No
one's opinion is "worthless" in my eyes. This is what open newsgroups
are about - everyone gathering together and discussing. Everyone
should be welcomed. If you think they are idiots, etc. you'd be a
better person if you kept it to yourself.

You will eventually learn that not only are some opinions worthless,
some are actually less than worthless, i.e. rather than add nothing to
the discussion they actually *detract* from it.

Well I TRIED to discuss what nasa would do if a shuttle got stuck at station
BEFORE coilumbia.

Told dont worry will not happen overreacting.

YEAH SURE

Giganews hosts/posts Bob Mosley's ongoing abuse for
Illuminati Online, and the abuse is getting steadily worse.

--
John Thomas Maxson, Retired Engineer (Aerospace)
Author, The Betrayal of Mission 51-L (www.mission51l.com)


OM om@our_blessed_lady_mary_of_the_holy_NASA_researc h_facility.org
wrote in message ...
On 14 Jul 2003 10:57:43 -0700,
(ElleninLosAngeles) wrote:

Some of us are tired of people beating up on Hallerb and others.

You either venture forth an *informed* opinion, or be prepared
to get your head handed to you on a platter after your ass has
been flamed to cremation. No ifs, ands or buts
about that one, kid. It's the way it's worked for years, and if it
worked any other way the sci groups would be filled with nothing but
bozo posts, MUFON moron babblings, Keely faux physicists, and above
all that some asswipe psychotic like John Maxson would be moderating
the entire heirarchy.

"Bruce Palmer" wrote in message
et...
ElleninLosAngeles wrote:
Some of us are tired of people beating up on Hallerb and others. No

You and who else?

Me. He is certainly better than those who are abusive and ill-mannered. I
don't recall him ever being mean to anyone else. His posts are on topic and
if you don't like them you don't have to respond. He can mumble to himself.
It does not hurt anyone.

"ElleninLosAngeles" wrote in message
om...
Some of us are tired of people beating up on Hallerb and others.

So you outweigh those of us who are tired of Haller's gnashing of teeth,
self-righteous indignation and wailing at the Moon? Get real. I've tolerated
Haller in silence for quite some time now, but I finally found it necessary
to put my opinion into words. That's what usenet is all about.

So now we get to be tired of each other. Happy? Thanks. Bye.

-Kim-

John Maxson and Hallerb seem to be here to stay, so it seems rather
useless to go and on about how you don't like their posts. I don't see
why people continue to bitch about whatever misspelled, crazy ideas
they put forth after saying they are going to killfile them and ignore
them. I think it would be a better Usenet world if they were ignored
rather than flamed - half the posts on here just dissolve into a back
and forth trade of insults. Not interesting to me. Maybe it is to you.

In news:ElleninLosAngeles typed:
John Maxson and Hallerb seem to be here to stay, so it seems rather
useless to go and on about how you don't like their posts. I don't see
why people continue to bitch about whatever misspelled, crazy ideas
they put forth after saying they are going to killfile them and ignore
them. I think it would be a better Usenet world if they were ignored
rather than flamed - half the posts on here just dissolve into a back
and forth trade of insults. Not interesting to me. Maybe it is to you.

shrug

Welcome to Keyboard Anarchy (TM) :-/
--
Mike
__________________________________________________ ______
"Colorado Ski Country, USA" Come often, Ski hard,
Spend *lots* of money, Then leave as quickly as you can.