3 people to check the hatch??!!

No wonder the Shuttle is so pharking expensive to operate!

Any news on the nitty-gritty of the Orion hatch; number of people needed
for closure?

Alan Erskine wrote:
No wonder the Shuttle is so pharking expensive to operate!

Welcome to the post-CAIB "need more government inspectors" world.

On Sun, 15 Mar 2009 17:21:56 -0500, "Jorge R. Frank"
wrote:

Alan Erskine wrote:
No wonder the Shuttle is so pharking expensive to operate!

Welcome to the post-CAIB "need more government inspectors" world.

....Jorge, this might be the one time I've ever disagreed with you, but
I'd rather see more inspectors actually doing the job properly than
something go wrong because a step was missed.

On the other hand, we *did* have that issue last mission where the
White Room had a panel that wasn't lashed down properly prior to arm
swingback, and there were several inspectors then as well...



OM
--
]=====================================[
] OMBlog - http://www.io.com/~o_m/omworld [
] Let's face it: Sometimes you *need* [
] an obnoxious opinion in your day! [
]=====================================[

"OM" wrote in message
...
On Sun, 15 Mar 2009 17:21:56 -0500, "Jorge R. Frank"
wrote:

Alan Erskine wrote:
No wonder the Shuttle is so pharking expensive to operate!

Welcome to the post-CAIB "need more government inspectors" world.

...Jorge, this might be the one time I've ever disagreed with you, but
I'd rather see more inspectors actually doing the job properly than
something go wrong because a step was missed.

On the other hand, we *did* have that issue last mission where the
White Room had a panel that wasn't lashed down properly prior to arm
swingback, and there were several inspectors then as well...


If more inspectors actually assured better quality I might agree.

How many people signed off on the thing that ended up going clunk in the
engine compartment over a decade ago?



--
Greg Moore
Ask me about lily, an RPI based CMC.

OM wrote:
On Sun, 15 Mar 2009 17:21:56 -0500, "Jorge R. Frank"
wrote:

Alan Erskine wrote:
No wonder the Shuttle is so pharking expensive to operate!
Welcome to the post-CAIB "need more government inspectors" world.

...Jorge, this might be the one time I've ever disagreed with you, but
I'd rather see more inspectors actually doing the job properly than
something go wrong because a step was missed.

On the other hand, we *did* have that issue last mission where the
White Room had a panel that wasn't lashed down properly prior to arm
swingback, and there were several inspectors then as well...

And there you have it. Are additional inspectors useful or are they not?
Your gut says "yes" but your data says "no." That squares very well with
my experience as well. We had some products that required four
signatures, but in all my years I never saw anybody past the second ever
catch a technical error, just editorial suggestions.

A "second set of eyes" is a good thing in general, both in the cockpit
and on the ground. But the added value of additional sets of eyes beyond
the second asymptotically (and rapidly) approaches zero. That is because
adding signatures divides accountability.

Stroustrup once wrote, "An organization that treats its programmers as
morons will soon have programmers capable of being morons only." That
applies to engineers and technicians as well.

Hang on a moment, all those people are there anyway doing other things
before hatch closure so your bean counting blinkered view is hardly valid.

Brian

--
Brian Gaff....Note, this account does not accept Bcc: email.
graphics are great, but the blind can't hear them
Email:
__________________________________________________ __________________________________________________ __________


"Alan Erskine" wrote in message
...
No wonder the Shuttle is so pharking expensive to operate!

Any news on the nitty-gritty of the Orion hatch; number of people
needed for closure?

Yes, accountablility only works if the people who are accountable, have the
mindset on the day to spot potential show stoppers. You can say and do what
you like but in any area where the adrenalin is high mistakes happen more.
It says more about the limitations of us as humans than anything else.

I do agree that you need two people though, and yes, more does not equate to
more security, it tends to just add complexity.
Brian

--
Brian Gaff....Note, this account does not accept Bcc: email.
graphics are great, but the blind can't hear them
Email:
__________________________________________________ __________________________________________________ __________


"Jorge R. Frank" wrote in message
...
OM wrote:
On Sun, 15 Mar 2009 17:21:56 -0500, "Jorge R. Frank"
wrote:

Alan Erskine wrote:
No wonder the Shuttle is so pharking expensive to operate!
Welcome to the post-CAIB "need more government inspectors" world.

...Jorge, this might be the one time I've ever disagreed with you, but
I'd rather see more inspectors actually doing the job properly than
something go wrong because a step was missed.

On the other hand, we *did* have that issue last mission where the
White Room had a panel that wasn't lashed down properly prior to arm
swingback, and there were several inspectors then as well...

And there you have it. Are additional inspectors useful or are they not?
Your gut says "yes" but your data says "no." That squares very well with
my experience as well. We had some products that required four signatures,
but in all my years I never saw anybody past the second ever catch a
technical error, just editorial suggestions.

A "second set of eyes" is a good thing in general, both in the cockpit and
on the ground. But the added value of additional sets of eyes beyond the
second asymptotically (and rapidly) approaches zero. That is because
adding signatures divides accountability.

Stroustrup once wrote, "An organization that treats its programmers as
morons will soon have programmers capable of being morons only." That
applies to engineers and technicians as well.

On Mar 16, 4:13�am, "Brian Gaff" wrote:
Yes, accountablility only works if the people who are accountable, have the
mindset on the day to spot potential show stoppers. You can say and do what
you like but in any area where the adrenalin is �high mistakes happen more.
It says more about the limitations of us as humans than anything else.

I do agree that you need two people though, and yes, more does not equate to
more security, it tends to just add complexity.
Brian

--
Brian Gaff....Note, this account does not accept Bcc: email.
�graphics are great, but the blind can't hear them
Email:
__________________________________________________ _________________________�______________________ _____________

"Jorge R. Frank" wrote in messagenews:SYWdnew3mNqIJyDUnZ2dnUVZ_hmWnZ2d@gigan ews.com...



OM wrote:
On Sun, 15 Mar 2009 17:21:56 -0500, "Jorge R. Frank"
wrote:

Alan Erskine wrote:
No wonder the Shuttle is so pharking expensive to operate!
Welcome to the post-CAIB "need more government inspectors" world.

...Jorge, this might be the one time I've ever disagreed with you, but
I'd rather see more inspectors actually doing the job properly than
something go wrong because a step was missed.

On the other hand, we *did* have that issue last mission where the
White Room had a panel that wasn't lashed down properly prior to arm
swingback, and there were several inspectors then as well...

And there you have it. Are additional inspectors useful or are they not?
Your gut says "yes" but your data says "no." That squares very well with
my experience as well. We had some products that required four signatures,
but in all my years I never saw anybody past the second ever catch a
technical error, just editorial suggestions.

A "second set of eyes" is a good thing in general, both in the cockpit and
on the ground. But the added value of additional sets of eyes beyond the
second asymptotically (and rapidly) approaches zero. That is because
adding signatures divides accountability.

Stroustrup once wrote, "An organization that treats its programmers as
morons will soon have programmers capable of being morons only." That
applies to engineers and technicians as well.- Hide quoted text -

- Show quoted text -

Well one person having a off day can easily miss something

Two people make it less likely, but 2 people can still have a off day.

Hopefully 3 people dont ALL have a brain freeze.

But when it comes to the hatch its likely a great idea.........

hey nasa cut the number of workers from 3 to 2.

3 flights later the orbiter depressurized on launch

not a worthwhile risk!

Of course it doesn't work that way in practice.

Person 1 looks and says, "hmm, looks good, besides, if I'm wrong, #2 will
catch it."
Person 2 looks and says, "well I'm in a hurry, I'm sure #1 caught anything,
besides, that's why #3 is there."
Person 3 looks and says, "well, I don't want to be the guy that calls out #1
and #2 for being wrong, so I won't say anything. I'm sure if this was
really a problem, they'd have caught it."

Adding people like this does not necessarily make things any safer and in
fact can make things less safe.

The way to properly due this is to focus on failsafe procedures. For one,
an interlock that doesn't permit the clock to go past X time unless the door
is registered as closed (and I'd be surprised if they don't have this). The
people are mostly a feel-good measure.

Think about when you fly. The flight attendants are told to check the doors.
They don't have all 3 or 5 or whatever check every door. And for the main
loading door, they have a procedure to make sure the door is locked and the
slide enabled.

When's the last time you heard of a door on an airliner not being sealed
properly?



"bob haller" wrote in message
...

- Show quoted text -

Well one person having a off day can easily miss something

Two people make it less likely, but 2 people can still have a off day.

Hopefully 3 people dont ALL have a brain freeze.

But when it comes to the hatch its likely a great idea.........

hey nasa cut the number of workers from 3 to 2.

3 flights later the orbiter depressurized on launch

not a worthwhile risk!



--
Greg Moore
Ask me about lily, an RPI based CMC.

"OM" wrote in message
...
On Sun, 15 Mar 2009 17:21:56 -0500, "Jorge R. Frank"
wrote:

Alan Erskine wrote:
No wonder the Shuttle is so pharking expensive to operate!

Welcome to the post-CAIB "need more government inspectors" world.

...Jorge, this might be the one time I've ever disagreed with you, but
I'd rather see more inspectors actually doing the job properly than
something go wrong because a step was missed.

On the other hand, we *did* have that issue last mission where the
White Room had a panel that wasn't lashed down properly prior to arm
swingback, and there were several inspectors then as well...

This is a common problem which has been discussed here many times. Adding
more inspectors does not necessarily mean that errors will go down. In
fact, errors can go up due to human nature. When you're the guy who's
supposed to be tripple-checking something that's already signed off by the
worker and two inspectors, are you really going to be giving this task 100%
of your attention?

Remember the NOAA-N Prime satellite that fell off its test stand becuase it
wasn't bolted down? There were multiple signatures on the paperwork saying
that the bolts were there, properly torqued, and etc.

Here's the redacted accident investigation report:

http://www.nasa.gov/pdf/65776main_noaa_np_mishap.pdf

Here's a quote from above:

The Responsible Test Engineer (RTE) did not "assure" the turnover
cart configuration through physical and visual verification as
required by the procedures but rather through an examination
of paperwork from a prior operation.

There it is in black and white. The RTE should have visually inspected the
rig to verify the installation of 24 bolts which would have held the
satellite to the stand. He didn't because the paperwork said they were
there.

So, what is the use of increased paperwork if you can't trust it? The
appropriate procedure here would seem to be that the person who's going to
throw the switch to transition the satellite from vertical to horizontal
should be the one who makes sure the bolts are really there. Extra
inspections and paperwork don't necessarily help.

Jeff
--
"Many things that were acceptable in 1958 are no longer acceptable today.
My own standards have changed too." -- Freeman Dyson