State Dept: Forget space weaponry treaties.

http://www.state.gov/t/vci/rls/rm/101754.htm

Is An Outer Space Arms Control Treaty Verifiable?
Paula A. DeSutter, Assistant Secretary for Verification, Compliance,
and Implementation
Remarks to the George C. Marshall Institute Roundtable at the National
Press Club (As delivered)
Washington, DC
March 4, 2008

As delivered

Thank you for your kind invitation once again to address the
Institute. The Marshall Institute serves as an important forum for
conducting serious study and facilitating public dialogue on critical
foreign and national security issues.

Anyone who looks at the "Space Security and National Defense" page on
the Marshall Institute's web site can see the complex range of issues
that the United States has addressed in space policy over the past
eighteen months. These include the release of the President's National
Space Policy, China's direct ascent anti-satellite (ASAT) test in
January 2007, and the growing international interest in transparency
and confidence building measures.

Marshall's web site also features an excellent article by its
President, Jeff Keeter, which ran in the February 21st issue of USA
Today. In this column, Jeff very ably responded to the paper's
mistaken editorial conclusion that the recent U.S. engagement of an
uncontrollable National Reconnaissance Office satellite should
"reignite" interest in binding treaties to quote "prevent space from
becoming the final battle ground."

As Jeff noted, "Few criticize the U.S. decision to attempt the
destruction of a fully fueled, disabled spy satellite before it
crashes to Earth. Using missile-defense assets to further minimize the
risk of harm is commendable."

Knowing the Institute's long-standing role in promoting unbiased and
scientifically accurate assessments of space security issues, I wasn't
surprised when Jeff told me that Marshall was making plans for a panel
discussion in the coming weeks to review the technical aspects of this
engagement and possible lessons for U.S. space policy. Such expert
reviews - a hallmark of the Institute's efforts to improve the use of
science in making public policy - are one of the most fitting ways to
carry on the legacy of Dr. Robert Jastrow and the other founders of
the Marshall Institute.

Our Verification Approach

With that context, let me move to the central theme of my remarks
today: the enduring challenge of verifying any outer space arms
control agreement. Let me begin by saying that, as the international
community continues to debate the merits of pursuing outer space arms
control agreements, governments must address two fundamental
questions: First, are the restraints contemplated in such agreements
verifiable? Second, if not, would such agreements nonetheless enhance
the security of the parties to such agreements, or actually harm their
security?

In trying to reach an overall verification judgment regarding any
proposed bilateral or international agreement, the United States seeks
to answer two questions:

* First, we seek to determine if the proposed agreement is
technically verifiable. To do so, we weigh the proposed limitations,
the clarity of the language by which the limitations are expressed,
and our ability to detect noncompliance in a timely fashion, using
both our own national means and methods of verification and possible
treaty-mandated or agreed-upon cooperative measures. The result of
this process is a judgment as to the "degree of verifiability" of the
agreement.

* Second, we address the issue of whether the proposed agreement
is effectively verifiable. This second, broader assessment aims to
establish whether the "degree of verifiability" is sufficient to
enable the United States to detect significant noncompliance, or a
pattern of noncompliance, early enough to counter the threat presented
by a violation and deny a violator the benefits of its wrongdoing. We
must also evaluate the risk of undetected cheating prior to a "break
out" from a regime. Such "effectiveness" judgments are informed not
only by the factors considered in reaching judgments regarding the
degree of verifiability, but also by the broader context, including
the compliance history of the parties to the potential agreement, the
risks associated with noncompliance, and the difficulty of responding
to deny violators the potential benefits of their violations.

It is theoretically possible that we could determine that an agreement
is "effectively verifiable" even when its degree of verifiability is
quite low, because the parties have a strong track record of
compliance, the risks associated with noncompliance are low, and/or
the ease of detection and response is high. Similarly, there could be
agreements that do not have a sufficient degree of verifiability to
overcome concerns about the track record of other potential states
party, the security risks of undetected cheating, and/or the
difficulty, once cheating is detected, of responding on a timely basis
to deny a violator the benefits of its violation.

Verification and Outer Space

So, using this calculus, let us examine the notional verifiability of
potential space arms control agreements. We begin with the issues of
what a possible treaty might hope to accomplish and what types of
constraints might be contemplated to achieve those objectives.

With regard to objectives and constraints, efforts to pursue space
arms control agreements have a long, but undistinguished, history.
Most space arms control proposals have sought to accomplish one or
more of four objectives: (1) prevent an arms race in outer space; (2)
prevent the placement of weapons in outer space; (3) prevent the
threat or use of force against objects in outer space; and/or (4)
prevent the development, testing, deployment, and/or use of
terrestrial-based anti-satellite weapons (ASATs). I must note that the
focus of these objectives is neither to ensure that a space faring
nation like the United States has secure ground stations nor to ensure
that we have secure communications between our space assets and ground
stations. Nor is the focus to ensure that our space assets -- both
commercial and governmental -- are protected from attack.

To achieve one or more of the four objectives most often posited for
space arms control, the vast majority of proposed constraints have
sought to ban the deployment, use and, even the threat of use, of
certain capabilities, while permitting other activities explicitly,
such as research, development, testing, production, and storage.

There are many scope problems with such proposals, including the fact
that there is no -- I repeat, no - on-going arms race in space.
However, from strictly and solely a verification perspective, we have
to begin with a fundamental issue, which is a definitional question -
that is, which objects and activities are to be defined as covered by
the proposed ban or limitation. Absent such definitional clarity, it
is exceedingly difficult -- indeed, probably impossible -- to
ascertain whether a given object or activity is compliant with the
agreement's terms.

Let me offer a few salient examples.

* First, when is an object to be considered to be a covered - and
prohibited - outer space weapon?

One possible definition would include only space-based devices that
were produced or converted specifically to damage or destroy other
space-based objects. Such a definition, however, immediately raises
the question of intent. How could one determine that an object was
specially produced or converted for that purpose? Also, how could one
verify, in the event of damage or destruction to a space object, that
the cause of the damage or destruction was the result of genuine error
or malfunction, and not deliberate?

Another approach could be to define "outer space weapon" to mean any
object in, or transiting through, space that could destroy or damage
another object in space. The problem with this approach is that it
would need to include all objects in or transiting space, since any
such object could, at least theoretically, have the inherent
capability to strike another object and cause damage to it or destroy
it. Moreover, would it be permissible to attack a ground tracking
station, which performs a critical role in providing access to space
and in the use of space, but which is not itself located in space?

Such an approach obviously would be unworkable. It would constrain -
if not force the end of - legitimate uses, such as defense, civil,
commercial, intelligence, and non-weapon military satellite functions
that are critical not only to the United States, but also to global
security, commerce, science, and research. In this regard, it easily
could capture and prohibit the deployment of ground-launched, non-
weapon systems such as, for example, an unmanned replacement for the
U.S. Space Shuttle, which is a workhorse of the International Space
Station. Furthermore, it would capture important systems designed for
other, non-counterspace missions, due to their inherent anti-satellite
capabilities. These would include missile defense systems whose
purpose is to destroy ballistic missiles launched from the ground at
other objects on the ground, and terrestrial-based ballistic missiles.

* Second, what activities would constitute either the use of or
threat to use force?

Again, we are faced with a definitional issue. How are the terms, "use
of force" and "threat of force" to be defined? How does intent enter
into the definition? Is action against one's own space-based object
considered to be a hostile - or a covered - action if it destroys or
alters that object, because it would confirm a capability to destroy
or alter any object in space? What if the action is simply a close
pass-by?

Clearly, the fact that a space-based object has been destroyed, or has
sustained damage or injury, or that its parameters have been altered
is detectable with high confidence by the satellite owner and, in some
instances, by the National Technical Means (NTM) of other states. The
attribution of such an action to another state may be possible with
high confidence in the case of a direct intercept or of a collision
with an object known to belong to that other state. However,
identification (as an attack) may not be possible if the other state
denies that its action was deliberate. Further, identification (as an
attack) and/or attribution (to a state) may not be possible in other
instances - e.g., if there were no observable intercept or collision,
as in the case of a remote, covert telemetric attack on the software
of the object's operating system or if the damage were caused by
"space debris." Attribution also could be a challenge with certain
types of launches, e.g., from locations at sea.

Moreover, in the absence of documentary evidence or public statements
to that effect, it would be extremely difficult, if not impossible, to
determine with certainty that such action was deliberate, i.e.,that it
was intentional, as noted previously. Neither NTM nor cooperative
measures, such as data exchanges or on-site measures, can be depended
upon to shed any light on the issue. (Indeed, the acquisition of
information to shed light on this issue from any source is likely to
be fortuitous, at best, and subsequent independent confirmation in
most instances will be unachievable, at least in a timely fashion.)
Most, if not all, detected actions that affect the objects in space of
another state likely would be alleged by the suspected state to be the
result of an error, malfunction, or unintended consequence of a
legitimate act; determining in a timely fashion that the actions in
question were deliberate would be virtually impossible. Even patterns
of action likely would be explainable in this way. For example, if one
of the 2,600 pieces of trackable space debris of the nearly 100,000
estimated pieces of debris resulting from the Chinese ASAT test of
January 2007 were to strike or destroy the satellites of other states,
would such an event be considered to be an unintended consequence of a
legitimate action or a prohibited use of force?

With respect to defining an action as a prohibited threat to use
force, the challenge is even greater. Verifying straightforward,
verbally communicated threats is easy. Determining and getting
international agreement that other actions constitute a threat to use
force because they demonstrate a capability to put space-based assets
at risk, however, is far more problematic. The challenge is likely to
be quite high, given the definitional issues that I already have
raised, which affect judgments as to intent and as to whether
particular actions are covered, as well as the inability of
verification means and methods to overcome determined efforts to
obscure capability as well as intent.

For example, did the January 2007 Chinese ASAT interception constitute
a threat to use force against other states' objects in space? It
clearly demonstrated a capability to destroy an object in space, and
other states clearly viewed it as such. Depending on the language in a
treaty text, though, such a test might fail to meet the criteria for
constituting a threat, since it involved only testing against a
satellite belonging to the launching state. Furthermore, would the
deployment of long-range ballistic missiles be construed to
demonstrate a threat to assets in space, since the Soviet Union
demonstrated such a capability with a co-orbital ASAT launched from a
space launch variant of its SS-9 ICBM in the 1970s and 1980s?

Means and Methods

I am suggesting that current verification means and methods do not
enable us to overcome determined efforts to obscure capabilities and
intent. Fair questions, then, would be: what are these means and
methods and how well can they detect noncompliance, and are there
other means and methods that can solve the verification problems?

Let me begin by noting that virtually all space arms control proposals
call for verification, but none has identified specific tools
envisioned for the "verification toolbox" that could be used for this
purpose. This, to me, suggests that no one has been able yet to
identify tools that could do the job effectively. Given the
definitional challenges and questions of intent, this is reasonable.

Presumably, any reasonable approach to verifying a space arms control
treaty would anticipate that NTM would be among the permitted
verification tools. These are sensor capabilities that sometimes are
deployed on satellites for the remote observation of ground-based
activities; other NTM may be deployed in other modes. Other tools that
some have suggested include data declarations and on-site inspections
of satellites, their payloads, and the locations where they are
produced, stored, and/or launched -- assisted, where appropriate, with
technical sensors that on-site inspectors might carry with them or
permanently emplace.

We know that NTM capabilities would, in most instances, enable states
to detect the fact of a launch and monitor its trajectory. We also
know that data exchanges could provide basic information that states
are willing to share on the numbers, types, and locations of permitted
systems, thereby possibly enabling a state to have an "order of
magnitude" assessment of the breakout potential of other states.
Further, on-site inspections may be able to help confirm this
information, although protecting legitimate commercial proprietary and
national security equities might mean that they could never be
intrusive or detailed enough to go beyond providing a general
confirmation of data.

However, even with the most intrusive and extensive e on-site
inspections, a key question remains: what would one look for to verify
intent? How could one construct an inspection regime that would
provide definitive information on whether activities and items visited
or observed were to be used for hostile purposes or were explicitly
deployed for prohibited hostile purposes? It is not even necessary to
consider how exceedingly difficult this task would be, were a state
intent on cheating. This is an exceedingly difficult task in any
event, given the dual-use nature of many space assets and activities.
In the world of arms control, in the absence of definitive
information, it is exceedingly difficult -- indeed, many would argue,
virtually impossible -- to reach actionable conclusions in a timely
fashion.

I mentioned earlier that most space arms control proposals have
permitted research and development into the very kind of activities
whose deployment would be banned. The breakout potential for permitted
R&D to support banned deployment activities is obvious. However, it
also is worth noting that verifying the fact of research and
development and the purposes for which R&D were undertaken also
present huge challenges, particularly if that R&D has few, if any,
external signatures, such as a test. A very real concern, even when
indications or evidence of R&D can be acquired, is whether sharing
that information would expose sensitive sources and methods. Even if
that hurdle could be crossed, given the dual-use nature of these
technologies, confirming that such activity is acquired or developed
to support a banned program is highly problematic - especially in
closed societies.

Is Undetected or Undetectable Cheating Possible?

So, unfortunately, even with all of these tools, undetected and
undetectable cheating remains quite possible. Neither National Means
and Methods of Verification (NMM) - which include but go beyond NTM --
nor negotiated cooperative measures (including declarations and on-
site inspection of satellites and their payloads prior to their
launch) would enable verifiers to determine with confidence whether an
activity circumvented or exploited loopholes in the definition of
banned activities, or could be rapidly converted for prohibited uses.
For example, the rendezvous and docking operations conducted by an
automated cargo transfer vehicle could be used to conceal the
development of a co-orbital ASAT guidance, navigation, and control
subsystem. Similarly, a test to confirm the ability to hit a target in
space could be concealed in a launch that resulted in a close fly-by
of a target satellite or a point in space.

Moreover, neither NMM nor negotiated cooperative measures (including
declarations and on-site inspection of satellites and their payloads
prior to use) would enable verifiers to determine with confidence
whether observed changes in orbiting satellites or payloads were due
to malfunctions, or deliberate actions as a result of either covert
modifications or inherent capabilities. Even the most intrusive of on-
site measures prior to launch - measures whose acceptability, for
commercial or national security reasons, to any nation is highly
doubtful - could do no more than indicate the maneuvering capability
of a given system and the degree of sophistication of that capability.
Additionally, maneuvering capabilities are the norm for satellites so
neither NMM nor negotiated cooperative measures would enable verifiers
to determine with more than low-to-very low confidence whether the
intent of that capability extended beyond normal operating and safety
requirements. Even then, it would be highly possible for a state to
hide its true intent or change it quickly, and to take the necessary
actions to exploit a latent or covert capability.

One plausible cheating scenario would be to develop seemingly peaceful
satellites with sufficient latent maneuvering capability that they
could, upon command, leave their specified orbits and kinetically
attack other satellites. Such a capability might require only
modifications that either might not be detectable or could reasonably
be explained as logical safety or operational improvements, e.g., to
enable maneuvering to avoid space debris. If a satellite routinely
received encrypted commands and suddenly veered off-orbit, it would be
impossible to determine whether the loss of orbit was due to a
malfunction or was a deliberate plan to test or exercise a capability
to attack another satellite.

Next, we have to address the questions of whether there are legal
means by which constraints can be circumvented and whether those legal
avenues provide reasonable or effective means for breakout?

There would be a high potential for rapid and effective breakout in
any treaty that focused its prohibitions exclusively on space-based
activities. Under such a scenario, a country could develop, produce,
and maintain a supply of ground-based direct-ascent ASAT interceptors,
as well as co-orbital interceptors in storage. At the same time, such
a space-based approach would preclude precisely those U.S. programs
that are intended to protect the peaceful use of space and other
security threats.

In this regard, it is important to remember that a relatively small
number of countries already are exploring and acquiring capabilities
to counter, attack, and defeat the space systems and the ground-based
components of such systems of other nations. These include
capabilities for jamming satellite links and blinding satellite
sensors; anti-satellite systems designed to destroy or damage
satellites in orbit; and capabilities for interfering with or
destroying the ground relay stations, communications nodes, and
satellite command-and-control systems that support and/or operate
space-based assets.

One argument often given for multilateral space arms control
agreements is that the international community then would be better
positioned to respond to threatening activities. This raises the
question of whether viable response options exist in the event that
cheating or bBreakout is detected.

Before response options can be pursued, there first needs to be
agreement that cheating or a plan for breakout has occurred and
warrants response. Even in cases where a party to a legally-binding
agreement might have a history of employing denial and deception
techniques or a spotty compliance record, achieving agreement on
identifying certain actions as noncompliant would be uncertain. There
is a correspondingly high risk, therefore, that it would be difficult
or impossible to garner the necessary support for countering those
risks in a timely fashion to deny violators the potential benefits of
their violations. Moreover, many proposals for additional space arms
control measures would prohibit some of the most promising defensive
response options.

As noted in the President's Space Policy, an attack on our space
assets would be an attack on a vital U.S. national security interest.
Would our options for response be any greater if we could also note
that such an event might be a violation of an arms control agreement?

Conclusions

After considerable review, my government has concluded that it does
not support additional arms control restrictions on our space
activities. Only part of the reason we have come to this conclusion
has to do with the foregoing verification issues. Put broadly, we have
reached this conclusion for two reasons: First the types of
restrictions that have been suggested by some states and some non-
governmental groups are not verifiable. Second, even if they could be
made verifiable, which we believe they could not, they would unduly
constrain legitimate self-defense, commercial and other activities.

As our National Space Policy makes clear, the United States will
oppose the development of new legal regimes or other restrictions that
seek to prohibit or limit U.S. access to or use of space. Proposed
arms control agreements or restrictions must not impair the rights of
the United States to conduct research, development, testing, and other
operations or activities in space for U.S. national interests. Thus,
we do not support such binding arms control approaches.

That is why, in part, the Bush Administration has concluded that
additional arms control restrictions on space activities beyond the
existing Outer Space Treaty are not necessary. In our view, the Outer
Space Treaty is sufficient to meet today's and tomorrow's needs. It
establishes guiding principles for space operations by all nations:
that space shall be free for all to explore and use; that space
activities shall be carried out in accordance with international law,
including the Charter of the United Nations, which guarantees the
right of self-defense; that weapons of mass destruction shall not be
put into orbit; that States Party shall not interfere with the assets
of other states; and that States Party shall bear responsibility for
the activities carried on by governmental and non-governmental
entities in territories and locations under their jurisdiction and
control. These are the principles according to which space faring
nations have and should continue to conduct themselves.

The President's Space Policy highlights our national and, indeed the
global, dependence on space. The Chinese interception only underscored
the vulnerability of these critical assets. Calling for arms control
measures can often appear to be a desirable approach to such problems.
Unfortunately, "feel good" arms control that constrains our ability to
seek real remedies to the vulnerabilities that we face has the net
result of harming rather than enhancing U.S. and international
security and well-being.

Thus, we do not need to enter into new agreements. Rather, we need
universal adherence to the existing Outer Space Treaty and to the
other existing international conventions designed to provide for
cooperation in space and to promote an understanding of the
obligations associated with being responsible space faring nations. It
is for these reasons that the United States will continue to encourage
others in the international community to examine the prospect of space
arms control with a critical eye.

Thank you tor your attention.