Response to Request for One-Page 51-L Summary

'Technical Summary of an O-Ring Cover-Up'
(requested by Pentagon efficiency expert
A. Ernest Fitzgerald on July 4, 2003)

NASA's fault-tree analysis failed to consider that Challenger's solid rocket
boosters could have crossed paths within the 51-L fireball. A crossing
necessarily negates Rogers' postulated "right-aft O-ring burnthrough."

In a hearing on February 7, 1986, Dr. Feynman inquired: "Can I ask a
dumb question? Do we know on which side which rocket is afterwards?
Did they go like this and cross or do they look like they went that way?"
NASA put Feynman off, and Rogers sidetracked him. Dr. Feynman did
not know about NASA's black ID band until I told him, in late 1987.

For photo/recovery identification, NASA paints a black ID band 18'' high
around the nose of the space shuttle's *left* solid rocket booster. Rogers
ignored this ID band in his report, most notably at the crucial fireball
exit.
Instead, Rogers conjectured a "R-SRB burnthrough" for identification.

Rogers' ID relies on an enhanced 15-second film strip ending in explosion.
However, in JSC's '51-L Mission History Video,' the continuation of this
film strip leaves no doubt that the *flared* booster sported the ID band.

On January 22, 1986, in a pre-Challenger technical report requested by
Senator Grassley's office, I warned: "... and 'cold flows' run at Pad B
were a failure, costing much waste of time and money. Tom Wiley can
testify to this. The net result of all this would be delays in launching
from Pad B, and delays in Centaur launches. I also learned from Bill
Bassler, Centaur 'single-point-of-contact' in LSOC CMO, that the waste
of hydrogen was deliberate, ..."

The terminal LH2 leaks were at the base of the left booster. It became
super-cooled during prelaunch scrubs. A thrust imbalance resulted. That
caused a right-aft leak in the hydrogen tank at lift-off, later aggravated
by
5000-plus degree heat from continuous R-Aft RCS firings at 59 seconds.
The pre-explosion chamber pressures of the two boosters (relative to
each other and to their respective lift-off pressures) were to be expected.

NASA could not identify the key piece of lower booster debris by serial
number, or by *any other* of NASA's standard identification methods.

The Rogers Report admits that no direct view exists of the location from
which black smoke at lift-off and an assumed burnthrough at 59 seconds
originated. Live launch-day video refutes NASA's "burnthrough" copies.
Congressional subpoena of the originals should lead to credible closure.

John Thomas Maxson (www.mission51l.com)

In sci.space.policy John Maxson wrote:
snip
Thanks, this is the first clear explanation of your theories I have seen.
I apologise for any comments I may have made earlier due to being unable
to find any earlier explanation (despite around a couple of hours of googling
at one point).


The terminal LH2 leaks were at the base of the left booster. It became
super-cooled during prelaunch scrubs. A thrust imbalance resulted. That
caused a right-aft leak in the hydrogen tank at lift-off, later aggravated
by

How do you reconcile this with
http://history.nasa.gov/rogersrep/v1ch4.htm#4.75

Which gives the strut closest to failure at liftoff somewhere around
40% of it's maximum load.?


5000-plus degree heat from continuous R-Aft RCS firings at 59 seconds.
The pre-explosion chamber pressures of the two boosters (relative to
each other and to their respective lift-off pressures) were to be expected.

NASA could not identify the key piece of lower booster debris by serial
number, or by *any other* of NASA's standard identification methods.

The Rogers Report admits that no direct view exists of the location from
which black smoke at lift-off and an assumed burnthrough at 59 seconds
originated. Live launch-day video refutes NASA's "burnthrough" copies.
Congressional subpoena of the originals should lead to credible closure.

Do you believe that the rogers report was just sloppy, driven by
pressure to get back to flights, or was intentionally covering up evidence?
If the latter, why?

--
http://inquisitor.i.am/ | | Ian Stirling.
---------------------------+-------------------------+--------------------------
"Give a man a fire, and he's warm for a day. Set him on fire, and he's warm
for the rest of his life" -- Terry Pratchett-Jingo

I was reading in the bathroom when I ran across an item written by Ian
Stirling on Sun, 6 Jul 2003 16:49:25 +0000
(UTC), which said:

How do you reconcile this with
http://history.nasa.gov/rogersrep/v1ch4.htm#4.75

Which gives the strut closest to failure at liftoff somewhere around
40% of it's maximum load.?

Do you believe that the rogers report was just sloppy, driven by
pressure to get back to flights, or was intentionally covering up evidence?
If the latter, why?

Ian, I'm not going to tell you to killfile the Maxsons. However, I do
have to ask: Given John Maxson's well-documented history over the
last ~2 years, *why* are you under the impression that he will give
you a straight answer?


-------------
Beady's Analogy: "A conspiracy theory is the intellectual equivalent of a Rube Goldberg machine; it is an overly-complex and dramatic alternative for an accepted adequate, simpler and more mundane explanation."

Ian Stirling wrote in message
...

How do you reconcile this with
http://history.nasa.gov/rogersrep/v1ch4.htm#4.75

Which gives the strut closest to failure at liftoff somewhere around
40% of it's maximum load.?

That's not "closest to failure," but "closest to" what NASA called
"*the* failure" (ie., an enhanced reflection).

I have NASA's initial loads analysis for lift-off (by Townsend at
MSFC). The "final" version was done at JSC. Without the MET,
who knows what JSC called "lift-off?" The critical MET occurred
during the ignition transient. You'll note that even JSC's version
gives much higher loads for 51-L on the P8 and P11 struts, although
without checking Townsend's analysis I don't recall their locations.
Off the top of my head, my unrefreshed recall is that P8 was key.

I also recall that elsewhere in the Rogers Report, even Al McDonald
testified and/or wrote about high 51-L strut loads. He may have also
done so in the final Accident Panel meeting (closed, in Washington),
which is not part of the Rogers Report (but I have the transcript).

Do you believe that the rogers report was just sloppy, driven by
pressure to get back to flights, or was intentionally covering up
evidence? If the latter, why?

I wouldn't have called it a cover-up if I could not (and had not)
proved it (to myself, to experts, and on sci.space.shuttle). Check
the discussion I had with Gavin Bull (put his name in the title box).
Rogers, Keel, and Kutyna went to great lengths to evade my reports.

--
John Thomas Maxson, Retired Engineer (Aerospace)
Author, The Betrayal of Mission 51-L (www.mission51l.com)

John Maxson wrote
in message ...

The critical MET occurred during the ignition transient.

I have crucial MSFC telemetry listings of the chamber
pressures for this key interval and beyond, as well as many
key plots of the ignition/lift-off telemetry from JSC. One
plot in particular is extremely revealing. I'd estimate it is
worth several hundred times its weight in gold to me. (I
have my son Dan to thank for obtaining this data.)

You'll note that even JSC's version gives much higher
loads for 51-L on the P8 and P11 struts, although
without checking Townsend's analysis I don't recall
their locations. Off the top of my head, my unrefreshed
recall is that P8 was key.

The location of the P8 strut is given he

http://history.nasa.gov/rogersrep/v2l142b.htm

--
John Thomas Maxson, Retired Engineer (Aerospace)
Author, The Betrayal of Mission 51-L (www.mission51l.com)

Just put this guy in your killfile. Then kill/ignore this thread
entirely. You'll be glad you did!

--
bp
Proud Member of the Human O-Ring Society Since 2003