CHICOM ASAT test?

Allen Thomson wrote:
Some decades of observation demonstrate that they don't ordinarily use
their propulsive capability to avoid predictability. They use it
infrequently (every few months) to keep their orbits tweaked up to
ensure optimum coverage.

But they do have that capability and it could be used to dodge a
direct-ascent ASAT if:

- There were sufficiently advanced warning. Like a half-hour if from
DSP detection of ASAT launch.

- The spysat controllers could figure out what was happening in that
half-hour and push the EVADE button.

- And the satellite could get outside the ASATs engagement envelope in
the time available.

- And it hadn't had to do this too many times before, because
satellites have a finite fuel reserve and need it for other purposes
(orbital maintenance) too.

My intuition is that anyone putting up a billion-dollar spy satellite
after the advent of direct-ascent ASATs would be grossly negligent to
not include at least some sort of countermeasures against possible
attack. If you spit out a couple of balloons, some flares, and a cloud
of chaff or two, it certainly won't hurt the effectiveness of your
evasive maneuver.

Also, can we figure out the lighting at the time of intercept? Might
tell us something about the sensor suite on the KV.

-jake

"Jake McGuire" wrote:

My intuition is that anyone putting up a billion-dollar spy satellite
after the advent of direct-ascent ASATs would be grossly negligent to
not include at least some sort of countermeasures against possible
attack. If you spit out a couple of balloons, some flares, and a cloud
of chaff or two, it certainly won't hurt the effectiveness of your
evasive maneuver.

As usual the intuition of the armchair strategist is utterly at odds
with reality.

D.
--
Touch-twice life. Eat. Drink. Laugh.

-Resolved: To be more temperate in my postings.
Oct 5th, 2004 JDL

"Jake McGuire" wrote
Also, can we figure out the lighting at the time of intercept? Might
tell us something about the sensor suite on the KV.

Enter Xichang coordinates in Heavens-Above and
clock back to last Friday -- you get an event about
two hours before local sunrise.

Whoa-- I wonder if Fengyun was illuminated?

Derek Lyons wrote:
"Jake McGuire" wrote:

My intuition is that anyone putting up a billion-dollar spy satellite
after the advent of direct-ascent ASATs would be grossly negligent to
not include at least some sort of countermeasures against possible
attack. If you spit out a couple of balloons, some flares, and a cloud
of chaff or two, it certainly won't hurt the effectiveness of your
evasive maneuver.

As usual the intuition of the armchair strategist is utterly at odds
with reality.

Which part?

The synergy between decoys and evasive maneuvering seems pretty
uncontroversial.

The negligence of not including at least some countermeasures against
attack still seems to qualify as uncontroversial, or at best mildly
controversial. Which doesn't mean it was done; both FIA and some of
the pre-launch planning of MISTY seem to indicate that negligence is
not entirely absent from the US spysat community.

I admit to complete ignorance of the mass penalties, cost penalties,
and usefulness of decoys.

- jake

Jake McGuire wrote:
Also, can we figure out the lighting at the time of intercept? Might
tell us something about the sensor suite on the KV.


I just ran up Redshift and went to the launch site's location to check.
At 28 .10 N and 102.30 E, at 5:28 PM EST on Jan. 11th, 2006, the
situation over Xichang is this:
It's 5:28 AM on the morning of the 12th, and the Sun hasn't risen yet,
but the first hints of brightening are occurring in the East.
So I'm pretty sure what they are doing is looking for the glint of
sunlight off the target satellite for the interceptor to home on.
Sunrise at the launch site occurs a 7:05 AM local time (00.05 UTC)
Center of the Sun is at 19 hrs. 32 min. 31.50 sec. x -24 deg. 44' 20''
at sunrise.

Pat

Derek Lyons wrote:
As usual the intuition of the armchair strategist is utterly at odds
with reality.


I looked up the data on this target satellite, and optically it should
make a pretty good target in the predawn sky
http://www.gisdevelopment.net/aars/a...ps6/ps6211.asp
Its big solar arrays should make it visible to the naked eye, so
something homing optically shouldn't have much of a problem locking onto it.
Here's some more info on it, although the description and photo don't
seem to match the data above:
http://www.fas.org/spp/guide/china/earth/fy-1.htm

Pat

I ran it -- FY was not illuminated.

"Jim Oberg" wrote in message
...

"Jake McGuire" wrote
Also, can we figure out the lighting at the time of intercept? Might
tell us something about the sensor suite on the KV.

Enter Xichang coordinates in Heavens-Above and
clock back to last Friday -- you get an event about
two hours before local sunrise.

Whoa-- I wonder if Fengyun was illuminated?

"Jake McGuire" wrote:

Derek Lyons wrote:
"Jake McGuire" wrote:

My intuition is that anyone putting up a billion-dollar spy satellite
after the advent of direct-ascent ASATs would be grossly negligent to
not include at least some sort of countermeasures against possible
attack. If you spit out a couple of balloons, some flares, and a cloud
of chaff or two, it certainly won't hurt the effectiveness of your
evasive maneuver.

As usual the intuition of the armchair strategist is utterly at odds
with reality.

Which part?

The synergy between decoys and evasive maneuvering seems pretty
uncontroversial.

Only of you (mistakenly) think of the evasive maneuvering as being
done in the face of an attack - like a fighter or a bomber, or
something out of Star Wars. In reality, the we have no way of knowing
when interception is imminent.

The 'evasive maneuvering' of a satellite is more akin to naval term
'deceptive routing' - like a fleet that departs a coast on a course of
075 degrees, but which alters course to 175 degrees as soon as it is
hidden by the horizon from observation. In extreme cases, one could
even zig-zag, making constant semi-random changes of orbital velocity.
The fuel penalty, not to mention the knock on effects on the
satellites own observation program, would however be truly enormous.

The negligence of not including at least some countermeasures against
attack still seems to qualify as uncontroversial, or at best mildly
controversial.

One need to differentiate between active and passive measures.

Only when you don't understand the problem does it seem
uncontroversial. The reality is, most active countermeasures (flares,
chaff, decoys) have fairly short lifetimes once deployed. (From
seconds until the flares burn out to minutes before the chaff or
decoys drift too far away to provide useful cover.) Even if we
assume, for example, that the only threat is China - a given bird may
cross Chinese territory multiple times a day over the course of months
or years. Are you going to manuever and deploy countermeasures for
each pass? The mass penalties can barely be called prohibitive
without breaking down in laughter at the understatement, even if one
only utilizes them in times of crisis.

This means, at least currently, that the only useful countermeasures
are passive ones - primarily stealth.

D.
--
Touch-twice life. Eat. Drink. Laugh.

-Resolved: To be more temperate in my postings.
Oct 5th, 2004 JDL

Derek Lyons wrote:
"Jake McGuire" wrote:

Derek Lyons wrote:
"Jake McGuire" wrote:

My intuition is that anyone putting up a billion-dollar spy satellite
after the advent of direct-ascent ASATs would be grossly negligent to
not include at least some sort of countermeasures against possible
attack. If you spit out a couple of balloons, some flares, and a cloud
of chaff or two, it certainly won't hurt the effectiveness of your
evasive maneuver.

As usual the intuition of the armchair strategist is utterly at odds
with reality.

Which part?

The synergy between decoys and evasive maneuvering seems pretty
uncontroversial.

Only of you (mistakenly) think of the evasive maneuvering as being
done in the face of an attack - like a fighter or a bomber, or
something out of Star Wars. In reality, the we have no way of knowing
when interception is imminent.

The 'evasive maneuvering' of a satellite is more akin to naval term
'deceptive routing' - like a fleet that departs a coast on a course of
075 degrees, but which alters course to 175 degrees as soon as it is
hidden by the horizon from observation. In extreme cases, one could
even zig-zag, making constant semi-random changes of orbital velocity.
The fuel penalty, not to mention the knock on effects on the
satellites own observation program, would however be truly enormous.

My understanding is that around the time of Operation Desert Storm, the
US dramatically streamlined the process of disseminating DSP launch
information in order to provide effective warning against SRBM and IRBM
attacks. The ASAT will launch on what is effectively an IRBM;
therefore getting sixty seconds of warning of inbound ASAT warheads
doesn't seem impossible. Kinetic kill warheads require a direct hit;
if you can jettison some decoys and maneuver at even a very small
fraction of a g, you can put the interceptor in a position where it has
to do decoy discrimination. Which isn't impossible (witness NMD), but
it's definitely harder than "look for something in the far IR along
this vector, and hit it".

Not trivial, it's true, but if you've got a limited number of
absolutely vital national assets that will take a lot of time to
replace.

Of course, if you assume that direct-ascent KE-ASAT is too difficult to
be a credible threat, then it doesn't make sense.

The negligence of not including at least some countermeasures against
attack still seems to qualify as uncontroversial, or at best mildly
controversial.

One need to differentiate between active and passive measures.

Only when you don't understand the problem does it seem
uncontroversial. The reality is, most active countermeasures (flares,
chaff, decoys) have fairly short lifetimes once deployed. (From
seconds until the flares burn out to minutes before the chaff or
decoys drift too far away to provide useful cover.) Even if we
assume, for example, that the only threat is China - a given bird may
cross Chinese territory multiple times a day over the course of months
or years. Are you going to manuever and deploy countermeasures for
each pass? The mass penalties can barely be called prohibitive
without breaking down in laughter at the understatement, even if one
only utilizes them in times of crisis.

We were thinking of different sorts of active countermeasures.

This means, at least currently, that the only useful countermeasures
are passive ones - primarily stealth.

Right. Having more satellites would also help.

- jake

We may have a hint as to what missile was used:

http://www.cnn.com/2007/TECH/space/0...ile/index.html

"A U.S. official, who would not agree to be identified, said the event
was the first successful test of the missile after three failures."


I'm tempted to see KT-1 he two reported failures plus one rumored
one in 2005. But I'm biased in favor of that interpretation -- are
there other Chinese missiles that would fit?

(Sorry I had the recent event in November in an earlier post. My brain
must have been processing "11" when that was typed.)