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#61
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#62
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From Herb Schaltegger:
(Stuf4) wrote: (Snipped a lot of undergraduate engineering basics) Stable - yes. Control? - can do without. Um, no. If your hypothetical escape module is ejected from a tumbling spacecraft as it's breaking up, how do you intend to get it into a stable attitude and on a stable trajectory? That's where "control" comes in. Please reconsider the statements that you snipped: - Stability happens whether or not control is attempted. - Control *cannot* happen without stability. This means that a stable escape module that is tumbling needs no control to get into a stable attitude and a stable trajectory. It will get there on its own. Perhaps what you are thinking of is stability augmentation. But let's not mistake this for some kind of flight _control_. This is from an old post: "Pilots flying ACES II seats (F-15, -16, -18, A-10, etc) are prohibited from wearing jungle boots with the nylon mesh because the stabilizing rocket motor blasts on the pilot's heels and can quickly cause nasty burns." The rocket motor on this seat swivels so that the thrust vector oscillates through the c.g. for the purpose of a more stable flight. But note that active stabilization of the velocity vector is distinct from control of that vector. No effort is made to steer the crewmember, say, away from the ground if the ejection was inverted. Let me guess: you've never designed an aircraft or even analyzed the aerodynamics yourself, have you? Just about every kid I know has designed and built an aircraft. This is how basic these aero principles are. Consider throwing a dart. If you hold it backwards, then throw it backwards... what do you know! The dart, all by itself with no control system whatsoever, turns around and hits the target with the pointy end first. Aerodynamic stability! c.g. seeks a position that is ahead of c.p. The dart's fins create a center of pressure that drags behind the dense metal tip. Ejection seats, modules, or anything you can pick up and throw through the air will experience this cg~cp interaction. (Consider the case of ICBMs. They get to the other side of the planet on a _ballistic_ trajectory.) That's not accurate at all. The trajectory is only ballistic after the RV(s) are ejected from the bus. In the case of MARVs, your statement is completely wrong. In either case, the trajectory is actively controlled until at least RV separation. ?! Please check your facts here. The guided boost phase is very short. The vast majority of the trajectory occurs with no control over the velocity vector. This is why they are called *ballistic* missiles. OK, maybe the more accurate term would be (Guided)Ballistic(Guided)Ballistic missiles! ~ CT |
#63
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From Derek:
Here is the statement that was being questioned: "...the problems with weight and controllability that F-111 style capsules suffer from..." If anyone thinks that these egress systems being discussed had *any type* of flight control system, I suggest that you check your facts. And the facts show plainly that they do in fact have rather elaborate flight control systems. Maybe it would help to succinctly discuss what flight control is so that we can all get on the same page. Here are the fundamental building blocks regarding the engineering of vehicle dynamics: GUIDANCE TARGETING NAVIGATION CONTROL STABILITY One block stacks on top of the other. As previously stated, you cannot have control without stability. This progression of dependency continues on up to Guidance. Here is the basic problem solved by each function: GUIDANCE - How do I get there? TARGETING - Where do I want to go? NAVIGATION - Where am I? CONTROL - Can I change where I'm going? STABILITY - Can I move without breaking? ....so I hope that the situation is now clear. Aerospace vehicles use all of these levels of "GN&C" in order to fulfill their roles. But the ejection systems we have been discussing here don't bother with any of the higher order functions. They are only designed to get away from the mess in a stable manner. They may have elaborate systems, but these are not elaborate flight control systems. There is no flight control whatsoever designed into these egress systems. ~ CT |
#64
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From Jon Berndt:
(If this is about submarine egress, that PopSci article had some interesting info on that topic as well.) ~ CT I've come to regard Popular Science (and Popular Mechanics) with a pretty big degree of skepticism, based on what I've seen in occasional perusings in the supermarket. I'm afraid that the shuttle can only be made safer by attending to prevention. This is not a big deal. (Hint: alpha=2 - debris hits SRB skirt; alpha=4 - debris hits RCC ... debris sources also removed ... on-orbit inspection capability added, etc.). With enough attention to detail, I think shuttle reliability can be kept above what most would consider acceptable for the near term. A CTV with more latitude in abort/escape capabilities needs to be fielded ASAP. I think that for shuttle, the dedicated pursuit of prevention is all that can be done, in lieu of an escape module concept that could very well end up adding failure modes with no real hope of adding actual survivability and reducing payload capacity to the point of making it useless. Jon I agree that Pop*** magazines often get pie-in-the-sky. And I agree that retrofitting the shuttle with crew escape capability would come at a huge cost in both dollars and performance. The smart time to design for crew escape is from the beginning. For the shuttle, that means the early 70s. Today, I sympathize with those at NASA tasked to work this problem. I am inclined to agree with your assessment that a dedicated pursuit of prevention is the best way to go. But it is tragic that NASA dropped the ball on this pursuit. (Several days ago I commented on how the MEDS glass cockpit led to the death of Columbia's crew. I'll get this story posted soon.) ~ CT |
#65
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snip
Here are the fundamental building blocks regarding the engineering of vehicle dynamics: GUIDANCE TARGETING NAVIGATION CONTROL STABILITY One block stacks on top of the other. As previously stated, you cannot have control without stability. This progression of dependency continues on up to Guidance. Here is the basic problem solved by each function: GUIDANCE - How do I get there? TARGETING - Where do I want to go? NAVIGATION - Where am I? CONTROL - Can I change where I'm going? STABILITY - Can I move without breaking? snip It would be good to also point out that these engineering principles generically apply to rocketships as well as bicycles as well as biological systems... Basically, anything that is being controlled (I would go so far as to state that if you accept Behavioral Science and Political Science to indeed be science, then GN&C principles can be applied to those fields as well). Consider the beautiful phenomenon of oscillating chemical reactions in a Petri dish. Such a dynamic system can be controlled. One famous author in the field of Chaos Theory, a man by the name of Ilya Prigogine, was awarded the Nobel Prize in Chemistry for his work on these oscillating systems. But you don't need a Nobel neck weight to understand the principles of Chaos and Control. Anybody can Get Smart about these fundamental concepts! ~ CT |
#66
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"Stuf4" wrote in message
(Several days ago I commented on how the MEDS glass cockpit led to the death of Columbia's crew. I'll get this story posted soon.) ~ CT ?! |
#67
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From Jon Berndt:
"Stuf4" wrote in message (Several days ago I commented on how the MEDS glass cockpit led to the death of Columbia's crew. I'll get this story posted soon.) ~ CT ?! (Posted at http://tinyurl.com/nrnt) ~ CT |
#68
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(Stuf4) wrote:
Let's be clear about the distinction between the concepts of _stability_ versus _control_: Let's be clear about the distinction between you adressing the issues, and you playing childish semantic games. The first is an unrealized hope on our part, the second your common mode. D. -- The STS-107 Columbia Loss FAQ can be found at the following URLs: Text-Only Version: http://www.io.com/~o_m/columbia_loss_faq.html Enhanced HTML Version: http://www.io.com/~o_m/columbia_loss_faq_x.html Corrections, comments, and additions should be e-mailed to , as well as posted to sci.space.history and sci.space.shuttle for discussion. |
#69
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From Derek Lyons:
(Stuf4) wrote: Let's be clear about the distinction between the concepts of _stability_ versus _control_: Let's be clear about the distinction between you adressing the issues, and you playing childish semantic games. The first is an unrealized hope on our part, the second your common mode. I was under the impression that the issues were addressed. If something was missed I would like to know about it. (Insult-free info preferred) ~ CT |
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