Landing gear on the shuttle

Keith E. McInnis wrote:

.... the only craft ever built to take people into space without a
crew escape system.

Let's not forget the craft of the Voskhod program.

--
Dave Michelson

Dave Michelson wrote:

Keith E. McInnis wrote:

.... the only craft ever built to take people into space without a
crew escape system.

Let's not forget the craft of the Voskhod program.

Or the fact that most escape systems are only good for a fairly small
portion of the total flight envelope.

D.
--
Touch-twice life. Eat. Drink. Laugh.

http://derekl1963.livejournal.com/

-Resolved: To be more temperate in my postings.
Oct 5th, 2004 JDL

From Keith McInnis:
djarvinen;825146 Wrote:

I was watching the live pics of STS-118 landing today and noticed that
the landing gear doesn't come down until what appears to be just
seconds (10-15?) before landing.

So what's the procedure if the gear doesn't come down? I'm pretty
sure a go-around isn't an option.

Ok, seeing as how no one has stated it on this thread as yet, I'll
pipe in with the obvious answer...

If the PLT pushes the Gear Deploy button and the gear doesn't come
down, the emergency procedure is for the CDR in the left seat to push
the ARM/DEPLOY buttons on that side of the cockpit.

I expect that most right seaters will also repeatedly keep pushing the
right seat buttons until runway impact, since there is not much else
to do from the right seat. As for the person on the stick, I suspect
that there are pilots who have a plan to porpoise the orbiter in hopes
of shaking something loose. That is a typical emergency action for
other jets like the T-38, although with engines you have the luxury of
doing this at altitude. I have never heard of anyone practicing a
"Fred Haise imitation" in the sim, but when any gear up landing is
expected to be catastrophic then there isn't much to lose by taking
desperate action on short final. (It would be interesting from a
flown commander on this.)

snip
You are correct that that there are no re-do's. Any
failure of the landing gear to deploy properly will lead to a
catastrophic failure. At about 220mph there is no room for ripping down
the runway hoping the 'belly' of the aircraft will hold up.
On a related note the recent Endeavor mission had a quandary. IF the
damage was severe enough to place the crew at great risk was it
possible to land the orbiter without a crew? The answer is yes. The
only barrier to autolanding the orbiter is deploying the gear and a
mechanism to do so could have been devised if it had been needed.
Thankfully it was not. The alternative risk of launching a 'rescue
shuttle' was great; this time all turned out well.
We are still flying an experimental 'spaceplane.'

I totally object to that viewpoint. I'll repost this view that I
shared back in '03:

====
: You can't have it both ways. It is
: either experimental and should be flown as such, or it is
operational
: and then assigned to conduct operational missions with cargo and
extra
: crewmembers.

: As soon as you
: decide to start flying passengers, you are implicitly stating that
: your vehicle is past the critical developmental stage and is now
safe
: and reliable enough to carry such extra members on board. The
: decision to carry people who were non-essential for flight
development
: was made for STS-5 which launched way back in 1982 (with Reagan's
: announcement, as you point out).
:
: I don't subscribe to the notion that the shuttle is an experimental
: vehicle. It has been used as an operational workhorse for many
years.
: Chris Kraft, in his 1995 report, went so far as recommending to
: freeze the design.
:
: I do not subscribe to any 1-to-1 comparison of aircraft flights to
: spaceflights, as some FAA officials might quote in their safety
: analyses. Space rockets are *not* aircraft. Their maturity needs
to
: be measured in "dog years". I'd take a wag at an equivalence of 1
: spaceflight to be on the order of 100 aircraft flights.
====

One which has no
viable escape system--the only craft ever built to take people into
space without a crew escape system. The next generation vehicle should
focus on crew safety, not payload capacity and as such can have a full
crew escape system integrated from the outset. Shuttle's have always
been envisioned as a way to ferry people to and from orbit safely, not
cargo. Cargo can be handled by 'dumb' boosters. Max Faget, whom I had
the honor of interviewing many times never did get to see the shuttle
he designed go into operation.

People like Bo Bejmuk (who after shuttle went on to SeaLaunch fame)
say that it was a blessing in disguise that the fully reusable shuttle
got scaled back. That grand vision was proposing to do way too much.


~ CT

Originally Posted by Dave Michelson

Keith E. McInnis wrote:

.... the only craft ever built to take people into space without a
crew escape system.

Let's not forget the craft of the Voskhod program.

--
Dave Michelson

Thanks for the correction. The most accurate statement is that no American craft for human spaceflight has been built without a viable escape system.
The Russians did use the escape system designed by Max Faget; it successfully saved the lives of Cosmonauts Tetov and Strekalov during a catastrophic launch failure by removing their entire crew compartment to a distance of several miles away from the launch area. It did so in less than 3 seconds. Speed of deployment is key to any escape system as Max pointed out in numerous discussions.

It is also true that no escape system can cover every scenario--but most failures happen on launch and ascent. In the case of Columbia it is hard to know if the escape system proposed by Rockwell had been in place if the flight path could have been altered to make crew escape via the automated ejection system feasible.

The need now is to ensure all future designs integrate from the outset a full crew automated escape system as certainly the vehicle will remain experimental for quite some time. The shuttle was certified as operational after a handful of missions, after which the two ejection seats were removed. This violates every standard in flight certification of a vehicle. We didn't 'man-rate' prior craft until much more rigorous testing, particularly on the engines of the day. When the shuttle was declared operational the main engines were still not certified by any established standard and were quite troublesome.

These are all lessons on how the pressure to get something flying can impact design, mission definition and safety. Avoiding making these mistakes again is the reason for my criticisms.

Keith E. McInnis

I'm not sure what you are disagreeing with. If it is my statement that the orbiter can land itself I can detail the fact of that assertion. If it is my focus on escape systems you are certainly not alone in disagreeing with the need for them. As for what version of the STS Bo is glad we didn't build I'd like to know. There were many versions. I support the design originally set forth by Max Faget. That placed the task of moving people on orbiter, the task of moving the orbiter on a separate fly-back-booster and the task of moving major payloads on unmanned systems. This segregation of tasks as part of the total space access system keeps us from being put out of operation with every failure.

On another note being new to this site i realize I've strayed from the landing gear focus of this area and wonder if it would be better to post in other areas or re-post these comments there. Any guidance appreciated.

Originally Posted by

From Keith McInnis:
djarvinen;825146 Wrote:

I was watching the live pics of STS-118 landing today and noticed that
the landing gear doesn't come down until what appears to be just
seconds (10-15?) before landing.

So what's the procedure if the gear doesn't come down? I'm pretty
sure a go-around isn't an option.



Ok, seeing as how no one has stated it on this thread as yet, I'll
pipe in with the obvious answer...

If the PLT pushes the Gear Deploy button and the gear doesn't come
down, the emergency procedure is for the CDR in the left seat to push
the ARM/DEPLOY buttons on that side of the cockpit.

I expect that most right seaters will also repeatedly keep pushing the
right seat buttons until runway impact, since there is not much else
to do from the right seat. As for the person on the stick, I suspect
that there are pilots who have a plan to porpoise the orbiter in hopes
of shaking something loose. That is a typical emergency action for
other jets like the T-38, although with engines you have the luxury of
doing this at altitude. I have never heard of anyone practicing a
"Fred Haise imitation" in the sim, but when any gear up landing is
expected to be catastrophic then there isn't much to lose by taking
desperate action on short final. (It would be interesting from a
flown commander on this.)

snip
You are correct that that there are no re-do's. Any
failure of the landing gear to deploy properly will lead to a
catastrophic failure. At about 220mph there is no room for ripping down
the runway hoping the 'belly' of the aircraft will hold up.
On a related note the recent Endeavor mission had a quandary. IF the
damage was severe enough to place the crew at great risk was it
possible to land the orbiter without a crew? The answer is yes. The
only barrier to autolanding the orbiter is deploying the gear and a
mechanism to do so could have been devised if it had been needed.
Thankfully it was not. The alternative risk of launching a 'rescue
shuttle' was great; this time all turned out well.
We are still flying an experimental 'spaceplane.'

I totally object to that viewpoint. I'll repost this view that I
shared back in '03:

====
: You can't have it both ways. It is
: either experimental and should be flown as such, or it is
operational
: and then assigned to conduct operational missions with cargo and
extra
: crewmembers.

: As soon as you
: decide to start flying passengers, you are implicitly stating that
: your vehicle is past the critical developmental stage and is now
safe
: and reliable enough to carry such extra members on board. The
: decision to carry people who were non-essential for flight
development
: was made for STS-5 which launched way back in 1982 (with Reagan's
: announcement, as you point out).
:
: I don't subscribe to the notion that the shuttle is an experimental
: vehicle. It has been used as an operational workhorse for many
years.
: Chris Kraft, in his 1995 report, went so far as recommending to
: freeze the design.
:
: I do not subscribe to any 1-to-1 comparison of aircraft flights to
: spaceflights, as some FAA officials might quote in their safety
: analyses. Space rockets are *not* aircraft. Their maturity needs
to
: be measured in "dog years". I'd take a wag at an equivalence of 1
: spaceflight to be on the order of 100 aircraft flights.
====

One which has no
viable escape system--the only craft ever built to take people into
space without a crew escape system. The next generation vehicle should
focus on crew safety, not payload capacity and as such can have a full
crew escape system integrated from the outset. Shuttle's have always
been envisioned as a way to ferry people to and from orbit safely, not
cargo. Cargo can be handled by 'dumb' boosters. Max Faget, whom I had
the honor of interviewing many times never did get to see the shuttle
he designed go into operation.

People like Bo Bejmuk (who after shuttle went on to SeaLaunch fame)
say that it was a blessing in disguise that the fully reusable shuttle
got scaled back. That grand vision was proposing to do way too much.


~ CT

Keith E. McInnis wrote:

The need now is to ensure all future designs integrate from the outset
a full crew automated escape system as certainly the vehicle will
remain experimental for quite some time.

Why? Crew are cheap and easy to replace.

(And why is astronaut safety held in such high priority when, say,
submariner safety is not?)

D.
--
Touch-twice life. Eat. Drink. Laugh.

http://derekl1963.livejournal.com/

-Resolved: To be more temperate in my postings.
Oct 5th, 2004 JDL

"Derek Lyons" wrote in message
...
Keith E. McInnis wrote:

The need now is to ensure all future designs integrate from the outset
a full crew automated escape system as certainly the vehicle will
remain experimental for quite some time.

Why? Crew are cheap and easy to replace.


But national prestige isn't.

(And why is astronaut safety held in such high priority when, say,
submariner safety is not?)

It's not? I wasn't aware the US Navy was routinely losing one submarine per
50-60 missions.



D.
--
Touch-twice life. Eat. Drink. Laugh.

http://derekl1963.livejournal.com/

-Resolved: To be more temperate in my postings.
Oct 5th, 2004 JDL



--
Greg Moore
SQL Server DBA Consulting Remote and Onsite available!
Email: sql (at) greenms.com http://www.greenms.com/sqlserver.html

"Greg D. Moore \(Strider\)" wrote:

"Derek Lyons" wrote in message
...
Keith E. McInnis wrote:

The need now is to ensure all future designs integrate from the outset
a full crew automated escape system as certainly the vehicle will
remain experimental for quite some time.

Why? Crew are cheap and easy to replace.

But national prestige isn't.

Crew survival is, IMO, essentially irrelevant to the loss of national
prestige for a LOV accident. (Heck, I'm not certain LOCV would cause
a significant loss of national prestige or pride - not for any longer
than it stayed in the headlines anyhow.)

(And why is astronaut safety held in such high priority when, say,
submariner safety is not?)

It's not? I wasn't aware the US Navy was routinely losing one submarine
per 50-60 missions.

We aren't - because we've spent a hell of a lot of money fixing the
basic problem(s) rather than applying liberal amounts of duct tape and
hoping. But that doesn't mean serious risks don't remain. (Ask the
crews of San Francisco or Bonefish for example.)

D.
--
Touch-twice life. Eat. Drink. Laugh.

http://derekl1963.livejournal.com/

-Resolved: To be more temperate in my postings.
Oct 5th, 2004 JDL

On Thu, 13 Sep 2007 18:00:22 -0400, "Greg D. Moore \(Strider\)"
wrote:

"Derek Lyons" wrote in message
...
Keith E. McInnis wrote:

The need now is to ensure all future designs integrate from the outset
a full crew automated escape system as certainly the vehicle will
remain experimental for quite some time.

Why? Crew are cheap and easy to replace.


But national prestige isn't.

(And why is astronaut safety held in such high priority when, say,
submariner safety is not?)

It's not? I wasn't aware the US Navy was routinely losing one submarine per
50-60 missions.



D.
--
Touch-twice life. Eat. Drink. Laugh.

http://derekl1963.livejournal.com/

-Resolved: To be more temperate in my postings.
Oct 5th, 2004 JDL
The above illustrates my reason for the move of Derek to my kill file.

--
Posted via a free Usenet account from http://www.teranews.com

On Thu, 13 Sep 2007 03:25:33 +0100, Keith E. McInnis
wrote:


Dave Michelson;832241 Wrote:
Keith E. McInnis wrote:-

.... the only craft ever built to take people into space without a
crew escape system.-

Let's not forget the craft of the Voskhod program.

--
Dave Michelson


Thanks for the correction. The most accurate statement is that no
American craft for human spaceflight has been built without a viable
escape system.
The Russians did use the escape system designed by Max Faget; it
successfully saved the lives of Cosmonauts Tetov and Strekalov during a
catastrophic launch failure by removing their entire crew compartment to
a distance of several miles away from the launch area. It did so in less
than 3 seconds. Speed of deployment is key to any escape system as Max
pointed out in numerous discussions.

It is also true that no escape system can cover every scenario--but
most failures happen on launch and ascent. In the case of Columbia it
is hard to know if the escape system proposed by Rockwell had been in
place if the flight path could have been altered to make crew escape
via the automated ejection system feasible.

The need now is to ensure all future designs integrate from the outset
a full crew automated escape system as certainly the vehicle will
remain experimental for quite some time. The shuttle was certified as
operational after a handful of missions, after which the two ejection
seats were removed. This violates every standard in flight
certification of a vehicle. We didn't 'man-rate' prior craft until much
more rigorous testing, particularly on the engines of the day. When the
shuttle was declared operational the main engines were still not
certified by any established standard and were quite troublesome.

These are all lessons on how the pressure to get something flying can
impact design, mission definition and safety. Avoiding making these
mistakes again is the reason for my criticisms.

Keith E. McInnis
Keith, do you have any information or a link to the proposed Rockwell
shuttle escape system? If so would you kindly post it. Thanks very
much.
Jim in Houston.

Contrary to popular opinion RN does not mean Real Nerd!
Teddy Roosevelt's mother said: "Fill what is empty,
empty what is full, and scratch where it itches"

--
Posted via a free Usenet account from http://www.teranews.com