National Space Policy: NSDD-42 (issued on July 4th, 1982)

From Scott Kozel:
(Stuf4) wrote:

From Scott Kozel:
(Stuf4) wrote:
From Scott Kozel:

I snipped the rest of your post because my comments above were
sufficient to refute your argument.

The space shuttle is not a "military aircraft" and it is not an
"aircraft" at all during the cruise portion of its mission, so your cite
the Hague Rules of Air Warfare is irrelevant.

There are many who would say that these Rules of Air Warfare are
irrelevant no matter what. Even for regular aircraft. Notice that
Tokyo firebombing, Hiroshima, Nagasaki, etc came *well after* these
rules were drafted.

Strawman alert. It's also amusing that you don't mention that the
Japanese were the ones who first conducted the firebombing of cities.

Since the focus has been on NASA, I considered it to be more relevant
to focus on other US gov't observance/lack of observance of the Hague
rules (rather than the Japanese or anyone else).

The fact that the Japanese were the ones who "lowered the bar" and first
conducted the firebombing of cities in that war, is crucial to
understanding why they later got the same treatment, and those cities
that you mentioned were legitimate aerial targets by the standards of
Hague, in that they were defensed cities that contained valid military
targets.

It is clear to me that such indiscriminant bombardment was expressly
prohibited. In particular, Articles 22, 24 and 25:

http://lawofwar.org/hague_rules_of_air_warfare.htm


I suspect that these Hague articles formed the basis for LeMay's
post-war words:
--------------
"Killing Japanese didn't bother me very much at that time... I suppose
if I had lost the war, I would have been tried as a war criminal..."

(From http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/amex/bomb/pe...ndeAMEX61.html,
one of many sources where LeMay's quote can be found)
--------------

[The above quote was pasted from an old ssh post from two years ago.]


~ CT

(Stuf4) wrote:

From Scott Kozel:

The fact that the Japanese were the ones who "lowered the bar" and first
conducted the firebombing of cities in that war, is crucial to
understanding why they later got the same treatment, and those cities
that you mentioned were legitimate aerial targets by the standards of
Hague, in that they were defensed cities that contained valid military
targets.

The Hague rules were never ratified by the signatories, so they were not
law.

It is clear to me that such indiscriminant bombardment was expressly
prohibited. In particular, Articles 22, 24 and 25:

http://lawofwar.org/hague_rules_of_air_warfare.htm

It wasn't indiscriminate. The "cottage industry" aspect of Japan's
military machine was well documented, whereby a considerable portion of
their military industrial output began in people's city homes and flowed
to the military factories and plants. That made the entirety of the
city a military target.

Those cities had other purely military targets. The accuracy of aerial
bombardment was not very good in WWII, so legitimate aerial bombardment
directed at a military objective could legitimately involve damage to
nearby areas.

See: The First Rules of Air Warfare, by Major Richard H. Wyman, USAF
http://www.airpower.au.af.mil/airchr...apr/wyman.html

I suspect that these Hague articles formed the basis for LeMay's
post-war words:
--------------
"Killing Japanese didn't bother me very much at that time... I suppose
if I had lost the war, I would have been tried as a war criminal..."

With the nature of the Japanese military in WWII, they undoubtedly would
have tried and killed most of a losing country's leaders as "war
criminals".

Japan had already clearly lost the war by the time that the B-29s
reached Japan in 1945, so LeMay would have had no fears of the U.S.
losing the war.

From Scott Kozel:
(Stuf4) wrote:

The Hague rules were never ratified by the signatories, so they were not
law.

I have explicitly stated:

"There are many who would say that these Rules of Air Warfare are
irrelevant no matter what."

....yet they are still used as an international standard. I stated
early on that these air warfare guidelines were created by
extrapolating the rules of land and sea warfare, documents that have
been ratified.

It is clear to me that such indiscriminant bombardment was expressly
prohibited. In particular, Articles 22, 24 and 25:

http://lawofwar.org/hague_rules_of_air_warfare.htm

It wasn't indiscriminate. The "cottage industry" aspect of Japan's
military machine was well documented, whereby a considerable portion of
their military industrial output began in people's city homes and flowed
to the military factories and plants. That made the entirety of the
city a military target.

Those cities had other purely military targets. The accuracy of aerial
bombardment was not very good in WWII, so legitimate aerial bombardment
directed at a military objective could legitimately involve damage to
nearby areas.

I point out Tokyo firebombing, Hiroshima and Nagasaki. You respond
with a concern about accuracy not being very good.

Area bombing was, by definition, indiscriminate. Families with young
children were targeted. A popular theory at the time, "thanks" to a
guy named Giulio Douhet, was that if you kill the non-combatants, a
country's will to fight would collapse.

See: The First Rules of Air Warfare, by Major Richard H. Wyman, USAF
http://www.airpower.au.af.mil/airchr...apr/wyman.html

I found it interesting to see Wyman refer to "German terror bombing
against England". I expect that he'd speak of the "collateral damage"
done at Dresden, etc.


I suspect that these Hague articles formed the basis for LeMay's
post-war words:
--------------
"Killing Japanese didn't bother me very much at that time... I suppose
if I had lost the war, I would have been tried as a war criminal..."

With the nature of the Japanese military in WWII, they undoubtedly would
have tried and killed most of a losing country's leaders as "war
criminals".

At issue here is the grounds for being tried. In LeMay's case, it is
the willful targeting of non-combatants (women, children, etc).

Japan had already clearly lost the war by the time that the B-29s
reached Japan in 1945, so LeMay would have had no fears of the U.S.
losing the war.

I agree with that point. Now notice that LeMay isn't quoted as saying
that he had no concerns about being tried as a war criminal. Knowing
that he was expecting to win the war, I take his statement as an
expression of conscience.


~ CT

(Stuf4) wrote:

From Scott Kozel:
(Stuf4) wrote:

The Hague rules were never ratified by the signatories, so they were not
law.

I have explicitly stated:

"There are many who would say that these Rules of Air Warfare are
irrelevant no matter what."

...yet they are still used as an international standard. I stated
early on that these air warfare guidelines were created by
extrapolating the rules of land and sea warfare, documents that have
been ratified.

The Hague rules were not law, and they did not have the force of an
"international standard". The Germans and the Japanese in their wars of
aggression that became WWII, certainly dismissed the Hague rules as
irrelevant.

It wasn't indiscriminate. The "cottage industry" aspect of Japan's
military machine was well documented, whereby a considerable portion of
their military industrial output began in people's city homes and flowed
to the military factories and plants. That made the entirety of the
city a military target.

Those cities had other purely military targets. The accuracy of aerial
bombardment was not very good in WWII, so legitimate aerial bombardment
directed at a military objective could legitimately involve damage to
nearby areas.

I point out Tokyo firebombing, Hiroshima and Nagasaki. You respond
with a concern about accuracy not being very good.

Accuracy from high altitude was what it was, and the weather over Japan
was notoriously poor for aerial bombing; but that didn't mean that the
Allies had to refrain from aerial bombing.

Area bombing was, by definition, indiscriminate. Families with young
children were targeted. A popular theory at the time, "thanks" to a
guy named Giulio Douhet, was that if you kill the non-combatants, a
country's will to fight would collapse.

See my previous post comment above. Military related targets were
targeted, and the fact that the enemy had civilians nearby didn't mean
that the Allies had to refrain from aerial bombing.

See: The First Rules of Air Warfare, by Major Richard H. Wyman, USAF
http://www.airpower.au.af.mil/airchr...apr/wyman.html

I found it interesting to see Wyman refer to "German terror bombing
against England". I expect that he'd speak of the "collateral damage"
done at Dresden, etc.

The Germans and the Japanese started wars of world conquest that became
WWII, and conducted many "terror bombing" aerial raids against England
and China.

I suspect that these Hague articles formed the basis for LeMay's
post-war words:
--------------
"Killing Japanese didn't bother me very much at that time... I suppose
if I had lost the war, I would have been tried as a war criminal..."

With the nature of the Japanese military in WWII, they undoubtedly would
have tried and killed most of a losing country's leaders as "war
criminals".

At issue here is the grounds for being tried. In LeMay's case, it is
the willful targeting of non-combatants (women, children, etc).

See above. Military related targets were what was targeted, and the
fact that the enemy (stupidly) had civilians nearby didn't mean that the
Allies had to refrain from aerial bombing.

The Hague rules that you love so much, also prohibit a combatant from
utilizing civilians as a "shield" to "protect" a military target, and
the Japanese could certainly be accused of doing that in nearly all of
their cities; furthermore, the other combatant could legitimately
utilize aerial bombing on those military targets, and the responsibility
for any ensuing civilian casualties falls on the ground combatant.

Japan had already clearly lost the war by the time that the B-29s
reached Japan in 1945, so LeMay would have had no fears of the U.S.
losing the war.

I agree with that point. Now notice that LeMay isn't quoted as saying
that he had no concerns about being tried as a war criminal. Knowing
that he was expecting to win the war, I take his statement as an
expression of conscience.

I take it that you consider your self a mind reader. You don't provide
any context whatsoever for LeMay's statement.

From Scott Kozel:
(Stuf4) wrote:

From Scott Kozel:
(Stuf4) wrote:

It wasn't indiscriminate. The "cottage industry" aspect of Japan's
military machine was well documented, whereby a considerable portion of
their military industrial output began in people's city homes and flowed
to the military factories and plants. That made the entirety of the
city a military target.

Those cities had other purely military targets. The accuracy of aerial
bombardment was not very good in WWII, so legitimate aerial bombardment
directed at a military objective could legitimately involve damage to
nearby areas.

I point out Tokyo firebombing, Hiroshima and Nagasaki. You respond
with a concern about accuracy not being very good.

Accuracy from high altitude was what it was, and the weather over Japan
was notoriously poor for aerial bombing; but that didn't mean that the
Allies had to refrain from aerial bombing.

An analogy to consider...

A bank is being robbed and the robbers take civilian hostages. Smoke
canisters are used to obscure visibility.

Can the police justify shooting into the "clouds" hoping that they
will take out the robbers? Bank customers and employees that get
killed fall under that callous label "collateral damage".

Here's one way the analogy breaks down:

LeMay specifically targeted the "customers and employees" along with
the "robbers". Firebombing and nuking made *no effort* to
discriminate between the groups traditionally known as combatants and
non-combatants.

Area bombing was, by definition, indiscriminate. Families with young
children were targeted. A popular theory at the time, "thanks" to a
guy named Giulio Douhet, was that if you kill the non-combatants, a
country's will to fight would collapse.

See my previous post comment above. Military related targets were
targeted, and the fact that the enemy had civilians nearby didn't mean
that the Allies had to refrain from aerial bombing.

Douhet's theories makes for interesting contrast to what you are
talking about.

See: The First Rules of Air Warfare, by Major Richard H. Wyman, USAF
http://www.airpower.au.af.mil/airchr...apr/wyman.html

I found it interesting to see Wyman refer to "German terror bombing
against England". I expect that he'd speak of the "collateral damage"
done at Dresden, etc.

The Germans and the Japanese started wars of world conquest that became
WWII, and conducted many "terror bombing" aerial raids against England
and China.

It is interesting to note that the December 7th raids on Hawaii and
the Philippines were justified by the Japanese as an effort to
liberate the natives from American imperial agression (with Hawaii
ultimately succumbing in 1959).

I suspect that these Hague articles formed the basis for LeMay's
post-war words:
--------------
"Killing Japanese didn't bother me very much at that time... I suppose
if I had lost the war, I would have been tried as a war criminal..."

With the nature of the Japanese military in WWII, they undoubtedly would
have tried and killed most of a losing country's leaders as "war
criminals".

At issue here is the grounds for being tried. In LeMay's case, it is
the willful targeting of non-combatants (women, children, etc).

See above. Military related targets were what was targeted, and the
fact that the enemy (stupidly) had civilians nearby didn't mean that the
Allies had to refrain from aerial bombing.

I'm not sure how you arrived at the conclusion that civilians were not
specifically targeted. Hiroshima and Nagasaki being two blatant
examples.

(A tragic irony is that Nagasaki was one of Japan's largest centers of
Catholicism.)

The Hague rules that you love so much, also prohibit a combatant from
utilizing civilians as a "shield" to "protect" a military target, and
the Japanese could certainly be accused of doing that in nearly all of
their cities; furthermore, the other combatant could legitimately
utilize aerial bombing on those military targets, and the responsibility
for any ensuing civilian casualties falls on the ground combatant.

If you are calling the civilian casualties from the Tokyo firebombings
and the nuking of Hiroshima and Nagasaki a collateral damage to the
"civilian shield" of a legitimate military target, I'm not aware of a
single historian who shares your view.

Japan had already clearly lost the war by the time that the B-29s
reached Japan in 1945, so LeMay would have had no fears of the U.S.
losing the war.

I agree with that point. Now notice that LeMay isn't quoted as saying
that he had no concerns about being tried as a war criminal. Knowing
that he was expecting to win the war, I take his statement as an
expression of conscience.

I take it that you consider your self a mind reader. You don't provide
any context whatsoever for LeMay's statement.

You initiated a statement that LeMay would have had no fears, and then
you criticize me for mind reading.

As for context to LeMay's quote, here's the link if you missed it the
first time:

http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/amex/bomb/pe...ndeAMEX61.html


~ CT

A bank is being robbed and the robbers take civilian hostages. Smoke
canisters are used to obscure visibility.

Can the police justify shooting into the "clouds" hoping that they
will take out the robbers? Bank customers and employees that get
killed fall under that callous label "collateral damage".


Another political grubber breaking into our national space policy!

Generally we start talking about National Space Policy, and then someone makes
a blanked statement about US soldiers being the equivalent of the NAZIS and
gets our feathers ruffled and then you have argument and counterargument and
the actual substance of the National space policy gets dropped. I wish you
people with an axe to grind in the backs of US soldiers would just go away and
let us talk about National Space Policy.

Tom

(Stuf4) wrote:

From Scott Kozel:

Accuracy from high altitude was what it was, and the weather over Japan
was notoriously poor for aerial bombing; but that didn't mean that the
Allies had to refrain from aerial bombing.

An analogy to consider...

A bank is being robbed and the robbers take civilian hostages. Smoke
canisters are used to obscure visibility.

Can the police justify shooting into the "clouds" hoping that they
will take out the robbers? Bank customers and employees that get
killed fall under that callous label "collateral damage".

A completely inappropriate analogy, as there is no comparison between
the principles utilized in police work, and the principles utilized in a
world war.

Here's one way the analogy breaks down:

LeMay specifically targeted the "customers and employees" along with
the "robbers". Firebombing and nuking made *no effort* to
discriminate between the groups traditionally known as combatants and
non-combatants.

Too bad. Japan started the war, committed numerous horrendous war
crimes against the U.S., China and other Asian countries (and not a peep
out of Stuffie about that), and Japan effectively lost the war at the
Battle of Leyte Gulf in October 1944, and if their government had any
sense, they would have surrendered then. The B-29 fire raids started in
1945. Japan sowed the wind, and they reaped a whirlwind.

They also intermingled military areas with civilian areas, so it was the
fault of the Japanese government that their civilians got hurt in those
cities.

It is interesting to note that the December 7th raids on Hawaii and
the Philippines were justified by the Japanese as an effort to
liberate the natives from American imperial agression (with Hawaii
ultimately succumbing in 1959).

Bull-oney. Japan "justified" those raids as part of their attempt to
conquer the whole western half of the Pacific Ocean and its islands and
its rim countries, to create the "Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity
Sphere", a Japanese Empire with vast amounts of natural resources, taken
by military power.

The Hague rules that you love so much, also prohibit a combatant from
utilizing civilians as a "shield" to "protect" a military target, and
the Japanese could certainly be accused of doing that in nearly all of
their cities; furthermore, the other combatant could legitimately
utilize aerial bombing on those military targets, and the responsibility
for any ensuing civilian casualties falls on the ground combatant.

If you are calling the civilian casualties from the Tokyo firebombings
and the nuking of Hiroshima and Nagasaki a collateral damage to the
"civilian shield" of a legitimate military target, I'm not aware of a
single historian who shares your view.

That shows just how unaware you are, then. Stuffie.

The "cottage industry" aspect of Japan's military machine was well
documented, whereby a considerable portion of their military industrial
output began in people's city homes and flowed to the military factories
and plants. That made the entirety of the city a military target.

I recommend that you read this outstanding book, as it will expose a lot
of the mush that is in your mind, Stuffie --

_Downfall: The End of the Imperial Japanese Empire_, by Richard B.
Frank, 1999

As for context to LeMay's quote, here's the link if you missed it the
first time:

http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/amex/bomb/pe...ndeAMEX61.html

'From early on he argued that, "if you are going to use military force,
then you ought to use overwhelming military force. Use too much and
deliberately use too much... You'll save lives, not only your own, but
the enemy's too."'

He's correct ... including in the case of Japan and the U.S. in WWII.

From Scott Kozel:
(Stuf4) wrote:

From Scott Kozel:

Accuracy from high altitude was what it was, and the weather over Japan
was notoriously poor for aerial bombing; but that didn't mean that the
Allies had to refrain from aerial bombing.

An analogy to consider...

A bank is being robbed and the robbers take civilian hostages. Smoke
canisters are used to obscure visibility.

Can the police justify shooting into the "clouds" hoping that they
will take out the robbers? Bank customers and employees that get
killed fall under that callous label "collateral damage".

A completely inappropriate analogy, as there is no comparison between
the principles utilized in police work, and the principles utilized in a
world war.

It was a simple analogy about discriminate killing vs indiscriminate
killing - bystanders compared to non-combatants.

Regarding the principles of the military and the police, I happen to
see them as more similar than different. Particularly in recent times
when military operations have been justified as actions of
"international law enforcement".

Here's one way the analogy breaks down:

LeMay specifically targeted the "customers and employees" along with
the "robbers". Firebombing and nuking made *no effort* to
discriminate between the groups traditionally known as combatants and
non-combatants.

Too bad. Japan started the war, committed numerous horrendous war
crimes against the U.S., China and other Asian countries (and not a peep
out of Stuffie about that), and Japan effectively lost the war at the
Battle of Leyte Gulf in October 1944, and if their government had any
sense, they would have surrendered then. The B-29 fire raids started in
1945. Japan sowed the wind, and they reaped a whirlwind.

They also intermingled military areas with civilian areas, so it was the
fault of the Japanese government that their civilians got hurt in those
cities.

Incindiary and nuclear weapons are not exactly weapons known for their
surgical precision.

It is interesting to note that the December 7th raids on Hawaii and
the Philippines were justified by the Japanese as an effort to
liberate the natives from American imperial agression (with Hawaii
ultimately succumbing in 1959).

Bull-oney. Japan "justified" those raids as part of their attempt to
conquer the whole western half of the Pacific Ocean and its islands and
its rim countries, to create the "Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity
Sphere", a Japanese Empire with vast amounts of natural resources, taken
by military power.

Perhaps the Japanese modeled their expansionism on the American
example of "sea to shining sea (and beyond)".

The Hague rules that you love so much, also prohibit a combatant from
utilizing civilians as a "shield" to "protect" a military target, and
the Japanese could certainly be accused of doing that in nearly all of
their cities; furthermore, the other combatant could legitimately
utilize aerial bombing on those military targets, and the responsibility
for any ensuing civilian casualties falls on the ground combatant.

If you are calling the civilian casualties from the Tokyo firebombings
and the nuking of Hiroshima and Nagasaki a collateral damage to the
"civilian shield" of a legitimate military target, I'm not aware of a
single historian who shares your view.

That shows just how unaware you are, then. Stuffie.

Douhet's theories of aerial bombardment of non-combatants as practiced
in WWII happens to be mainstream history. I see your position here as
out on the fringe.

The "cottage industry" aspect of Japan's military machine was well
documented, whereby a considerable portion of their military industrial
output began in people's city homes and flowed to the military factories
and plants. That made the entirety of the city a military target.

One could also attempt to justify the targeting of high schools
because that is where a considerable portion of draftees flow out of.

I recommend that you read this outstanding book, as it will expose a lot
of the mush that is in your mind, Stuffie --

_Downfall: The End of the Imperial Japanese Empire_, by Richard B.
Frank, 1999

If you have any quotes to offer that support your position, I'd be
glad to consider them.

As for context to LeMay's quote, here's the link if you missed it the
first time:

http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/amex/bomb/pe...ndeAMEX61.html

'From early on he argued that, "if you are going to use military force,
then you ought to use overwhelming military force. Use too much and
deliberately use too much... You'll save lives, not only your own, but
the enemy's too."'

He's correct ... including in the case of Japan and the U.S. in WWII.

It's not hard to imagine that Tojo (who unlike LeMay, was tried and
punished for war crimes) wanted the raid on Pearl Harbor to be an
example of overwhelming force.

Whether Tojo thought of the attack as *saving* American lives, I do
not know.


~ CT

Too bad. Japan started the war, committed numerous horrendous war
crimes against the U.S., China and other Asian countries (and not a peep
out of Stuffie about that), and Japan effectively lost the war at the
Battle of Leyte Gulf in October 1944, and if their government had any
sense, they would have surrendered then. The B-29 fire raids started in
1945. Japan sowed the wind, and they reaped a whirlwind.

But Japan didn't have a space policy in 1944 and the primitive B29 couldn't go
into space!

Look at the sunject title: National Space Policy: NSDD-42 (issued on July
4th, 1982)

Not that anything of significance was accomplished in 1982. The Shuttle was
flying but so what?

Tom