Russia's Secret: Did Space Station Nearly Die The Day It Was Born?

In article ,
"Jorge R. Frank" wrote:

Pat Flannery wrote in
:



JimO wrote:

Russia's Secret: Did Space Station Nearly Die The Day It Was Born?

From the article:
"The module was the FGB, Russian for “Functional Cargo Block,”
code-named “Zarya.” Based on a design flown before (including one
spectacular Russian space station failure in May 1987 that the
Russians had not told NASA about), the hardware was part of the
military side of the Russian program and had special high-security
radio links with Earth." Does this refer to Polyus?

Yes. The FGB was used as the orbit insertion/maneuvering stage for Polyus.

Interestingly, at the tail end of Space Station Freedom, as it was
morphing through Space Station Alpha on it's way to ISS, the final
"restructure/rephase" was to consider the option of using a
Lockheed-designed "service module" to perform the task later given to
FGB. It was not divulged how and why Lockheed had designed such a
module nor were we encouraged to ask; it was enough that we were told:
"It works and this is what it can do . . ." Obviously (moreso now than
in the summer of 1993), this was a core vehicle used for various
classified NRO payloads that NASA was essentially begging for permission
to use for early attitude and orbital control. It's unclear if NRO
simply refused or if they place so many roadblocks in the way of its use
that NASA was forced to go to the Russians on this aspect of the program.

Anyway, just another tidbit from the dusty archives of SSF/ISS trivia I
carry around with me . . .

--
Herb Schaltegger, B.S., J.D.
Reformed Aerospace Engineer
Columbia Loss FAQ:
http://www.io.com/~o_m/columbia_loss_faq_x.html

Herb Schaltegger wrote:

Interestingly, at the tail end of Space Station Freedom, as it was
morphing through Space Station Alpha on it's way to ISS, the final
"restructure/rephase" was to consider the option of using a
Lockheed-designed "service module" to perform the task later given to
FGB. It was not divulged how and why Lockheed had designed such a
module nor were we encouraged to ask; it was enough that we were told:
"It works and this is what it can do . . ." Obviously (moreso now than
in the summer of 1993), this was a core vehicle used for various
classified NRO payloads that NASA was essentially begging for permission
to use for early attitude and orbital control.

This probably gives the recon satellites the ability to change their
orbital parameters on-station; both to evade interception and to make
their time of passage over interesting photo targets less predictable.

It's unclear if NRO
simply refused or if they place so many roadblocks in the way of its use
that NASA was forced to go to the Russians on this aspect of the program.

It would have meant people would get a detailed look at its design, and
a lot of its capabilities could have been deduced from that.

Pat

Pat Flannery wrote in
:

Herb Schaltegger wrote:

Interestingly, at the tail end of Space Station Freedom, as it was
morphing through Space Station Alpha on it's way to ISS, the final
"restructure/rephase" was to consider the option of using a
Lockheed-designed "service module" to perform the task later given to
FGB. It was not divulged how and why Lockheed had designed such a
module nor were we encouraged to ask; it was enough that we were told:
"It works and this is what it can do . . ." Obviously (moreso now than
in the summer of 1993), this was a core vehicle used for various
classified NRO payloads that NASA was essentially begging for permission
to use for early attitude and orbital control.

This probably gives the recon satellites the ability to change their
orbital parameters on-station; both to evade interception and to make
their time of passage over interesting photo targets less predictable.

More the latter than the former; neither superpower actually deployed ASAT
capability. But photorecon birds are generally in sun-synchronous orbits,
so that their passage over a given target is near the same local time every
day. That makes photo analysis easier but also makes overflights
predictable. As you say, periodic maneuvers will change the overflight
times.

--
JRF

Reply-to address spam-proofed - to reply by E-mail,
check "Organization" (I am not assimilated) and
think one step ahead of IBM.

Jorge R. Frank wrote:

More the latter than the former; neither superpower actually deployed ASAT
capability.

We deployed one under Program 437; it was based on Thor missiles and was
deployed at Johnston Atoll from 1963-1975; there is a PDF on it he
http://www.maxwell.af.mil/au/aul/aup...F_Bin/chun.pdf
The Pentagon sure thought that the Soviet system was operational, if
"Soviet Military Power-1986" is anything to go by:
http://www.fas.org/irp/dia/product/smp_86_ch3.htm
....their drawing in the book shows five ready-to-go ASATs being housed
in a hanger at Tyuratam: http://www.fas.org/irp/dia/product/86_48.jpg

Pat

In article ,
Jorge R. Frank wrote:
This probably gives the recon satellites the ability to change their
orbital parameters on-station; both to evade interception and to make
their time of passage over interesting photo targets less predictable.

More the latter than the former; neither superpower actually deployed ASAT
capability.

Actually, both superpowers had some limited ASAT capability (the US via
the nuclear-tipped Thors on Johnston Island) deployed at times. But it
never became a big factor in military satellite design.
--
MOST launched 30 June; first light, 29 July; 5arcsec | Henry Spencer
pointing, 10 Sept; first science, early Oct; all well. |

Pat Flannery wrote


This probably gives the recon satellites the ability to change their
orbital parameters on-station; both to evade interception and to make
their time of passage over interesting photo targets less predictable.


Both the "KH-11-like" electro-optical and the Lacrosse radar imagers
have been tracked fairly closely for the past 15 years or so by the
amateur community. Neither kind maneuvers much after reaching the
operational orbit -- the Lacrosses hardly at all. The "KH-11s"
typically carry out small orbital maintenance maneuvers at intervals
of months(*) plus a larger orbit raising that seems to separate major
mission phases. Given warning, they could dodge a few times, but
at the expense of mission capability.

The classified LEO satellites that have shown significant propulsive
capability are the Titan-launched NOSS-2-A objects, now known to be
TLDs hosting SLDCOM and COBRA BRASS payloads, and USA 53 and USA 144.
There's a fair chance that USA 53 was a stealthified KH-11, so Bus 1
is a good candidate for its propulsion package. USA 144 is a
considerable puzzle, but may be a successor to USA 53.


(*) The maneuver times are quite predictable, BTW. They occur on an
ascending node when the perigee drops below a certain value and the
argument of perigee precesses through zero.

In article ,
Herb Schaltegger wrote:
Lockheed-designed "service module" to perform the task later given to
FGB. It was not divulged how and why Lockheed had designed such a
module nor were we encouraged to ask; it was enough that we were told:
"It works and this is what it can do . . ."

Aviation Week speculated that it was the KH-11 spysat bus; the numbers
seemed about right.

...It's unclear if NRO
simply refused or if they place so many roadblocks in the way of its use
that NASA was forced to go to the Russians on this aspect of the program.

I don't think they were *forced* to do it, so much as they found it a more
attractive alternative. The FGB module had in-orbit refueling capability,
had rather more ACS authority than the Lockheed bus (which was marginal in
this area and might have needed upgrading), and looked cheaper. Moreover,
NASA historically has been very reluctant to get involved with highly
classified stuff, just because it is so much hassle.
--
MOST launched 30 June; first light, 29 July; 5arcsec | Henry Spencer
pointing, 10 Sept; first science, early Oct; all well. |

(Henry Spencer) wrote in
:

In article ,
Herb Schaltegger wrote:
Lockheed-designed "service module" to perform the task later given to
FGB. It was not divulged how and why Lockheed had designed such a
module nor were we encouraged to ask; it was enough that we were told:
"It works and this is what it can do . . ."

Aviation Week speculated that it was the KH-11 spysat bus; the numbers
seemed about right.

Given that Lockheed was the prime contractor on KH-11, HST, and Bus-1, that
KH-11 is said to closely resemble HST, and that Bus-1's cylindrical shape
seems to be a good fit for the base of HST, that sounds reasonable.

...It's unclear if NRO
simply refused or if they place so many roadblocks in the way of its
use that NASA was forced to go to the Russians on this aspect of the
program.

I don't think they were *forced* to do it, so much as they found it a
more attractive alternative. The FGB module had in-orbit refueling
capability, had rather more ACS authority than the Lockheed bus (which
was marginal in this area and might have needed upgrading), and looked
cheaper. Moreover, NASA historically has been very reluctant to get
involved with highly classified stuff, just because it is so much
hassle.

Case in point being the compartmentalization within HST contractors
Lockheed and Perkin-Elmer.

Interestingly, in 1997, when NASA was looking for backup options in the
event the Russians failed to launch the ISS service module, rather than
going back to Lockheed/Bus-1, they went to the Naval Research Laboratory
and their Interim Control Module (ICM). Like Bus-1, ICM is a propulsion
module used on some top-secret NRO birds, and was designed to be compatible
with both the Space Shuttle and Titan launch vehicles.

Should be an interesting story why NASA preferred to deal with NRL vice
Lockheed.

--
JRF

Reply-to address spam-proofed - to reply by E-mail,
check "Organization" (I am not assimilated) and
think one step ahead of IBM.

Jorge R. Frank wrote:

Should be an interesting story why NASA preferred to deal with NRL vice
Lockheed.

A story that you will likely never hear.

Brett

Brett Buck wrote in :

Jorge R. Frank wrote:

Should be an interesting story why NASA preferred to deal with NRL vice
Lockheed.

A story that you will likely never hear.

It depends on how long I live. The stories behind Corona and Discoverer
have been declassified after 40 years; if this story comes out after the
same interval, I'll be in my 70's. I figure I have a decent shot.

--
JRF

Reply-to address spam-proofed - to reply by E-mail,
check "Organization" (I am not assimilated) and
think one step ahead of IBM.