Faulty hardware found on shuttle

rk wrote:
OK, so you can't show any lineage for the FBW systems from Airbus.

Airbus introduced FBW to commercial aviation in 1987 on the A320. It wasn't
only the "FBW" portion that was new, but also the sophisticated flight
management software that automated much of aircraft/cockpit, and introduced
many error checking software to prevent pilot errors. (this was source of much debate).

But Airbus was fraught with problems (read: Bugs) in its software for the
first couple of years. (with Air France bearing the brunt of the problems).
And the FAA was caught with its pants down because it had given the A320 its
certificate without properly testing the software (since it hadn't designed
software testing methods.

Another issue was that of pilot training. Initial training focused on the
switches and blinking lights. But pilots ended up fighting the aircraft
instead of understanding how it worked. So Pilot training was changed to make
pilots better understand the aircraft philosophy.

Now, add a few years, during which Boeing had a lot of fun at Airbus's
expense, and when Boeing did get into the FBW fray, it had learned a lot from
the Airbus experience. During this time the FAA also had setup better testing
procedures to monitor software quality. So the 777 (and airbus's other planes)
were introduced with far fewer problems, and by now, you don't hear much
criticism of FBW because the technology has matured.

And that has what to do with technology development for the A380?

Airbus didn't have any government imposed deadlines to launch and deliver the
A380. It was a "nice project in study" for many years until they got
reasonably sure that they could do it. There was also questions of how it
would be financed.


NASA is in a different position now. It has been given a deadline of 2008 (and
hard deadline of 2010) to get a new vehicle up and running, and retire shuttle
by 2010. So it's got roughly 3.5 years to get that CEV/whatever on the pad
for its first test flight. And it has no budget to do that, and there are
expectations that it will magically and dramatically reduce flight costs.

Even if they are given massive amounts of money, I doubt that NASA could get
such a totally new vehicle up and running by the deadline. Unless, of course,
it becomes a race at any cost and without much concern for long term operating
costs (which was the case for the moon shots).

On Mon, 29 Mar 2004 01:42:27 -0400, John Doe wrote:

Now, add a few years, during which Boeing had a lot of fun at Airbus's
expense, and when Boeing did get into the FBW fray, it had learned a lot from
the Airbus experience. During this time the FAA also had setup better testing
procedures to monitor software quality. So the 777 (and airbus's other planes)
were introduced with far fewer problems, and by now, you don't hear much
criticism of FBW because the technology has matured.

You know, you can say pretty much the same thing about the F/A-18 and
the F-16. GD/Lockheed got to solve a lot of the operational FBW
problems on the F-16 and McAir took advantage of that when they built
the F/A-18.

Of course, Dryden had solved the basic FBW problems with the F-8 DFBW.
So much so, in fact, that GD only went with FBW because of our
success.

Now FBW is old hat but I can remember when it was a Big Deal and we
were considered to be real risk takers for not having a mechanical or
hydraulic backup on the F-8.

And that has what to do with technology development for the A380?

Airbus didn't have any government imposed deadlines to launch and deliver the
A380. It was a "nice project in study" for many years until they got
reasonably sure that they could do it. There was also questions of how it
would be financed.

You do know, don't you, that it's still got to prove itself as being
certifiable, economic to build, economic to fly, and economic to
maintain? All the predictions in the world won't help if the airplane
misses any of those goals. Look at the A340 on the Asian routes and
all the problems it has for an example of a seemingly minor glitch in
performance having a major effect in operation.

As I recall, one of the A380 issues was manufacturing the skin. In
order to be strong enough, it has to be quite thick, so thick that
it's more like plate. This means that different methods have to be
used to shape it, as the usual tooling doesn't work on plate.

Mary

--
Mary Shafer Retired aerospace research engineer

Mary Shafer wrote:
You do know, don't you, that it's still got to prove itself as being
certifiable, economic to build, economic to fly, and economic to
maintain? All the predictions in the world won't help if the airplane
misses any of those goals.

Correct. But the big difference is that if the 380 sinks instead of flies, it
is Airbus that will bear the wrath of bankers wanting their money back, and
airlines will just go shop elsewhere. Airlines have negotiated a fixed price
with certain performance garantees and certain garantees on cost of operation.
But if it does meet its goals, Airbus will deliver at least 100 of the beasts
before the end of this decade. (It has sold nearly 130 by now).

Now, if NASA were to choose a disposable vehicle, perhaps it could sign deals
with Boeing to buy 100 vehicles over a period of 10 years at a fixed price.

Lets look at the ET for the shuttle. I realise they are a technical problem
for Columbia. But from a business point of view, aren't those as close to
"commodity product" as one can get ?

As I recall, one of the A380 issues was manufacturing the skin. In
order to be strong enough, it has to be quite thick, so thick that
it's more like plate. This means that different methods have to be
used to shape it, as the usual tooling doesn't work on plate.

What I had heard was that they developped new manufacturing techniques to
produce not thicker sheets, but rather much larger in order to reduce
joints/riveting (where much fatique occurs). They also implemented cold
welding techniques to bond sheets together. (Still possible that it will be thicker).

I believe that surface of the main wings will be made of a single sheet of
aluminium. (except for moving surfaces, of course).

John Doe wrote:

Lets look at the ET for the shuttle. I realise they are a technical problem
for Columbia. But from a business point of view, aren't those as close to
"commodity product" as one can get ?

No.

D.
--
Touch-twice life. Eat. Drink. Laugh.