NEWS: After Columbia Tragedy, NASA Considers Space Rescue

On Tue, 26 Aug 2003 21:34:36 GMT, "Steven D. Litvintchouk"
wrote:


Reuters

Aug. 26
— By Deborah Zabarenko

WASHINGTON (Reuters) - Could the Columbia disaster have been avoided?
After the fatal accident, NASA came up with a possible scenario to
rescue the crew with another shuttle.

If shuttle controllers knew by the seventh day of the mission there
was catastrophic damage to Columbia's left wing, they could have
rushed shuttle Atlantis into orbit and evacuated Columbia's crew
before the supply of breathable air ran out, investigators said in
their report on Tuesday.

We've been all thru this already, repeatedly.

Rushing Atlantis for launch contradicts the strong CAIB recommendations
that NASA shouldn't launch the shuttle if there is significant suspicion
that a major safety problem exists. Well guess what, the fact that
Columbia's left wing would have known to be damaged would have made them
just a little suspicious that a safety problem exists that could
jeopardize Atlantis too, don't you think?

With that problem unsolved at that point, they could have lost Atlantis
to exactly the same wing problem as they were losing Columbia.

And beyond that, rushing Atlantis for launch and insisting it launch no
matter what, in order to reach Columbia in time, could have caused other
safety problems to crop up.

Better to lose one shuttle and seven astronauts, then to lose two
shuttles and 11 astronauts.

The shuttle is an experimental vehicle, not some routine spaceliner.
And in experiments, you never risk any more people than you have to.



Here's what the CAIB report says about an Atlantis rescue mission:

Page 173



"...6.4 POSSIBILITY OF RESCUE OR REPAIR

To put the decisions made during the flight of STS-107 into
perspective, the Board asked NASA to determine if there were options
for the safe return of the STS-107 crew. In this study, NASA was to
assume that the extent of damage to the leading edge of the left wing
was determined by national imaging assets or by a spacewalk. NASA was
then asked to evaluate the possibility of:

1. Rescuing the STS-107 crew by launching Atlantis. Atlantis would be
hurried to the pad, launched, rendezvous with Columbia, and take on
Columbia's crew for a return. It was assumed that NASA would be
willing to expose Atlantis and its crew to the same possibility of
External Tank bipod foam loss that damaged Columbia.

2. Repairing damage to Columbia's wing on orbit. In the repair
scenario, astronauts would use onboard materials to rig a temporary
fix. Some of Columbia's cargo might be jettisoned and a different
re-entry profile would be flown to lessen heating on the left wing
leading edge. The crew would be prepared to bail out if the wing
structure was predicted to fail on landing.

In its study of these two options, NASA assumed the following
timeline. Following the debris strike discovery on Flight Day Two,
Mission Managers requested imagery by Flight Day Three. That imagery
was inconclusive, leading to a decision on Flight Day Four to perform
a spacewalk on Flight Day Five. That spacewalk revealed potentially
catastrophic damage. The crew was directed to begin conserving
consumables, such as oxygen and water, and Shuttle managers began
around-the-clock processing of Atlantis to prepare it for launch.
Shuttle managers pursued both the rescue and the repair options from
Flight Day Six to Flight Day 26, and on that day (February 10) decided
which one to abandon.The NASA team deemed this timeline realistic for
several reasons. First, the team determined that a spacewalk to
inspect the left wing could be easily accomplished. The team then
assessed how the crew could limit its use of consumables
to determine how long Columbia could stay in orbit. The limiting
consumable was the lithium hydroxide canisters, which scrub from the
cabin atmosphere the carbon dioxide the crew exhales. After consulting
with flight surgeons, the team concluded that by modifying crew
activity and sleep time carbon dioxide could be kept to acceptable
levels until Flight Day 30 (the morning of February 15). All other
consumables would last longer. Oxygen, the next most critical, would
require the crew to return on Flight Day 31.

Repairing Damage On Orbit

The repair option (see Figure 6.4-1), while logistically viable
using existing materials onboard Columbia, relied on so many
uncertainties that NASA rated this option “high risk.” To complete a
repair, the crew would perform a spacewalk to fill an assumed 6-inch
hole in an RCC panel with heavy metal tools, small pieces of titanium,
or other metal scavenged from the crew cabin. These heavy metals,
which would help protect the wing structure, would be held in place
during

re-entry by a water-filled bag that had turned into ice in the cold of
space. The ice and metal would help restore wing leading edge
geometry, preventing a turbulent airflow over the wing and therefore
keeping heating and burn-through levels low enough for the crew to
survive re-entry and bail out before landing. Because the NASA team
could not verify that the repairs would survive even a modified
re-entry, the rescue option had a considerably higher chance of
bringing Columbia's crew back alive.

Rescuing the STS-107 Crew with Atlantis

Accelerating the processing of Atlantis for early launch and
rendezvous with Columbia was by far the most complex task in the
rescue scenario. On Columbia's Flight Day Four, Atlantis was in the
Orbiter Processing Facility at Kennedy Space Center with its main
engines installed and only 41 days from its scheduled March 1 launch.
The Solid Rocket Boosters were already mated with the External Tank in
the Vehicle Assembly Building. By working three around-the-clock
shifts seven days a week, Atlantis could be readied for launch, with
no necessary testing skipped, by February 10. If launch processing and
countdown proceeded smoothly, this would provide a five-day window,
from February 10 to February 15, in which Atlantis could rendezvous
with Columbia before Columbia's consumables ran out. According
to records, the weather on these days allowed a launch. Atlantis would
be launched with a crew of four: a commander, pilot, and two
astronauts trained for spacewalks. In January, seven commanders, seven
pilots, and nine spacewalk-trained astronauts were available. During
the rendezvous on Atlantis's first day in orbit, the two Orbiters
would maneuver to face each other with their payload bay doors open
(see Figure 6.4-2). Suited Columbia crew members would then be
transferred to Atlantis via spacewalks. Atlantis would return with
four crew members on the flight deck and seven in the mid-deck.
Mission Control would then configure Columbia for a de-orbit burn that
would ditch the Orbiter in the Pacific Ocean, or would have the
Columbia crew take it to a higher orbit for a possible subsequent
repair mission if more thorough repairs could be developed.

This rescue was considered challenging but feasible. To succeed, it
required problem-free processing of Atlantis and a flawless launch
countdown. If Program managers had understood the threat that the
bipod foam strike posed and were able to unequivocally determine
before Flight Day Seven that there was potentially catastrophic damage
to the left wing, these repair and rescue plans would most likely have
been developed, and a rescue would have been conceivable. For a
detailed discussion of the rescue and repair options, see Appendix
D.13.

Findings:

F6.4-1 The repair option, while logistically viable using existing
materials onboard Columbia, relied on so many uncertainties that NASA
rated this option high risk.

F6.4-2 If Program managers were able to unequivocally determine before
Flight Day Seven that there was potentially catastrophic damage to the
left wing, accelerated processing of Atlantis might have provided a
window in which Atlantis could rendezvous with Columbia before
Columbia's limited consumables ran out...."









--
Rusty Barton - Antelope, California |"I'm moving to Mars next week,
E-mail - | so if you have any boxes...."
Visit my Titan I ICBM website at: | - Steven Wright
http://www.geocities.com/titan_1_missile |

Dave Ludlow wrote:
It would be quite logical to risk 4 volunteer crew with a (say) 10 to
30% risk of death in an attempt to save seven more with a (say) 80%
probability of death.

The problem isn't the crew, they are easily replaced. Atlantis
however is near irreplaceable.

I don't know how the *overall* probabilities would have worked out but
the chance of foam strikes causing severe wing damage in successive
shuttle missions, given the history, would be quite low.

The overall probability is low, but both 107 *and the flight
immediately before* suffered foam strikes, and both lost the left
bipod ramp.

That tells me that that using 'overall' statistics is shakey at best.
(Which is what NASA did, and paid for it in blood.)

D.
--
The STS-107 Columbia Loss FAQ can be found
at the following URLs:

Text-Only Version:
http://www.io.com/~o_m/columbia_loss_faq.html

Enhanced HTML Version:
http://www.io.com/~o_m/columbia_loss_faq_x.html

Corrections, comments, and additions should be
e-mailed to , as well as posted to
sci.space.history and sci.space.shuttle for
discussion.

With respect, I think that the criterion change when you have to find a way
to get a crew back. I imagine that those in the know would be aware of any
problems with the other Shuttle, and the actual odds of the same problem
occuring are pretty slim.

Do people who man lifeboats say, no, not going to try , the sea is too
rough?

Brian

--
Brian Gaff....
graphics are great, but the blind can't hear them
Email:
__________________________________________________ __________________________
__________________________________


"Steven D. Litvintchouk" wrote in message
link.net...
| Rusty B wrote:
|
| After Columbia Tragedy, NASA Considers Space Rescue
|
| Reuters
|
| Aug. 26
| - By Deborah Zabarenko
|
| WASHINGTON (Reuters) - Could the Columbia disaster have been avoided?
| After the fatal accident, NASA came up with a possible scenario to
| rescue the crew with another shuttle.
|
| If shuttle controllers knew by the seventh day of the mission there
| was catastrophic damage to Columbia's left wing, they could have
| rushed shuttle Atlantis into orbit and evacuated Columbia's crew
| before the supply of breathable air ran out, investigators said in
| their report on Tuesday.
|
| We've been all thru this already, repeatedly.
|
| Rushing Atlantis for launch contradicts the strong CAIB recommendations
| that NASA shouldn't launch the shuttle if there is significant suspicion
| that a major safety problem exists. Well guess what, the fact that
| Columbia's left wing would have known to be damaged would have made them
| just a little suspicious that a safety problem exists that could
| jeopardize Atlantis too, don't you think?
|
| With that problem unsolved at that point, they could have lost Atlantis
| to exactly the same wing problem as they were losing Columbia.
|
| And beyond that, rushing Atlantis for launch and insisting it launch no
| matter what, in order to reach Columbia in time, could have caused other
| safety problems to crop up.
|
| Better to lose one shuttle and seven astronauts, then to lose two
| shuttles and 11 astronauts.
|
| The shuttle is an experimental vehicle, not some routine spaceliner.
| And in experiments, you never risk any more people than you have to.
|
|
| --
| Steven D. Litvintchouk
| Email:
|
| Remove the NOSPAM before replying to me.
|


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In article ,
(Derek Lyons) writes:
| Dave Ludlow wrote:
| It would be quite logical to risk 4 volunteer crew with a (say) 10 to
| 30% risk of death in an attempt to save seven more with a (say) 80%
| probability of death.
|
| The problem isn't the crew, they are easily replaced. Atlantis
| however is near irreplaceable.

The same argument applies with slightly different numbers. Get the
crew down first, and run another mission with a foam repair kit.
If all goes well, you have saved both shuttles.

| I don't know how the *overall* probabilities would have worked out but
| the chance of foam strikes causing severe wing damage in successive
| shuttle missions, given the history, would be quite low.
|
| The overall probability is low, but both 107 *and the flight
| immediately before* suffered foam strikes, and both lost the left
| bipod ramp.
|
| That tells me that that using 'overall' statistics is shakey at best.
| (Which is what NASA did, and paid for it in blood.)

It shouldn't. Using overall statistics is fine, provided that you
don't ABUSE them. And assuming independence of events with no
reason to believe it is a very common abuse of statistics.

In this context, it raises the question of whether that was a simple
coincidence or due to a common cause. With the former, it would
be very unlikely to happen a third time; with the latter, it might
be almost certain to.


Regards,
Nick Maclaren.

On Wed, 27 Aug 2003 12:48:36 +0000, Nick Maclaren wrote:

The same argument applies with slightly different numbers. Get the
crew down first, and run another mission with a foam repair kit.
If all goes well, you have saved both shuttles.

Er... no.

If you leave an orbiter unattended for the length of time required
to send up a _second_ rescue mission, it's dead.

Unrecoverable.

An orbiter needs power to protect its mechanisms and electronics
from orbital conditions.

You can't just "park it" and walk away with the keys...

Regards,
Nick Maclaren.

--
Chuck Stewart
"Anime-style catgirls: Threat? Menace? Or just studying algebra?"

In article ,
"Chuck Stewart" writes:
| On Wed, 27 Aug 2003 12:48:36 +0000, Nick Maclaren wrote:
|
| The same argument applies with slightly different numbers. Get the
| crew down first, and run another mission with a foam repair kit.
| If all goes well, you have saved both shuttles.
|
| Er... no.
|
| If you leave an orbiter unattended for the length of time required
| to send up a _second_ rescue mission, it's dead.
|
| Unrecoverable.
|
| An orbiter needs power to protect its mechanisms and electronics
| from orbital conditions.
|
| You can't just "park it" and walk away with the keys...

A fair comment. I should have said that I was talking about the
principle, and not about the details - where you are right that I
am completely ignorant.

But, subject to the same assumptions as for the rescue evaluation,
(a) how much hacking would be necessary to enable it to last that
long and (b) could enough supplies have been take up to enable a
skeleton crew to maintain it for that long? It assuredly would
have justified a (separate) team evaluating the possibility.


Regards,
Nick Maclaren.

On Wed, 27 Aug 2003 13:12:58 +0000, Nick Maclaren wrote:

"Chuck Stewart" writes:

An orbiter needs power to protect its mechanisms and electronics
from orbital conditions.

You can't just "park it" and walk away with the keys...

A fair comment. I should have said that I was talking about the
principle, and not about the details - where you are right that I
am completely ignorant.

But, subject to the same assumptions as for the rescue evaluation,
(a) how much hacking would be necessary to enable it to last that
long and (b) could enough supplies have been take up to enable a
skeleton crew to maintain it for that long? It assuredly would
have justified a (separate) team evaluating the possibility.

These questions and more are answered in the Columbia Loss FAQ...
http://www.io.com/~o_m/columbia_loss_faq_x.html
http://www.io.com/~o_m/columbia_loss...scu e_shuttle
http://www.io.com/~o_m/columbia_loss..._cross_package

The short answer is that there is no way to refuel on-orbit the
fuel cells that provide power, so... when they run out the orbiter
dies. And they will run out no matter how you much you try to cut
back on power consumption.

Regards,
Nick Maclaren.

--
Chuck Stewart
"Anime-style catgirls: Threat? Menace? Or just studying algebra?"

On Wed, 27 Aug 2003 07:58:59 +0000, "Chuck Stewart"
wrote:

On Wed, 27 Aug 2003 12:48:36 +0000, Nick Maclaren wrote:

The same argument applies with slightly different numbers. Get the
crew down first, and run another mission with a foam repair kit.
If all goes well, you have saved both shuttles.

Er... no.

If you leave an orbiter unattended for the length of time required
to send up a _second_ rescue mission, it's dead.

Unrecoverable.

An orbiter needs power to protect its mechanisms and electronics
from orbital conditions.

You can't just "park it" and walk away with the keys...

True... but from page 174 of the report:

"...Mission Control would then configure Columbia for a de-orbit burn
that would ditch the Orbiter in the Pacific Ocean, or would have the
Columbia crew take it to a higher orbit for a possible subsequent
repair mission if more thorough repairs could be developed.
This rescue was considered challenging but feasible... For a detailed
discussion of the rescue and repair options see Appendix D.13."

[Appendix D had not yet been published when I last checked, yesterday
evening).

So, the "park and repair later" option was certainly not ruled out by
the investigation team.

--
Dave

On Wed, 27 Aug 2003 15:29:19 +0100, Dave Ludlow wrote:

On Wed, 27 Aug 2003 07:58:59 +0000, "Chuck Stewart"

You can't just "park it" and walk away with the keys...

True... but from page 174 of the report:

"...Mission Control would then configure Columbia for a de-orbit burn
that would ditch the Orbiter in the Pacific Ocean, or would have the
Columbia crew take it to a higher orbit for a possible subsequent
repair mission if more thorough repairs could be developed.
This rescue was considered challenging but feasible... For a detailed
discussion of the rescue and repair options see Appendix D.13."

[Appendix D had not yet been published when I last checked, yesterday
evening).

So, the "park and repair later" option was certainly not ruled out by
the investigation team.

Hmmm... assuming power is brought to the orbiter is it possible to
reheat and use a frozen hypergolic OMS system?

We could assume the power is from a payload bay pallet brought up
in the repair ship, transferred to the stricken orbiter, and
hotwired to the orbiter power system. It would have to last just
long enough for the orbiter to get home.

--
Chuck Stewart
"Anime-style catgirls: Threat? Menace? Or just studying algebra?"

Dave Ludlow wrote:
So, the "park and repair later" option was certainly not ruled out by
the investigation team.

Keep in mind two factors; One - The scenario posited early discovery
and aggressive early action. Two - The Columbia was carrying the EDO
(Extended Duration Orbiter) pallet, which meant she had more
consumables than an ordinary flight.

However, there isn't a second EDO pallet, the only one was lost with
Columbia. Also, it's a huge payload and performance hit.

D.
--
The STS-107 Columbia Loss FAQ can be found
at the following URLs:

Text-Only Version:
http://www.io.com/~o_m/columbia_loss_faq.html

Enhanced HTML Version:
http://www.io.com/~o_m/columbia_loss_faq_x.html

Corrections, comments, and additions should be
e-mailed to , as well as posted to
sci.space.history and sci.space.shuttle for
discussion.