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JimO: Please forgive the tone of this brag -- I think it's timely.
Today's 'Washington Post' (Aug 24) has a long narrative of the sequence of events that led to the loss of space shuttle 'Columbia' on February 1. Of particular interest is Sawyer's comments, "The ... predictions would turn out to be correct about the nonlethal effects of the foam striking glassy tiles. But later, in painful hindsight, a glaring misstep in the engineering calculus would become clear: The team had assumed that the tile analysis told them all they needed to know about the potential damage to the very different RCC material as well. Conventional wisdom among the engineers was that the RCC, designed to withstand higher temperatures than the tiles, was also more resistant to impact damage. But they really did not know. Nobody had tested the question. This fact had been clearly noted in Boeing's written Jan. 23 assessment of the potential damage to Columbia: 'No SOFI [spray on foam insulation] on RCC test data available.' The engineers had, in effect, been guessing. And neither Ham nor any other manager challenged the conclusion." This is the very heart of the fatal flaw in NASA's decision-making. And it is basically a rewrite of the groundbreaking analysis of this precise issue, in my msnbc.com columns "The Hole in NASA's Safety Culture" (July 8) http://www.msnbc.com/news/936070.asp?0cv=CB20, and "Post-Columbia NASA hunkers down" (July 23), http://www.msnbc.com/news/943305.asp?0dm=C219T. It's happened before -- when you publish an original insight too far in advance, by the time the rest of the news media catches on and repeats it (right down to the same word I used -- "guess"), it's become 'common knowledge' not worthy of citation or credit grin! The only remedy is for NBC to continue to 'own this story' by staying ahead and continuing to break new facts, new analysis, new insights, new images -- which we intend to do! This has been possible -- and will continue to be possible -- thanks to insights shared by many, many people who trust us to get the story out accurately, completely, and fairly -- the only possible route to recovery for the program as a whole. Jim O 281-337-2838 Columbia's 'Smoking Gun' Was Obscured NASA Did Not See a Deadly Risk When Foam Struck Shuttle Wing By Kathy Sawyer, Washington Post Staff Writer Sunday, August 24, 2003; Page A01 http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn...2003Aug23.html |
#2
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Yes, of course we can all see the wood for the trees now. I just wonder if
the real problem is that reading something, and comprehending what it says are two very different things, ofthen you see and read what you expect to se. Quite how you sort this problem out I'm not sure. I guess you use a shadow team or something, a bit like you use multiple computers in safety critical processes. I mean why would the human system be able to get the right answer if it malfunctioned any more than a single computer would. Brian -- Brian Gaff.... graphics are great, but the blind can't hear them Email: __________________________________________________ __________________________ __________________________________ --- Outgoing mail is certified Virus Free. Checked by AVG anti-virus system (http://www.grisoft.com). Version: 6.0.512 / Virus Database: 309 - Release Date: 19/08/03 |
#3
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![]() No revelation. Ron Dittemore's first press conference pretty much summed it up. Columbia's 'Smoking Gun' Was Obscured NASA Did Not See a Deadly Risk When Foam Struck Shuttle Wing By Kathy Sawyer, Washington Post Staff Writer Sunday, August 24, 2003; Page A01 http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn...2003Aug23.html -----= Posted via Newsfeeds.Com, Uncensored Usenet News =----- http://www.newsfeeds.com - The #1 Newsgroup Service in the World! -----== Over 100,000 Newsgroups - 19 Different Servers! =----- |
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In article ,
James Oberg wrote: This is the very heart of the fatal flaw in NASA's decision-making. And it is basically a rewrite of the groundbreaking analysis of this precise issue, in my msnbc.com columns "The Hole in NASA's Safety Culture" (July 8) http://www.msnbc.com/news/936070.asp?0cv=CB20, and "Post-Columbia NASA hunkers down" (July 23), http://www.msnbc.com/news/943305.asp?0dm=C219T. If it had been written before February 1, then it might have been "groudbreaking". When Richard Blomberg said in Congressional testimony in April 2002, "I have never been as worried for space shuttle safety as I am right now," that was a timely statement. Who reported on it then? Your story now is just grubbing for priority. And it's misleading too, because the mission management team did not crash the shuttle. They passed up a desperate chance to save the shuttle at the last hour, which is not the same thing. I really feel sorry for the MMT: they were left holding the bag, and any mistakes they made look awful. The real problem was that the foam hit the shuttle in the first place. As the CAIB report explains, NASA manned spaceflight let it happen because the space shuttle is an experimental vehicle with an operational mission. It goes all the way back to the beginning of space shuttle flights. As the CAIB report quoted Ronald Reagan from 1982: [b]eginning with the next flight, the Columbia and her sister ships will be fully operational, ready to provide economical and routine access to space for scientific exploration, commercial ventures, and for tasks related to the national security. The space shuttle has always dragged along this millstone of unrealistic expectations. That's why it crashed. -- /\ Greg Kuperberg (UC Davis) / \ \ / Visit the Math ArXiv Front at http://front.math.ucdavis.edu/ \/ * All the math that's fit to e-print * |
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