1977 DCI view of tactical use of spysats, vulnerability

A while back I posted some vulnerability-related excerpts
from the famous (or infamous, as you choose to see it)
Team B pseudo-NIE: "Team B on ASATs (the view from 1976)"
http://tinyurl.com/b57uy also
http://www.fas.org/spp/military/prog.../at_951019.htm

The document the following was taken from was published
soon after the Team B report and probably was at least
somewhat influenced by it.



1977
Director of Central Intelligence
Report on
The Intelligence Community
DCI/IC 77-4657

SECRET
Approved for Release 2002/05/07:
CIA-RDP83M00171R002100110007-6


-Page 1-

INTRODUCTION

A. Purpose of the Report

This is the first comprehensive report(*) on the Intelligence
Community presented to the President and the Congress by the
Director of Central Intelligence. It is designed to provide an
over-view of the context, significant trends and major
challenges confronting the United States national foreign
intelligence effort from the DCI's perspective on the
Intelligence Community as a whole(**). (U)

(*) The original report, published in January 1977, was
classified Top Secret. This version is being published at the
Secret level to make the report available to a wider readership.

(**) The term "intelligence," whenever used in this report,
should be taken to mean foreign intelligence unless otherwise
specified. [remainder of footnote omitted]. (U)

-Page 20-

National/Tactical Intelligence Interface.

Considerable attention has recently been devoted to problems
related to the conflicting demands of national and tactical
needs for intelligence derived from national systems,
particularly over-head reconnaissance systems. In reality the
problem is three-tiered, involving the needs of national,
departmental and field consumers. Each element has needs and
missions which are unique, and which differ in important
respects from those of the others. The nature of some of these
differing needs is such that certain collection systems cannot
be optimized for one consumer without serious degradation of
their utility to others. Tradeoffs are required, and must be
made from a national perspective. (S)

The current mission of most national intelligence collection
resources is the timely and continuing support of national-
level decision makers involved in policy formulation,
international negotiations, and crisis, control. These systems
are designed to operate in an essentially benign environment. If
we were to redesign our national intelligence capabilities to
operate effectively in both benign and conflict environments, we
would have to make a major investment in system survivability
and the tactical communication and dissemination links and
subsystems. We would also have to consider the impacts of such a
step in terms of effects on aspects of our foreign policy (such
as the Open Skies Agreement. SALT verification, etc.) and on the
overall intelligence budget, including national, departmental,
and intelligence-related* programs. (S)

In effect, we are faced with the dilemma of trading off our
capabilities to support war avoidance and crisis control and our
capabilities to provide tactical intelligence from hardened
national systems at such time as our military forces may be
committed. In reality, the viability of national intelligence
systems as wartime assets remains to be proven. It needs to be
tested in more joint exercises and war games. Such evaluations
would demonstrate the relative capabilities of national and
tactical intelligence assets for support of combat operations,
as well us of the National Command Authority. We must ascertain
what can be accomplished effectively with the systems now in
being, both national and tactical, before we venture into a
massive redesign which would be expensive in terms of money,
time and capabilities. (S)

(*) Intelligence-related programs are those programs which,
while not art of the National Foreign Intelligence Program, are
closely related to it; included are such things as tactical
warning, airborne reconnaissance, ocean surveillance, and
certain training. (C)

-Page 20-

The recent recommendation for a national-level study to provide
the basis for a Presidential decision is the first step.
Planning for more joint exercises involving national systems is
underway and should establish what we can effectively do now.
Simultaneously, the capability of tactical systems to provide
information to the National Command Authority will be tested. On
the basis of what we learn from these initiatives, we can make
informed judgments as to how to proceed in resolving the
interface problem. (S)

As intelligence-related assets become more expensive, complex,
and interrelated with national intelligence assets, it becomes
even more crucial that central control be exercised to prevent
overlap and unnecessary duplication. The Congress has stressed
this point and E.O. 11905 has emphasized the same theme. There
must be the necessary concept, doctrine, policy, and strategy to
assure that we are moving in the right direction. (U)