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NASA Astronaut on Columbia Repair (and others)



 
 
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  #171  
Old November 24th 06, 11:20 PM posted to sci.space.shuttle,sci.space.history
Jonathan Silverlight[_1_]
external usenet poster
 
Posts: 298
Default NASA Astronaut on Columbia Repair (and others)

In message . com,
columbiaaccidentinvestigation
writes

Open sharing of information is crucial to improving everybody's
understanding of the universe around us.


Is this supposed to be a sig? If so, it's not correctly formatted
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Signature_block
--
Open sharing of information is crucial to improving everybody's
understanding of the universe around us.
  #172  
Old November 24th 06, 11:35 PM posted to sci.space.shuttle,sci.space.history
columbiaaccidentinvestigation
external usenet poster
 
Posts: 1,344
Default NASA Astronaut on Columbia Repair (and others)


Jonathan Silverlight wrote:
In message . com,
columbiaaccidentinvestigation
writes

Open sharing of information is crucial to improving everybody's
understanding of the universe around us.


Is this supposed to be a sig? If so, it's not correctly formatted
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Signature_block
--
Open sharing of information is crucial to improving everybody's
understanding of the universe around us.


Interesting jonathon, perhaps i might misunderstand you but are you
trying to speak for others with youre above post?

Would you like to attempt to state what you would do in boisjoly's
situation?


http://history.nasa.gov/rogersrep/v1ch2.htm
"Report of the PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION on the Space Shuttle
Challenger Accident, Chapter II: Events Leading Up to the Challenger
Mission
Flight Readiness Review
The Level I Flight Readiness Review for mission 51-L took place on
January 15, 1986. The Flight Readiness Review should address all
aspects of flight preparation about which any questions have arisen. In
addition, attendees confirm that all equipment and operational plans
have been certified ready by the responsible manager within NASA. Solid
Rocket Booster joints were not discussed during the review on January
15.
The period during the day when a particular flight can be launched is
determined by the requirements of the Orbiter and the payloads. The
launch period for mission 51-L was limited in order to provide the best
lighting conditions for Spartan's observations of Halley's Comet. The
resulting «launch window" was a topic of some discussion at the Flight
Readiness Review. The Challenger launch originally had been scheduled
for a morning lift off. When Spartan was added to the mission, the
launch window was changed to the afternoon. This change would have
required a landing at night if a transatlantic abort landing had become
necessary. Because the alternate transatlantic site, Casablanca, was
not equipped for a night landing, the afternoon launch eliminated that
back-up site. As January drew to a close, however, the conditions for
optimum telescopic viewing of the comet could not be met. The launch
window was shifted back to the morning hours so that the transatlantic
abort site would be in daylight and a back-up site (Casablanca) would
be available.
The results of the flight design process were summarized at the Flight
Readiness Review. The predicted ascent performance, including expected
trajectory, main engine throttling profile, expected dynamic pressure
and the amount of propellant reserve expected at main engine cutoff,
were presented and discussed. The expected landing parameters, weight
and center of gravity figures were also presented for a variety of
contingencies. It should be noted that a waiver was required because
the weight of the Orbiter exceeded the allowable limits for an abort
landing. The flight design data presented at the Flight Readiness
Review are available in the Appendix in the NASA Mission Planning and
Operations Team Report. No outstanding concerns were identified in the
discussion of flight design."



ROGERS COMMISSION TESTIMONY
http://history.nasa.gov/rogersrep/v1ch5.htm
Report of the PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION on the Space Shuttle Challenger
Accident
Chapter V: The Contributing Cause of The Accident.
[82] The decision to launch the Challenger was flawed. Those who made
that decision were unaware of the recent history of problems concerning
the O-rings and the joint and were unaware of the initial written
recommendation of the contractor advising against the launch at
temperatures below 53 degrees Fahrenheit and the continuing opposition
of the engineers at Thiokol after the management reversed its position.
They did not have a clear understanding of Rockwell's concern that it
was not safe to launch because of ice on the pad. If the decisionmakers
had known all of the facts, it is highly unlikely that they would have
decided to launch 51-L on January 28, 1986.

Flaws In The Decision Making Process
In addition to analyzing all available evidence concerning the material
causes of the accident on January 28, the Commission examined the chain
of decisions that culminated in approval of the launch. It concluded
that the decision making process was flawed in several ways. The actual
events that produced the information upon which the approval of launch
was based are recounted and appraised in the sections of this chapter.
The discussion that follows relies heavily on excerpts from the
testimony of those involved in the management judgments that led to the
launch of the Challenger under conditions described.
That testimony reveals failures in communication that resulted in a
decision to launch 51-L based on incomplete and sometimes misleading
information, a conflict between engineering data and management
judgments, and a NASA management structure that permitted internal
flight safety problems to bypass key Shuttle managers.
The Shuttle Flight Readiness Review is a carefully planned,
step-by-step activity, established by NASA program directive SPO-PD
710.5A, 1 designed to certify the readiness of all components of the
Space Shuttle assembly. The process is focused upon the Level I Flight
Readiness Review, held approximately two weeks before a launch. The
Level I review is a conference chaired by the NASA Associate
Administrator for Space Flight and supported by the NASA Chief
Engineer, the Program Manager, the center directors and project
managers from Johnson, Marshall and Kennedy, along with senior
contractor representatives.
The formal portion of the process is initiated by directive from the
Associate Administrator for Space Flight. The directive outlines the
schedule for the Level I Flight Readiness Review and for the steps that
precede it. The process begins at Level IV with the contractors
formally certifying-in writing-the flight readiness of the elements for
which they are responsible. Certification is made to the appropriate
Level III NASA project managers at Johnson and Marshall. Additionally,
at Marshall the review is followed by a presentation directly to the
Center Director. At Kennedy the Level III review, chaired by the Center
Director, verifies readiness of the launch support elements.
The next step in the process is the Certification of Flight Readiness
to the Level II Program Manager at Johnson. In this review each Space
Shuttle program element endorses that it has satisfactorily completed
the manufacture, [83] assembly, test and checkout of the pertinent
element, including the contractors" certification that design and
performance are up to standard. The Flight Readiness Review process
culminates in the Level I review.
In the initial notice of the review, the Level I directive establishes
a Mission Management Team for the particular mission. The team assumes
responsibility for each Shuttle's readiness for a period commencing 48
hours before launch and continuing through post-landing crew egress and
the safing of the Orbiter. On call throughout the entire period, the
Mission Management Team supports the Associate Administrator for Space
Flight and the Program Manager.
A structured Mission Management Team meeting-called L-1-is held 24
hours, or one day, prior to each scheduled launch. Its agenda includes
closeout of any open work, a closeout of any Flight Readiness Review
action items, a discussion of new or continuing anomalies, and an
updated briefing on anticipated weather conditions at the launch site
and at the abort landing sites in different parts of the world. It is
standard practice of Level-I and II officials to encourage the
reporting of new problems or concerns that might develop in the
interval between the Flight Readiness Review and the L-1 meeting, and
between the L-1 and launch.
In a procedural sense, the process described... At approximately 8:45
p.m. Eastern Standard Time, Phase 2 of the teleconference commenced,
the Thiokol charts and written data having arrived at Kennedy Space
Center by telefax. (A table of teleconference participants is included
with Chronology of Events.) The charts presented a history of the
O-ring erosion and blow-by in the Solid Rocket Booster joints of
previous flights, presented the results of subscale testing at Thiokol
and the results of static tests of Solid Rocket Motors. In the
following testimony, Roger Boisjoly, Allan McDonald and Larry Mulloy
expressed their recollections of this teleconference up to the point
when an off-net caucus was requested: 9

Mr. Boisjoly: I expressed deep concern about launching at low
temperature. I presented Chart 2-1 with emphasis-now, 2-1, if you want
to see it, I have it, but basically that was the chart that summarized
the primary concerns, and that was the chart that I pulled right out of
the Washington presentation without changing one word of it because it
was still applicable, and it addresses the highest concern of the field
joint in both the ignition transient condition and the steady state
condition, and it really sets down the rationale for why we were
continuing to fly. Basically, if erosion penetrates the primary O-ring
seal, there is a higher probability of no secondary seal capability in
the steady state condition. And I had two sub-bullets under that which
stated bench testing showed O-ring not capable of maintaining contact
with metal parts, gap, opening rate to maximum operating pressure. I
had another bullet which stated bench testing showed capability to
maintain O-ring contact during initial phase (0 to 170 milliseconds of
transient). That was my comfort basis of continuing to fly under normal
circumstances, normal being within the data base we had.
I emphasized, when I presented that chart about the changing of the
timing function of the O-ring as it attempted to seal. I was concerned
that we may go from that first beginning region into that intermediate
region, from O to 170 being the first region, and 170 to 330 being the
intermediate region where we didn't have a high probability of sealing
or seating.
I then presented Chart 2-2 with added concerns related to the timing
function. And basically on that chart, I started off talking about a
lower temperature than current data base results in changing the
primary O-ring sealing timing function, and I discussed the SRM-15
[Flight 51-C, January, 1985] observations, namely, the 15A [Left SRM,
Flight 51-C] motor had 80 degrees arc black grease between the O-rings,
and make no mistake about it, when I say black, I mean black just like
coal. It was jet black. And SRM-15B [Right SRM, Flight 51-C] had a 110
degree arc of black grease between the O-rings. We would have low
O-ring squeeze due to low.....


[89] ....temperature which I calculated earlier in the day. We should
have higher O-ring Shore hardness.
Now, that would be harder. And what that material really is, it would
be likened to trying to shove a brick into a crack versus a sponge.
That is a good analogy for purposes of this discussion. I also
mentioned that thicker grease, as a result of lower temperatures, would
have a higher viscosity. It wouldn't be as slick and slippery as it
would be at room temperature. And so it would be a little bit more
difficult to move across it.
We would have higher O-ring pressure actuation time, in my opinion, and
that is what I presented.... These are the sum and substance of what I
just presented. If action time increases, then the threshold of
secondary seal pressurization capability is approached. That was my
fear. If the threshold is reached, then secondary seal may not be
capable of being pressurized, and that was the bottom line of
everything that had been presented up to that point.
Chairman Rogers: Did anybody take issue with you?
Mr. Boisjoly: Well, I am coming to that. I also showed a chart of the
joint with an exaggerated cross section to show the seal lifted off,
which has been shown to everybody. I was asked, yes, at that point in
time I was asked to quantify my concerns, and I said I couldn't. I
couldn't quantify it. I had no data to quantify it, but I did say I
knew that it was away from goodness in the current data base. Someone
on the net commented that we had soot blow-by on SRM-22 [Flight 61-A,
October, 1985] which was launched at 75 degrees. I don't remember who
made the comment, but that is where the first comment came in about the
disparity between my conclusion and the observed data because SRM-22
[Flight 61-A, October, 1985] had blow-by at essentially a room
temperature launch.
I then said that SRM-15 [Flight 51-C, January, 1985] had much more
blow-by indication and that it was indeed telling us that lower
temperature was a factor. This was supported by inspection of flown
hardware by myself. I was asked again for data to support my claim, and
I said I have none other than what is being presented, and I had been
trying to get resilience data, Arnie and I both, since last October,
and that statement was mentioned on the net.

Others in the room presented their charts, and the main telecon session
concluded with Bob Lund, who is our Vice President of....


[90] ....Engineering, presenting his conclusions and recommendations
charts which were based on our data input up to that point. Listeners
on the telecon were not pleased with the conclusions and the
recommendations.
Chairman Rogers: What was the conclusion ?
Mr. Boisjoly: The conclusion was we should not fly outside of our data
base, which was 53 degrees. Those were the conclusions. And we were
quite pleased because we knew in advance, having participated in the
preparation, what the conclusions were, and we felt very comfortable
with that.
Mr. Acheson: Who presented that conclusion?
Mr. Boisjoly: Mr. Bob Lund. He had prepared those charts. He had input
from other people. He had actually physically prepared the charts. It
was about that time that Mr. Hardy from Marshall was asked what he
thought about the MTI [Morton Thiokol] recommendation, and he said he
was appalled at the MTI decision. Mr. Hardy was also asked about
launching, and he said no, not if the contractor recommended not
launching, he would not go against the contractor and launch.
There was a short discussion that ensued about temperature not being a
discriminator between SRM-15 [Flight 51-C] and SRM-22 [Flight 61-A],
and shortly after, I believe it was Mr. Kilminster asked if- excuse me.
I'm getting confused here. Mr. Kilminster was asked by NASA if he would
launch, and he said no because the engineering recommendation was not
to launch.
Then MTI management then asked for a five-minute caucus. I'm not sure
exactly who asked for that, but it was asked in such a manner that I
remember it was asked for, a five-minute caucus, which we put on- the
line on mute and went off-line with the rest of the net.
Chairman Rogers: Mr. Boisjoly, at the time that you made the-that
Thiokol made the recommendation not to launch, was that the unanimous
recommendation as far as you knew?
Mr. Boisjoly: Yes. I have to make something clear. I have been
distressed by the things that have been appearing in the paper and
things that have been said in general, and there was never one
positive, pro-launch statement ever made by anybody. There have been
some feelings since then that folks have expressed that they would
support the decision, but there was not one positive statement for
launch ever made in that room."



Open sharing of information is crucial to improving everybody's
understanding of the universe around us.
Tom

  #173  
Old November 25th 06, 10:07 PM posted to sci.space.history,sci.space.shuttle
Craig Fink
external usenet poster
 
Posts: 1,858
Default Dear NASA Administrator Michael Griffin ( NASA Astronaut on Columbia Repair (and others))

Dear...Columbia's Tiles...not of Museum Quality...I'd like to...
...
..

Thanks,
Craig Fink
Electronic Mail Address;
....
...
..
--
On Sat, 25 Nov 2006 08:06:00 +0200, SENECA and ... wrote:

Like the myth that the tiles are too fragile to touch. Propagated
here, right up the the point where astronauts started hacking away with
hack saw blades to remove gap fillers, tapping on them, got them between
their fingers. Hey these things aren't too fragile after all.



They are very _fragile_; someone here on the newsgroup had one, and
dropped it on a table from a few inches up; the densified covering cracked.


....Yeah, I agree...throw it against a...

Not a surprise. Colliding rigid objects with low elasticity and no
plasticity can get high local pressures. Maybe 100 to 1000 times the
pressure an astronaut finger could create. Unlike at a RCC, a crack on
a tile surface is no big issue. Probably most tiles today have small
cracks on its surface.

If an astronaut wants to powderize a tile he may be able to do it with
one hand only. But as we know from NASA, he may also be able to handle
tile parts:

For a missing portion of T-seal, the best option would have
been to fill the resulting gap between the RCC panels with
tile fragments harvested by the EVA crew. The tile fragments
would be shaped by the crew IVA and then pushed into the
gap by the EVA crew. [NASA Report to CAIB]

The alleged danger to tiles by EVA astronauts was considered by NASA and
CAIB to unimportant to mention. Seems a typical Columbia Myth keept alive
by some regulars here.


Misspellings and grammer corrected by; Criag Fink

  #174  
Old November 26th 06, 02:46 PM posted to sci.space.history,sci.space.shuttle,sci.space.policy
Craig Fink
external usenet poster
 
Posts: 1,858
Default Dear NASA Administrator Michael Griffin

Not the right letter, but Privatizing Earth to LEO might be.

So what would a letter to Michael Griffin look like to privatize Earth to
LEO manned space flight? To get NASA to push for legislation to encourage
it?

What would the legislation look like to encourage, nurture, support and
transition to thriving Earth to LEO market? Private Enterprise?

Ideas?

Henry's probably right, money is people and NASA really wouldn't want to
lay off some of there own. But, I would think Contractors are fair game,
and really that's what a private market place to LEO looks like. No NASA
contractors in the Earth to LEO market, just purchased rides.

It would have to set up incentives to encourage Private Investment,
instead of Public Spending.

What other attributes should Private Enterprise Legislation have? To make
in a Win-Win situation all around?

NASA's perspective?

Major Contractor's (BoingLockMart) perspective?

Small Business's (Entrepreneurial) perspective?

Investment Capitalists perspective?

Large Banks perspective?

Average US Citizens perspective?

--
Craig Fink
Courtesy E-Mail Welcome @
--


  #175  
Old November 26th 06, 03:21 PM posted to sci.space.history,sci.space.shuttle,sci.space.policy
columbiaaccidentinvestigation
external usenet poster
 
Posts: 1,344
Default Dear NASA Administrator Michael Griffin


Craig Fink wrote:" Not the right letter, but Privatizing Earth to LEO
might be."

Gee craig, not the right thread, as the original post was pertaining to
an astronauts statements,

http://www.stpns.net/view_article.ht...43251064362304

Gutierrez said the fault lies in two words - engineering arrogance.

"NASA engineers were confident that they did everything right,"
Gutierrez said. "They were so sure everything would work as planned
they didn't think an escape system was necessary. The fact is, if
there had been an escape system on Columbia and Challenger, the crews
could have survived."

Actually the design shortcomings of the shuttle system had been known
for along time before the challenger tragedy, (ie no crew escape system
for more than a small percentage of the crew if in place, and only
usable for a small percentage of the flight) and therefore it is the
responsibility of managers and engineers to operate the space shuttle
system safely within it's known parameters, (ie launching on jan 28
1986 was a managerial decision to launch in the coldest wheather
despite engineers recommendations not to launch, and inspite of
evidence of srb "o-ring" burnthrough on the previous launch
sts-61c).

tom

  #176  
Old November 26th 06, 03:23 PM posted to sci.space.history,sci.space.shuttle,sci.space.policy
columbiaaccidentinvestigation
external usenet poster
 
Posts: 1,344
Default NASA Astronaut on Columbia Repair (and others)

Craig Fink wrote:" Not the right letter, but Privatizing Earth to LEO
might be."

Gee craig, not the right thread, as the original post was pertaining to
an astronauts statements,

http://www.stpns.net/view_article.ht...43251064362304

Gutierrez said the fault lies in two words - engineering arrogance.

"NASA engineers were confident that they did everything right,"
Gutierrez said. "They were so sure everything would work as planned
they didn't think an escape system was necessary. The fact is, if
there had been an escape system on Columbia and Challenger, the crews
could have survived."

Actually the design shortcomings of the shuttle system had been known
for along time before the challenger tragedy, (ie no crew escape system
for more than a small percentage of the crew if in place, and only
usable for a small percentage of the flight) and therefore it is the
responsibility of managers and engineers to operate the space shuttle
system safely within it's known parameters, (ie launching on jan 28
1986 was a managerial decision to launch in the coldest wheather
despite engineers recommendations not to launch, and inspite of
evidence of srb "o-ring" burnthrough on the previous launch
sts-61c).

tom

  #177  
Old November 26th 06, 06:22 PM posted to sci.space.history,sci.space.shuttle,sci.space.policy
jacob navia
external usenet poster
 
Posts: 341
Default Dear NASA Administrator Michael Griffin

Craig Fink a écrit :
Not the right letter, but Privatizing Earth to LEO might be.

So what would a letter to Michael Griffin look like to privatize Earth to
LEO manned space flight? To get NASA to push for legislation to encourage
it?

What would the legislation look like to encourage, nurture, support and
transition to thriving Earth to LEO market? Private Enterprise?


If "Private Enterprise" is so phantastic, why must it be "nurtured"
and "supported" with tax payer's money????

Damm it. It is PRIVATE so it doesn't need any public money!

Ideas?


Yes, let the market decide!

  #178  
Old November 26th 06, 06:40 PM posted to sci.space.history,sci.space.shuttle
columbiaaccidentinvestigation
external usenet poster
 
Posts: 1,344
Default NASA Astronaut on Columbia Repair (and others)

jacob navia wrote:"If "Private Enterprise" is so phantastic, why must
it be "nurtured" and "supported" with tax payer's money???? Damm it. It
is PRIVATE so it doesn't need any public money! Yes, let the market
decide!"

Not the right thread, as the original post was pertaining to an
astronauts statements,

http://www.stpns.net/view_article.ht...43251064362304

Gutierrez said the fault lies in two words - engineering arrogance.

"NASA engineers were confident that they did everything right,"
Gutierrez said. "They were so sure everything would work as planned
they didn't think an escape system was necessary. The fact is, if
there had been an escape system on Columbia and Challenger, the crews
could have survived."

Actually the design shortcomings of the shuttle system had been known
for along time before the challenger tragedy, (ie no crew escape system
for more than a small percentage of the crew if in place, and only
usable for a small percentage of the flight) and therefore it is the
responsibility of managers and engineers to operate the space shuttle
system safely within it's known parameters, (ie launching on jan 28
1986 was a managerial decision to launch in the coldest wheather
despite engineers recommendations not to launch, and inspite of
evidence of srb "o-ring" burnthrough on the previous launch
sts-61c).

Tom

  #179  
Old November 26th 06, 10:06 PM posted to sci.space.shuttle,sci.space.history
Danny Dot[_1_]
external usenet poster
 
Posts: 481
Default NASA Astronaut on Columbia Repair (and others)


wrote in message
...

And as you are the only one who draw that conclusion, isn`t it your
duty to allert higher managment, Congress or even the New York Times
about it? (What some regulars here accused Boisjoly in 1986 failed to do)


My experience at NASA is management will "roast" an engineer that attempts
to allert them to a bad management decision that might be unsafe.

Danny Dot
www.mobbinggonemad.org

snip


  #180  
Old November 26th 06, 11:09 PM posted to sci.space.shuttle,sci.space.history
columbiaaccidentinvestigation
external usenet poster
 
Posts: 1,344
Default NASA Astronaut on Columbia Repair (and others)

Danny Dot wrote:"My experience at NASA is management will "roast" an
engineer that attempts to allert them to a bad management decision that
might be unsafe.Danny Dot"


The purpose of establishing the independent technical authority within
nasa is so that "All programs should have the benefit of an
independent engineering authority to ensure that technical standards
are being met" according to the diaz report to the caib and that a
flights readiness is independently verified. Now implementing the
recommendations contained in the diaz report to the caib, in
conjunction with a full quantitative risk assessment of the shuttle
system would provide nasa managers the communication structure,
information, and technology to manage and understand the technical
input from engineers up and down the decision making process in
determining flight readiness. Providing an independent authority in
backing minority opinions who are opposed to declaring a flight is
ready, should help improve communications and speed up the process for
flight readiness determination as managers will have assistance in
correlating the minority opinion with things such as previously granted
waivers.. The establishment of the independent technical authority is
a definite step in a positive direction for nasa, as they are currently
implementing a partial quantitative risk assessment (qra), but a full
shuttle system qra will assist nasa engineers and managers in operating
the shuttle safely within it's capabilities throughout the fleets
retirement process.

Diaz report to the caib page and pertinent factors
Diaz report to the caib page a-9
Caib report recomnedations
Engineering Authority that is responsible for technical requirements
and all waivers tto them, and will build a disciplined, systematic
approach to identifying, analyzing, and controlling hazards throughout
the life cycle of the Shuttle System. The independent technical
authority does the following as a minimum:
· Develop and maintain technical standards for all Space Shuttle
Program projects and elements
· Be the sole waiver-granting authority for all technical standards
· Conduct trend and risk analysis at the sub-system, system, and
enterprise levels
· Own the failure mode, effects analysis and hazard reporting systems
· Conduct integrated hazard analysis
· Decide what is and is not an anomalous event
· Independently verify launch readiness
· Approve the provisions of the recertification program called for in
Recommendation R9.1-1
The Technical Engineering Authority should be funded directly from NASA
Headquarters, and should have no connection to or responsibility for
schedule or program cost.

Diaz summary discussion
All programs should have the benefit of an independent engineering
authority to ensure that technical standards are being met. No programs
should have the ability to waive technical standards or compromise a
standard without the review and approval of an appropriate engineering
authority. All projects and programs should conduct risk analysis
consistent with Agency policy regarding risk management. All Centers
should have the capability in either their engineering or Safety and
Mission Assurance (SMA) organizations to perform and or review failure
modes and effects analysis, and hazard analysis. For manned and
unmanned flights and launches, Centers should establish flight,
mission, or launch readiness certification processes that include
verification by the independent engineering and SMA organizations.
Independence is defined as both organizational (outside the operations,
project or program structure) as well as financial (funding allocation
decisions made or approved) at the first organizational level that owns
both the operation, project or program and the center engineering and
SMA"


tom

 




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