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NASA Astronaut on Columbia Repair (and others)
In message . com,
columbiaaccidentinvestigation writes Open sharing of information is crucial to improving everybody's understanding of the universe around us. Is this supposed to be a sig? If so, it's not correctly formatted http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Signature_block -- Open sharing of information is crucial to improving everybody's understanding of the universe around us. |
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NASA Astronaut on Columbia Repair (and others)
Jonathan Silverlight wrote: In message . com, columbiaaccidentinvestigation writes Open sharing of information is crucial to improving everybody's understanding of the universe around us. Is this supposed to be a sig? If so, it's not correctly formatted http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Signature_block -- Open sharing of information is crucial to improving everybody's understanding of the universe around us. Interesting jonathon, perhaps i might misunderstand you but are you trying to speak for others with youre above post? Would you like to attempt to state what you would do in boisjoly's situation? http://history.nasa.gov/rogersrep/v1ch2.htm "Report of the PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION on the Space Shuttle Challenger Accident, Chapter II: Events Leading Up to the Challenger Mission Flight Readiness Review The Level I Flight Readiness Review for mission 51-L took place on January 15, 1986. The Flight Readiness Review should address all aspects of flight preparation about which any questions have arisen. In addition, attendees confirm that all equipment and operational plans have been certified ready by the responsible manager within NASA. Solid Rocket Booster joints were not discussed during the review on January 15. The period during the day when a particular flight can be launched is determined by the requirements of the Orbiter and the payloads. The launch period for mission 51-L was limited in order to provide the best lighting conditions for Spartan's observations of Halley's Comet. The resulting «launch window" was a topic of some discussion at the Flight Readiness Review. The Challenger launch originally had been scheduled for a morning lift off. When Spartan was added to the mission, the launch window was changed to the afternoon. This change would have required a landing at night if a transatlantic abort landing had become necessary. Because the alternate transatlantic site, Casablanca, was not equipped for a night landing, the afternoon launch eliminated that back-up site. As January drew to a close, however, the conditions for optimum telescopic viewing of the comet could not be met. The launch window was shifted back to the morning hours so that the transatlantic abort site would be in daylight and a back-up site (Casablanca) would be available. The results of the flight design process were summarized at the Flight Readiness Review. The predicted ascent performance, including expected trajectory, main engine throttling profile, expected dynamic pressure and the amount of propellant reserve expected at main engine cutoff, were presented and discussed. The expected landing parameters, weight and center of gravity figures were also presented for a variety of contingencies. It should be noted that a waiver was required because the weight of the Orbiter exceeded the allowable limits for an abort landing. The flight design data presented at the Flight Readiness Review are available in the Appendix in the NASA Mission Planning and Operations Team Report. No outstanding concerns were identified in the discussion of flight design." ROGERS COMMISSION TESTIMONY http://history.nasa.gov/rogersrep/v1ch5.htm Report of the PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION on the Space Shuttle Challenger Accident Chapter V: The Contributing Cause of The Accident. [82] The decision to launch the Challenger was flawed. Those who made that decision were unaware of the recent history of problems concerning the O-rings and the joint and were unaware of the initial written recommendation of the contractor advising against the launch at temperatures below 53 degrees Fahrenheit and the continuing opposition of the engineers at Thiokol after the management reversed its position. They did not have a clear understanding of Rockwell's concern that it was not safe to launch because of ice on the pad. If the decisionmakers had known all of the facts, it is highly unlikely that they would have decided to launch 51-L on January 28, 1986. Flaws In The Decision Making Process In addition to analyzing all available evidence concerning the material causes of the accident on January 28, the Commission examined the chain of decisions that culminated in approval of the launch. It concluded that the decision making process was flawed in several ways. The actual events that produced the information upon which the approval of launch was based are recounted and appraised in the sections of this chapter. The discussion that follows relies heavily on excerpts from the testimony of those involved in the management judgments that led to the launch of the Challenger under conditions described. That testimony reveals failures in communication that resulted in a decision to launch 51-L based on incomplete and sometimes misleading information, a conflict between engineering data and management judgments, and a NASA management structure that permitted internal flight safety problems to bypass key Shuttle managers. The Shuttle Flight Readiness Review is a carefully planned, step-by-step activity, established by NASA program directive SPO-PD 710.5A, 1 designed to certify the readiness of all components of the Space Shuttle assembly. The process is focused upon the Level I Flight Readiness Review, held approximately two weeks before a launch. The Level I review is a conference chaired by the NASA Associate Administrator for Space Flight and supported by the NASA Chief Engineer, the Program Manager, the center directors and project managers from Johnson, Marshall and Kennedy, along with senior contractor representatives. The formal portion of the process is initiated by directive from the Associate Administrator for Space Flight. The directive outlines the schedule for the Level I Flight Readiness Review and for the steps that precede it. The process begins at Level IV with the contractors formally certifying-in writing-the flight readiness of the elements for which they are responsible. Certification is made to the appropriate Level III NASA project managers at Johnson and Marshall. Additionally, at Marshall the review is followed by a presentation directly to the Center Director. At Kennedy the Level III review, chaired by the Center Director, verifies readiness of the launch support elements. The next step in the process is the Certification of Flight Readiness to the Level II Program Manager at Johnson. In this review each Space Shuttle program element endorses that it has satisfactorily completed the manufacture, [83] assembly, test and checkout of the pertinent element, including the contractors" certification that design and performance are up to standard. The Flight Readiness Review process culminates in the Level I review. In the initial notice of the review, the Level I directive establishes a Mission Management Team for the particular mission. The team assumes responsibility for each Shuttle's readiness for a period commencing 48 hours before launch and continuing through post-landing crew egress and the safing of the Orbiter. On call throughout the entire period, the Mission Management Team supports the Associate Administrator for Space Flight and the Program Manager. A structured Mission Management Team meeting-called L-1-is held 24 hours, or one day, prior to each scheduled launch. Its agenda includes closeout of any open work, a closeout of any Flight Readiness Review action items, a discussion of new or continuing anomalies, and an updated briefing on anticipated weather conditions at the launch site and at the abort landing sites in different parts of the world. It is standard practice of Level-I and II officials to encourage the reporting of new problems or concerns that might develop in the interval between the Flight Readiness Review and the L-1 meeting, and between the L-1 and launch. In a procedural sense, the process described... At approximately 8:45 p.m. Eastern Standard Time, Phase 2 of the teleconference commenced, the Thiokol charts and written data having arrived at Kennedy Space Center by telefax. (A table of teleconference participants is included with Chronology of Events.) The charts presented a history of the O-ring erosion and blow-by in the Solid Rocket Booster joints of previous flights, presented the results of subscale testing at Thiokol and the results of static tests of Solid Rocket Motors. In the following testimony, Roger Boisjoly, Allan McDonald and Larry Mulloy expressed their recollections of this teleconference up to the point when an off-net caucus was requested: 9 Mr. Boisjoly: I expressed deep concern about launching at low temperature. I presented Chart 2-1 with emphasis-now, 2-1, if you want to see it, I have it, but basically that was the chart that summarized the primary concerns, and that was the chart that I pulled right out of the Washington presentation without changing one word of it because it was still applicable, and it addresses the highest concern of the field joint in both the ignition transient condition and the steady state condition, and it really sets down the rationale for why we were continuing to fly. Basically, if erosion penetrates the primary O-ring seal, there is a higher probability of no secondary seal capability in the steady state condition. And I had two sub-bullets under that which stated bench testing showed O-ring not capable of maintaining contact with metal parts, gap, opening rate to maximum operating pressure. I had another bullet which stated bench testing showed capability to maintain O-ring contact during initial phase (0 to 170 milliseconds of transient). That was my comfort basis of continuing to fly under normal circumstances, normal being within the data base we had. I emphasized, when I presented that chart about the changing of the timing function of the O-ring as it attempted to seal. I was concerned that we may go from that first beginning region into that intermediate region, from O to 170 being the first region, and 170 to 330 being the intermediate region where we didn't have a high probability of sealing or seating. I then presented Chart 2-2 with added concerns related to the timing function. And basically on that chart, I started off talking about a lower temperature than current data base results in changing the primary O-ring sealing timing function, and I discussed the SRM-15 [Flight 51-C, January, 1985] observations, namely, the 15A [Left SRM, Flight 51-C] motor had 80 degrees arc black grease between the O-rings, and make no mistake about it, when I say black, I mean black just like coal. It was jet black. And SRM-15B [Right SRM, Flight 51-C] had a 110 degree arc of black grease between the O-rings. We would have low O-ring squeeze due to low..... [89] ....temperature which I calculated earlier in the day. We should have higher O-ring Shore hardness. Now, that would be harder. And what that material really is, it would be likened to trying to shove a brick into a crack versus a sponge. That is a good analogy for purposes of this discussion. I also mentioned that thicker grease, as a result of lower temperatures, would have a higher viscosity. It wouldn't be as slick and slippery as it would be at room temperature. And so it would be a little bit more difficult to move across it. We would have higher O-ring pressure actuation time, in my opinion, and that is what I presented.... These are the sum and substance of what I just presented. If action time increases, then the threshold of secondary seal pressurization capability is approached. That was my fear. If the threshold is reached, then secondary seal may not be capable of being pressurized, and that was the bottom line of everything that had been presented up to that point. Chairman Rogers: Did anybody take issue with you? Mr. Boisjoly: Well, I am coming to that. I also showed a chart of the joint with an exaggerated cross section to show the seal lifted off, which has been shown to everybody. I was asked, yes, at that point in time I was asked to quantify my concerns, and I said I couldn't. I couldn't quantify it. I had no data to quantify it, but I did say I knew that it was away from goodness in the current data base. Someone on the net commented that we had soot blow-by on SRM-22 [Flight 61-A, October, 1985] which was launched at 75 degrees. I don't remember who made the comment, but that is where the first comment came in about the disparity between my conclusion and the observed data because SRM-22 [Flight 61-A, October, 1985] had blow-by at essentially a room temperature launch. I then said that SRM-15 [Flight 51-C, January, 1985] had much more blow-by indication and that it was indeed telling us that lower temperature was a factor. This was supported by inspection of flown hardware by myself. I was asked again for data to support my claim, and I said I have none other than what is being presented, and I had been trying to get resilience data, Arnie and I both, since last October, and that statement was mentioned on the net. Others in the room presented their charts, and the main telecon session concluded with Bob Lund, who is our Vice President of.... [90] ....Engineering, presenting his conclusions and recommendations charts which were based on our data input up to that point. Listeners on the telecon were not pleased with the conclusions and the recommendations. Chairman Rogers: What was the conclusion ? Mr. Boisjoly: The conclusion was we should not fly outside of our data base, which was 53 degrees. Those were the conclusions. And we were quite pleased because we knew in advance, having participated in the preparation, what the conclusions were, and we felt very comfortable with that. Mr. Acheson: Who presented that conclusion? Mr. Boisjoly: Mr. Bob Lund. He had prepared those charts. He had input from other people. He had actually physically prepared the charts. It was about that time that Mr. Hardy from Marshall was asked what he thought about the MTI [Morton Thiokol] recommendation, and he said he was appalled at the MTI decision. Mr. Hardy was also asked about launching, and he said no, not if the contractor recommended not launching, he would not go against the contractor and launch. There was a short discussion that ensued about temperature not being a discriminator between SRM-15 [Flight 51-C] and SRM-22 [Flight 61-A], and shortly after, I believe it was Mr. Kilminster asked if- excuse me. I'm getting confused here. Mr. Kilminster was asked by NASA if he would launch, and he said no because the engineering recommendation was not to launch. Then MTI management then asked for a five-minute caucus. I'm not sure exactly who asked for that, but it was asked in such a manner that I remember it was asked for, a five-minute caucus, which we put on- the line on mute and went off-line with the rest of the net. Chairman Rogers: Mr. Boisjoly, at the time that you made the-that Thiokol made the recommendation not to launch, was that the unanimous recommendation as far as you knew? Mr. Boisjoly: Yes. I have to make something clear. I have been distressed by the things that have been appearing in the paper and things that have been said in general, and there was never one positive, pro-launch statement ever made by anybody. There have been some feelings since then that folks have expressed that they would support the decision, but there was not one positive statement for launch ever made in that room." Open sharing of information is crucial to improving everybody's understanding of the universe around us. Tom |
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Dear NASA Administrator Michael Griffin ( NASA Astronaut on Columbia Repair (and others))
Dear...Columbia's Tiles...not of Museum Quality...I'd like to...
... .. Thanks, Craig Fink Electronic Mail Address; .... ... .. -- On Sat, 25 Nov 2006 08:06:00 +0200, SENECA and ... wrote: Like the myth that the tiles are too fragile to touch. Propagated here, right up the the point where astronauts started hacking away with hack saw blades to remove gap fillers, tapping on them, got them between their fingers. Hey these things aren't too fragile after all. They are very _fragile_; someone here on the newsgroup had one, and dropped it on a table from a few inches up; the densified covering cracked. ....Yeah, I agree...throw it against a... Not a surprise. Colliding rigid objects with low elasticity and no plasticity can get high local pressures. Maybe 100 to 1000 times the pressure an astronaut finger could create. Unlike at a RCC, a crack on a tile surface is no big issue. Probably most tiles today have small cracks on its surface. If an astronaut wants to powderize a tile he may be able to do it with one hand only. But as we know from NASA, he may also be able to handle tile parts: For a missing portion of T-seal, the best option would have been to fill the resulting gap between the RCC panels with tile fragments harvested by the EVA crew. The tile fragments would be shaped by the crew IVA and then pushed into the gap by the EVA crew. [NASA Report to CAIB] The alleged danger to tiles by EVA astronauts was considered by NASA and CAIB to unimportant to mention. Seems a typical Columbia Myth keept alive by some regulars here. Misspellings and grammer corrected by; Criag Fink |
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Dear NASA Administrator Michael Griffin
Not the right letter, but Privatizing Earth to LEO might be.
So what would a letter to Michael Griffin look like to privatize Earth to LEO manned space flight? To get NASA to push for legislation to encourage it? What would the legislation look like to encourage, nurture, support and transition to thriving Earth to LEO market? Private Enterprise? Ideas? Henry's probably right, money is people and NASA really wouldn't want to lay off some of there own. But, I would think Contractors are fair game, and really that's what a private market place to LEO looks like. No NASA contractors in the Earth to LEO market, just purchased rides. It would have to set up incentives to encourage Private Investment, instead of Public Spending. What other attributes should Private Enterprise Legislation have? To make in a Win-Win situation all around? NASA's perspective? Major Contractor's (BoingLockMart) perspective? Small Business's (Entrepreneurial) perspective? Investment Capitalists perspective? Large Banks perspective? Average US Citizens perspective? -- Craig Fink Courtesy E-Mail Welcome @ -- |
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Dear NASA Administrator Michael Griffin
Craig Fink wrote:" Not the right letter, but Privatizing Earth to LEO might be." Gee craig, not the right thread, as the original post was pertaining to an astronauts statements, http://www.stpns.net/view_article.ht...43251064362304 Gutierrez said the fault lies in two words - engineering arrogance. "NASA engineers were confident that they did everything right," Gutierrez said. "They were so sure everything would work as planned they didn't think an escape system was necessary. The fact is, if there had been an escape system on Columbia and Challenger, the crews could have survived." Actually the design shortcomings of the shuttle system had been known for along time before the challenger tragedy, (ie no crew escape system for more than a small percentage of the crew if in place, and only usable for a small percentage of the flight) and therefore it is the responsibility of managers and engineers to operate the space shuttle system safely within it's known parameters, (ie launching on jan 28 1986 was a managerial decision to launch in the coldest wheather despite engineers recommendations not to launch, and inspite of evidence of srb "o-ring" burnthrough on the previous launch sts-61c). tom |
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NASA Astronaut on Columbia Repair (and others)
Craig Fink wrote:" Not the right letter, but Privatizing Earth to LEO
might be." Gee craig, not the right thread, as the original post was pertaining to an astronauts statements, http://www.stpns.net/view_article.ht...43251064362304 Gutierrez said the fault lies in two words - engineering arrogance. "NASA engineers were confident that they did everything right," Gutierrez said. "They were so sure everything would work as planned they didn't think an escape system was necessary. The fact is, if there had been an escape system on Columbia and Challenger, the crews could have survived." Actually the design shortcomings of the shuttle system had been known for along time before the challenger tragedy, (ie no crew escape system for more than a small percentage of the crew if in place, and only usable for a small percentage of the flight) and therefore it is the responsibility of managers and engineers to operate the space shuttle system safely within it's known parameters, (ie launching on jan 28 1986 was a managerial decision to launch in the coldest wheather despite engineers recommendations not to launch, and inspite of evidence of srb "o-ring" burnthrough on the previous launch sts-61c). tom |
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Dear NASA Administrator Michael Griffin
Craig Fink a écrit :
Not the right letter, but Privatizing Earth to LEO might be. So what would a letter to Michael Griffin look like to privatize Earth to LEO manned space flight? To get NASA to push for legislation to encourage it? What would the legislation look like to encourage, nurture, support and transition to thriving Earth to LEO market? Private Enterprise? If "Private Enterprise" is so phantastic, why must it be "nurtured" and "supported" with tax payer's money???? Damm it. It is PRIVATE so it doesn't need any public money! Ideas? Yes, let the market decide! |
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NASA Astronaut on Columbia Repair (and others)
jacob navia wrote:"If "Private Enterprise" is so phantastic, why must
it be "nurtured" and "supported" with tax payer's money???? Damm it. It is PRIVATE so it doesn't need any public money! Yes, let the market decide!" Not the right thread, as the original post was pertaining to an astronauts statements, http://www.stpns.net/view_article.ht...43251064362304 Gutierrez said the fault lies in two words - engineering arrogance. "NASA engineers were confident that they did everything right," Gutierrez said. "They were so sure everything would work as planned they didn't think an escape system was necessary. The fact is, if there had been an escape system on Columbia and Challenger, the crews could have survived." Actually the design shortcomings of the shuttle system had been known for along time before the challenger tragedy, (ie no crew escape system for more than a small percentage of the crew if in place, and only usable for a small percentage of the flight) and therefore it is the responsibility of managers and engineers to operate the space shuttle system safely within it's known parameters, (ie launching on jan 28 1986 was a managerial decision to launch in the coldest wheather despite engineers recommendations not to launch, and inspite of evidence of srb "o-ring" burnthrough on the previous launch sts-61c). Tom |
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NASA Astronaut on Columbia Repair (and others)
wrote in message ... And as you are the only one who draw that conclusion, isn`t it your duty to allert higher managment, Congress or even the New York Times about it? (What some regulars here accused Boisjoly in 1986 failed to do) My experience at NASA is management will "roast" an engineer that attempts to allert them to a bad management decision that might be unsafe. Danny Dot www.mobbinggonemad.org snip |
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NASA Astronaut on Columbia Repair (and others)
Danny Dot wrote:"My experience at NASA is management will "roast" an
engineer that attempts to allert them to a bad management decision that might be unsafe.Danny Dot" The purpose of establishing the independent technical authority within nasa is so that "All programs should have the benefit of an independent engineering authority to ensure that technical standards are being met" according to the diaz report to the caib and that a flights readiness is independently verified. Now implementing the recommendations contained in the diaz report to the caib, in conjunction with a full quantitative risk assessment of the shuttle system would provide nasa managers the communication structure, information, and technology to manage and understand the technical input from engineers up and down the decision making process in determining flight readiness. Providing an independent authority in backing minority opinions who are opposed to declaring a flight is ready, should help improve communications and speed up the process for flight readiness determination as managers will have assistance in correlating the minority opinion with things such as previously granted waivers.. The establishment of the independent technical authority is a definite step in a positive direction for nasa, as they are currently implementing a partial quantitative risk assessment (qra), but a full shuttle system qra will assist nasa engineers and managers in operating the shuttle safely within it's capabilities throughout the fleets retirement process. Diaz report to the caib page and pertinent factors Diaz report to the caib page a-9 Caib report recomnedations Engineering Authority that is responsible for technical requirements and all waivers tto them, and will build a disciplined, systematic approach to identifying, analyzing, and controlling hazards throughout the life cycle of the Shuttle System. The independent technical authority does the following as a minimum: · Develop and maintain technical standards for all Space Shuttle Program projects and elements · Be the sole waiver-granting authority for all technical standards · Conduct trend and risk analysis at the sub-system, system, and enterprise levels · Own the failure mode, effects analysis and hazard reporting systems · Conduct integrated hazard analysis · Decide what is and is not an anomalous event · Independently verify launch readiness · Approve the provisions of the recertification program called for in Recommendation R9.1-1 The Technical Engineering Authority should be funded directly from NASA Headquarters, and should have no connection to or responsibility for schedule or program cost. Diaz summary discussion All programs should have the benefit of an independent engineering authority to ensure that technical standards are being met. No programs should have the ability to waive technical standards or compromise a standard without the review and approval of an appropriate engineering authority. All projects and programs should conduct risk analysis consistent with Agency policy regarding risk management. All Centers should have the capability in either their engineering or Safety and Mission Assurance (SMA) organizations to perform and or review failure modes and effects analysis, and hazard analysis. For manned and unmanned flights and launches, Centers should establish flight, mission, or launch readiness certification processes that include verification by the independent engineering and SMA organizations. Independence is defined as both organizational (outside the operations, project or program structure) as well as financial (funding allocation decisions made or approved) at the first organizational level that owns both the operation, project or program and the center engineering and SMA" tom |
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