Atlantic Monthly Nov 2003 Shuttle Article

Atlantic Monthly has a very good article on the Columbia Disaster in it's
November issue. Here is a small except of what engineers were thinking at
the time that the Shuttle Program Office turned down multiple request to
look at the damaged wing.

begin quote

The CAIB investigator who asked the engineers what conclusion they had
drawn at the time from management's refusal later said to me, "They all
thought, 'Well, none of us have a security clearance high enough to view
any of this imagery.' They talked about this openly amoung themselves, and
they figured one of three things:

"'One: The "no" means that management's already got photos, and the
damage isn't too bad. They can't show us the photos, because we don't have
the security clearance, and they can't tell us they have the photos, or
tell us the damage isn't bad, because that tells us how accurate the photos
are - and we don't have the security clearance. But wait a minute, if
that's the case, then what're we doing here? Why are we doing the analysis?
So no, that can't be right.

"'Okay, then, two: They already took the photos, and the damage is so
severe that there's no hope of recovery. Well ... that can't be right
either, because in that case why are we doing the analysis?

"'Okay, then, three: They took the photos. They can't tell us they took
the photos, and the photos don't give us clear definition. So we need to do
the analysis. That's gotta be it!"

end quote

It's still really hard to believe that no photos were take to examine the
damage to the vehicle. A simple step that any reasonable person would have
taken before trying to figure out if the damaged vehicle could make it
home. What no one knew or understood at the time, was that the Shuttle
Program Office was working on Plausible Deniablity and trying to keep the
official record as clean as possible.

Craig Fink

Craig Fink
Atlantic Monthly has a very good article on the Columbia Disaster in it's
November issue.

Did you get yours at the newstand or do you have a subscription? An
earlier poster said it wouldn't be out at newstands til the 14th.....
I want to get one!

Ellen

ElleninLosAngeles wrote:

Craig Fink
Atlantic Monthly has a very good article on the Columbia Disaster in it's
November issue.

Did you get yours at the newstand or do you have a subscription? An
earlier poster said it wouldn't be out at newstands til the 14th.....
I want to get one!


Subscription, the local libarary, I don't usally read the Atlantic Monthly,
but it's cover reach out and grabbed me. I'll probably buy a copy of this
one.

It's an interesting article. It also says NASA management didn't think it
was necessary to do a RCC impact test, even *after* the Columbia Disaster.
So, they fought against doing the RCC test, just like they fought against
taking pictures of the damage before the Disaster. I guess, ignorance
*really* is bliss wrt NASA management. It was one of the CAIB board members
that was the driving force and kept pushing for and got the testing done.

To me, it seems if you want to build a proper repair kit for the RCC, the
first thing you would have to do, is break a bunch of RCC panels. That way
you can see what the typical damage might look like in the future, and
figure out how to stabilize the damage, and fill or cover the all the
different types of holes. Currently, NASA has only two examples to work
with, a mighty small sample size. It really seems like NASA management is
incapable or unwilling to come up with a plan for repairing the RCC panels.

Craig Fink

ElleninLosAngeles wrote:

Craig Fink
Atlantic Monthly has a very good article on the Columbia Disaster in it's
November issue.

Did you get yours at the newstand or do you have a subscription? An
earlier poster said it wouldn't be out at newstands til the 14th.....
I want to get one!


Subscription, the local libarary, I don't usally read the Atlantic Monthly,
but it's cover reached out and grabbed me. I'll probably buy a copy of this
one.

It's an interesting article. It also says NASA management didn't think it
was necessary to do a RCC impact test, even *after* the Columbia Disaster.
So, they fought against doing the RCC test, just like they fought against
taking pictures of the damage before the Disaster. I guess, ignorance
*really* is bliss wrt NASA management. It was one of the CAIB board members
that was the driving force and kept pushing for and got the testing done.

To me, it seems if you want to build a proper repair kit for the RCC, the
first thing you would have to do, is break a bunch of RCC panels. That way
you can see what the typical damage might look like in the future, and
figure out how to stabilize the damage, and fill or cover the all the
different types of holes. Currently, NASA has only two examples to work
with, a mighty small sample size. It really seems like NASA management is
incapable or unwilling to come up with a plan for repairing the RCC panels.

Craig Fink

ElleninLosAngeles spewed out:
Craig Fink

Atlantic Monthly has a very good article on the Columbia Disaster in it's
November issue.


Did you get yours at the newstand or do you have a subscription? An
earlier poster said it wouldn't be out at newstands til the 14th.....
I want to get one!

Ellen

I saw a bunch of them on the rack at the local Borders Books last night in NY.

--
bp
Proud Member of the Human O-Ring Society Since 2003

Craig Fink wrote in message link.net...
ElleninLosAngeles wrote:

Did you get yours at the newstand or do you have a subscription? An
earlier poster said it wouldn't be out at newstands til the 14th.....
I want to get one!

I ran out and got one last night at the newstand (subscribers usually
get their magazine in the mail before the magazine has reached the
newstands or at least the supermarkets). Really a great article! Very
long and in-depth. I highlighted just about the whole article...lots
of good reference info. More Linda Ham bashing. Also, descriptions of
what Gehman and O'Keefe are like behind-the-scenes.

In article , ElleninLosAngeles wrote:

I ran out and got one last night at the newstand (subscribers usually
get their magazine in the mail before the magazine has reached the
newstands or at least the supermarkets). Really a great article! Very
long and in-depth. I highlighted just about the whole article...lots
of good reference info. More Linda Ham bashing. Also, descriptions of
what Gehman and O'Keefe are like behind-the-scenes.

I'm interested in reading the article when I do get a copy.

But wanted to say something -- that while things that transpired in the MMT
meetings may not have had been up to par, and with Ms. Ham at the head of
it, the buck stopped there so she had to take some responsibility for it.

No question, it's a truly tough business to be in - make mistakes, and real
people could die, along with a lot of intense public scrutiny. Not for the
faint hearted or less than an emotional rock-of-gibraltar type of person.
In other words, I certainly don't envy folks who manages the SSP.

However, makes me think NASA may have hung her out in the wind as a
sacrificial lamb, because in an huge organization like that and quite a few
other decision-makers, there's got to be other folks that didn't perform up
to par. But yet all we hear is about Ms. Ham because she went in front of
the cameras. That took guts, no question about it.

Where were the other managers that were reassigned to other duties? If they
were doing a good job, they didn't need to be reassigned 'en masse', but
yet they were. The public press releases announcing them didn't mention any
hints of performance-related reasons; merely put a good face on it saying
that it was to further enhance safety or RTF work. Right, and I implicitly
believe in both Santa Claus and the Public Affairs Office's claims.

They didn't make these people available for no-holds-barred questioning by
the press, did they?

In short, while Ms. Ham may have had been pretty competent, and performed
*excellently* 97% (or whatever number) of the time, she did deserve some of
the responsibility... but she most certainly didn't deserve *all* this
criticism as there were others responsible for where processes broke down.

After all, had the earlier processes not broken down and others done their
job well, the MMT wouldn't have had been the final link in a decades-long
chain of breakdowns. These other folks were just as responsible and
culpable.

I'd be more impressed if it was a balanced and well-covered piece instead
of a pile job on an individual or two. Again, I must note I haven't yet
read the article, but the preliminary reports about its contents has me
wondering. So I will most assuredly obtain a copy and read it.

-Dan

(Disclaimer: no relation to NASA or any of its contractors, subcontractors,
or whomever. Strictly a private citizen with an interest in manned space
programs.)

Dan Foster

But wanted to say something -- that while things that transpired in the MMT
meetings may not have had been up to par, and with Ms. Ham at the head of
it, the buck stopped there so she had to take some responsibility for it.

However, makes me think NASA may have hung her out in the wind as a
sacrificial lamb, because in an huge organization like that and quite a few
other decision-makers, there's got to be other folks that didn't perform up
to par. But yet all we hear is about Ms. Ham because she went in front of
the cameras. That took guts, no question about it.

Just to follow up on the going in front of the cameras part, she
appeared along with Engelhauf and Cain. And if you saw it/read a
transcript you know none of them was forthcoming about how NASA may
have failed. Rather they said they thought they all did the best they
could and left it at that.

I agree that I wouldn't want to be L. Ham right now! I really believe,
from following this story since it happened, that she has been the
most often mentioned by name in a disparaging way because people in
Houston and elsewhere decided she deserved most of the lumps. But it's
hard to assess who did a good job and who didn't when you don't know
the people personally. I notice in this article that R. Dittemore gets
off without a scratch once again. I think either he is very well-liked
or well-connected in the industry (personally, I am a fan of his for
his great job doing the press conferences starting the day of the
accident) or was let off the hook since he was on vacation during the
flight, when all the foam issues were being bandied about, and never
knew anyone had tried to get pictures taken thru his office until
after the accident. (the article relays that an assistant - it's left
open whether or not it was his assistant - told a caller who asked for
Dept of Defense photos that L. Ham had already cancelled an earlier
request so the caller dropped the idea, thinking it wouldn't get
OK'd). You could try to make a case that Linda is being vilified
because she is the rare woman in a man's field.
Ellen

"ElleninLosAngeles" wrote in
You could try to make a case that Linda is being vilified
because she is the rare woman in a man's field.
Ellen

Back off. There are plenty of women in Mission Control,
and nobody got any slack cut based on diversity points.
The only purpose to making the argument you mention,
is to show one's own bigotry by impugning base motives to strangers.
Please reconsider your comment, or seek evidence to defend it.

"James Oberg"
Back off. There are plenty of women in Mission Control,
and nobody got any slack cut based on diversity points.
The only purpose to making the argument you mention,
is to show one's own bigotry by impugning base motives to strangers.
Please reconsider your comment, or seek evidence to defend it.

My comment is that Dan might want to use this argument, since he is
pro-Linda Ham and I am not. Calling ME sexist is a little weird since
I am a woman! "there are plenty of women in Mission Control" sounds a
little sexist to me - like you would be ****ed off if there were any
MORE women around?