NASA Astronaut on Columbia Repair (and others)

"columbiaaccidentinvestigation"
wrote:

Monday morning armchair quarterbacking, and using hindsight to say what
should have been done is a rather interesting place to be critiquing
the history of somebodys actions.

Boisjoly sets himself up as a public figure and as an arbiter and
example of ethical behavior. That places discussion of said behavior
into the public arena.

You present an interesting opinion, but never the less not it is backed
by historical facts,

snippage handwaving and bull****

Then show me where Boisjoly & Co. stood up and stood firm - not where
they just went through the business as usual motions. Because the
historical record (that I have read, and you cited) contains nothing
but business as usual.

D.
--
Touch-twice life. Eat. Drink. Laugh.

-Resolved: To be more temperate in my postings.
Oct 5th, 2004 JDL

Derek Lyons wrote:" Boisjoly sets himself up as a public figure and as
an arbiter and example of ethical behavior. That places discussion of
said behavior into the public arena. Then show me where Boisjoly & Co.
stood up and stood firm - not where they just went through the business
as usual motions. Because the historical record (that I have read, and
you cited) contains nothing but business as usual"


And your critique of one mans actions is public as well, so I guess you
would like to snip away the facts that you don't like, but arm chair
quarterbacking and cherry picking do not reflect reality of the event
leading up to a launch decision the morning of jan 28 1986. The concept
is that bioscopy was quoted as stating was something to the effect of
they (those who were in opposition to launching sts-51l the morning of
jan 28, 1986) needed to prove to nasa management that a launch wasn't
safe, rather than the launch was safe, setting the stage for the tragic
loss of crew and vehicle. So Derek try again explaining how you would
handle boisjolys situation yourself, if you can, otherwise you public
critique of somebody else in that situation really doesn't mean much
at all. And since you do not seem to be interested in the facts here
is a piece of the diaz report to the Columbia accident investigation
board, and please note (in your reading of the rogers commission
report) the similarities in describing the communication problems
inside nasa, and the creation of the independent technical authority.

http://t2www.nasa.r3h.net/pdf/55691main_Diaz_020204.pdf
Diaz report to the caib
Page 17
"10.1 SUMMARY
In summary, the CAIB Report includes significant technical and
non-technical R-O-Fs, which NASA leaders must adhere to in order to
help the Agency move forward to meet the challenges of the future. The
Diaz Team realizes that, in some respects, the most challenging changes
will be those which pertain to culture, or those which are the
non-technical R-O-Fs noted in the CAIB or Report. The Team knows that
the organizational changes recommended in the CAIB Report will require
sustained planning implementation over time to achieve the desired
future the CAIB and NASA foresee. When making cultural change, large
organizations such as NASA need to assure that, throughout the change
process the organizations core values are both relied on and sustained.
The Team believes these core values will help the Agencys leaders take
on the serious challenges ahead, which should yield improved safety,
performance excellence, and mission success.
The proposed actions in the Diaz Team Report are based on
culture-related issues identified by NASA leadership and the work-
workforce in the areas of: leadership, learning, communication,
processes and rules, technical capabilities, organizational structure,
and risk management. The Team believes this systemic approach to
cultural change at this critical juncture of the Agencys history will
yield a NASA culture that is significantly more responsive and prepared
for the promising opportunities of the American space programs future.
The seven Diaz Team goals are shown in Table 24. In order to gain a
more thorough understanding of the Diaz Teams determiatoons, more
detailed examination of the entire Diaz Team Matrix and its 40 actions
(Appendix A) and the tables in each of the foregoing
chapters is critical.
NASA indeed stands at a crossroads. One path is a continuation of the
course that allowed the of the course that allowed the Challenger and
Columbia accidents to occur. The new path of change may be difficult,
particularly at the start, and sometimes the goal is not always in
sight. But the rewards for walking this path are far greater than those
the old path could ever offer us. For NASA to embark on the new
pathway, some fundamental reforms must be instituted. These are
encompassed by the 40 reforms Diaz Team actions and seven goals
identified in the Report. The essence of these can be captured in three
overarching reforms:
· NASA must assure that appropriate checks and balances are in place
to develop and operate its missions safely, and must undertake the
organizational changes necessary to make this happen. The
organizationalstructure should help clarify roles and responsibilities
of individual employees, work groups and leadership. Every member of
the workforce must know his or her. Every member of the workforce
must know his or her position in the organization and all must know
their position in the organization and all must know their authority,
responsibility and accountability for assuring mission success. The
entire workforce must also be aware of and understand the rules.

· NASA must enhance communications at all levels NASA with a focus on
fostering diversity of viewpoints and with a focus on fostering
diversity of viewpoints and
eliminating fear of retribution. A communications culture must be
established with formal communications procedures to ensure effective
communications flow up and down the chain of command and across
organizational lines. Communications channels should be sufciently
flexible to support, encourage, and objectively evaluate all
viewpoints, ensuring sound decision-making practices.
· NASA must focus on the ways it is managing risk. Safety, mission
success and program performance must not be the product of schedule and
budget pressures alone. Technological and workforce factors be
considered in program planning and decision- making as well. A critical
role of leadership is to ensure there is an appropriate balance between
requirements, resources and risk. NASA must assure that the workforce
has the appropriate processes, tools and technical force has
capabilities to accomplish this."


Open sharing of information is crucial to improving everybody's
understanding of the universe around us.
Tom

I implore you to read this entire message and ponder upon it before
replying, its quite long and involved. (I think this is the first
time I've put my whole argument in one place as a complete unit.)

It might be better to reply in manageable chunks.

Dave Michelson wrote:

Derek Lyons wrote:

Except - he didn't actually take any actual action to stop the launch
and prevent the tragedy. When push came to shove - he folded.

With due respect, I suggest that you're confusing engineering certainty
with professional opinion. As a result, you're being a bit harsh.

My criticism is not of his behavior at the time, but that the picture
he paints of himself today and his behavior at the time do not agree
with each other. (I don't think I've been clear, even to myself, that
I am not criticizing the Boisjoly of January 1986, but the one who
subsequently emerged upon the public stage and asking why the behavior
of the latter is not reflected in the behavior of the former.) My
seeming harshness springs from the stark contrast between the facts in
evidence of the events _then_ and his (and more importantly his
supporters) version of them _now_.

The problem, as I understand it, is that the cold temperatures on launch
day were a new scenario and Boisjoly and co. only suspected that a
problem existed. They didn't know for certain. (It was a strong
suspicion, but the trends in what data existed weren't fully appreciated
until after the fact.) In the absence of detailed calculations or data,
others with detailed technical knowledge in the area disagreed. It then
became a matter of professional opinion and, yes, engineers often have
to agree to disagree. And further study might have shown that Boisjoly
and co. had been overcautious.

That's precisely my point Dave - the evidence supports the contention
that he had an incompletely supported hunch. In that instance it's
entirely reasonable for the chain of events to unfold as they actually
did. Tragic and regrettable, but reasonable and understandable -
everyone makes mistakes from false or incomplete understanding, and in
the manned space business mistakes kill. But that does not change
reality - everyone in the process bases their understanding on the
evidence they have in hand at the time, and their own experience and
the surrounding circumstances. They did not enjoy, as we do today,
the advantages of 20-20 hindsight and an understanding of the
consequences that arose from decisions made nearly inevitably in the
circumstances.

Now if Boisjoly (and his supporters) stopped there with a mea culpa
for their own failings of insight, before calling Dr Guillotine to
treat the symptoms exhibited by management, and using today's insight
into yesterdays behavior as springboard to seeking ways to improve all
links in the chain - I'd have no disagreement. But they go beyond
that to the position that "management is evil because they failed to
stop the launch and hold up the program based on a few reports and an
incompletely supported hunch". There is where we part ways - because
that position is to me unsupportable.

Management (as you point out) wasn't technically unsophisticated, nor
inexperienced (in so much as anyone could be experienced with that few
flights under their belt), but they had pressures and priorities of
their own. The evidence in their possession at the time indicated
that the risk could not be quantified - and thus did not justify
canceling the launch and disrupting events downstream. If Boisjoly
had been wrong, for him it would have been a tempest in a teapot - one
more time when a hunch failed to pan out. If management however had
(at the time) believed him to be right (and he subsequently was
discovered to be wrong), then they would have been responsible for
tens (hundreds?) of millions of dollars in delay, the impacts on
Galileo and Hubble, the impacts of public and upper management
opinion, etc... etc...

To expect them to immune to these pressures is irrational, especially
while excusing Boisjoly's bowing to his pressures as being merely
human - because the managers too are merely human. Engineers are not
universally angels, and equally managers are not universally demons.
Each hold attributes of both in equal measures.

Boisjoly (I believe) errs in two ways. First in believing the two
sets of consequences (his and managements) were equivalent. Secondly
in not appreciating the underlying causes of managements decisions.
With 20-20 hindsight, we now know that those causes were predicated on
the false assumption [belief] that the Shuttle was 'operational'
(whatever that means) - a belief that was politically inevitable, with
tragic consequences that were equally inevitable.

It's ludicrous to hold someone accountable for something that not only
did they not appreciate at the time, and which would have required a
near superhuman flash of insight to appreciate and to escape the
intellectual and emotional fortress in which they had become
imprisoned.

Even such steely eyed missile men as Gene Krantz and John Aaron, both
rightfully lauded for their roles in Apollo, were seduced to the Dark
Side - Pre Challenger both supported the Shuttle program and defended
its safety. Which is unsurprising, because at the end of the day -
they too are merely human. In the days of Apollo they could act in
ways they could not in the days of the Shuttle - the times had
changed, and they with them. (And as a side note: Why does Apollo
era managers and engineers not come under the vitriolic attacks that
Shuttle era management does? They too faced their Challenger (Apollo
1) and Columbia (Apollo 13) that arose from their own mistakes and
shortsightedness...)

Note: I am defending the managers here - I am merely examining the
complete picture in its true colors, not the stark black and white,
angels and demons terms it is normally cast in.

Had Boisjoly and co. deferred to a client or contractor with less
technical skill than they had in the interests of expediency, then, once
again, your criticism would be justified. Had they not argued loudly
and forcefully that the matter required further attention, your
criticism would be justified. However, they were overruled
by more senior individuals within their own organization and by a
client/customer with considerable expertise of their own in the area.

That Boisjoly and co. had insufficient time to assemble the detailed
calculations or data, convince themselves that their concerns were
justified, and present their case, all in the few hours before the
launch took place cannot be held against them.

My criticism is *not* of his behavior at the time - both Boisjoly's
and managements are fairly predictable once you completely understand
the situation. (From _both_ sides, Boisjoly's _and managements_, the
latter being something few even attempt.) My criticism is of his
behavior *now*, where he strongly implies (contends) that he knew that
a tragedy was in the offing and that he made every effort to stop it.

Neither contention is supported by the historical record. For the
first, his own reports fail to clearly quantify the risk. For the
second, he did nothing but business as usual - reports, memos,
conferences and phone calls. If he did know, or even extremely
strongly believed (as he implies today), that a tragedy was in the
offing - then that situation calls for those same things, but _not_
worded in the dry and ambiguous phrasing of the work-a-day engineering
report - but in strong, clear, and unequivocal wording. That would
justify him becoming an arbiter and exemplar of morals and ethics -
but that's not what happened.

That is the basis of my criticism - ethical and moral behavior demands
extraordinary behavior in the face of extraordinary circumstances. I
can, and do, excuse him for being merely human and responding to
pressures in a way that is predictable and understandable. Equally I
can, and do, fault him and his supporters for painting a false picture
unsupported by evidence - and then using that picture to support his
beatification.

In the end it comes down to two simple cases; In the first, Boisjoly
is an angel thwarted by dark forces who today testifies to the
existence of the demons that defeated him despite his best efforts.
In the second, Boisjoly is but one man who played his bit part on the
stage, a tragic character but a stock and predictable one.

He, and his supporters, wish to paint the first picture. The
historical record paints the second.

D.
--
Touch-twice life. Eat. Drink. Laugh.

-Resolved: To be more temperate in my postings.
Oct 5th, 2004 JDL

Derek lyons stated without citations or any support to his statements
in (reference to roger boijolys attempts to convince nasa managers not
to launch challenger in the cold weather of jan 28 1986, and the rest
of dereks statement is shown below) :

"Note: I am defending the managers here - I am merely examining the
complete picture in its true colors, not the stark black and white,
angels and demons terms it is normally cast in.... That is the basis of
my criticism - ethical and moral behavior demands extraordinary
behavior in the face of extraordinary circumstances. I can, and do,
excuse him for being merely human and responding to pressures in a way
that is predictable and understandable. Equally I can, and do, fault
him and his supporters for painting a false picture unsupported by
evidence - and then using that picture to support his beatification. In
the end it comes down to two simple cases; In the first, Boisjoly is
an angel thwarted by dark forces who today testifies to the existence
of the demons that defeated him despite his best efforts. In the
second, Boisjoly is but one man who played his bit part on the stage, a
tragic character but a stock and predictable one.... He, and his
supporters, wish to paint the first picture. The historical record
paints the second."

Derk please read the information the from the rogers report the caib
thought was pertinent enough to include in its final report, along with
the diaz report summary, and you will find how your thinking is exactly
the type of thinking that must change, (ie nasa managers must operate
the shuttle system within it's known safety parameters) for nasa to
move forward on the path described by the diaz report. Nasa managers
had the authority to did overrule boijsoly, and did in spite of the
evidence from the sts-61c srb report listed below, so yes Derek in
spite of you're (demons vs. angles) examples and rhetoric, it is the
professional responsibility of nasa managers to hold of schedule and
monetary pressures for safety, otherwise we are testing Murphy's law.

Caib report vol 1 page 100, col2
"SELECTED ROGERS COMMISSION RECOMMENDATIONS
· "The faulty Solid Rocket Motor joint and seal must be changed.
This could be a new design eliminating the joint or a redesign of the
current joint and seal. No design options should be prematurely
precluded because of schedule, cost or reliance on existing hardware.
All Solid Rocket Motor joints should satisfy the following:
· "The joints should be fully understood, tested and verified."
· "The certification of the new design should include:
· Tests which duplicate the actual launch configu-ration as closely
as possible.
· Tests over the full range of operating conditions, including
temperature."
· "Full consideration should be given to conducting static firings
of the exact flight configuration in a vertical at-titude."
· "The Shuttle Program Structure should be reviewed. The project
managers for the various elements of the Shuttle program felt more
accountable to their center management than to the Shuttle program
organization."
· "NASA should encourage the transition of qualified astronauts
into agency management positions."
· "NASA should establish an Office of Safety, Reliability and
Quality Assurance to be headed by an Associate Ad-ministrator,
reporting directly to the NASA Administra-tor. It would have direct
authority for safety, reliability, and quality assurance throughout the
agency. The office should be assigned the work force to ensure adequate
oversight of its functions and should be independent of other NASA
functional and program responsibilities."
· "NASA should establish an STS Safety Advisory Panel reporting to
the STS Program Manager. The charter of this panel should include
Shuttle operational issues, launch commit criteria, flight rules,
flight readiness and risk management."
· "The Commission found that Marshall Space Flight Center project
managers, because of a tendency at Marshall to management isolation,
failed to provide full and timely information bearing on the safety of
flight 51-L [the Challenger mission] to other vital elements of Shuttle
program management ... NASA should take energetic steps to eliminate
this tendency at Marshall Space Flight Center, whether by changes of
personnel, organization, indoctrination or all three."
· "The nation.s reliance on the Shuttle as its principal space
launch capability created a relentless pressure on NASA to increase the
flight rate ... NASA must estab-lish a flight rate that is consistent
with its resources."


http://t2www.nasa.r3h.net/pdf/55691main_Diaz_020204.pdf
Diaz report to the caib
Page 17
"10.1 SUMMARY
In summary, the CAIB Report includes significant technical and
non-technical R-O-Fs, which NASA leaders must adhere to in order to
help the Agency move forward to meet the challenges of the future. The
Diaz Team realizes that, in some respects, the most challenging changes
will be those which pertain to culture, or those which are the
non-technical R-O-Fs noted in the CAIB or Report. The Team knows that
the organizational changes recommended in the CAIB Report will require
sustained planning implementation over time to achieve the desired
future the CAIB and NASA foresee. When making cultural change, large
organizations such as NASA need to assure that, throughout the change
process the organizations core values are both relied on and sustained.
The Team believes these core values will help the Agencys leaders take
on the serious challenges ahead, which should yield improved safety,
performance excellence, and mission success.
The proposed actions in the Diaz Team Report are based on
culture-related issues identified by NASA leadership and the work-
workforce in the areas of: leadership, learning, communication,
processes and rules, technical capabilities, organizational structure,
and risk management. The Team believes this systemic approach to
cultural change at this critical juncture of the Agencys history will
yield a NASA culture that is significantly more responsive and prepared
for the promising opportunities of the American space programs future.
The seven Diaz Team goals are shown in Table 24. In order to gain a
more thorough understanding of the Diaz Teams determiatoons, more
detailed examination of the entire Diaz Team Matrix and its 40 actions
(Appendix A) and the tables in each of the foregoing
chapters is critical.
NASA indeed stands at a crossroads. One path is a continuation of the
course that allowed the of the course that allowed the Challenger and
Columbia accidents to occur. The new path of change may be difficult,
particularly at the start, and sometimes the goal is not always in
sight. But the rewards for walking this path are far greater than those
the old path could ever offer us. For NASA to embark on the new
pathway, some fundamental reforms must be instituted. These are
encompassed by the 40 reforms Diaz Team actions and seven goals
identified in the Report. The essence of these can be captured in three
overarching reforms:
· NASA must assure that appropriate checks and balances are in place
to develop and operate its missions safely, and must undertake the
organizational changes necessary to make this happen. The
organizationalstructure should help clarify roles and responsibilities
of individual employees, work groups and leadership. Every member of
the workforce must know his or her. Every member of the workforce
must know his or her position in the organization and all must know
their position in the organization and all must know their authority,
responsibility and accountability for assuring mission success. The
entire workforce must also be aware of and understand the rules.

· NASA must enhance communications at all levels NASA with a focus on
fostering diversity of viewpoints and with a focus on fostering
diversity of viewpoints and
eliminating fear of retribution. A communications culture must be
established with formal communications procedures to ensure effective
communications flow up and down the chain of command and across
organizational lines. Communications channels should be sufciently
flexible to support, encourage, and objectively evaluate all
viewpoints, ensuring sound decision-making practices.
· NASA must focus on the ways it is managing risk. Safety, mission
success and program performance must not be the product of schedule and
budget pressures alone. Technological and workforce factors be
considered in program planning and decision- making as well. A critical
role of leadership is to ensure there is an appropriate balance between
requirements, resources and risk. NASA must assure that the workforce
has the appropriate processes, tools and technical force has
capabilities to accomplish this."

(*3)
http://ntrs.nasa.gov/archive/nasa/ca...992075284..pdf
NSTS-22301, page 4
"SOLID ROCKET BOOSTER
The STS 61-C flight utilized lightweight solid rocket motor (SRM)
cases. SRM
propulsion performance was normal and within specification limits, with
propellant burn rates for both SRM's near predicted values. Solid
rocket booster (SRB) thrust differentials were within specification
throughout the flight....

A postflight evaluation of the SRM structure to determine the extent of
damage
revealed the following significant items:
a. A gas path was noted at the 154-degree position of the aft field
joint of the left S_M. Soot was found from the 140-degree to the
178-degree position, and soot was found in the primary groove from the
68-degree to the 183-degree (115 degrees arc) position. C-ring
damagewas noted at the 154-degree position with a maximumerosion depth
of 0.00_ inch and erosion length of 3.5 inches. The 0-ring was affected
by heat over a 14-inch length in this area.
b. A gas path was found from the 273.6-degree to the 309.6-degree (36
degrees arc) position of the left S_Mnozzle joint. Soot was found in
the primary 0-ring groove over the entire 360-degree circumference. A
potential impingement point was located at the 302.4-degree point;
however, no 0-ring damage was found.
c. A gas path was found at the 162-degree point with soot in the
primary 0-ring groove from the lOS-degree to the 220-degree (112
degrees arc) point on the right SRM nozzle joint. 0-ring damage was
found at the 162-degree point with the maximum erosion depth being
0.011 inch and the erosion length being 8 inches. The 0-rlng was
affected by heat over a 26-1nch length in this area.
d. A gas path was found on the outer surface of the igniter at the
130-degree point of the left SRM. Soot was found on the aft side of the
outer Gaskoseal, approaching the primary sea! over a 70-degree arc (130
to 200 degrees), and on the outer edge of the inner Gasko seal over a
130-degree arc (ii0 to 240 degrees), however, no seal damage was found.
e. A gas path was found on the outer surface of the igniter at the
250-degree point of the right S_. Soot was found on the inside edge of
the outer Gasko seal over the entire 360-degree circumference, however,
it did not progress beyond the edge of the seal. There was a slight
discoloration of the metal on both sides of the seal over the entire
360-degree circumference."

Open sharing of information is crucial to improving everybody's
understanding of the universe around us.
Tom



Derek Lyons wrote:
I implore you to read this entire message and ponder upon it before
replying, its quite long and involved. (I think this is the first
time I've put my whole argument in one place as a complete unit.)

It might be better to reply in manageable chunks.

Dave Michelson wrote:

Derek Lyons wrote:

Except - he didn't actually take any actual action to stop the launch
and prevent the tragedy. When push came to shove - he folded.

With due respect, I suggest that you're confusing engineering certainty
with professional opinion. As a result, you're being a bit harsh.

My criticism is not of his behavior at the time, but that the picture
he paints of himself today and his behavior at the time do not agree
with each other. (I don't think I've been clear, even to myself, that
I am not criticizing the Boisjoly of January 1986, but the one who
subsequently emerged upon the public stage and asking why the behavior
of the latter is not reflected in the behavior of the former.) My
seeming harshness springs from the stark contrast between the facts in
evidence of the events _then_ and his (and more importantly his
supporters) version of them _now_.

The problem, as I understand it, is that the cold temperatures on launch
day were a new scenario and Boisjoly and co. only suspected that a
problem existed. They didn't know for certain. (It was a strong
suspicion, but the trends in what data existed weren't fully appreciated
until after the fact.) In the absence of detailed calculations or data,
others with detailed technical knowledge in the area disagreed. It then
became a matter of professional opinion and, yes, engineers often have
to agree to disagree. And further study might have shown that Boisjoly
and co. had been overcautious.

That's precisely my point Dave - the evidence supports the contention
that he had an incompletely supported hunch. In that instance it's
entirely reasonable for the chain of events to unfold as they actually
did. Tragic and regrettable, but reasonable and understandable -
everyone makes mistakes from false or incomplete understanding, and in
the manned space business mistakes kill. But that does not change
reality - everyone in the process bases their understanding on the
evidence they have in hand at the time, and their own experience and
the surrounding circumstances. They did not enjoy, as we do today,
the advantages of 20-20 hindsight and an understanding of the
consequences that arose from decisions made nearly inevitably in the
circumstances.

Now if Boisjoly (and his supporters) stopped there with a mea culpa
for their own failings of insight, before calling Dr Guillotine to
treat the symptoms exhibited by management, and using today's insight
into yesterdays behavior as springboard to seeking ways to improve all
links in the chain - I'd have no disagreement. But they go beyond
that to the position that "management is evil because they failed to
stop the launch and hold up the program based on a few reports and an
incompletely supported hunch". There is where we part ways - because
that position is to me unsupportable.

Management (as you point out) wasn't technically unsophisticated, nor
inexperienced (in so much as anyone could be experienced with that few
flights under their belt), but they had pressures and priorities of
their own. The evidence in their possession at the time indicated
that the risk could not be quantified - and thus did not justify
canceling the launch and disrupting events downstream. If Boisjoly
had been wrong, for him it would have been a tempest in a teapot - one
more time when a hunch failed to pan out. If management however had
(at the time) believed him to be right (and he subsequently was
discovered to be wrong), then they would have been responsible for
tens (hundreds?) of millions of dollars in delay, the impacts on
Galileo and Hubble, the impacts of public and upper management
opinion, etc... etc...

To expect them to immune to these pressures is irrational, especially
while excusing Boisjoly's bowing to his pressures as being merely
human - because the managers too are merely human. Engineers are not
universally angels, and equally managers are not universally demons.
Each hold attributes of both in equal measures.

Boisjoly (I believe) errs in two ways. First in believing the two
sets of consequences (his and managements) were equivalent. Secondly
in not appreciating the underlying causes of managements decisions.
With 20-20 hindsight, we now know that those causes were predicated on
the false assumption [belief] that the Shuttle was 'operational'
(whatever that means) - a belief that was politically inevitable, with
tragic consequences that were equally inevitable.

It's ludicrous to hold someone accountable for something that not only
did they not appreciate at the time, and which would have required a
near superhuman flash of insight to appreciate and to escape the
intellectual and emotional fortress in which they had become
imprisoned.

Even such steely eyed missile men as Gene Krantz and John Aaron, both
rightfully lauded for their roles in Apollo, were seduced to the Dark
Side - Pre Challenger both supported the Shuttle program and defended
its safety. Which is unsurprising, because at the end of the day -
they too are merely human. In the days of Apollo they could act in
ways they could not in the days of the Shuttle - the times had
changed, and they with them. (And as a side note: Why does Apollo
era managers and engineers not come under the vitriolic attacks that
Shuttle era management does? They too faced their Challenger (Apollo
1) and Columbia (Apollo 13) that arose from their own mistakes and
shortsightedness...)

Note: I am defending the managers here - I am merely examining the
complete picture in its true colors, not the stark black and white,
angels and demons terms it is normally cast in.

Had Boisjoly and co. deferred to a client or contractor with less
technical skill than they had in the interests of expediency, then, once
again, your criticism would be justified. Had they not argued loudly
and forcefully that the matter required further attention, your
criticism would be justified. However, they were overruled
by more senior individuals within their own organization and by a
client/customer with considerable expertise of their own in the area.

That Boisjoly and co. had insufficient time to assemble the detailed
calculations or data, convince themselves that their concerns were
justified, and present their case, all in the few hours before the
launch took place cannot be held against them.

My criticism is *not* of his behavior at the time - both Boisjoly's
and managements are fairly predictable once you completely understand
the situation. (From _both_ sides, Boisjoly's _and managements_, the
latter being something few even attempt.) My criticism is of his
behavior *now*, where he strongly implies (contends) that he knew that
a tragedy was in the offing and that he made every effort to stop it.

Neither contention is supported by the historical record. For the
first, his own reports fail to clearly quantify the risk. For the
second, he did nothing but business as usual - reports, memos,
conferences and phone calls. If he did know, or even extremely
strongly believed (as he implies today), that a tragedy was in the
offing - then that situation calls for those same things, but _not_
worded in the dry and ambiguous phrasing of the work-a-day engineering
report - but in strong, clear, and unequivocal wording. That would
justify him becoming an arbiter and exemplar of morals and ethics -
but that's not what happened.

That is the basis of my criticism - ethical and moral behavior demands
extraordinary behavior in the face of extraordinary circumstances. I
can, and do, excuse him for being merely human and responding to
pressures in a way that is predictable and understandable. Equally I
can, and do, fault him and his supporters for painting a false picture
unsupported by evidence - and then using that picture to support his
beatification.

In the end it comes down to two simple cases; In the first, Boisjoly
is an angel thwarted by dark forces who today testifies to the
existence of the demons that defeated him despite his best efforts.
In the second, Boisjoly is but one man who played his bit part on the
stage, a tragic character but a stock and predictable one.

He, and his supporters, wish to paint the first picture. The
historical record paints the second.

D.
--
Touch-twice life. Eat. Drink. Laugh.

-Resolved: To be more temperate in my postings.
Oct 5th, 2004 JDL

On 17 Nov 2006 13:53:47 -0800, "columbiaaccidentinvestigation"
wrote:

Open sharing of information is crucial to improving everybody's
understanding of the universe around us.

sniffsniff. I smell a Znkfba.

OM
--
]=====================================[
] OMBlog - http://www.io.com/~o_m/omworld [
] Let's face it: Sometimes you *need* [
] an obnoxious opinion in your day! [
]=====================================[

Derek lyons stated :"Management (as you point out) wasn't technically
unsophisticated, nor inexperienced (in so much as anyone could be
experienced with that few flights under their belt), but they had
pressures and priorities of their own. The evidence in their
possession at the time indicated that the risk could not be quantified
- and thus did not justify canceling the launch and disrupting events
downstream. If Boisjoly had been wrong, for him it would have been a
tempest in a teapot - one more time when a hunch failed to pan out. If
management however had (at the time) believed him to be right (and he
subsequently was discovered to be wrong), then they would have been
responsible for tens (hundreds?) of millions of dollars in delay, the
impacts on Galileo and Hubble, the impacts of public and upper
management opinion, etc... etc..."

Now Derek, for a little more insight into how nasa is attempting to
implement the recommendations from the rogers commission, caib report,
and diaz report ( and change the thinking you have portrayed in
you're posts pertaining to nasa management and culture), you may want
to visit the web address below.

http://www.onenasa.nasa.gov/NEWS/SMS...mary_Final.pdf

"Safety and Mission Success Week Agency-Wide Summary Executive
Summary
Safety and Mission Success Week was designed to facilitate open
communication, and to engage the entire NASA community in addressing
the CAIB Report. Each Center Director was asked to champion the
week's events and collect feedback from their workforce. After
holding the work unit discussions, Center Directors were asked
facilitate a data rollup into the main ideas from their Center. Data
roll up validated the results of the CAIB and the Diaz Forty Actions.
Data from center roll ups were analyzed by a subset of the One NASA
Team. The "One NASA Data Team" included members from ARC, GSFC,
GRC, and JSC. The team examined the final Center reports and after
completing their three-phase analysis arrived at summary descriptions
of the themes submitted by the Centers as well as the following 12
cross-cutting themes. Each cross cutting theme was a major idea or
theme in at least two Center Reports.

1. NASA should willfully seek out and understand minority opinions.
This includes establishing a process to collect anonymous feedback, and
holding meetings that encourage open discussion.
2. Resources including time, human capital, and cash flow should be
allocated realistically and according to the design standards set forth
at project conception.
3. Strategic planning should be relevant for every employee, include
human capabilities needed for the future, and be the baseline for on
going initiatives.
4. The Agency needs a strategy for leadership development that
includes/supports a specific set of skills for all levels of
management. These skills should then be used for evaluating performance
and making personnel decisions such as promotions and awards.
5. Decisions should be made based on what is best for the Agency, be
placed in context using Agency priorities, guide allocation of
resources, and be fully rationalized and communicated to the workforce.
6. NASA needs a truly independent safety organization as described in
the CAIB report. This organization should serve as a clearinghouse for
any safety related concerns from any employee.
7. NASA needs to clarify the organizational structure of the Agency.
Current matrix system is too complex and is not perceived as a useful
management tool.
8. Safety expertise should exist for every specific discipline within
the Agency.
9. NASA needs an increased value on respect for others. All those
affected by the decision should be part of the decision making process.
Leaders should have the responsibility to provide employees with full
information regarding decisions, including options considered, and
rationale for making final choice.
10. NASA needs more emphasis on the entire lifespan of projects to
avoid being tied up in unnecessary processes, or lengthy approvals that
draw resources away from goal achievement. Appropriate procedures
should be established, and followed from project conception to
completion.
11. NASA should use/design ONE tool to capture expertise and lessons
learned in all areas. The tool should be easily accessible, and
actively used by the workforce.
12. Contractors should not be used to supply core competency expertise.
Building from an inclusive strategic plan the Agency should determine
what capabilities should be kept in house, and what capabilities should
be provided by contractors.

The themes were mapped against the 7 Diaz Team goals outlined in: A
Renewed Commitment to Excellence: An Assessment of the NASA Agency-wide
Applicability of the Columbia Accident Investigation Board Report. This
document is intended to provide a clear picture of the steps taken to
analyze the Safety and Mission Success Week....

Page 2
"Introduction
As a part of Safety and Mission Success Week, everyone across the
Agency was given a copy of the Colombia Accident Investigation Board
(CAIB) report and the Diaz Matrix. Management was asked to provide time
for employees to read both documents and to hold work unit discussions
regarding the applicability of the CAIB findings.
At the conclusion of Safety and Mission Success Week, each Center
(including JPL and HQ) submitted a brief report that outlined the main
ideas or themes from work unit discussions. The One NASA Team was asked
to examine each Center Report and develop a set of common themes that
would encompass the ideas brought forward
by all of the Centers. Note that there was not specific guidelines for
reporting data back to Headquarters. Prior to outlining the iterative
process used to analyze the Safety and Mission Success Week data, it is
important to note that our effort also aligns with recent publication
of the Diaz Team's: A Renewed Commitment to Excellence: An Assessment
of the NASA Agency-wide Applicability of the Columbia Accident
Investigation Board Report. Each Diaz Topic is found in at least two of
the cross-cutting themes identified by the One NASA Data Team. In
addition, each theme was also identified as a major theme or idea in at
least two Center Reports."...

page 6
COMMUNICATIONS
The comments were grouped into three major sub-topics consisting of 1)
disdain for bad news, 2) managers (leaders) not doing what they say,
and 3) observations on how we communicate. Based on the data set
analyzed, communication is a very important area of concern across the
Agency workforce. References to communication were also made in
numerous comments in other categories as well. Lack of a process for
delivering upward feedback: The predominant theme voiced within the
communication topic was that neither NASA nor contractor management
wants to deal with bad news or dissenting opinions. The perception is
that the all-to-common reaction is to not listen, not
understand/believe, not pass it on, and/or penalize the messenger. To
follow are a few comments that represent this area of concern.
· "Operational and safety information is suppressed at lower levels
to the point that most middle managers aren't aware of many concerns
that have cropped up. This system results in only good news going
uphill, bad news is largely suppressed. This results in a system where
risk is accepted by the lowest levels without management having the
opportunity to accept risk. This is completely unsafe, and will only
stop when upper/middle management actively seeks the dissenting
opinions (gets out in the field!)" · "Fear of retribution for
speaking against a group decision is clearly an issue at all levels.
This includes fear of: Losing contracts, being "frozen" in career
path or moved out of position, being passed over for key projects, and
experiencing tarnished reputation or professional ridicule."
· "It is very intimidating for us or even developer staff to
express minority opinions. The thought of going before the [program
panel name deleted] to request a change to software is daunting...The
program management doesn't encourage minority opinions."
Leaders do not follow words with actions: The second most prevalent
theme voiced in the comments was that managers (leaders) do not do what
they say. This sends a confusing message that undermines trust and
respect.
Actions must match words. To follow are a few comments that represent
this area of concern.
· "There is a hesitancy to communicate with someone in authority
who has the power to change something or make something happen. We say
that people have the right to stop work, but the first time they do and
they get jumped on for it, we lose everything that we tried to gain.
That's why it is so important for management to support and back the
employees."

Open sharing of information is crucial to improving everybody's
understanding of the universe around us.
Tom



Derek Lyons wrote:
I implore you to read this entire message and ponder upon it before
replying, its quite long and involved. (I think this is the first
time I've put my whole argument in one place as a complete unit.)

It might be better to reply in manageable chunks.

Dave Michelson wrote:

Derek Lyons wrote:

Except - he didn't actually take any actual action to stop the launch
and prevent the tragedy. When push came to shove - he folded.

With due respect, I suggest that you're confusing engineering certainty
with professional opinion. As a result, you're being a bit harsh.

My criticism is not of his behavior at the time, but that the picture
he paints of himself today and his behavior at the time do not agree
with each other. (I don't think I've been clear, even to myself, that
I am not criticizing the Boisjoly of January 1986, but the one who
subsequently emerged upon the public stage and asking why the behavior
of the latter is not reflected in the behavior of the former.) My
seeming harshness springs from the stark contrast between the facts in
evidence of the events _then_ and his (and more importantly his
supporters) version of them _now_.

The problem, as I understand it, is that the cold temperatures on launch
day were a new scenario and Boisjoly and co. only suspected that a
problem existed. They didn't know for certain. (It was a strong
suspicion, but the trends in what data existed weren't fully appreciated
until after the fact.) In the absence of detailed calculations or data,
others with detailed technical knowledge in the area disagreed. It then
became a matter of professional opinion and, yes, engineers often have
to agree to disagree. And further study might have shown that Boisjoly
and co. had been overcautious.

That's precisely my point Dave - the evidence supports the contention
that he had an incompletely supported hunch. In that instance it's
entirely reasonable for the chain of events to unfold as they actually
did. Tragic and regrettable, but reasonable and understandable -
everyone makes mistakes from false or incomplete understanding, and in
the manned space business mistakes kill. But that does not change
reality - everyone in the process bases their understanding on the
evidence they have in hand at the time, and their own experience and
the surrounding circumstances. They did not enjoy, as we do today,
the advantages of 20-20 hindsight and an understanding of the
consequences that arose from decisions made nearly inevitably in the
circumstances.

Now if Boisjoly (and his supporters) stopped there with a mea culpa
for their own failings of insight, before calling Dr Guillotine to
treat the symptoms exhibited by management, and using today's insight
into yesterdays behavior as springboard to seeking ways to improve all
links in the chain - I'd have no disagreement. But they go beyond
that to the position that "management is evil because they failed to
stop the launch and hold up the program based on a few reports and an
incompletely supported hunch". There is where we part ways - because
that position is to me unsupportable.

Management (as you point out) wasn't technically unsophisticated, nor
inexperienced (in so much as anyone could be experienced with that few
flights under their belt), but they had pressures and priorities of
their own. The evidence in their possession at the time indicated
that the risk could not be quantified - and thus did not justify
canceling the launch and disrupting events downstream. If Boisjoly
had been wrong, for him it would have been a tempest in a teapot - one
more time when a hunch failed to pan out. If management however had
(at the time) believed him to be right (and he subsequently was
discovered to be wrong), then they would have been responsible for
tens (hundreds?) of millions of dollars in delay, the impacts on
Galileo and Hubble, the impacts of public and upper management
opinion, etc... etc...

To expect them to immune to these pressures is irrational, especially
while excusing Boisjoly's bowing to his pressures as being merely
human - because the managers too are merely human. Engineers are not
universally angels, and equally managers are not universally demons.
Each hold attributes of both in equal measures.

Boisjoly (I believe) errs in two ways. First in believing the two
sets of consequences (his and managements) were equivalent. Secondly
in not appreciating the underlying causes of managements decisions.
With 20-20 hindsight, we now know that those causes were predicated on
the false assumption [belief] that the Shuttle was 'operational'
(whatever that means) - a belief that was politically inevitable, with
tragic consequences that were equally inevitable.

It's ludicrous to hold someone accountable for something that not only
did they not appreciate at the time, and which would have required a
near superhuman flash of insight to appreciate and to escape the
intellectual and emotional fortress in which they had become
imprisoned.

Even such steely eyed missile men as Gene Krantz and John Aaron, both
rightfully lauded for their roles in Apollo, were seduced to the Dark
Side - Pre Challenger both supported the Shuttle program and defended
its safety. Which is unsurprising, because at the end of the day -
they too are merely human. In the days of Apollo they could act in
ways they could not in the days of the Shuttle - the times had
changed, and they with them. (And as a side note: Why does Apollo
era managers and engineers not come under the vitriolic attacks that
Shuttle era management does? They too faced their Challenger (Apollo
1) and Columbia (Apollo 13) that arose from their own mistakes and
shortsightedness...)

Note: I am defending the managers here - I am merely examining the
complete picture in its true colors, not the stark black and white,
angels and demons terms it is normally cast in.

Had Boisjoly and co. deferred to a client or contractor with less
technical skill than they had in the interests of expediency, then, once
again, your criticism would be justified. Had they not argued loudly
and forcefully that the matter required further attention, your
criticism would be justified. However, they were overruled
by more senior individuals within their own organization and by a
client/customer with considerable expertise of their own in the area.

That Boisjoly and co. had insufficient time to assemble the detailed
calculations or data, convince themselves that their concerns were
justified, and present their case, all in the few hours before the
launch took place cannot be held against them.

My criticism is *not* of his behavior at the time - both Boisjoly's
and managements are fairly predictable once you completely understand
the situation. (From _both_ sides, Boisjoly's _and managements_, the
latter being something few even attempt.) My criticism is of his
behavior *now*, where he strongly implies (contends) that he knew that
a tragedy was in the offing and that he made every effort to stop it.

Neither contention is supported by the historical record. For the
first, his own reports fail to clearly quantify the risk. For the
second, he did nothing but business as usual - reports, memos,
conferences and phone calls. If he did know, or even extremely
strongly believed (as he implies today), that a tragedy was in the
offing - then that situation calls for those same things, but _not_
worded in the dry and ambiguous phrasing of the work-a-day engineering
report - but in strong, clear, and unequivocal wording. That would
justify him becoming an arbiter and exemplar of morals and ethics -
but that's not what happened.

That is the basis of my criticism - ethical and moral behavior demands
extraordinary behavior in the face of extraordinary circumstances. I
can, and do, excuse him for being merely human and responding to
pressures in a way that is predictable and understandable. Equally I
can, and do, fault him and his supporters for painting a false picture
unsupported by evidence - and then using that picture to support his
beatification.

In the end it comes down to two simple cases; In the first, Boisjoly
is an angel thwarted by dark forces who today testifies to the
existence of the demons that defeated him despite his best efforts.
In the second, Boisjoly is but one man who played his bit part on the
stage, a tragic character but a stock and predictable one.

He, and his supporters, wish to paint the first picture. The
historical record paints the second.

D.
--
Touch-twice life. Eat. Drink. Laugh.

-Resolved: To be more temperate in my postings.
Oct 5th, 2004 JDL

OM wrote:



Open sharing of information is crucial to improving everybody's
understanding of the universe around us.



sniffsniff. I smell a Znkfba.


I'm beginning to suspect that also.

Pat

On Fri, 17 Nov 2006 19:24:43 -0600, Pat Flannery
wrote:

sniffsniff. I smell a Znkfba.


I'm beginning to suspect that also.

....Yeah, the stench was rather old and musty, sort of like what a
janitor fired from an aerospace corporation for being a nutball would
smell like. That, and a trace of fried hire-a-pig.

OM
--
]=====================================[
] OMBlog - http://www.io.com/~o_m/omworld [
] Let's face it: Sometimes you *need* [
] an obnoxious opinion in your day! [
]=====================================[

Derek lyons stated:"That's precisely my point Dave - the evidence
supports the contention that he had an incompletely supported hunch.
In that instance it's entirely reasonable for the chain of events to
unfold as they actually did. Tragic and regrettable, but reasonable
and understandable - everyone makes mistakes from false or incomplete
understanding, and in the manned space business mistakes kill. But
that does not change reality - everyone in the process bases their
understanding on the evidence they have in hand at the time, and their
own experience and the surrounding circumstances. They did not enjoy,
as we do today, the advantages of 20-20 hindsight and an understanding
of the consequences that arose from decisions made nearly inevitably in
the circumstances."

Now derek a little historical refresher of the events occuring inside
nasa in preparation for the tragic sts-51l mission from the rogers
commission, and the documented previous missions (sts-61c) srb o-ring
seal failure, might help youre confusion of the historical facts.

http://www.gpoaccess.gov/challenger/64_420b.pdf
page (26 pdf) or 208 in the report
"In the case of STS 51-L, no deviation from normal procedure
apparently occurred. This means that the Solid Rocket Motor, containing
the seal that apparently failed, proceeded through the usual eight
levels of review a t Thiokol's Wasatch Division, Marshall Space
Flight Center, the STS Program Office at Johnson Space Flight Center,
and the Associate

"Administrator's review at NASA Headqarters.
The Flight Readiness Review process for STS 51-L began on December l l
, 1985, at Thiokol's Utah plant. No information is presented in the
briefing charts used that day regarding the continuing failure of the
SRM joint seals. The chart entitled "STS-61C
(STS-32) (SRM-24) Performance "has only one entry: "TBD [to be
determined]."

Post-flight disassembly of STS 61-C SRB hardware following its launch
on January 12 revealed that erosion of the primary O-ring had occurred
in the aft field joint of the left motor. Hot gas had also bypassed the
primary seal in the left nozzle joint. Erosion of the primary seal had
also occurred in the nozzle joint of the right motor.6 Under the terms
of the FRR Policy Directive, such damage would appear to require
discussion: "the scope of the review should cover status and issues
in areas such as . . . prior flight anomalies. . . ."
However, according to Mr. McDonald and Mr. Kennedy, Thiokol normally
took about one week to prepare a discussion of problems noted in the
initial inspection following SRB hardware disassembly. It would seem
logical, when faced with the lack of data from the previous hardware
set, to expand the search to other previously-flown hardware. On 61-A,
hot gas had bypassed the primary seals in both the center and aft field
joints of the left motor. The right motor suffered erosion of the
primary O-ring in the nozzle joint.
The SRBs from 61-B suffered erosion of the seals in both nozzle joints,
with gas bypassing the primary seal of the left nozzle." The
Associate Administrator's policy directive is not alone instressing
that any available information capable of assisting with an assessment
of flight readiness should be presented at a readiness review.
Marshall's Shuttle Projects Office policy guidance uses virtually
identical language. Under "Shuttle Policy Guidance," it states,
"Review Concept: The Shuttle Projects FRR will employ a delta review
concept from prior reviews and previous STS missions."

In his letter announcing the STS 51-L Marshall Center FRR, Dr. Lucas
wrote:
Each project manager must certify the flight readiness of his hardware
and present supporting rationale and data so the Board can
independently assess the flight readiness
.. . . Emphasis will be placed on safety of flight and mission success,
including potential impact of prior flight anomalies. Apparent in the
STS 51-L process, however, is that the continuing SRM seal problem did
not receive such treatment. The "delta review concept" referred to
above, according to Mr. McDonald, meant that the contractor was
obligated to step back only to the previous mission for comparison. For
51-L, there was no previous mission to compare data with, since 61-C
had not yet flown. Anomalies on STS 61-A and 61-B were not discussed,
Mr. McDonald said, because they had already been dispositioned in the
FRR's for 61-B and 61-C. The Marshall Space Flight Center FRR
conducted by Dr. Lucas occurred only one day after the 61-C launch.
Mulloy's presentation under STS 61-C performance noted that "all
SRB systems functioned normally." Under "ascent," the chart shows
"no anomalies."
There is no indication in the documentation for this FRR that the
continuing problem with the SRM seals was raised. The parachute
recovery system was discussed at some length. Much of the presentation
appears to be drawn from the booster assembly pres
entation made at Mulloy's Level I11 FRR on January 3. The
onlyrelevant item that mi ht refer to the O-rings appears under
"Certification verification status" where no findings from
continuing analyses that changes previously established rationale for
flight. 'Mr. Mulloy's presentation at the January 15, 1986, Level 1
FRR does not indicate any serious problems with the SRBs. Documentation
under "Problems/Anomalies" lists "[IL]~ 61-C flight anomalies."




http://ntrs.nasa.gov/archive/nasa/ca...1992075284.pdf
NSTS-22301, page 4
"SOLID ROCKET BOOSTER
The STS 61-C flight utilized lightweight solid rocket motor (SRM)
cases. SRM
propulsion performance was normal and within specification limits, with
propellant burn rates for both SRM's near predicted values. Solid
rocket booster (SRB) thrust differentials were within specification
throughout the flight....

A postflight evaluation of the SRM structure to determine the extent of
damage
revealed the following significant items:
a. A gas path was noted at the 154-degree position of the aft field
joint of the left S_M. Soot was found from the 140-degree to the
178-degree position, and soot was found in the primary groove from the
68-degree to the 183-degree (115 degrees arc) position. C-ring
damagewas noted at the 154-degree position with a maximumerosion depth
of 0.00_ inch and erosion length of 3.5 inches. The 0-ring was affected
by heat over a 14-inch length in this area.
b. A gas path was found from the 273.6-degree to the 309.6-degree (36
degrees arc) position of the left S_Mnozzle joint. Soot was found in
the primary 0-ring groove over the entire 360-degree circumference. A
potential impingement point was located at the 302.4-degree point;
however, no 0-ring damage was found.
c. A gas path was found at the 162-degree point with soot in the
primary 0-ring groove from the lOS-degree to the 220-degree (112
degrees arc) point on the right SRM nozzle joint. 0-ring damage was
found at the 162-degree point with the maximum erosion depth being
0.011 inch and the erosion length being 8 inches. The 0-rlng was
affected by heat over a 26-1nch length in this area.
d. A gas path was found on the outer surface of the igniter at the
130-degree point of the left SRM. Soot was found on the aft side of the
outer Gaskoseal, approaching the primary sea! over a 70-degree arc (130
to 200 degrees), and on the outer edge of the inner Gasko seal over a
130-degree arc (ii0 to 240 degrees), however, no seal damage was found.
e. A gas path was found on the outer surface of the igniter at the
250-degree point of the right S_. Soot was found on the inside edge of
the outer Gasko seal over the entire 360-degree circumference, however,
it did not progress beyond the edge of the seal. There was a slight
discoloration of the metal on both sides of the seal over the entire
360-degree circumference."

Open sharing of information is crucial to improving everybody's
understanding of the universe around us.
Tom

Derek Lyons wrote:
I implore you to read this entire message and ponder upon it before
replying, its quite long and involved. (I think this is the first
time I've put my whole argument in one place as a complete unit.)

It might be better to reply in manageable chunks.

Dave Michelson wrote:

Derek Lyons wrote:

Except - he didn't actually take any actual action to stop the launch
and prevent the tragedy. When push came to shove - he folded.

With due respect, I suggest that you're confusing engineering certainty
with professional opinion. As a result, you're being a bit harsh.

My criticism is not of his behavior at the time, but that the picture
he paints of himself today and his behavior at the time do not agree
with each other. (I don't think I've been clear, even to myself, that
I am not criticizing the Boisjoly of January 1986, but the one who
subsequently emerged upon the public stage and asking why the behavior
of the latter is not reflected in the behavior of the former.) My
seeming harshness springs from the stark contrast between the facts in
evidence of the events _then_ and his (and more importantly his
supporters) version of them _now_.

The problem, as I understand it, is that the cold temperatures on launch
day were a new scenario and Boisjoly and co. only suspected that a
problem existed. They didn't know for certain. (It was a strong
suspicion, but the trends in what data existed weren't fully appreciated
until after the fact.) In the absence of detailed calculations or data,
others with detailed technical knowledge in the area disagreed. It then
became a matter of professional opinion and, yes, engineers often have
to agree to disagree. And further study might have shown that Boisjoly
and co. had been overcautious.

That's precisely my point Dave - the evidence supports the contention
that he had an incompletely supported hunch. In that instance it's
entirely reasonable for the chain of events to unfold as they actually
did. Tragic and regrettable, but reasonable and understandable -
everyone makes mistakes from false or incomplete understanding, and in
the manned space business mistakes kill. But that does not change
reality - everyone in the process bases their understanding on the
evidence they have in hand at the time, and their own experience and
the surrounding circumstances. They did not enjoy, as we do today,
the advantages of 20-20 hindsight and an understanding of the
consequences that arose from decisions made nearly inevitably in the
circumstances.

Now if Boisjoly (and his supporters) stopped there with a mea culpa
for their own failings of insight, before calling Dr Guillotine to
treat the symptoms exhibited by management, and using today's insight
into yesterdays behavior as springboard to seeking ways to improve all
links in the chain - I'd have no disagreement. But they go beyond
that to the position that "management is evil because they failed to
stop the launch and hold up the program based on a few reports and an
incompletely supported hunch". There is where we part ways - because
that position is to me unsupportable.

Management (as you point out) wasn't technically unsophisticated, nor
inexperienced (in so much as anyone could be experienced with that few
flights under their belt), but they had pressures and priorities of
their own. The evidence in their possession at the time indicated
that the risk could not be quantified - and thus did not justify
canceling the launch and disrupting events downstream. If Boisjoly
had been wrong, for him it would have been a tempest in a teapot - one
more time when a hunch failed to pan out. If management however had
(at the time) believed him to be right (and he subsequently was
discovered to be wrong), then they would have been responsible for
tens (hundreds?) of millions of dollars in delay, the impacts on
Galileo and Hubble, the impacts of public and upper management
opinion, etc... etc...

To expect them to immune to these pressures is irrational, especially
while excusing Boisjoly's bowing to his pressures as being merely
human - because the managers too are merely human. Engineers are not
universally angels, and equally managers are not universally demons.
Each hold attributes of both in equal measures.

Boisjoly (I believe) errs in two ways. First in believing the two
sets of consequences (his and managements) were equivalent. Secondly
in not appreciating the underlying causes of managements decisions.
With 20-20 hindsight, we now know that those causes were predicated on
the false assumption [belief] that the Shuttle was 'operational'
(whatever that means) - a belief that was politically inevitable, with
tragic consequences that were equally inevitable.

It's ludicrous to hold someone accountable for something that not only
did they not appreciate at the time, and which would have required a
near superhuman flash of insight to appreciate and to escape the
intellectual and emotional fortress in which they had become
imprisoned.

Even such steely eyed missile men as Gene Krantz and John Aaron, both
rightfully lauded for their roles in Apollo, were seduced to the Dark
Side - Pre Challenger both supported the Shuttle program and defended
its safety. Which is unsurprising, because at the end of the day -
they too are merely human. In the days of Apollo they could act in
ways they could not in the days of the Shuttle - the times had
changed, and they with them. (And as a side note: Why does Apollo
era managers and engineers not come under the vitriolic attacks that
Shuttle era management does? They too faced their Challenger (Apollo
1) and Columbia (Apollo 13) that arose from their own mistakes and
shortsightedness...)

Note: I am defending the managers here - I am merely examining the
complete picture in its true colors, not the stark black and white,
angels and demons terms it is normally cast in.

Had Boisjoly and co. deferred to a client or contractor with less
technical skill than they had in the interests of expediency, then, once
again, your criticism would be justified. Had they not argued loudly
and forcefully that the matter required further attention, your
criticism would be justified. However, they were overruled
by more senior individuals within their own organization and by a
client/customer with considerable expertise of their own in the area.

That Boisjoly and co. had insufficient time to assemble the detailed
calculations or data, convince themselves that their concerns were
justified, and present their case, all in the few hours before the
launch took place cannot be held against them.

My criticism is *not* of his behavior at the time - both Boisjoly's
and managements are fairly predictable once you completely understand
the situation. (From _both_ sides, Boisjoly's _and managements_, the
latter being something few even attempt.) My criticism is of his
behavior *now*, where he strongly implies (contends) that he knew that
a tragedy was in the offing and that he made every effort to stop it.

Neither contention is supported by the historical record. For the
first, his own reports fail to clearly quantify the risk. For the
second, he did nothing but business as usual - reports, memos,
conferences and phone calls. If he did know, or even extremely
strongly believed (as he implies today), that a tragedy was in the
offing - then that situation calls for those same things, but _not_
worded in the dry and ambiguous phrasing of the work-a-day engineering
report - but in strong, clear, and unequivocal wording. That would
justify him becoming an arbiter and exemplar of morals and ethics -
but that's not what happened.

That is the basis of my criticism - ethical and moral behavior demands
extraordinary behavior in the face of extraordinary circumstances. I
can, and do, excuse him for being merely human and responding to
pressures in a way that is predictable and understandable. Equally I
can, and do, fault him and his supporters for painting a false picture
unsupported by evidence - and then using that picture to support his
beatification.

In the end it comes down to two simple cases; In the first, Boisjoly
is an angel thwarted by dark forces who today testifies to the
existence of the demons that defeated him despite his best efforts.
In the second, Boisjoly is but one man who played his bit part on the
stage, a tragic character but a stock and predictable one.

He, and his supporters, wish to paint the first picture. The
historical record paints the second.

D.
--
Touch-twice life. Eat. Drink. Laugh.

-Resolved: To be more temperate in my postings.
Oct 5th, 2004 JDL

On 17 Nov 2006 20:09:16 -0800, "columbiaaccidentinvestigation"
wrote:

Open sharing of information is crucial to improving everybody's
understanding of the universe around us.

....Fee. Fie. Foe. Fum. I *do* smell the stench of a Znkfba scum.

PLONK

OM
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