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US intelligence on USSR, 1967
This is kind of interesting and even somewhat relevant to space
matters to the extent it indicates the general quality and limitations of US intelligence in the middle of the "moon race" era. In particular, it does seem to indicate the absence of high-level penetrations in the government and military. Not surprising given other information, but it never hurts to have all the evidence you can get, even if it is NEGINT. http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ho/frus/johnsonlb/x/9098.htm US INTELLIGENCE CAPABILITIES TO MONITOR CERTAIN LIMITATIONS ON SOVIET STRATEGIC WEAPONS PROGRAMS SNIE 11-10-67 TCS 6228-67 Washington, February 14, 1967. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, National Intelligence Estimates, 11-67--USSR, Box 4. Top Secret; Ruff; Trine; Zarf. Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency and concurred in by the U.S. Intelligence Board. A title page and table of contents are not printed. Conclusions A. In the continued absence of a large-scale Soviet program of deception and concealment we believe that we would almost certainly detect any extensive new deployment in strategic forces, although the Soviets could probably effect small-scale increases without our knowledge. The timing of detection and identification would vary with the nature and size of the program. We probably would identify a land-mobile offensive system, for example, but perhaps only after it had become operational in substantial numbers. B. We would almost certainly detect any large-scale test program, but we could not always expect to assess accurately the test objectives or even the precise nature of the system being tested. Our capabilities are generally better in the case of offensive than of defensive weapons. We believe, for example, that we could detect and identify Soviet testing of multiple, independently-targeted reentry vehicles (MIRVs); we could probably also detect test activity associated with an ABM system, but are not confident that we could identify it as such before it became operational. C. Our capabilities for detecting qualitative improvements in the deployed forces are better in the case of defensive weapons than offensive ones. Our chances of determining whether a SAM system had been provided with significant ABM capabilities are at present about even, but we think that they will improve. On the other hand, we see no prospect of determining whether MIRVs (if developed) or other significant improvements had been incorporated in deployed offensive missiles. D. Soviet employment of deception and concealment on a large- scale would, of course, degrade our capabilities. The principal effect would be that of delay. Thus, while we still believe that substantial new deployment would almost certainly be detected, detection would come later in the program, perhaps not until after significant deployment had occurred. Some of the deception and concealment measures which the Soviets could employ would probably be recognizable as such, but their purpose might not be readily apparent. Additionally, we assume that the Soviets will not interfere actively with US collection systems. E. Factors affecting intelligence collection will vary over the period of this estimate but intelligence is not expected to be able to guarantee that the Soviets have not violated one or more provisions of the agreement under consideration. F. Finally, we wish to note that the demonstration of violations of the arms control agreement under consideration would almost certainly involve the use and possibly the compromise of very costly and highly sophisticated intelligence collection methods. |
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(Airyx) wrote in message . com...
(Allen Thomson) wrote in message . com... This is kind of interesting and even somewhat relevant to space matters to the extent it indicates the general quality and limitations of US intelligence in the middle of the "moon race" era. In particular, it does seem to indicate the absence of high-level penetrations in the government and military. Not surprising given other information, but it never hurts to have all the evidence you can get, even if it is NEGINT. http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ho/frus/johnsonlb/x/9098.htm US INTELLIGENCE CAPABILITIES TO MONITOR CERTAIN LIMITATIONS ON SOVIET STRATEGIC WEAPONS PROGRAMS This looks like somebody asked the CIA "If we enter into an arms control agreement with the Soviet's, would we be able to tell if they are cheating?" I've found that through the 60's and 70's, Soviet military power was vastly overestimated. The Mig-25 is the most prominent example, but the SS-20's mobility, range, payload, and accuracy were all overestimated by an order of magnitude. May I insert a comment based on experience but without any facts to substantiate what I say? The MiG 25 was a pet of the US Air Force, with it they could obtain any amount of budget money for any project based it's rather frightening performance over a short distance. The SS-20 was involved in a piece of Soviet deception, possibly not intended as such. The capabilities of the missile had been estimated fairly accurately when the Scaleboard transporter-launcher was shown. Then someone in Red Star (Krasnaya Zvezda) decided to do an article on the Scaleboard and said the missile had a range of "thousands" (sic) of kilometers. Some people decided that the Red Star never lied about such things and gave the SS-12/Scaleboard capabilities beyond its obvious performance envelope. When it appear in the Far East and eventually Europe the underwear laundry went into extra hours. Even in the 80's, I remember all sorts of panic over the appearance of a Super-Fighter (called RAM-L) which later turned out to be the Su-27. |
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