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#12
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In article .com,
Jake McGuire wrote: Planning exploration missions for a variety of commercial boosters does several good things. It gives greater program reliability... It gives lower costs, directly as commercial providers compete, Assuming of course that the boosters are interchangeable in the same way a 777 and MD-110 are. Part of the initial EELV spec was common payload interfaces to allow satellites to be moved between EELVs with minimal/no effort. I've got no idea if this was dropped to save cost or how closely the Boeing and LockMart followed the spec... Some differences may have crept in if nobody was watching... but all it would take to eliminate them would be bulk orders conditional on full standardization. Comsats are routinely moved from one launcher to another nowadays, not just within the US but across the full {Ariane, Atlas, Sea Launch, Proton} spectrum of large commercial launchers. (The list would also include the H-IIA, the Delta IV, and the high-end Long March configurations, were it not for political and marketing issues.) This does sometimes require bits of engineering work as part of a switch, but there's nothing inherently necessary about that -- it's from lack of incentive to standardize, rather than any fundamental need for launchers or payloads to differ. -- spsystems.net is temporarily off the air; | Henry Spencer mail to henry at zoo.utoronto.ca instead. | |
#13
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#14
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"Derek Lyons" wrote in message ... Henry Vanderbilt wrote: We have to ask, after forty years of stunning technological progress, shouldn't we be able to improve on Apollo's cost-to-exploration ratio a bit more than this? We have to ask - what stunning technological leaps have occurred to lead you to assume this is a rational question? In the area of space exploration, there have been few technological leaps which have led to reduced launch costs. It's not the lack of technology that keeps launch costs high, but it's certainly the high launch costs that makes NASA want to develop the SDHLV, since they think that saves money by launching most of everything you need for a lunar mission on one launch vehicle. - NASA should let go of controlling their own space transportation from start to finish. They should make an exploration plan based on a variety of existing commercially available boosters, then put the entire ground-to-orbit leg of their new deep space missions out to bid. Why should NASA be so different from any other government organization that uses unique hardware and transport? Why does NASA *need* unique hardware and transport? Specifically, why does it *need* to develop the stick and the SDHLLV? Why doesn't it spend that development money coming up with better ways to do automated LEO docking and orbital assembly? Planning exploration missions for a variety of commercial boosters does several good things. It gives greater program reliability - if one booster has a problem, traffic can be switched to another without putting the program on hold for two years. It gives lower costs, directly as commercial providers compete, Assuming of course that the boosters are interchangeable in the same way a 777 and MD-110 are. Since the CEV provides it's own power, life support, abort systems, and etc, why would the choice of launch vehicle make much of a difference? It's pretty heavy, so you need a big launcher, but why couldn't you size it for launch on either a Delta IV Heavy or Atlas V Heavy? What's fundamentally different between the two that would make launching the CEV harder on one of these than on the stick? indirectly as NASA takes advantage of the cheaper lift to allow engineering more margin into spacecraft designs (thus reducing both development and operating costs), Increasing the number of design generations reduces neither - except in the unlikely event that the changes are so transparent to the end user as to make no difference in planning, maintenance, documentation, etc... etc.. (Which raises the question of why one should bother in the first place.) and it reduces future costs even further since newer cheaper launchers can be phased in as commercial competition makes them available. Assuming that said competition does occur, and their is payoff to the vendors in the form of a large market - from someplace other than NASA. Making that assumption is still better than letting NASA develop its own heavy lift launch vehicles yet again, since we can rest assured that they won't let the stick or the SDHLV be used for anything but NASA missions. Jeff -- Remove icky phrase from email address to get a valid address. |
#15
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In article ,
Derek Lyons wrote: - NASA should let go of controlling their own space transportation from start to finish. They should make an exploration plan based on a variety of existing commercially available boosters, then put the entire ground-to-orbit leg of their new deep space missions out to bid. Why should NASA be so different from any other government organization that uses unique hardware and transport? What is "unique" about ground-to-orbit transportation? 45 years ago, it was unique and special; now, it is a routine commercial service. Even the military, despite its preference for detailed control of everything it depends on, relies heavily on commercial air and surface transport for getting people and supplies into the theater of operations. It provides its own only for some genuinely unique requirements, like moving extremely dense loads by air (747 floors are not built to support heavy tanks), and for extremely-high-risk operations like battlefield transportation. (Merely being shot at occasionally doesn't preclude civilian transport -- ask anyone who was in the WW2 merchant marine.) indirectly as NASA takes advantage of the cheaper lift to allow engineering more margin into spacecraft designs (thus reducing both development and operating costs), Increasing the number of design generations reduces neither... Why would it increase the number of design generations? You build more margin in *from the start*, exploiting cheaper transport to relax mass constraints and reduce the need to shave margins. This has been done with spacecraft, occasionally, when circumstances dictated or permitted using a launcher bigger than the bare minimum needed to fly the mission. It works. and it reduces future costs even further since newer cheaper launchers can be phased in as commercial competition makes them available. Assuming that said competition does occur... Yes, that cost reduction occurs only if that assumption is correct. On the other hand, it's a legitimate advantage of this approach that it is *able* to exploit such improvements if they appear. -- spsystems.net is temporarily off the air; | Henry Spencer mail to henry at zoo.utoronto.ca instead. | |
#16
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In message
Pat Flannery wrote: Max Turner wrote: article snipped Makes a lot of sense, particularly the in-orbit assembly using commercial launches. What's the point of re-doing Apollo 50 years later? That's going to be the question. What exactly does this do that Apollo didn't do? As of yet, there is no real answer to that one. I have serious doubts that this plan will ever survive the next administration. Pat Try reading Apollo the Lost & Forgotten Missions by David Shayler Springer-Praxis books. This is about cancelled plans to expand Apollo to explore the moon. They included sending unmanned apollos to th moon with large presurised moble labs or fixed habitats for extended stays. Which would be Manned by crews sent on later flights So the new program would:- start with 4 man return missions then get a small lunar outpoust (3-10 cargo flights) then get mobile labs then??? Unless it all get cancelled again. -- J.P. Kerslake B.Sc., F.B.I.S. Dyslexia Rules KO. "phone"01248-353264. e-mail (remove NOSPAM) RiscStation Lite+. RiscOS 4.03 boot 1.03. MPro.3.27 DialUp 3.10. SpanStamp 1.02a |
#17
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Just a note that the BBC picked up your excellent posting:
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/science/nature/4263106.stm Sadly, they didn't include a link to the full text, or the SAS web site. |
#18
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Derek Lyons wrote: Henry Vanderbilt wrote: We have to ask, after forty years of stunning technological progress, shouldn't we be able to improve on Apollo's cost-to-exploration ratio a bit more than this? We have to ask - what stunning technological leaps have occurred to lead you to assume this is a rational question? Let's see. Since 1965, when Apollo's approach was pretty much set, we've seen somewhat better engines, several times better structures, orders of magnitude better electronics, vastly more operational experience, and markedly better organizational paradigms. From what we can see, ESAS makes modest use of the first four, near zero use of the last one. (I will ignore your initial rudeness. Once.) - NASA should let go of controlling their own space transportation from start to finish. They should make an exploration plan based on a variety of existing commercially available boosters, then put the entire ground-to-orbit leg of their new deep space missions out to bid. Why should NASA be so different from any other government organization that uses unique hardware and transport? Circular reasoning there - NASA should use unique transportation hardware because NASA has always used unique transportation hardware. Except we're in transition away from the last example of NASA developing its own unique transportation hardware, and it's a good time to look really really hard at their claims they need to do it again, rather than go over to the (far more widely available now) generic commercial transportation hardware that now routinely goes to the same basic destination, low orbit. Put another way, yes, NASA builds an X-plane when it wants to test some new experimental aerodynamic feature. It calls an air cargo company when it wants to move that X-plane from the manufacturer's to Dryden, though. Planning exploration missions for a variety of commercial boosters does several good things. It gives greater program reliability - if one booster has a problem, traffic can be switched to another without putting the program on hold for two years. It gives lower costs, directly as commercial providers compete, Assuming of course that the boosters are interchangeable in the same way a 777 and MD-110 are. Commercial comsats routinely swap from one booster to another these days based on booster availability, without the comsat makers working up too much of a sweat. Not to mention that if NASA published a payload interface spec and said they plan to buy a dozen or two launches a year, I expect they'd find plenty of compatible rides on offer in short order. indirectly as NASA takes advantage of the cheaper lift to allow engineering more margin into spacecraft designs (thus reducing both development and operating costs), Increasing the number of design generations reduces neither - except in the unlikely event that the changes are so transparent to the end user as to make no difference in planning, maintenance, documentation, etc... etc.. (Which raises the question of why one should bother in the first place.) "Increasing the number of design generations"? Say what? and it reduces future costs even further since newer cheaper launchers can be phased in as commercial competition makes them available. Assuming that said competition does occur, and their is payoff to the vendors in the form of a large market - from someplace other than NASA. NASA would make up a respectable slice of market under this regime all by itself. Regardless, if they don't provide for using newer cheaper launch as it comes along, then they certainly won't ever reduce their launch costs - very much the case under the current plan. |
#19
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#20
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Alan Anderson wrote:
(Derek Lyons) wrote: Henry Vanderbilt wrote: We have to ask, after forty years of stunning technological progress, shouldn't we be able to improve on Apollo's cost-to-exploration ratio a bit more than this? We have to ask - what stunning technological leaps have occurred to lead you to assume this is a rational question? No leaps are necessary. Continuous progress over the past several decades is sufficiently stunning to justify asking the question. Yet somehow - niether you nor Henry seem willing or able to state precisely which areas have gotten significantly cheaper while providing significantly improved performance. D. -- Touch-twice life. Eat. Drink. Laugh. -Resolved: To be more temperate in my postings. Oct 5th, 2004 JDL |
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