Shift from LEO-Assembly to Single-Vehicle Strategy for Lunar Mission

I had long thought before Apollo it was widely agreed that the way to
get to the moon was through assembly or at least re-fueling in low
Earth orbit, and that it was Apollo's end-of-the-decade deadline that
resulted in the use of a single large launch vehicle (or, in EOR mode,
two large vehicles). For example, as late as 1959, the Army's Project
Horizon proposed the use of half a dozen Saturn IB-class launch
vehicles, with assembly or re-fueling.

Actually, though, the single-vehicle approach seems to have been
rising even before JFK imposed the 1970 deadline. NASA's long-range
plan of 1960 envisioned a manned lunar landing only after the
development of the Nova, which would have been in the Saturn V class.
The Air Force's Project Lunex, initiated in 1958 and completed in
1961, also went for a single large launch vehicle.

So, why the seeming shift in approach, even before the JFK deadline?
Did the fact that ICBM-sized rockets (e.g., Atlas and Titan) had come
on line by 1960 make engineers less conservative about large vehicles?
Did early space-operations experience make them more conservative
about complex orbital operations? Was there a political imperative to
make use of the F-1 engine? Was NASA, before it absorbed the von Braun
team in late 1960, trying to justify a large booster effort
independent of the Army's Saturn?

A related question; it's interesting that Lunex, despite being the Air
Force's baby, would not have utilized the F-1. So just what was the
Air Force thinking when it began the F-1 project in the mid-1950s? Did
it ever have a particular application in mind?

It's not going to happen within the best of fly-by-rocket technology
at hand, not even if those Apollo missions were exactly duplicated.
.. - Brad Guth

are wrote:
I had long thought before Apollo it was widely agreed that the way to
get to the moon was through assembly or at least re-fueling in low
Earth orbit, and that it was Apollo's end-of-the-decade deadline that
resulted in the use of a single large launch vehicle (or, in EOR mode,
two large vehicles). For example, as late as 1959, the Army's Project
Horizon proposed the use of half a dozen Saturn IB-class launch
vehicles, with assembly or re-fueling.

Actually, though, the single-vehicle approach seems to have been
rising even before JFK imposed the 1970 deadline. NASA's long-range
plan of 1960 envisioned a manned lunar landing only after the
development of the Nova, which would have been in the Saturn V class.
The Air Force's Project Lunex, initiated in 1958 and completed in
1961, also went for a single large launch vehicle.

So, why the seeming shift in approach, even before the JFK deadline?
Did the fact that ICBM-sized rockets (e.g., Atlas and Titan) had come
on line by 1960 make engineers less conservative about large vehicles?
Did early space-operations experience make them more conservative
about complex orbital operations? Was there a political imperative to
make use of the F-1 engine? Was NASA, before it absorbed the von Braun
team in late 1960, trying to justify a large booster effort
independent of the Army's Saturn?

A related question; it's interesting that Lunex, despite being the Air
Force's baby, would not have utilized the F-1. So just what was the
Air Force thinking when it began the F-1 project in the mid-1950s? Did
it ever have a particular application in mind?

If you think our NASA/Apollo was telling us the whole truth and
nothing but the truth, think again.
.. - Brad Guth

The shuttle program is almost 40 years old, yet you must wait 5 more
years to have a vehicle capable of going to the Space Station. You
still insist that they could land people on the Moon in less than a
decade starting from scratch. You have no idea of the challenges of
real space flight, for the life of you you can't begin to understand
the truth, even though it is as plain as day. That is what is so
amazing, your astronomical capacity for ignorance, even if you were
clued in to the obvious, your ignorance would still live on and that
is what is important. Sorry kids, you can't really fly to the Moon,
you are just a simple minded cretin for so blinding believing such
absurd garbage for so long.

On Apr 14, 12:28 pm, wrote:
The shuttle program is almost 40 years old, yet you must wait 5 more
years to have a vehicle capable of going to the Space Station. You
still insist that they could land people on the Moon in less than a
decade starting from scratch. You have no idea of the challenges of
real space flight, for the life of you you can't begin to understand
the truth, even though it is as plain as day. That is what is so
amazing, your astronomical capacity for ignorance, even if you were
clued in to the obvious, your ignorance would still live on and that
is what is important. Sorry kids, you can't really fly to the Moon,
you are just a simple minded cretin for so blinding believing such
absurd garbage for so long.

I totally agree, so why did you post this one as though directed at
myself, instead of "are"?

There's no question that our LLPOF NASA/Apollo fiasco has not set a
human foot upon that physically dark and nasty moon of ours, and
there's more than a fair share of replicated proof-positive in support
of that deductive interpretation.
.. - Brad Guth

On Fri, 11 Apr 2008 10:02:40 -0700 (PDT), are
wrote:

I had long thought before Apollo it was widely agreed that the way to
get to the moon was through assembly or at least re-fueling in low
Earth orbit, and that it was Apollo's end-of-the-decade deadline that
resulted in the use of a single large launch vehicle (or, in EOR mode,
two large vehicles). For example, as late as 1959, the Army's Project
Horizon proposed the use of half a dozen Saturn IB-class launch
vehicles, with assembly or re-fueling.

Actually, though, the single-vehicle approach seems to have been
rising even before JFK imposed the 1970 deadline. NASA's long-range
plan of 1960 envisioned a manned lunar landing only after the
development of the Nova, which would have been in the Saturn V class.
The Air Force's Project Lunex, initiated in 1958 and completed in
1961, also went for a single large launch vehicle.

So, why the seeming shift in approach, even before the JFK deadline?
Did the fact that ICBM-sized rockets (e.g., Atlas and Titan) had come
on line by 1960 make engineers less conservative about large vehicles?
Did early space-operations experience make them more conservative
about complex orbital operations? Was there a political imperative to
make use of the F-1 engine? Was NASA, before it absorbed the von Braun
team in late 1960, trying to justify a large booster effort
independent of the Army's Saturn?

A related question; it's interesting that Lunex, despite being the Air
Force's baby, would not have utilized the F-1. So just what was the
Air Force thinking when it began the F-1 project in the mid-1950s? Did
it ever have a particular application in mind?

I would like to know the reason for the change in approach also, sorry
I don't have the answer. Unfortunately the other two posters are using
unreliable translation programs and had reply's that had nothing to do
with your questions.
JBL

In article ,
wrote:

On Fri, 11 Apr 2008 10:02:40 -0700 (PDT), are
wrote:

I had long thought before Apollo it was widely agreed that the way to
get to the moon was through assembly or at least re-fueling in low
Earth orbit, and that it was Apollo's end-of-the-decade deadline that
resulted in the use of a single large launch vehicle (or, in EOR mode,
two large vehicles). For example, as late as 1959, the Army's Project
Horizon proposed the use of half a dozen Saturn IB-class launch
vehicles, with assembly or re-fueling.

Actually, though, the single-vehicle approach seems to have been
rising even before JFK imposed the 1970 deadline. NASA's long-range
plan of 1960 envisioned a manned lunar landing only after the
development of the Nova, which would have been in the Saturn V class.
The Air Force's Project Lunex, initiated in 1958 and completed in
1961, also went for a single large launch vehicle.

So, why the seeming shift in approach, even before the JFK deadline?
Did the fact that ICBM-sized rockets (e.g., Atlas and Titan) had come
on line by 1960 make engineers less conservative about large vehicles?
Did early space-operations experience make them more conservative
about complex orbital operations? Was there a political imperative to
make use of the F-1 engine? Was NASA, before it absorbed the von Braun
team in late 1960, trying to justify a large booster effort
independent of the Army's Saturn?

A related question; it's interesting that Lunex, despite being the Air
Force's baby, would not have utilized the F-1. So just what was the
Air Force thinking when it began the F-1 project in the mid-1950s? Did
it ever have a particular application in mind?

I would like to know the reason for the change in approach also, sorry
I don't have the answer. Unfortunately the other two posters are using
unreliable translation programs and had reply's that had nothing to do
with your questions.
JBL

The development of the F-1 and J-2 engines allowed a significantly
larger booster rocket assembly than those previously envisioned.

The Sat-V was actually a Nova, but was called a Saturn, to please the
budgeteers, implying that it was just an extension of the Saturn-I
series developed at MSFC. The Sat-I and Sat-IB were puny (2-stages, 1.5M
lbf thrust), compared to the Sat-V (7.5M lbf thrust, 3 stages).

Both Sat-IB and Sat-V had the S-IVB upper stage, but LOX/H2 Sat-V had
the LOX/H2 S-II second stage (1M lbf thrust), allowing a very heavy lift
capability.

Having the entire mission contained in one booster/spacecraft/lander
combo eliminated the uncertainties of multiple launches and rendezvous
in Earth orbit.

--
Remove _'s from email address to talk to me.

On Thu, 26 Jun 2008 00:11:05 -0400, Orval Fairbairn
wrote:

The Sat-V was actually a Nova, but was called a Saturn, to please the
budgeteers, implying that it was just an extension of the Saturn-I
series developed at MSFC. The Sat-I and Sat-IB were puny (2-stages, 1.5M
lbf thrust), compared to the Sat-V (7.5M lbf thrust, 3 stages).

....And let us not forget that there were also other Saturns with 2 and
3 F-1s in the first stage. Check out Mark Wade's Encyclopedia
Astronomica page on the Saturn variants for more details. The
Saturn-VIII wasn't exactly a Nova.

OM
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wrote:
I would like to know the reason for the change in approach also, sorry
I don't have the answer. Unfortunately the other two posters are using
unreliable translation programs and had reply's that had nothing to do
with your questions.


There's background on the engine's development he
http://history.nasa.gov/SP-4206/ch4.htm

Pat

OM wrote:
...And let us not forget that there were also other Saturns with 2 and
3 F-1s in the first stage. Check out Mark Wade's Encyclopedia
Astronomica page on the Saturn variants for more details. The
Saturn-VIII wasn't exactly a Nova.


IIRC, the direct ascent varient of Saturn was to have 8 F-1's on it.
Some of those Nova designs planned for after the Saturn V were downright
immense: http://www.astronautix.com/lvfam/nova.htm
There's a 1962 vintage NASA drawing of a Saturn I, Saturn V, and Nova
he http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/Image:Nova_Rocket.jpg
The Saturn V appears to be carrying the direct ascent Apollo to be
fueled in Earth orbit, the Nova one that takes off fully tanked up.

Pat

In article ,
OM wrote:

On Thu, 26 Jun 2008 00:11:05 -0400, Orval Fairbairn
wrote:

The Sat-V was actually a Nova, but was called a Saturn, to please the
budgeteers, implying that it was just an extension of the Saturn-I
series developed at MSFC. The Sat-I and Sat-IB were puny (2-stages, 1.5M
lbf thrust), compared to the Sat-V (7.5M lbf thrust, 3 stages).

...And let us not forget that there were also other Saturns with 2 and
3 F-1s in the first stage. Check out Mark Wade's Encyclopedia
Astronomica page on the Saturn variants for more details. The
Saturn-VIII wasn't exactly a Nova.

OM

But those 2 and 3-engine versions were never built.

There also were proposed Sat V versions proposed with solid strapons,
but there never went beyond the proposal stage.

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Remove _'s from email address to talk to me.