NEWS- False move by astronaut put space station out of kilter

"Nicholas Fitzpatrick" wrote in message
...
In article ,
stmx3 wrote:
---clip---

Is this for real? I'd assumed that it was a joke (because any engineer
worth their salt would at least have had some kind of lockout/tagout
procedure to stop something like that ). No mentions of this anywhere
else
that I can see ...

Nick


It's mentioned in the MSNBC story about the landing (without the button
specifics), for example:
http://www.msnbc.com/news/984143.asp?cp1=1

"The operation was marred only by the inadvertent pushing of a button by one
of the space capsule occupants during the undocking, which caused the space
station to rotate 25 degrees, and it required a large expenditure of fuel to
correct the alignment, Russian media reported. "

Russian human-factors R&D seems to be a little behind the times. I seem to
remember that Shannon Lucid commented on the dangers of the Soyuz button
layout during the Mir expeditions. Luckily, they had an American and a
Spaniard to blame it on this time.

JJ Robinson II
Houston, TX
****************
* JOKE *
****************
* SERIOUS *
****************
* SARCASTIC *
****************
* OTHER? *
****************

Is this for real? I'd assumed that it was a joke (because any engineer
worth their salt would at least have had some kind of lockout/tagout
procedure to stop something like that ). No mentions of this anywhere
else that I can see ...
It's mentioned in the MSNBC story about the landing (without the button
specifics), for example:
http://www.msnbc.com/news/984143.asp?cp1=1

The press release from RSC Energia:

http://www.energia.ru/english/energi...se_iss-16.html

"The crew actions in the final phase of its flight (when preparing the
spacecraft for its undocking from the station and descent) are being
analyzed."

I sure looks like something out of the ordinary happened...

/Nikolaj

wrote:

Russian human-factors R&D seems to be a little behind the times. I seem to
remember that Shannon Lucid commented on the dangers of the Soyuz button
layout during the Mir expeditions. Luckily, they had an American and a
Spaniard to blame it on this time.

That's pretty typical of the Russians of late. They blame the problem
on foreigners, and the truth only comes out much later.

D.
--
The STS-107 Columbia Loss FAQ can be found
at the following URLs:

Text-Only Version:
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Enhanced HTML Version:
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Corrections, comments, and additions should be
e-mailed to , as well as posted to
sci.space.history and sci.space.shuttle for
discussion.

wrote in message ...

Russian human-factors R&D seems to be a little behind the times. I seem to
remember that Shannon Lucid commented on the dangers of the Soyuz button
layout during the Mir expeditions. Luckily, they had an American and a
Spaniard to blame it on this time.

JJ Robinson II
Houston, TX

Brings to mind the story of Jack Swigert putting "NO" on the LEM
ejection button near the end of Apollo 13. In the movie the line went
"I was getting kind of punchy and didn't want to eject the LEM with
you guys still in it..."
I'm not sure what he really said...

Fun with life or death decisions!

The Navy Nuclear program over time has done quite a bit of button
relocation, switch covers, and actuator redesign to prevent mistakes,
a lesson learned through lots of nuclear pain. (For those unaquainted,
nuclear pain takes the form of endless inspections by independant
authority (Naval Reactors Representatives) who often seem to delight
in finding every minor problem you might have. It's a damn good
motivator for excrutiating attention to detail.)

Tom Merkle

Jorge R. Frank wrote:
[snip]

So perhaps the problems is just procedures for standard undockings.
paperwork, not engineering.


If the problem was procedures, we would have seen this problem on every
undocking. We have not.

More likely, the problem is in following the procedures.

Nicholas Fitzpatrick wrote:
In article ,
stmx3 wrote:
[snip]

Is this for real? I'd assumed that it was a joke (because any engineer
worth their salt would at least have had some kind of lockout/tagout
procedure to stop something like that ). No mentions of this anywhere else
that I can see ...

Nick


Hmmm...makes you wonder what procedures are in place for other ISS gear
that, if it were on earth, would need a lockout/tagout. The MCA, for
example, seems like it needs to be tagged out. But then again, with
only 2 people onboard the ISS at this time, I doubt its worth it (easier
to pass down knowledge with fewer people). But suppose, in your wildest
imaginings, there were actually SEVEN crewmembers onboard. How do you
prevent one from (for example) energizing a piece of OOC gear? Morning
briefs? Don't push buttons w/o ground control authorization?

Is there any program like this in place for ISS? I.e. does it have its
own space-based version of JPG 1700.1?

Tom Merkle wrote:
[snip]


The Navy Nuclear program over time has done quite a bit of button
relocation, switch covers, and actuator redesign to prevent mistakes,
a lesson learned through lots of nuclear pain. (For those unaquainted,
nuclear pain takes the form of endless inspections by independant
authority (Naval Reactors Representatives) who often seem to delight
in finding every minor problem you might have. It's a damn good
motivator for excrutiating attention to detail.)


Navy nuclear power program is outstanding...much better than NASA's.
But still, it has had its share of incidences. The Lessons Learned
binder ain't thin, but unlike NASA, it is required reading.

Tom Merkle

stmx3 wrote:
If the problem was procedures, we would have seen this problem on every
undocking. We have not.

More likely, the problem is in following the procedures.

If procedures are set in such a way that the thrusters need to be armed before
undocking, then there should be huge warnings on the paper not to even think
about getting your big fat fingers anywhere near those 2 buttons.

Or simply put the equivalent of "Do not flush while in space dock" sign over
the 2 buttons.

In article ,
Derek Lyons wrote:
That's pretty typical of the Russians of late. They blame the problem
on foreigners, and the truth only comes out much later.

They've learned fingerpointing from the masters of the art. (Remember a
few years ago, when all the station schedule slips were officially the
Russians' fault, never mind that the US side was just as far behind?)
--
MOST launched 30 June; first light, 29 July; 5arcsec | Henry Spencer
pointing, 10 Sept; first science, early Oct; all well. |

NASA has nothing to do with Soyuz button locations or procedures.

If anything, the safeties on the NASA PCS are overkill.




On Thu, 30 Oct 2003 14:15:14 GMT, stmx3
wrote:

Tom Merkle wrote:
[snip]


The Navy Nuclear program over time has done quite a bit of button
relocation, switch covers, and actuator redesign to prevent mistakes,
a lesson learned through lots of nuclear pain. (For those unaquainted,
nuclear pain takes the form of endless inspections by independant
authority (Naval Reactors Representatives) who often seem to delight
in finding every minor problem you might have. It's a damn good
motivator for excrutiating attention to detail.)


Navy nuclear power program is outstanding...much better than NASA's.
But still, it has had its share of incidences. The Lessons Learned
binder ain't thin, but unlike NASA, it is required reading.

Tom Merkle