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Old December 21st 03, 08:46 PM
Greg Dortmond
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Default Something more interesting for you to read!

Since 1613, when John Rolfe introduced a successful experiment in
tobacco cultivation in Virginia (Morison, 1965 : 52) the leaf has
assumed major social, industrial, economic and medical implications.
Consequently, persons concerned with tobacco on a commercial or
personal basis have been subject to a variety of different regulations
over the past 360 years.


Tobacco has been attacked by social observers and medical authorities
for the damage it has allegedly done, to the social and physical
condition of man. Yet it has also provided a substantial source of
revenue to the state and Federal governments of the United States.

As is now the case with alcohol, tobacco has long been subject to
regulatory controls over the quantity and quality of production. On
the other hand, sumptuary laws affecting tobacco have been far
fewer-and weaker-than those aimed at alcohol. In fact, there has never
been a time when tobacco was prohibited throughout the United States
although consumption under certain circumstances has been forbidden at
various times in different jurisdictions.

Tobacco-associated today with smoking of cigarettes, and to a lesser
extent, of pipes and cigars-has been popular at times for both
snuffing and chewing. Indeed, until about 1870 cigarettes were
relatively rare in the United States, and almost all tobacco consumed
domestically was chewed during the mid-19th century (Gottsegen, 1940:
9-10).

What ever the preferred mode of consumption, however, the, commodity
has always been the subject of debate respecting the appropriate
governmental attitude. On the one hand, proponents of the leaf stress
its social benefits and its economic and industrial significance. Some
enthusiasts even endorse its alleged medical and psychological
benefits. Opposed are those who cite the health hazards of smoking and
others who are convinced of its immorality.


The motivation for regulation has come from both sides of the
controversy. Most sumptuary restrictions were fostered by the latter
group in an effort to suppress the habit. Those who seek to
institutionalize and foster use of the drug focus on the regulation of
the quantity and quality of production.


This section does not attempt to weigh the merits of the various
regulatory schemes. Rather, it will trace from John Rolfe's day the
three threads of regulation which have circumscribed both the producer
and consumer of tobacco in the United States.



--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

REGULATION OF PRODUCTION


In the opinion of King James I of England, tobacco was "loathsome to
the eye, hateful to the nose, harmful to the brain" and "dangerous to
the lungs" (Middleton, 1953: 93). Whether the King was prescient, or
simply sensitive, was irrelevant in the 17th and 18th centuries,
however, for tobacco rapidly became the mainstay of the Maryland and
Virginia economics. Within seven years of John Rolfe's first
imaginative experiment,, Virginia exported nothing but tobacco and a
little sassafrass to England (Middleton, 1953: 93-94). Almost as
quickly, the leaf became the staple of the colony of Maryland and
competition developed in Carolina as well.


In Massachusetts Bay, the product fared less well. The first general
letter (April 17,1629) from an official of the New England Company to
the Massachusetts Bay settlers prohibited the planting of tobacco
except in small quantities for medicinal purposes (Werner, 1922: 100).
Next door in Connecticut, however, the colonists attempted to rival
the southern planters with a local leaf. Indeed, the infant industry
was coddled by the protectionist General Court at New Haven, which
promulgated a rule in 1641 that:

No persons within this jurisdiction shall [smoke] any other Tobacco
but such as is or shall be planted within these [districts], except
they have license from the Courte (Tobacco Institute, Connecticut,
undated: 20).


Notwithstanding the royal attitude and the fear of certain patent
holders of the London Company that Virginia had become a "colony
founded on smoke" (Tobacco Institute,, Virginia, 1971 : 19; Middleton,
1953: 94), England encouraged the growth of the tobacco industry.
Monopolies to import tobacco from the colonies were granted by the
Crown to court favorites who soon prospered as a result of this trade.

In 1621, a bill was introduced which, according to one contemporary
commentator, was "extremely remarkable": No tobacco was to be imported
after the 1st of October, 1621, except from Virginia and Bermuda; and,
after that day, none was to be planted in England. Although the act
was initially defeated by the House of Lords, James I in 1922 himself
granted the import monopoly to the Virginia and Bermuda, companies and
prohibited the domestic cultivation of tobacco (Brooks, 1952: 88).

The system worked well for the British importers, but the methods of
financing they employed became onerous to the colonial planters. The
tobacco was marketed by consignment to an English merchant who
deposited the proceeds of the sale to the planters' accounts. Often,
however, the high commissions charged and the cost, of goods ordered
by the Virginians in payment for their crop contributed to the growth
of colonial indebtedness. The extension of credit to cover the
deficiencies caused the debts to grow constantly, but the only
alternative to the consignment system was to sell the product in the
colony at a lower price (Middleton, 1953: 104-107).

Industrial competition in this market provided the impulse for certain
regulatory relief. Importation of the Carolinian product into Virginia
was forbidden by an act of 1679, amended in 1726 to prohibit
importation by land as well as by sea. Nor was North Carolina
permitted to export its tobacco from Virginia ports. In Great Britain,
the Privy Council looked with disfavor upon such colonial legislation
which threatened the financial well-being of the merchants and so
disallowed the Virginia Act in 1731 (Middleton, 1953: 114-115).

Competition similarly induced both Virginia and Maryland to enact laws
prescribing the dimensions of the hogshead in which tobacco was
packaged in 1658. Vying for purchasers, the two colonies gradually
enlarged the statutory size of the hogshead until, under edict from
the Privy Council in Britain, Maryland was ordered to pass a gauge act
establishing the size of the hogshead in the same dimensions as those
fixed in Virginia.

Notwithstanding such legislation, however, the manufacture of
hogsheads was still characterized by carelessness and irregularity
until the warehouse inspection system went into effect in the 18th
century (Middleton, 1953: 116-117).

It was not long before the colonial planters were faced with a more
serious problem-overproduction-which was causing a decline in prices
as well as quality of the leaf. In 1619, the first tobacco inspection
law was passed by the Virginia House of Burgesses, ordering the lowest
grade of tobacco to be destroyed and prohibiting "second growth"
tobacco and the marketing of trash leaves.

This act was followed in 1621 by a more direct attempt to restrict
production. Each cultivator was required to limit his growth to 1000
plants of nine leaves each. Although this order was soon rescinded as
a patent failure, an act of 1629 permitted each planter to tend only
3000 plants with an additional allowance of 1000 for non-laboring
'women and each child (Brooks, 1952: 96).


Notwithstanding the statutory effort, the problem intensified.
Virginia attempted to encourage the other tobacco colonies to reach
agreements restricting plantings, but in Maryland, Lord Baltimore
resisted. If planters were poor, he asserted:

It is not from the low price of Tobacco, but from their owne sloth,
ill husbandry and profusely spending their croppe in Brandewine, and
other liquors (Robert, 1949: 11).


Carolina, Maryland and Virginia actually reached a decision to
prohibit the planting of the staple from. February 1667 to February
1668. This "stint" proved a less effective means of control than the
winds of 1667, which almost destroyed the, crop ready for harvest that
year (Tobacco Institute, Virginia, 1971: 19).

Acts of God failed to provide an ultimate solution, however, and
severe economic dislocation in Maryland and Virginia intensified. By
1681, the Virginia governor, Lord Culpeper, complained:


.... [T]hat which is more to us than all other things put together, and
will be the speedy and certain ruin of the colony, is the low price of
tobacco. The thing is so fatal and desperate that there is no remedy;
the market is overstocked and every crop overstocks it more. It is
commonly said that there is tobacco enough now in London to last all
England for five years.... Our thriving is our undoing, and our
purchase of negroes, by increasing the supply of tobacco, has greatly
contributed thereto (Brooks, 1952: 112-113).


The failure of the Virginia Assembly to pass another act requiring a
"stint"' led the so-called "cutters and pluckers" to take the matter
into their own hands in 1682 by burning both their own crops and the
plants of their neighbors (Roberts, 1949: 11). The riot stimulated
legislative action in 1684 of a less helpful sort: the destruction of
tobacco was made a criminal offense,, subject to the death penalty
(Brooks, 1952: 12).

Seventeenth century quality control laws proved no more successful in
the effort to relieve the depression of the industry. Renewed efforts
were made in early years of the next century, however.

In 1713, the Virginia House of Burgesses established a warehouse
system to enforce tobacco inspection. Forty public warehouses were
created. Strong opposition to the system led the Privy Council to
disallow the act In 1717, but the ensuing depression of the 1720's was
convincing evidence of the need for relief. Accordingly, the system
was reinstated with British approval in 1730, cornplete with public
warehouses and official inspectors (Middleton, 1953: 120-121).

The apparent success of the system appealed to Maryland, suffering
also from a surfeit of tobacco. "Tobacco, our money, is worth nothing
wrote one Marylander in 1724, "'and [there is] not a Shirt to be had
for Tobacco this year in all our country" (Tobacco Institute,
Maryland, 1971: 21).

Tobacco riots ensued when the Mary] and Assembly initially refused to
follow Virginia's example. One individual was moved to inform Lord
Baltimore that no improvement in the economic state of the colony was
possible until inspection laws were passed that "will prevent the
sending to Market Such trash as is unfit for any other use but Manure"
(Tobacco Institute,,, Maryland, 1971: 23). Accordingly, Maryland
followed Virginia in the creation of an inspection system in 1747,and
Carolina did likewise in 1754 (Brooks, 1952: 165).

Tobacco entirely dominated the economic and social structure of
Virginia and Maryland. "Tobacco requires us to abhor communities or
townships," wrote a 17th century governor of Maryland, "since a
planter cannot carry on his affairs without considerable elbow room
within his plantation" (Brooks, 1952: 98).

In Virginia, tobacco had gained such ascendancy that it was used as
money. For example, when, in 1621, a cargo of twelve young women made
its way to the colony, each one was valued at 120 pounds of the best
leaf (Brooks, 1952: 93). By law, Virginia's ministers were paid in
tobacco at 16,000 pounds annually in 1696. The law provided that:

A competent and sufficient provision for the clergy will be the only
means to supply this dominion with able and faithful Ministers whereby
the glory of God may be advanced,the church propagated, and the people
edified (Werner, 1922: 102).


Not until the Option Act was passed by the Virginia Assembly in 1755
could the clergy's fees be paid in either money or tobacco (Brooks,
1952: 167).

The regulation of tobacco in the colonies was devised in response to
the industry with the intent to further the prosperity of the planters
who dominated the economy. This theme continued to pervade all related
regulatory efforts in the tobacco-producing states thereafter, as new
practices developed in the marketing of the leaf.

The initial hogshead inspection system gradually gave way to the sale
of loose-leaf tobacco by auction. In 1849 the Virginia Code recognized
these methods in lieu of the sale of hogsheads of the leaf as provided
in the 1730 Act. By 1865, the tobacco auction had completely replaced
the earlier marketing techniques in Virginia (Tobacco Institute,
Virginia, 1971: 28-29).

More than a half century later Maryland followed suit. In 1939, the
loose-leaf auction warehouse system was introduced to replace the
hogshead system, and the conversion occurred almost overnight. The
practices engaged in are regulated by the Maryland State Tobacco
Authority, established in 1947 by law. The Authority itself is
supervised by eight representatives selected by the Governor from the
producing counties, the University of Maryland, the buyers and the
sellers (Tobacco Institute, Maryland, 1971: 9-10).

The Federal Government came to recognize the significance of the
tobacco industry in response to state pressures. Accordingly, since
1930, several bills have been enacted to aid the growers.

Enacted in 1935, the Tobacco Inspection Act directs the Secretary of
Agriculture to establish quality standards and to designate auction
markets (7 U.S.C. 511 (b) and (d)). The following year, the Tobacco
Control Act was passed, bestowing Congressional approval upon state
compacts which regulate the production of tobacco, and subsidizing the
expenses of the state commissions involved (7 U.S.C. 515). Thus, the
two elements of initial colonial regulation were preserved: the
encouragement of quality and the discouragement of quantity.

The latter objective was further implemented by the Agricultural
Adjustment Act of 1938. Since that time, parity payments have been
made to tobacco producers:

In amounts which, together with the proceeds thereof, will provide a
return to such producers which is as nearly equal to parity price as
the funds so made available will permit (7 U.S.C. 1303).


In addition, the Secretary of Agriculture is authorized to set
national marketing quotas respecting each kind of tobacco (7 U.S.C.
1312), to apportion the quotas among the states, and to allot the
portions among the farms (7 U.S.C. 1314). Penalties are imposed for
overproduction (7 U.S.C. 1314).

There is nothing subtle about these measures, of course. Their intent
is obvious: to assure the economic stability of an industry which, as
of 1960, provided the United States population with more than
150,000,000 pounds of manufactured tobacco for consumption annually
(Heimann, 1960: 93), and which provided more than $4.8 billion in
taxes in 1971 (USDA, Tobacco Situation, 1971b: 44).

During the same year, growers' gross receipts reached about $900
million (Tobacco Tax Council, 1970: 2), while cigarette sales alone
grossed for the manufacturer and seller approximately $5 billion
(Tobacco Tax Council, 1970: 53). The commercial motivation is sound
enough if considered abstractly. When combined with the revenue
incentive, however, it has largely obscured sumptuary controls.



--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

REGULATION FOR REVENUE


Alexander Hamilton's tax package of 1794 proposed the first federal
excise taxes upon tobacco products. To the distress of Philadelphia
snuff manufacturers (Brooks, 1952: 146), however, the tax was
restricted after serious Congressional debate to their product only.

James Madison led the opposition to a general tobacco tax; his views
were summarized in the Annals of Congress on May 2, 1794:

As to the subject before the House, it was proper to choose taxes the
least unequal. Tobacco excise was a burden the most unequal. It fell
upon the poor, upon the sailors, day-laborers, and other people of
these classes, while the rich will often escape it (Robert, 1949:
100).

The legislative decision was probably tempered as well by
considerations of the enforceability of the measu snuff had to be
manufactured, while quid and pipe tobacco were often homegrown leaf at
the time (Heimann, 1960: 155). In any case, the snuff bill was
ultimately enacted, modified, suspended and repealed, with small, if
any, effect upon federal revenues.

The opportunity to distill tax money from tobacco was seized upon more
vigorously at the time of the Civil War. On July 1, 1862, an ad
valorem tax was imposed upon cigars for the first time. This tax was
raised two years later when a separate tax upon cigarettes was also
imposed (Werner, 1922: 358). (Even the Confederacy sought to levy a
tax-in-kind upon tobacco crops, but was precluded from doing so by the
inspection system which required the inspector to deliver the full
amount of tobacco specified in the warehouse receipt (Robert, 1949:
117).)

Thereafter, the taxes were raised in 1865, 1866 and 1875. A temporary
reduction followed, until the Spanish-American War necessitated
further increases. Concurrently, taxes were levied upon smoking and
manufactured tobacco and snuff, lest the burden fall unequally upon
smokers (Werner, 1922: 559).

By 1880, the tobacco taxes bad largely stabilized. At that time, they
accounted for 31% of total federal tax receipts, or $38.9 million. Of
this, 50% of the collections was derived from smoking and chewing
tobacco, 40% from cigars and cheroots, and less than 2% from
cigarettes (Heimann, 1960: 156).

Since that time, federal tax collections on tobacco products have
risen almost annually. Between 1910 and 1920, they increased more than
500%, the greatest increase in any single decade. By 1970, they
accounted for almost $2.1 billion, down slightly from the two
preceding years (Tobacco Tax Council, 1970: 5).

Indicative of changing patterns of consumption, the taxes on
cigarettes, as a percentage of the total federal tobacco revenue
jumped from 13.6% in 1910 to 51.1% in 1920. By 1970, the percentage at
97.2% far outdistanced those revenues derived from other forms of the
product (Tobacco Tax Council, 1970: 5).

Excise taxes have proved profitable and easy to collect. The revenue
schemes are simple on both the federal (26 U.S.C. 5701 et seq.) and
state levels. In the past, no justification for them has been deemed
necessary since Madison's protest. No elaborate licensing or state
monopoly system, such as those designed to control commerce in
alcohol, has ever been imposed.


In 1921, Iowa became the first state to cash in on the crop directly
by taxing cigarettes. By 1930, 11 other states had adopted the revenue
measure (Robert, 1949: 256).

In 1950, 40 states and the District of Columbia taxed cigarettes. The
rates ranged from one cent to five cents for a pack of 20 except in
Louisiana which levied an eight cent tax on cigarettes. In 1958,
Montana imposed an equivalent rate.

Between 1950 and 1962, 43 of the 47 taxing states raised their rates
at least once. The frequent increase in cigarette taxes narrowed the
gap between the rates in low tax states and higher tax states. In the
12-year period, the median tax rate rose from three cents to six cents
per pack (Federal Trade Commission, 1970: 3) ; the maximum rate
remained at eight cents in Texas, Louisiana, Montana and New Mexico,
in contrast to the two cent rate in the District of Columbia and
Kentucky.

The four leading states in terms of both production and relative
dependence on the crop have been North Carolina, South Carolina,
Kentucky and Virginia, the latter two being the only states in the
history of cigarette taxation to decrease their taxes; the reduction
was only .5 cent (from three cents to two and a half cents) in 1960
and 1961, respectively.


By 1966, Oregon became the 49th state to impose a tax on cigarettes;
the rate was four cents per pack. Finally, in 1969 North Carolina
imposed a cigarette tax-two cents.

The cigarette excise taxes continued to increase during the sixties.
By 1970, the taxes ranged from North Carolina's two cents to
Pennsylvania's 18 cents for a weighted average of 10.7 cents. Twenty
nine states levied taxes of 10 cents or more per pack (USDA, Tobacco
Situation, 1971b: 40). Local governments superimposed further excise
taxes on the state taxes, ranging from one cent to 10 cents per
package (Tobacco Tax Council, 1970: iv).

By mid-1971, the range had widened further Connecticut at 21 cents and
North Carolina at two cents, the weighted average state tax being 11.1
cents (USDA, Tobacco Situation , 1971a: 7).



--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

TOBACCO REVENUES


A peculiar relationship exists between production and revenue. In
1970, cash receipts from tobacco brought in $11 million for
Pennsylvania; tobacco farmers and cigarette taxes amassed $194.6
million for the state. By comparison growers in North Carolina
collected $576 million while the state collected only $13.4 million in
cigarette revenues (USDA, Tobacco Situation, 1971b: 43).

The federal excise tax on a package of cigarettes is currently eight
cents and has remained so since 1951. The combined state and federal
tax was highest in Pennsylvania; 26 cents for 20 cigarettes, which was
58.2% of the retail price. Connecticut's 24 cents and Texas's 23.5
cents were close behind; the average for the United States was 46.8%.

To the Federal and state governments today, tobacco is a financial
asset. The total federal and state revenue collected f rom all tobacco
products in 1971 amounted to over $4.7 billion. Local governments
excised the product further bringing the sum total to $4.8 million
(USDA, Tobacco Situation, 1971b: 44).

From the years 1890 to 1930 cigarette tax collections from tobacco
soared from approximately $1 million to over $339 million. By 1950,
they exceeded $1.2 billion.

Totals for the years 1890 to 1970 are recorded in the following chart
(Tobacco Tax Council, 1970: 5)


Cigarette tax

Years Collections
1890 $1,100,000
1900 4,000,000
1910 7,900,000
1920 151,300,000
1930 359,800,000
1940 533,000,000
1950 1,242,800,000
1960 1,863,600.000
1970 2,036,100,000


--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

REGULATION OF CONSUMPTION


Even as far back as the 16th century, smoking was considered to have
medicinal value. Juan de Cardenas, a Spanish physician who lived in
Mexico in the late 1500's, wrote that "Soldiers subject to privations,
kept off cold, hunger, thirst by smoking and all the inhabitants of
the hot countries of the Indies alleviate their discomforts by the
smoke of this blessed and medicinal weed" (Wagner, 1971: 63-64).

During, the recurrent epidemics of plague in the 17th century, it was
widely believed that smokers were spared; it has been reported that
men who attended the sick and accompanied the dead kept their pipes
lit (Wagner, 1971: 63-64).

In 1614, one Scottish doctor praised the tobacco plant which:

Prepareth the stomach for meat; it maketh a clear voice: it maketh a
sweet breath . . . in a few words it is the princess of physical
plants (Gottsegen, 1940: 87).


King James disagreed strenuously, and in 1604 ordered a substantial
increase in the import duty on the leaf. Smoking, he wrote in "A
Counterblaste to Tobacco", is:

A custom loathsome to the eye, hateful to the nose, harmful to the
brain, dangerous to the lungs, and in the black stinking fume thereof,
nearest resembling the horrible Stygian smoke of the pit that is
bottomless (Brooks, 1952:56, 71).

Another more passionate moralist wrote:

.. . . imagine thou beheldest here a firme-sucker's wife most fearfully
fuming forth very fountains of blood, howling for anguish of heart,
weeping, wailing, and wringing her hands together . . . while she
_pitifully pleads with her husband thus: Oh husband, my husband . . .
! Why dost thou so vainly prefer a vanishing filthy fume before my
permanent virtues? (Brooks, 1952: 72).


Notwithstanding such alliterative literature, the habit of smoking
increased in popularity, particularly in the colonies. A French
visitor observed in 1686 that:

Large quantities of it [tobacco] are used in this country, besides
what they sell. Everyone smokes while working and idling. I sometimes
went to hear the sermon; their churches are in the woods, and when
everyone has arrived the minister and all the others smoke before
going in. The preaching over, they do the same thing before parting.
They have seats for that purpose. It was here I saw that everybody
smokes, men, women, girls and boys from the age of seven years
(Robert, 1949: 99).


It was said that even in New England, women of the colony "smoke in
bed, smoke as they knead their bread, smoke whilst they're cooking"
(Gottsegen, 1940: 147).

In the tobacco colonies, of course, there was no attempt to restrict
Consumption of tobacco. It was, after all, their economic mainstay.

Officials in the northern colonies were less enthusiastic about the
habit, however. In 1632, the General Court of Massachusetts Bay took
the initiative and forbade smoking in public tinder penalty of a fine
(Tobacco Institute, Massachusetts, 1971 : 17). In 1638, the
proscription was expanded to prohibit anyone from smoking in any inn
or public house except in his own room "so as neither the master of
the house nor any of the guests there shall take offense thereat which
if they do, then such person is forthwith to forebear upon paying of
two shillings sixpence fine for every offense" (Werner, 1922: 100).

This law was followed by another in 1646 which prohibited smoking
except on a journey of five miles or more from any town. Nor could a
citizen of the colony bring a pipe or tobacco into the precincts of
the court (Werner, 1922: 100), although he might smoke at "the
ordinary tyme of repast comonly called dynner" (Heimann, 1960: 83).


Plymouth colony was similarly strict. In 1638, a law was passed
forbidding anyone from smoking on the streets. The following year, it
was decreed that jurymen might not smoke, on pain of a five shilling
penalty.

In 1641, even the importation of tobacco was forbidden, although the
law was repealed a year later. A law passed in 1646 prohibited all
from smoking, but exempted "soldiers in time of their training." And,
finally, in 1669, it was ordered that anyone found smoking on the
Sabbath within two miles of a meeting house, would be fined 12 pence
(Werner, 1922: 101).

The colony at New Haven, Connecticut, essayed a like series of
statutes to regulate tobacco consumption. In 1646, the General Court
decreed that:

No person under the age of twenty years nor any other that hath not
already accustomed himself to the use thereof, shall take any tobacko,
until he hath brough a certificate under the hands of [a physician]
that it is usefull for him, and also, that he hath received a license
from the court for the same.... None shall take any tobacko, publickly
in the street or any open places unless on a journey of at least ten
miles. (Tobacco Institute, Connecticut: 20-21).


Within three years those laws were repealed (Werner, 1922: 102).
However, it was further ordered in 1655 that:

No tobacco shall be taken in the streets, yards or aboute the howses
in any plantation or farme in this jurisdiction without dores, neere
or aboute the towne, or in the meeting howse, or body of the trayne
Souldiors, or any other place where they may doe mischief thereby,
under the penalty of 84 pence a pipe for a time, wch is to goe to him
that informs and prosecuts (Heimann, 1960: 83).


As a result of the regulation, snooping became a profitable
undertaking. In the end, however, the laws were of no avail in
suppressing tobacco.

By 1680, the governor of Connecticut recognized the significance of
the leaf and reported that, "We have no need of Virginia's trade, most
people planting so much Tobacco as they spend," (Heimann, 1960: 84).
Indeed, by the early 18th century, New England-grown tobacco was being
produced in great enough quantity for both domestic consumption and
export (Tobacco Institute, Connecticut: 22-23).


Tobacco was not one of the major concerns of the 18th century either
before or after the Revolution. Social reform was generally secondary
to political issues. By the end of the century, however, Dr. Benjamin
Rush had published his "Observations upon the influence of the
Habitual use of Tobacco upon Health, Morals, and Property" in his
collection of Essays, Literary, Moral and Philosophical. It appeared
in 1798, and stressed the Doctor's thesis that smoking and chewing
provoked drunkenness:


One of the usual effects of smoking and chewing is thirst. This thirst
cannot be allayed by water, for no sedative or even insipid liquor
will be relished after the mouth and throat have been exposed to the
stimulus of the smoke, or juice of Tobacco. A desire of course is
excited for strong drinks, and these when taken between meals soon
lead to intemperance and drunkenness. One of the greatest sots I ever
knew, acquired a love for ardent spirits by swallowing ends of
Tobacco, which he, (lid, to escape detection in the use of it. . .
(Robert, 1949: 106).


There was little immediate response to Rush's dire warnings, although
in the year his tract was published, Boston enacted a statute to
prohibit the carrying of a lighted pipe or cigar in public
streets-apparently with the intent to reduce the hazard of fire
(Brooks, 1952: 245).

An anti-tobacco crusade was launched in the 19th century, although
with considerably less fervor that its sister movement against
alcohol. Among the leaders were Rev. George Trask who said tobacco and
alcohol were Satan's twins; and the Rev. Orin Fowler, who declared in
1833: "Rum-drinking will not cease,, till tobacco-chewing and tobacco
smoking and snuff -taking shall cease" (Robert, 1949: 107). Another,
Dr. Joel Shew, attributed delirium tremens, perverted sexuality,
impotency, insanity and cancer to the effects of smoking and chewing
(Brooks, 1952: 219).

The crusade warned as the pipe continued to attract adherents. From
the 18th century on, the cigar too began to grow in favor,
particularly after 1840. It is estimated that by 1850, the average
number of cigars smoked was approximately 19 per capita. Within 10
years, the number had increased to about 26 (Gottsegen, 1940: 8-10).

Women smoked and chewed as well as the men. Indeed, Mrs. Andrew
Jackson and Mrs. Zachary Taylor both smoked their pipes in the White
House (Heimann, 1960: 90). And, of course, the other residents of the
Capital engaged heavily in the practices of both chewing and spitting,
to the extent that Charles Dickens, during his tour of the States,
felt called upon to report that:


Washington may be called the headquarters of tobaccotinctured
saliva.... In all the public places of America, this filthy custom is
recognized. In the courts of law, the judge has his spittoon, the
crier his, the witness his, and the prisoner his; while the jurymen
and spectators are provided for. . . . The stranger will find [the
custom] in its full bloom of glory, luxuriant in all its alarming
recklessness, at Washington (Brooks, 1952: 215-216).


Chewing and snuffing remained popular until the time of the Civil War.
Thereafter, cigarette smoking was gradually adopted in North America,
a habit indirectly acquired through the British from their Turkish and
French allies during the Crimean War (Werner, 1922: 105).

By 1870, approximately 13.9 million cigarettes were smoked annually in
the United States, or .36 per capita. Over the next 60 years, the
number was to reach 976.91 per capita (Gottsegen, 1940: 28).

As more persons took to cigarettes, the zeal of reformers, which had
ebbed during the Civil War, was renewed. Pamphlets, like those of the
Temperance Movement, were published, urging abstinence from smoking:

"I'll never use tobacco, no;

It is a filthy weed;

I'll never put it in my mouth."

Said Little Robert Reed.

"It hurts the health ; it makes bad breath;

'Til very bad indeed.

I'll never, never use it, no!"

Said Little Robert Reed (Brooks, 1952: 242-243).


During the period following the Civil War and prior to the formation
of the American Tobacco Company in 1890, the anti-liquor forces
continued to snipe at tobacco in all forms. A reformed drinker and
temperance lecturer, John B. Gough, would pull from his pocket a
square of tobacco, smell it as if it were a rose, cry out "Ali you
black devil, I love-you" and throw it away.

The anti-tobacconists were led by Lucy Gaston, the greatest, warrior
in the anti -cigarette campaign who was trained in the office of the
Women's Christian Temperance Union and then moved over into the
anti-tobacco Movement in the 1890's. Miss Gaston encouraged children
to wear anti-tobacco pins or buttons and organized armies of children
to sing and preach to and against their smoking elders (Wagner, 1971:
40).

"All hostility to tobacco seems nowadays to be concentrated on
cigarettes," noted Harper's Weekly, observing the scene in 1905
(Robert, 1949: 169). It was scarcely a startling revelation. Twenty
years earlier, the New York Times editorialized that:


A grown man has no possible excuse for thus imitating the small
boy.... The decadence of Spain began when the Spaniards adopted
cigarettes and if this pernicious habit obtains among adult Americans
the ruin of the Republic is close at hand . . . (Brooks, 1952: 253).


Miss Gaston witnessed some legislation victories. Between 1895 and
1921, 14 states banned the sale of cigarettes (Neuberger, 1963: 52).
Even in the city of New York it was declared unlawful for women to
smoke in public (Brooks, 1952: 271). Curiously, However, the city of
Boston repealed its law which prohibited smoking in public in 1880
(Gottsegen, 1940: 153).

The apparent success of the prohibitionists revived the
anti-tobacconists' enthusiasm. "Prohibition is won; now for tobacco!"
pledged Billy Sunday. Miss Gaston also renewed her dedication and
actually announced her candidacy for the presidency of the United
States in 1920 on an antitobacco platform.

For many anti-tobacconists, when it became apparent that the elder
generation may be lost, the war against tobacco was focused on the
youth of the country. The National Education Association pledged its
membership to cooperate in efforts made in the city, state and nation
to safeguard the health and morals of youth from cigarette smoking to
the end that high ideals for American manhood may be, preserved for
the coming generation (Hamilton, 1927: 168).

The National Congress of PTA, in Atlanta, Georgia, in 1926 resolved
"to lend its force to the cause of eliminating throughout the United
State-, the use of cigarettes by minors and make this a special work
for the ensuing year for the good of our youth" (Hamilton, 1927: 168).

It is for these reasons that the WCTU declared an educational war
against tobacco, but declined to seek prohibitory legislation (Robert,
1949: 247).

The disenchanting experience of Prohibition, the omnipresence of the
tobacco industry, the need for new sources of state revenues and the
prevalence and popularity of cigarette smoking combined to frustrate
the anti-tobacco campaign. Cigarettes did provide a new source of
revenue. Federal income from tobacco taxes soared to new heights
because of increased cigarette consumption and advanced rates.

In any event, by 1927, each of the 14 states which had enacted
prohibitory laws against cigarettes had repeated them (Neuberger,
1963: 52). Immediately thereafter these, states imposed taxes upon the
once forbidden product (Robert, 1949: 256; Federal Trade Commission,
1970: 3).



--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

STATE REGULATION

Only those laws which forbade the sale of tobacco products to minors
remain on the books, a trend set by New Jersey and Washington in 1883
(Gottsegen, 1940: 155).

All but a few statutes restricting tobacco products to minors were
enacted between 1916-1920, simultaneous to the development and
popularity of the domestic-blend cigarette.

All 50 states bad laws banning sales to minors by 1950. Since then,
Georgia,. Louisiana, and Wisconsin have repealed theirs le o 47 states
plus the District of Columbia, WIL Vs prohibiting sales to minors.

The most common age of restriction for cigarettes and tobacco products
today applies to persons under the age of 18. In an effort to ensure
stricter enforcement 11 states have lowered the age of restriction
from 21 to 15 (Tobacco Merchants Association, 1971: 1-2). In contrast
to this trend, however, the, California Legislature, 1971 defeated a
bill to allow school smoking areas and lowering the sale to minor
restrictions to 15 years old (NIC Smoking and Health, 1971: 1).

According to a Special Report released by the Tobacco Merchants
Association of the United States, the liability for infractions in all
states is on the vendor and donor of cigarettes. In a few states,
manufacturer and persons advising or compelling the minors to smoke,
or owning the premise where such behavior occurs are also liable.
However, in some states the infraction does not extend to the parent
or guardian. Some states penalize the minor himself and others require
that he divulge his source.

Most of the statutes that prohibit the furnishing of cigarettes to
minors extend the ban also to one or more other tobacco products. Only
I 1 states restrict the sale "only" to cigarettes. The efficacy of
such statutes, in the day of the cigarette machine, is subject to
substantial skepticism.

A complete listing of existing state statutes concerning possession by
and sales to minors follows (Tobacco Merchants Association, 1971: 3-4)
:


State




Alabama

Alaska

Arizona

Arkansas

California


Colorado

Connecticut

Delaware

District of Columbia

Florida

Georgia


,see footnotes at end of table.


Sale to minors


Prohi I bited Age


Yes Minor

Yes Under 18

Yes Minor

YeS Under 18

Yes Under 18


Yes Under 16

Yes Under 16

Yes Under 17

... Yes Under 16

Yes Minor

No provision


Use or possession


Prohibited Age


No provision

No provision

Yes I Minor.

No provision

Yes (4).


No provision

No provision

No provision

No provision

No provision

No provision


Sale to minors Use or possession

State

Prohibited Age Prohibited Age


Hawaii Yes Under 15 No provision

Idaho Yes Under 18 Yes Under 18.

Illinois Yes 5 Under 18 Yes Under 18.

Indiana Yes Under 16 Yes Under 21.


Iowa Yes Under 18 (57) Under 18.

Kansas Yes Under 18 Yes Under 18.

Kentucky Yes Under 18 Yes Under 18.

Louisiana No provision No provision

Maine Yes Under 16 No provision


Maryland Yes Under 15 No provision

Massachusetts Yes' Under 18 No provision

Michigan Yes Under 21 Yes Under 21.

Minnesota Yes Under 18 Yes Under 18.

Mississippi Yes5 Under 18 No provision


Missouri Yes Under 18 Yes Under 18.

Montana Yes Under 18 No provision

Nebraska Yes Under 18 Yes Under 18.

Nevada Yes 5 Under 18 No provision

New Hampshire Yes Minor No provision


New Jersey Yes Under 16 No provision

New Mexico Yes5 Under 18 8 No provision

New York Yes Under 18 No provision

North Carolina Yes Under 17 No provision

North Dakota Yes Under 21 Yes Under 18.9


Ohio Yes Under 18 No provision

Oklahoma Yes Minor (6) Minor.

Oregon Yes Under 18 Yes Under 18.

Pennsylvania Yes Minor (6) Minor.

Rhode Island Yes Under 16 Yes Under 16.


South Carolina Yes Under 18 (6) Under 18.

South Dakota Yes Under 18 Yes Under 18.

Tennessee Yes Under 18 No provision

Texas Yes,' Under 16 No provision

Utah Yes Under 19 Yes' Under 19.


Vermont Yes5 Under 17 No provision

Virginia Yes Under 18 No provision

Washington Yes Under 21 Yes Between 18 and 21.1


West Virginia Yes Under2l Yes Under 21.

'Wisconsin No provision No provision

Wyoming Yes Under 18 No provision



1 Includes a prohibition against the purchase of cigarettes by minors
(in Illinois without written order of parent or guardian), as well as
use or possession by

2 if other than parent or guardian.

3 However, inmates in State correction institutions 16 or over, with
consent of parent or guardian, may be furnished tobacco and tobacco
products.

Eighteen and over. in junior college if not permitted by governing
board.

Without consent of parent or guardian.

Minors smoking or in possession of cigarettes are required to give
source of cigarettes; use or possession not otherwise regulated.

in addition, high school students may not smoke.

And any pupil of any school in State.

Or a minor pupil in any school.

Purchase or possession by misrepresentation of age a misdemeanor.



--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

THE IMPETUS FOR FEDERAL SUMPTUARY REGULATION


The effect of smoking on health has been the subject of discussion for
hundreds of years. Early participants in the tobacco controversy,
beginning in the late 16th century, did not associate the use of
tobacco with the production of cancers although they credited it with
causing or curing nearly every other known disease.

Dr. John Hill, of London, a physician, botanist and prolific writer,
first suggested the relation in 1761. In Cautions Against the
Immoderate Use ol Snuff, he reported six cases of "polypusses" related
to excessive indulgence in tobacco in the form of snuff. One such
"polypus" was described as a swelling in one nostril that was hard,
black and adherent on a broad base. Painless at first, it later
developed "all the frightful symptoms of an open cancer." Dr. Hill
believed that this lesion could be fatal and placed the blame for its
origin on tobacco. Dr. Hill has been noted as the first to report an
association of tobacco with cancer (Redmond, 1970: 21).

In 1939, the first scientific study linking lung cancer with smoking
was published. Between 1950 and 1954, 14 studies associating
cigarettes and serious diseases were copleted (Fritschler, 1969:
145).

At the present time, there is no government agency with clear
jurisdiction over the health aspects of cigarettes. The Federal Trade
Commission can act on matters of advertising and package information.
The Food and Drug Administration concerns itself only with foods,
drugs, solids, or liquids that are eaten or drunk. Tobacco is neither
a food nor a drug under current legal definitions. Nor are cigarettes
eaten or drunk; they are inhaled.


The 1890 edition of the U.S. Pharmacopoeia, an official listing of
drugs published by the government, included tobacco. In later
editions, tobacco was dropped. Former Senator Maurine Neuberger has
claimed that the removal of tobacco from the Pharmacopoeia was the
price paid to get support of tobacco-state legislators for the Food
and Drug Act of 1906. The leaf was thereby removed from the
jurisdiction of the FDA (Wagner, 1971: 74).


The first statement from the Public Health Service on the subject was
made by its Surgeon General, Leroy F. Burney, M.D., in the Journal of
the American Medical Association in November, 1959. The heart of this
statement was that "the weight of evidence at present implicates
smoking as the principal etiological factor in the increased incidence
of lung cancer" (Diehl, 1969: 154).

In June, 1961 the American Cancer Society, the American Heart
Association and the National Tuberculosis and Respiratory Disease
Association jointly requested that a commission be appointed "to
consider the responsibilities of government, of business and of
voluntary agencies relative to the health hazards of cigarette smoking
and to recommend a solution of this health problem that would protect
the public and would interfere least with the freedom of industry and
the happiness of individuals" (Diehl, 1969: 155).

On June 7, 1962, the then Surgeon General, Dr. Luther Terry,
announced, with the approval of the President, that he was
establishing an "expert committee to undertake a comprehensive review
of all data on smoking and health."

The members of this committee were respected scientists who had
previously expressed no opinion about the relationship of tobacco to
health. All members were approved for appointment by the tobacco
industry as well as by the American Medical Association and several
national health agencies. Half of the committee members were cigarette
smokers.

On January 11, 1964, after some 15 months of intensive study, this
Advisory Committee- to the Surgeon General issued its monumental
unanimous report stating that "cigarette smoking is a health hazard of
sufficient importance in the United States to warrant, appropriate
remedial action."

The committee stated unequivocally that "cigarette smoking is causally
related to lung cancer in men; the magnitude of the effect of
cigarette smoking far outweighs other factors. The data for women,
though less extensive, point in the same direction." Air pollution was
found to be a very minor factor in the cause of the disease, far
outweighed by cigarette smoking.

The death rate from heart disease, the report noted, was 70 percent
higher in cigarette smokers than in nonsmokers, and although there was
not enough evidence to say positively that smoking causes heart
disease, there was enough to assume that it is a cause and to take
action against it.

Another conclusion of great importance was that "cigarette smoking is
the most important of the causes of chronic bronchitis in the United
States and increases the risk of dying from chronic bronchitis and
emphysema."

The report analyzed the statistical, pathological, clinical, and
experimental evidence in relation to smoking and other diseases. A
total of more than 4,000 published reports were studied and more than
150 investigators were personally interviewed. "The result was the
most comprehensive and authoritative report on this subject ever made"
(Diehl, 1969: 156).



--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

THE HEALTH WARNING REQUIREMENT


At the time the Surgeon General's Report was published, no statute,
administrative ruling or court decision required that cigarette
packaging or advertising contain any statement about the dangers to
health attributable to cigarette smoking.


After Trade Regulation Rule Proceedings in March and June 1964, the
Federal Trade Commission concluded that cigarette advertising was
deceptive (misleading) and that advertisers had a responsibility to
warn the public of the health hazards of cigarette smoking.

To accomplish this, the Commission proposed that cigarette packages
state the amount of tar and nicotine in the smoke of the cigarette
which the package contains and that cigarette packages and cigarette
advertising carry a statement such as: "Caution: Cigarette 'Smoking is
Dangerous to Health. It May Cause Death from Cancer and Other
Diseases."

This warning was to be required on cigarette packages beginning
January 1, 1965, and in cigarette advertising beginning July 1, 1965.
The tobacco industry first obtained a postponement of the effective
dates of this ruling and then prevailed upon Congress to vitiate the
ruling by passing the Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act,
requiring all packages of cigarettes sold in this country to carry the
label "Cigarette Smoking May be Hazardous to Your Health," but
prohibiting the Federal Trade Commission and state and local
governments from requiring any other label on cigarette packages and
any warnings in cigarette advertising at least until 1969.

A New York Times editorial called the Cigarette Labeling and
Advertising Act of 1965 "a shocking piece of special-interest
legislation-a bill to protect the economic health of the tobacco
industry by freeing it of proper regulation" (Cigarette Labeling and
Advertising, 1965). An article in the Atlantic Monthly described the
political maneuvering behind this legislation under the title "The
Quiet Victory of the Cigarette Lobby: How It Found the Best Filter
Yet-Congress" (Diehl, 1969:162).

Public concern attending publication of the Surgeon General's report,
Smoking and Health, and the pending FTC regulations for warnings on
cigarette packages and in cigarette advertising apparently convinced
the tobacco industry that some action by Congress was inevitable.

Reportedly the industry decided to accept a weak label on cigarette
packages provided that the legislation would prevent any regulation of
cigarette advertising. This was accomplished by inserting into the
proposed law the provision precluding the FTC and all state or local
governments from requiring any warning on cigarette packages other
than the one approved by Congress and also preventing any warnings in
cigarette advertising.

At House and Senate committee hearings, committee members friendly to
the industry attempted to discredit both the Surgeon General's Report
and the testimony given by the Surgeon General, the Chairman of the
Federal Trade Commission, and the representatives of various medical
and health organizations. The tobacco industry then presented a number
of physicians who testified that they disagreed with the conclusions
of the Surgeon General's Advisory Committee and that in their opinion
there was no real evidence that cigarette smoking is harmful (Diehl,
1969: 162).

Although this act temporarily prevented any requirement that tar and
nicotine content be indicated on cigarette packages, the Federal Trade
Commission did establish a laboratory to determine the, tar and
nicotine content of the smoke of cigarettes on the American market,
making the results of these tests available periodically to the
public.

The Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act also required that about
July 1, 1967, and annually thereafter the Federal Trade Commission
report to Congress concerning the effectiveness of the warning label,
and upon current practices of cigarette advertising and promotion,
with "recommendations for legislation that are deemed appropriate."

After an intensive study the Federal Trade Commission made a detailed
report to Congress with the following summary and recommendations:
"There is virtually no evidence that the warning statement on
cigarette packages has had any significant effect."

Sales remained constant and the industry continued to invest hundreds
of millions of dollars in advertising; $200 million a year was being
spent on radio and television alone in 1967; cigarette advertisers had
become the single largest product advertisers on television accounting
for about eight per cent of television advertising time (Wagner, 1971:
166).



--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

THE FAIRNESS DOCTRINE


Another government agency had become concerned with cigarette
advertising. The Federal Communications Commission is mandated to
assure that the airways, which belong to the public, are used in the
public interest.

John P. Banzhaf, III, who has been called the "Ralph Nader of the
tobacco industry" was responsible for the FCC's involvement in the
cigarette advertising controversy. After viewing several cigarette
commercials on television, Banzhaf concluded that "what he was seeing
might be considered legally 'controversial"' (Wagner, 1971: 168). He
then wrote to WCBS-TV in New York on December 1, 1966, requesting that
he or some other responsible spokesman be given an opportunity to
present contrasting views on the issue of the benefits and
advisability of smoking.

Banzhaf's letter cited three commercials that presented the view that
smoking is "socially acceptable and desirable, manly, and a necessary
part of a rich full life. "He asked-free time roughly approximate to
that spent on the promotion of the "virtues and values of smoking."
CBS routinely turned down the request. He sent a second letter to CBS
and submitted a formal complaint against WCBS-TV to the FCC in
Washington.

The FCC, in a letter to the television station dated June 2, 1967,
said programs it had broadcast dealing with the effect of smoking on
health were insufficient to offset the effects of paid advertisements
broadcast for a total of five to 10 minutes each broadcast day. "We
hold that the fairness doctrine is applicable to such advertisements"
the Commission said. They rejected Banzhaf's claim for equal time,
however.

The FCC called on the station to provide free each week "a significant
amount of time for the other viewpoint," thereby implementing the
smoking education campaigns launched by the government under the
cigarette labeling law. "This requirement will not preclude or curtail
presentation by stations of cigarette advertising which they choose to
carry." The FCC basically decided that it was not in the public
interest for the airways to be used by radio and television to
advertise cigarettes without some warning of the health hazards
involved with smoking (Wagner, 1971: 169).

The FCC was deluged with requests to reconsider its action. The agency
stood firm in its unanimous decision. As a result of the ruling many
of the voluntary health agencies and the Public Health Service made
available to the television and radio industries spot announcements
and other program materials on the serious consequences to health
caused by cigarette smoking.

The FCCs decision was upheld by the U.S. Court of Appeals on November
21, 1968; the court said the agency could indeed use its fairness
doctrine to require free time for anti-smoking commercials. "The
danger cigarettes may pose to health is, among others, a danger to
life itself," the Court said.

As the Commission emphasized, it is a danger inherent in the normal
use of the product, not one merely associated with its abuse or
dependent on intervening fortuitous events. It threatens a substantial
body of the population, not merely a peculiarly susceptible fringe
group. Moreover, the danger, though not established beyond all doubt,
is documented by a compelling cumulation of statistical evidence
(Wagner, 1971: l66-173).

(The cigarette manufacturers then asked the Supreme Court to review
their case, but the high court turned down the request, leaving the
appeals court decision standing.)

"Most observers agree that the dramatic entrance of the FCC into the
smoking controversy was probably the most important single event
during the three-year moratorium on requiring health warnings in
cigarette advertisements imposed by Congress on the FTC" (Wagner, 1971
: 175).



--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

THE BAN ON ADVERTISING


Both the U.S. Public Health Service and Federal Trade Commission have
annually reported findings to Congress since passage of the cigarette
labeling law. The FTC recommended that the Act should be amended to:
"Warning: Cigarette Smoking Is Dangerous to Health and May Cause Death
From Cancer and Other Diseases."

Additionally, the FTC recommended legislation to require the same
warning to appear in all cigarette advertisements and to require
statements of tar and nicotine content on all cigarette packages and
in all advertising.

Legislation to accomplish these objectives as well as the following
were recommended by the FTC:

Cigarette advertising on television and radio should be barred
entirely. Alternately, cigarette advertising on television and radio
should be limited as to hours in which it may appear; the extent to
which it may appear; and the types of programs on which it may appear;

Increased appropriations, should be made to the Department of Health,
Education, and Welfare for education of the public (especially young
people) as to the health hazards of smoking;

Appropriations should be made for research under the direction of the
National Institutes of Health on the development of less hazardous
cigarettes.


"By 1969, the stage had been set for a showdown over cigarette
advertising and promotion" (Wagner, 1971: 190). The U.S. Government
was increasing its efforts to discourage the sale of cigarettes. Post
office trucks carried posters: "100,000 Doctors Have Quit Smoking."

The Surgeon General continued to release reports about the adverse
health effects of smoking.

Dr. Daniel Horn, director of the National Clearinghouse for Smoking
and Health, was urging doctors to deliver antismoking appeals to
patients in their offices.

Movie personalities had become involved in the American Cancer
Society's campaign called I.Q. (for "I Quit") that passed out lapel
buttons and dispatched public speakers around the country to
discourage the habit. Doris Day, Debbie Reynolds and Lawrence Welk
refused to allow tobacco companies to sponsor their TV shows.

Two ad agencies--Ogilivy and Mather and Doyle Dane Bernbach-and a few
radio and television stations would not accept cigarette business.
Several magazines did not accept cigarette advertising as a matter of
principle: Reader's Digest, the New Yorker, and the Saturday Review.
The Christian Science Monitor had never carried cigarette ads; the
Boston Globe announced in May, 1969 that it would no longer accept
such advertising "because accumulated medical evidence has indicated
that cigarette smoking is hazardous to health" (Wagner, 1971: 220).

In April 1969, a few weeks before the House Interstate and Foreign
Commerce Committee was scheduled to open hearings on the FTC
proposals, a series of bills were introduced in the House by
representatives of tobacco producing states. One such bill, H.R. 7177,
co-sponsored by all eleven of North Carolina's House Delegation,
proposed "to establish a comprehensive Federal program to deal with
cigarette labeling and advertising with respect to any relationship
between smoking and health."


Identical measures were introduced under the sponsorship of
congressmen from Virginia, Maryland, Kentucky, and Florida. Some
accounts of the activity on Capitol Hill during this period attribute
these bills to the tobacco interests' intention "to prevent
strengthening of the warning label and make permanent the ban on state
and Federal regulation of cigarette advertising, which was due to
expire on June 30. Passage of this legislation was the best tobacco
interests could have hoped for under the circumstances" (Wagner, 1971:
205).

After testimony from both sides, the House Committee approved a
stiffer health warning but prohibited regulatory action on cigarette
advertising for six years and in other ways generally upheld the
status quo.

The Senate, Commerce Committee, on December 5, 1970, voted out a bill
banning cigarette commercials from the air as of January 1, 1971. The
FTC was prohibited from acting on cigarette ads in newspapers and
magazines until the middle of 1972. The labeling provision in the
Senate bill was weaker than that established in the House-voted
measure, and the bill also precluded cigarette regulatory action by
the fifty states and local governments.

In a session on December 12, a floor amendment was introduced which
loosened the Committee's proposed restriction on the FTC by allowing
the agency to require health warnings in advertising as of July 1,
1971. The bill also authorized the FTC to move sooner if it found that
tobacco companies were switching from broadcast to print advertising
so massively that it could be considered a " gross abuse." This bill
also approved a new required health warning for cigarette
packages"Warning: Cigarette Smoking Is Dangerous to Your Health."

After Senate passage, the measure still had to -pass a joint
Senate-House Conference Committee where important differences between
the two bills had to be reconciled.

The bill that emerged from conference differed only slightly from the
Senate measure. The cautionary label to which the conferees agreed
provides: "Warning: The Surgeon General Has Determined That Cigarette
Smoking is Dangerous to Your Health." "In a final concession to the
broadcasters, the conferees agreed to delay for one day the blackout
of cigarette commercials from December 31, 1970, to midnight January
1, 1971. That would give them a last shower of cash from the New
Year's Day football bowl games" (Wagner, 1971: 216). It was estimated
that the loss to television and radio stations would amount to about
$220 million a year, or about 7.5% of their total advertising
revenues.

President Nixon signed the Act on April 1, 1970.

Some observers marvel that the bill was passed "in spite of massive
pressure that had been brought to bear against it and against the
regulation of cigarette advertising generally, by the tobacco
industry, the broadcasting industry, and the lobbyists and their
political allies. This was a combination that for years had proved
invincible against a counterforce of scientists and public health and
public interest advocates who, armed with formidable statistics on the
damage to health and life caused by cigarette smoking, had sought to
protect consumers by requiring all cigarette advertising to provide
adequate warnings of these dangers" (Whiteside, 1970: 58).

There are those observers , on the other hand, who do not view the ban
of cigarette advertising on television and radio as such a success for
the consumer. Rather, they cite the statistics on consumption in other
countries to point up the fact that bans on advertising do not reduce
sales.


In Czechoslovakia, for example, no direct advertising of tobacco is
permitted; yet consumption increased 14% between 1953 and 1958.
Advertising of foreign cigarettes was banned in 1962 in Italy; the
following year sales increased 39.4% and in 1964, 11.7 %. Sales
increased in England after television cigarette advertisements were
banned in 1965. Consumption figures for the following three years in
Britain reveal increases: 112 billion cigarettes in 1965, 118 billion
in 1966; and 119.1 billion in 1967 (Cigarette Advertising, 1970:
113-114).

Robert Miller, an agricultural economist in the Department of
Agriculture's Economic Research Service, reports that cigarette
consumption is up in every part of the world although advertising was
banned in several European countries some years ago. He predicts an
eventual decrease in sales during the next five years and perhaps a
12-13% decrease in tobacco consumption (Tobacco Advertising Could End,
1970: 7).

Other observers can see a gradual reduction in cigarette consumption
as a result of a prohibition on advertising; some feel a ban on
advertising merely makes it difficult to launch a new brand. Others
predict that the ban will eliminate the social acceptability of the
habit although consumption will not go down.

The "live dangerously novelty" has also been identified as a possible
cause for gains in consumption; "such a philosophy might well be
prevalent among the young, the very ones that antismoking advocates
are most anxious to protect" (Cigarette Advertising, 1970: 112-113).

Another consequence of the ban on cigarette commercials was the FCC
ruling that the broadcasters' obligation to air antismoking messages
had ended. The stations continue to run them as public service spots;
however, the volume was decreased considerably from the former 1 to 3
ratio established by the FCC. The antismoking forces are fearful that
a decrease in these spots is harmful to their cause and may retard
their efforts to reduce cigarette consumption.

On October 20,1971, a U.S. District Court ruled that the Congressional
ban on cigarette advertising is constitutional. The ruling stated that
such advertising does not qualify under the First Amendment's
guarantee of freedom of speech; a sharp distinction was drawn between
guarantees of freedom. of speech for individuals and the "limited
extent" to which broadcast advertising qualifies for such protection.

The court also ruled that Congress had more than one "rational basis"
for excluding cigarette ads from television and not the printed media
one being that broadcasts are the "most persuasive" types of
advertising (Cigarette Ad Ban, 1971). Ultimately, the constitutional
question will have to be decided by the United States Supreme Court.



--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

CONSUMPTION TRENDS


Cigarette smoking is widespread in America today; 45.9% of the male
population 17 years of age and over and 30.5% of females 17 and over
are smokers. In 1970, about $10.6 billion of individuals' expenditures
was for cigarettes.

Data on cigarette sales and advertising has been obtained by the FTC
from domestic cigarette manufacturers; the table below provides
cigarette sales for the years 1963 to the present (Federal Trade
Commission, 1970: 3) :


TOTAL CIGARETTES SOLD


Year Billions

1963 516.5

1964 505.0

1965 521.1

1966 529.9

1967 535.8

1968 540.3

1969 527.9

1970 534.2

The reduction in sales in 1964 coincides with the public attention
given the Report of the Surgeon General issued on January 11, 1964.
Public awareness of the dangers cited in the Report was high. It was
soon forgotten, for in 1965 the total number of cigarettes sold was
almost 5 billion higher than the year prior to the Surgeon General's
Report.

In 1969 there was another significant decline; it has been suggested
that this decline is attributable to several high-visibility events
and also by sales tax increases. For example, the FCC ruling was
upheld in November 1968 giving impetus to the antismoking TV campaign;
the federal government's anti-smoking campaign was in full swing
during 1968-69; the public outcry was being felt by economic
interests-magazines, newspapers, personalities and advertising
agencies which refused sponsorship for business from tobacco
companies.

There were significant state tax increases immediately prior to 1969
which probably contributed to the reduction in sales during that year.
During fiscal year 1967, 15 states increased their cigarette tax
rates; the average increase was 3.5 cents. The rate increase ranged
from New York's, Ohio's, and Illinois' two cents to California's and
Florida's seven cents. The next year, seven more states increased
their cigarette taxes. The rates ranged from Massachusetts' and
Vermont's two cents to Minnesota's, Rhode Island's, and Tennessee's
five cents the average increase approximately four cents (Council of
State Governments, 1968: 196-197).

The ban on cigarette advertising on television and radio began on
January 2, 1971, yet several calculations reflect a rise in cigarette
sales during the past year. Business Week projections of industry
sales and brand rankings show that a record 529 billion cigarettes
were consumed in 1971, 1.5% more than 1970's sales (Where Cigarette
Makers Spend, 1971: 56). Tobacco industry sources estimate that
consumption has risen in 1971 by 1.5% to 535 billion cigarettes
(Cigarette Sales Up, 1972: 3).

John C. Maxwell, tobacco analyst for Oppenheimer & Company, a
brokerage firm, also reported a rise-2.3% in domestic unit sales in
1971. He relates part of the growth in cigarette consumption to the
population mix the increase hit the 20-40 year age group, where
smoking is heaviest. The Maxwell report suggests that the rest of this
growth must be related to "government overkill, wherein many voices in
Washington suggest that everything we eat or drink is harmful"
(Maxwell, 1971: 1).


An industry specialist with Manufacturers Hlanover Trust Company, on
the other hand, attributes both the lag in sales in 1969 and the new
increase to the "very effective antismoking ads on television. Since
the ban, these commercials rarely appear" (Cigarette Sales Up, 1972:
3).

Another industry executive notes, "For years we have believed that the
role of cigarette advertising is to attract smokers from competitive
brands rather than induce nonsmokers to start smoking. We failed to
convince the Federal Communications Commission of this, but it is
borne out by our industry's experience since the TV ban. Within a
relatively stable market, some companies have continued to gain while
others lost. Some brands have increased their share of market while
others have declined" (Where Cigarette Makers Spend, 1971: 56).
Skeptics continue to argue that tobacco companies have also been
trying to recruit new young smokers.



--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

TOBACCO: ECONOMICS AND POLITICS


It is generally accepted that tobacco has been an extremely powerful
force in American politics. Approximately 50 million smokers smoked
535 billion cigarettes in the past year. More than 100,000 employees
receive $500 million in wages annually from tobacco manufacturing
companies; over 4,500 wholesalers handle the distribution of tobacco
products and hundreds of thousands of merchants depend on tire sale of
cigarettes as a source of their income.

Cigarette companies had been spending over $200 million per year on
radio and television advertising, and since the ban, almost all of
this money has been diverted to other media advertising providing many
thousands of jobs in ad agencies and in the various media. Three
million people from about 750,000 families receive $1.4 billion
annually for the cultivation of tobacco used in cigarettes.

Peripherally affected are those involved in producing the 40 million
pounds of moisture-proof cellophane, the 70 million pounds of aluminum
foil, the 27 billion printed packs, and the 2.7 billion cartons
(Cigarette Advertising, 1970: 110-111; Wagner, 1971: 120; USDA,
Tobacco Situation, 1971a: 29-31).

One writer, reporting on the present public policy trend, notes that
"attempts to discourage smoking would affect the lives of millions of
people and would have profound economic and political consequences"
(Wagner, 1971: 121).

Advocates of cigarette smoking today are organized into extremely
powerful groups, each having its own specific function and plentiful
resources.

The Tobacco Tax Council, established in 1949, compiles data on the
taxation of tobacco products by the Federal, state and local
governments. The Council's annual booklet, "Cigaret Taxes in the
United States" has been superseded by " The Tax Burden on Tobacco"
since 1966. This pamphlet "undertakes to trace the history of tobacco
taxes from the years of the Civil War down through [the present year]"
(Tobacco Tax Council, 1970: iii).


The trade association promoting the welfare of the tobacco industry is
the Tobacco Merchants Association of the U.S. It is composed of
manufacturers, wholesalers, retailers, importers, exporters, leaf
dealers, suppliers, and firms interested in the industry. Its
Bulletins cover legislation, trends, special reports; its numerous
other publications and activities seek to improve industry operations
and expand outlets (e.g., international) f or potential sales (Tobacco
Merchants Association, 1971: 1-4).


The tobacco industry's point of view is nurtured and protected by the
Tobacco Institute, a nonprofit corporation founded in 1958. Its
membership includes major U.S. manufacturers of cigarettes, smoking
and chewing tobacco, and snuff: The Bloch Brothers Tobacco Company,
Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corporation, Conwood Corporation, G. A.
Georgopulo & Company, Helme Products, Larus & Brother Company, Liggett
& Myers, Lorillard, Philip Morris Incorporated, R. J. Reynolds
Industries, Scotten-Dillion Company, and United States Tobacco
Company.

The Institute is financed by contributions from the large corporations
according to their share of the market. The institute reports on the
pro-tobacco side of the medical story, attempting to discredit
antismoking publicity, and publishes information on the historical
role of tobacco, its place in the national economy, the industry
itself, and the public's use of tobacco products.

The Council for Tobacco Research, created in 1953 in response to
medical bulletins reporting on the hazards of smoking, processes and
administers millions of research grants. "Although research money was
to be awarded with no strings attached [The Council] nicely serve[s]
the purpose of identifying the industry with the welfare of humanity
and spreading good will through the scientific community" (Wagner,
1971: 80).

The scientific data continue to be attacked from both sides. Since
1954 a great quantity of research has been published and, in turn,
disputed. For example, "the press played up the Hammond and Auerbach
study and the claim that twelve beagles had developed lung cancer"
from cigarettes. "The findings have subsequently been downgraded by '
v the author to two microscopic tumors with the further revelation
that two dogs in the control group also developed tumors" (Maxwell,
1971: 1).

Another area of contention has developed around the relationship
between cigarette smoke itself and lung cancer. A recent paper by Dr.
Geoffrey Myddelton given at the Second World Conference on Smoking and
Health in London, September 20-24, 1971, compares the incidence of
smoking and lung cancer in various countries. He indicates, "Japan
smokes 86% as much as Britain but has only 27% of its lung cancer.
Canada smokes twice as many cigarettes as the Netherlands but has only
69% as much lung cancer." He goes on to correlate the use of diesel
file] in England to lung cancer (Maxwell, 1971: 2).

From the other side, the United States Public Health Service 1972
report The Health Consequences of Smoking maintains that "nonsmokers
as well as smokers may be harmed by cigarettes, . . . tobacco smoke in
closed cars and poorly ventilated rooms can contaminate the atmosphere
for everyone. . . . The chief danger is exposure to low levels of the
deadly gas, carbon monoxide. Experiments, with animals have shown that
various concentrations of the colorless, odorless, and tasteless gas
'adversely affect' the structure and function of the heart and lungs.
The implication is that this may also be true in man" (Study Says
Cigarette Smoke Also May Harm Nonusers, 1972: 1).

It is estimated that at the present time one and a half to two million
adults give up smoking every year. Sensing the hazards of the future,
some cigarette, companies sought fiscal security in diversification
and substitution; tobacco manufacturers are now marketing, for
example, safety razors, fertilizers, dog food, ballpoint pens, peanut
butter and other non-nicotine products. By 1967, sales on non-tobacco
products accounted for approximately one-third of the, total sales of
cigarette manufacturers.

It remains to be seen whether tobacco power will be whittled away any
further in the next few years. Some feel that "the tobacco subsystem
has succeeded in keeping the health question a low priority item on
the government's agenda by playing one government agency off against
another.... This subsystem cuts across institutional lines and
includes the paid representatives of tobacco growers, marketing
organizations and manufacturers.,. Congressmen representing tobacco
growing states [are] leading members of four subcommittees, including
two ,appropriations subcommittees and two committees in each house of
Congress handling tobacco legislation. . . . Tobacco power [is] thus
firmly entrenched and well supported" (Wagner, 1971: 121).

On the other hand, a strongly worded commentary by an industry
spokesman cites Justice John Marshall's statement to illustrate
industry's precarious position: "The power to tax involves the power
to destroy." He continues with a description of the tobacco industry's
present situation:


The onslaught of state and local taxes on tobacco products ...
represents a most serious threat to all segments of our industry....
We are now facing a calculated attempt to destroy, or at least
drastically curtail, the sale of smoking products. The political and
economic climate is most favorable for this attack. Smoking and health
is a prime political issue in the same context as air pollution, crime
in the streets, and consumerism. At the same time, local governments
are verging on bankruptcy. Revenue of any sort is therefore a must. It
is a tough battle, and cigarette industry is currently bearing the
largest part of the attack (Regensburg, 1971: 146).


The revenues gained from tobacco tax collections are significant. Over
$2.1 billion in Federal taxes and over $2.5 billion in state cigarette
taxes were collected in Fiscal Year 1971 (Tobacco Tax Council, 1970:
4-6, 8; USDA, Tobacco Situation, 1971b: 44). Total tobacco taxes were
$4.8 billion in 1971 compared with $1.7 billion in 1950.

In 1970 tobacco taxes accounted for 1.1% of total federal tax receipts
and represented 13.8 percent of all excise taxes (USDA, Tobacco
Situation, 1971b: 40). This places the tobacco tax as the seventh
largest source of collection by the Federal government behind the
major giants, e.g., income and profit taxes (both corporate and
individual), employment taxes, manufacturers excise taxes, alcohol
taxes, and estate and gift taxes. In terms of individual commodities
it ranks behind only alcohol. Thus, federal revenue would be
importantly affected if tobacco consumption were to decline.



--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

CONCLUSION


The big question is how the Federal government plans to proceed. Six
tobacco bills are now pending in Congress. One of these bills would
give the Federal Trade Commission authority to set maximum permissible
limits on tar and nicotine. Another would establish a graduated
cigarette tax based on tar content.

The FTC is presently carrying on negotiations with the industry to
come up with a "clear and conspicuous" health warning for its print
advertising. It is expected that the industry, " which has been
working closely with the FTC 'will' take some 'voluntary' labeling
action" (Where Cigarette Makers Spend, 1971: 57).

The industry feels the pressure; one member explains: "We are resigned
to it. Over-all.... the industry mood is much more relaxed-now that we
have this first big year behind us" (Where Cigarette Makers Spend,
1971: 57).

The public is clamoring for government action; a 1970 College Poll'.
surveying-youths 18 and older on more than 100 campuses reveals that
96% believe that smoking is dangerous to one's health (College Poll,
1971).

Further, a 1969 study on teenage (13- to 18-yearolds) smoking
attitudes, motivation and habits indicates "deep teenage
dissatisfaction with cigarette smoking, considerable knowledge of its
ill effects, but a very exaggerated estimate of the acceptance of
smoking by the adult world" (Lieberman Research, 1969: 1-20). And, a
1970 nationwide survey of teenagers revealed: "72% of non-smokers
identified physicians as the one group that could persuade them not to
start smoking and 42% of those who smoked said their physician's
advice would influence them to stop" (Doctors, 1970: 24).

Critics of the industry claim: "The controversy about smoking and
health continues largely because of the energy, time and money spent
by the tobacco industry in keeping this controversy alive" (College
Poll, 1971).


In September, 1935, Fortune Magazine published a discussion of the
medical implications of smoking. It concluded that:

This much can be said: That the possible benefit to be derived from
tobacco is always less than the possible harm (Robert, 1949: 256).


Official policy has never accepted this judgment. In recent years,
steps have been taken to discourage smoking, although there is little
conclusive evidence that consumption patterns are changing. It can be
expected that official policy and alterations in individual behavior
will both evolve slowly during the coming years. The socioeconomic
impact of a sudden change in official policy would be great, a
circumstance reflecting the momentum of several centuries of intense
commercial activity.



--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

References

Brooks, J. E. The Mighty Leaf: Tobacco Thru the Centuries, Boston:
Little, Brown & Co., 1952, 12, 27, 56, 71-72, 88, 93-98, 102, 112-113,
146-147, 165, 167, 215216, 219, 242-243, 245, 258, 271, 274.

"Cigarette Ad Ban Ruled Constitutional by Panel," Washington Post
(Washington, D.C.), October 21, 1971. "Cigarette Advertising and the
Public Health," Columbia Journal of Law: Social Problems, 6 (1) :
110-114, 1970. "Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act of 1965," New
York Times (New York, New York), July 9, 1965. "Cigarette Sales Up
Despite Ad Curbs," Washington Post (Washington, D.C.), January 1,
1972,3.


"College Poll Shows Students' Smoking Habits," Tobacco Reporter, June,
1971.

Council of State Goverments. The Book of the States,
1968,196-197,200-208,212-213.

Diehl, H. Tobacco and Your Health, New York: McGrawHill Book Co.,
1969, 154-156, 161-162.

"Doctors Could Disuade Youths From Smoking," Pediatric News, 4(2) :24,
1970.

Federal Trade Commission. "FTC Statistical Supplement," December,
1970, 3.

Fritschler, A. T. Smoking and Politics, New York:
Appleton-Century-Cross, Inc., 1969, 145.

Gottsegen, J. J. Tobacco-A Study of its Consumption in the United
States, New York-Chicago: Pitman Publishing Corp., 1940, 8-10, 28, 87,
147, 153, 155.

Hamilton, A. E. This Smoking World, New York: The Century Co., 1927,
168, 205.

Heimann, R. K. Tobacco and Americans, New York:

McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1960, 22-23, 83-84, 90, 93, 155-156.

Lehman Brothers. About Tobacco, (N.P.), 1955, 39.

Lieberman Research, Inc. "The Teenager Looks at Cigarette Smoking,"
Report of a Study Conducted for the American Cancer Society, November,
1969, 1-20.

Maxwell, J. C., Jr. "Preliminary Year End Estimate," The Maxwell
Report, November, 1971,1-2.

Middleton, A. P. Tobacco Coast, Charlottesville: University of
Virginia Press, 1953, 93-94, 104-107, 114-117, 120-121.

Morison, S. E. The Oxford History of the American People, New York:
Oxford University Press, 1965, 93-94. National Interagency Council on
Smoking and Health. "State Activities," Bulletin, July-September 1971,
1.

Neuberger, M. B. Smoke Screen: Tobacco and the Public Welfare,
Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall, Inc., 1963, 52, 62.

Redmond, D. E., Jr., "Tobacco and Cancer: The First Clinical Report,
1761," New England Journal of Medicine, 28-9 (1) : 21, 1970.

Regensburg, A. "The Tax That Destroys," NATD Coordinator, XXXI: 146,
April, 1971.

Robert, J. C. The Story of Tobacco, Chapel Hill: University of North
Carolina Press, 1949, 11, 99-101, 106107, 117, 169, 247, 256.

"Study Says Cigarette Smoke Also May Harm Nonusers," Washington Post
(Washington, D.C.), January 10, 1972, 1 (6).

"Tobacco Advertising Could End in 1975," Herald (Lexington, Kentucky),
January 18, 1970, 7.

Tobacco Institute. "Connecticut and Tobacco," Washington: Tobacco
Institute, Undated], 20-23.

"Kansas and Tobacco," Washington: Tobacco Institute, 1970, 9.

"Kentucky and Tobacco," Washington: Tobacco Institute, 1971, 0.
- "Maryland and Tobacco," Washington: Tobacco Institute, 1971, 9-10,
21, 23.
- "Massachusetts and Tobacco," Washington: Tobacco Institute, 1971,
17.
-"Virginia and Tobacco," Washington: Tobacco Institute, 1971, 19, 22,
28, 29.

Tobacco Merchants Association. "Sales of Tobacco Products to Minors,"
March 1971, 1-4.

Tobacco Tax Council. "The Tax Burden on Tobacco," 1970, iii-iv, v, 2,
4-6,8,17,53.

U.S. Department of Agriculture. "Tobacco Situation,"

Economic Research Service, TS-136, June, 1971a, 29-31. - "Tobacco
Situation," Economic Research Service, TS-137, September, 1971b, 7,
39-44.

Vlassis, T. "Should Pharmacists Sell Cigarettes?" Iowa Pharmacists, 24
(9) : 10, 15, 1969.

Wagner, S. Cigarette Country, -New -York: Praeger Publishers, 1971,
40, 63-64, 74, 80, 120-121, 166-173, 175, 190, 205, 216, 220.

Werner, C. Tobacco Land, New York: Tobacco Leaf Publishing Co., 1922,
100-102, 105, 358-359, 559. "Where Cigarette Makers Spend Ad Dollars
Now," Business Week, December 25, 1971, 56-57.

Whiteside, T. "Annals of Advertising: Cutting Down," The New Yorker,
December 19, 1970, 58-80.

7 USC § 511 (b) (d), 1935.

7 USC § 515, 1936.

7 USC § 1303,1938.

7 USC § 1312, 1938.

7 USC § 1314, 1938.

26-USC §-5701, et seq.



--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Cliff Schaffer's Home Page
  #2  
Old December 21st 03, 09:04 PM
Martin Frey
external usenet poster
 
Posts: n/a
Default

Too long for my filter to allow.

-----------------------------
Martin Frey
http://www.hadastro.org.uk
N 51 01 52.2 E 0 47 21.1
-----------------------------
  #3  
Old December 21st 03, 09:06 PM
adam bootle
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And its another addition to killfile hell !


"Greg Dortmond" wrote in message
om...

Assorted crap deleted for ease of loading.


  #4  
Old December 21st 03, 09:14 PM
Pete Lawrence
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On Sun, 21 Dec 2003 20:04:28 +0000, Martin Frey
wrote:

Too long for my filter to allow.


Best advice is to activate the killfile Martin
--
Pete Lawrence
http://www.pbl33.co.uk
Come and visit the "Lunar Parallax Demonstration Project"
  #5  
Old December 21st 03, 09:24 PM
Jonathan Silverlight
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In message , Greg
Dortmond writes

Nothing

That's you not just kill filed but reported to your ISP.
Have a nice day.

  #6  
Old December 21st 03, 09:26 PM
David Harris
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Greg Dortmond wrote:

28 pages of total feking drivel......

and you still think that WE dont think that YOU are NOT a troll ?

**** !

Sorry Group, but this guy finally got to me ....

David Harris
N52:37:56 W02:27:10
Telford, Shropshire
  #7  
Old December 21st 03, 09:26 PM
Jeroen Smaal
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"Greg Dortmond" wrote in message
om...

That's just sad. If you've ever tried to make a point, this shows your
intent. Happy observing, and please try not to put off too many potential
amateur astronomers!

Jeroen.

PLONK


  #8  
Old December 21st 03, 09:43 PM
gp.skinner
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"Martin Frey" wrote in message
...
Too long for my filter to allow.


I did not even get the header, must be a long one.

Graeme



  #9  
Old December 21st 03, 09:58 PM
Jonathan Silverlight
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In message , Jonathan Silverlight
writes
In message , Greg
Dortmond writes

Nothing

That's you not just kill filed but reported to your ISP.
Have a nice day.

Sorry to follow up my own post, but I just noticed Hotmail's automated
reply was marked by Mailwasher as "blacklisted by Spamcop". What a
surprise!
--
Rabbit arithmetic - 1 plus 1 equals 10
Remove spam and invalid from address to reply.
  #10  
Old December 21st 03, 11:19 PM
mike ring
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Pete Lawrence wrote in
:

On Sun, 21 Dec 2003 20:04:28 +0000, Martin Frey
wrote:

Too long for my filter to allow.


Best advice is to activate the killfile Martin


Pity I didn't _before_ I checked how long it is - thought it was a bloody
binary, how can anyone write that much text


mike r
 




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