Hundreds of Deaths Attributed to Conversion to Glass Cockpits (Proof Offered, MEDS...)

Here are just a few cases of death and destruction cited to show why
NASA funded the "Mixed Fleet Study" with the goal of minimizing the
risk created by transition to MEDS:


"Some examples of incidents and accidents where better understanding
of
the systems' functionality would have possibly prevented them from
happening are the Boeing 757 CFIT accident at Cali, Columbia in 1995
and
the A320 accident at Bangalore (1990) in which inadvertent altitude
acquisition and open descent modes resulted in a crash of the
aircraft.
These accidents are but a few of the reported accidents and incidents
where the cause of the problem was attributed to lack of mode
awareness.
Mode awareness indicates the amount of knowledge the crew has of the
systems and in particular status and activity of the auto-flight
systems;
the term is most often used in relation to glass cockpit aircraft. By
now it appears that modern glass cockpit aircraft have an inherent
risk
of the crew not being fully mode aware."

(From http://www.nlr.nl/public/hosted-sites/ecottris/main.htm)


"...where these reports relate to fatal accidents, it is important
that the
associated causal factors are not overlooked."
(From p32of80, http://www.nlr.nl/public/hosted-site...s/wp2brpt7.pdf)


Evidence Type: Excerpt from Accident Report
Evidence: "3.0 CONCLUSIONS 3.1 Findings ... 47. The EFIS and RMI
compass displays do not contain the letters 'N', 'S', 'E' or 'W' to
show
cardinal headings, which might have provided directional cues to
prompt
the crew."
(From http://flightdeckautomation.com/acci...-analysis.aspx
http://flightdeckautomation.com/resourceevid.aspx?ID=23)



Aeronautica Civil of the Republic of Colombia (1996). Controlled
Flight
Into Terrain, American Airlines Flight 965, Boeing 757-223, N651AA,
Near Cali, Colombia, December 20, 1995. Santafe de Bogota, DC,
Colombia:
Aeronautica Civil of the Republic of Colombia.
"However, unlike charts, the FMS-generated displays do not present
associated information, such as terrain, and do not display navaids
that
are behind the airplane unless specifically directed to by a
flightcrew
member. As a result, pilots who are accustomed to relying exclusively
on
FMS-generated displays for navigation, can, over time, fail to
recognize the relative proximity of terrain and can lose the ability
to quickly
determine that a fix or beacon is behind them. The evidence suggests
that this partially explains the difficulty of the AA965 flightcrew in
locating the ULQ. "
(From http://flightdeckautomation.com/resourceevid.aspx?ID=38)

And finally (not to say that there isn't lots more) there is this
excerpt from
http://www.aviationtoday.com/reports...0103editor.htm
_____________

Since the crashes, Team Osprey has implemented approximately 500
changes in the aircraft's design, including alterations in the
cockpit's
visual and audio warning indicators.
"One of the lessons we've learned from the crashes is to change the
prioritization of some of the cockpit warnings," said Marine Colonel
Dan
Schultz, V-22 program manager. "For example, running low on hydraulic
fluid is indicated on the panel with much greater urgency now."
Schultz added that, as an experienced Marine helicopter pilot, he's
accustomed to low-tech gauges. "For old-school pilots, the tiltrotor's
glass cockpit takes a little getting used to," he said.

_______________



~ CT

(Stuf4) wrote:
Here are just a few cases of death and destruction cited to show why
NASA funded the "Mixed Fleet Study" with the goal of minimizing the
risk created by transition to MEDS:

Except... the reports you cite don't show any such risks.

What they do show is the design of glass cockpits is still climbing
the learning curve.

Actually this is true of most all computer devices. If you don't
already, I commend reading the RISKS digest to you. Sobering food for
thought.

D.
--
The STS-107 Columbia Loss FAQ can be found
at the following URLs:

Text-Only Version:
http://www.io.com/~o_m/columbia_loss_faq.html

Enhanced HTML Version:
http://www.io.com/~o_m/columbia_loss_faq_x.html

Corrections, comments, and additions should be
e-mailed to , as well as posted to
sci.space.history and sci.space.shuttle for
discussion.

From Derek Lyons:
(Stuf4) wrote:
Here are just a few cases of death and destruction cited to show why
NASA funded the "Mixed Fleet Study" with the goal of minimizing the
risk created by transition to MEDS:

Except... the reports you cite don't show any such risks.

What they do show is the design of glass cockpits is still climbing
the learning curve.

Actually this is true of most all computer devices. If you don't
already, I commend reading the RISKS digest to you. Sobering food for
thought.

Either analysis above leads to the same conclusion that MEDS
introduced a risk concern that did not previously exist, and this
serves to erode any justification that might be offered to claim that
the MEDS upgrade was money well spent toward improving shuttle safety.


~ CT

(Stuf4) wrote:
Either analysis above leads to the same conclusion that MEDS
introduced a risk concern that did not previously exist,

Um, no. Only *your* analysis does so. The *facts* tell a different
tale as I said previously.

D.
--
The STS-107 Columbia Loss FAQ can be found
at the following URLs:

Text-Only Version:
http://www.io.com/~o_m/columbia_loss_faq.html

Enhanced HTML Version:
http://www.io.com/~o_m/columbia_loss_faq_x.html

Corrections, comments, and additions should be
e-mailed to , as well as posted to
sci.space.history and sci.space.shuttle for
discussion.

From Derek Lyons:
(Stuf4) wrote:
Either analysis above leads to the same conclusion that MEDS
introduced a risk concern that did not previously exist,

Um, no. Only *your* analysis does so. The *facts* tell a different
tale as I said previously.

The view I presented is that transition to MEDS induces a safety
concern that did not previously exist in the shuttle (supported with
info from the ECOTTRIS study and subsequently with specific crashes
cited in this offshoot thread).

This is an unquestioned fact within the PVI cockpit human factors
community.

There is crash upon crash where multitudes have died and the
subsequent investigation concluded that the root cause was transition
from steam gauges to glass cockpits. As one more example, I remember
sharing a story about an F-15E (glass) pilot who crashed his jet doing
a post-hole maneuver, killing the WSO in the backseat. The surviving
pilot was interviewed as to the cause of his spatial disorientation.
His testimony revealed that he was looking for the 'nadir' symbol on
the glass ADI. While mechanical attitude indicators have a nadir
symbol, the F-15E symbology did not. The pilot killed his WSO because
he was looking for something that wasn't there.

There are many other stories with large searchable databases (faa.gov
for starters).

With all this evidence, I find it curious to see how a view that MEDS
transition didn't incur a safety concern can be maintained.


And going back to the bigger picture, for anyone (Derek, or anyone
else) who wants to attempt building credence to the view that MEDS was
a cost efficient safety upgrade, I would be interested to examine such
an argument for merit.

Until then, my position stands that MEDS was an unnecessary expense
that proved fatal in how it crowded out the strengthened WLE safety
upgrade.


~ CT

In article ,
(Stuf4) wrote:

Until then, my position stands that MEDS was an unnecessary expense
that proved fatal in how it crowded out the strengthened WLE safety
upgrade.

No, it does not. Not until you provide evidence on two points.

First, that the decision process for these two upgrades was an
"either/or" situation; e.g., either MEDS or WLE upgrades (and I don't
think that you can provide ANY evidence for this whatsoever). Second,
that the WLE upgrade you described (a layer of Nextel 440 fabric inside
the RCC cavity) would have somehow prevented the deaths of the crew of
STS-107. I doubt that you can do this, either.

--
Herb Schaltegger, B.S., J.D.
Reformed Aerospace Engineer
"Heisenberg might have been here."
~ Anonymous

In article ,
(Stuf4) wrote:

Until then, my position stands that MEDS was an unnecessary expense
that proved fatal in how it crowded out the strengthened WLE safety
upgrade.

....Would you please just die and put yourself out of our misery?
Painfully, even?


OM

--

"No ******* ever won a war by dying for | http://www.io.com/~o_m
his country. He won it by making the other | Sergeant-At-Arms
poor dumb ******* die for his country." | Human O-Ring Society

- General George S. Patton, Jr

From Herb Schaltegger:
(Stuf4) wrote:

Until then, my position stands that MEDS was an unnecessary expense
that proved fatal in how it crowded out the strengthened WLE safety
upgrade.

No, it does not. Not until you provide evidence on two points.

First, that the decision process for these two upgrades was an
"either/or" situation; e.g., either MEDS or WLE upgrades (and I don't
think that you can provide ANY evidence for this whatsoever). Second,
that the WLE upgrade you described (a layer of Nextel 440 fabric inside
the RCC cavity) would have somehow prevented the deaths of the crew of
STS-107. I doubt that you can do this, either.

I remember both of these points being addressed on the original
thread. The basic gist is that there is *lots* you can buy with a
quarter of a billion dollars (that's billion with a -b-). For anyone
who disagrees with the view that stronger WLEs could have been bought
by cancelling MEDS, I have yet to see a case presented (let alone
support for such a case).

Pressing your second point is quite curious. Herb, I am assuming that
you are not glad that NASA cancelled plans to strengthen the Wing
Leading Edges. So perhaps we are agreed that NASA made a mistake in
cancelling the WLE upgrade. Whatever the case, I hope we can find
common ground with this conclusion regarding NASA's shuttle upgrade
priorities:

Huge sums of money were spent on upgrading to MEDS cockpit displays
with questionable, if any, safety benefit while known safety concerns,
such as WLE vulnerability, were left unchecked.

*

I've gone out on a limb and presented my take on this. If anyone has
major problems with this analysis of shuttle upgrade prioritization,
one constructive approach is to offer an alternative analysis that can
be examined for merit. Hacking away at deficient views can be a seen
as "productive demolition", but the job is not complete until a new
theory is constructed to take its place.

I will be glad to revise my views at any such time that I learn of a
view I consider to be more accurate.


~ CT

In article ,
(Stuf4) wrote:

From Herb Schaltegger:
(Stuf4) wrote:

Until then, my position stands that MEDS was an unnecessary expense
that proved fatal in how it crowded out the strengthened WLE safety
upgrade.

No, it does not. Not until you provide evidence on two points.

First, that the decision process for these two upgrades was an
"either/or" situation; e.g., either MEDS or WLE upgrades (and I don't
think that you can provide ANY evidence for this whatsoever). Second,
that the WLE upgrade you described (a layer of Nextel 440 fabric inside
the RCC cavity) would have somehow prevented the deaths of the crew of
STS-107. I doubt that you can do this, either.

I remember both of these points being addressed on the original
thread. The basic gist is that there is *lots* you can buy with a
quarter of a billion dollars (that's billion with a -b-). For anyone
who disagrees with the view that stronger WLEs could have been bought
by cancelling MEDS, I have yet to see a case presented (let alone
support for such a case).

You haven't gotten it; the statement you made above REQUIRES that the
decision was an either/or. As in, "We've got this $250M; we can either
spend it on MEDS or we can spend it on increasing the resistance of the
wing leading edge to an as-yet-unquantified risk of orbital debris
damage. So, what do we do?"

YOUR OWN premise was that the WLE upgrade proposal made no mention of
foam shedding from the ET. And as well it didn't, for that just
underscores the fact that the ET was violating a Level 1 or 2
requirement with nearly every launch; however, you provided NO evidence
that foam damage to RCC was ever even a consideration.

Pressing your second point is quite curious. Herb, I am assuming that
you are not glad that NASA cancelled plans to strengthen the Wing
Leading Edges. So perhaps we are agreed that NASA made a mistake in
cancelling the WLE upgrade. Whatever the case, I hope we can find
common ground with this conclusion regarding NASA's shuttle upgrade
priorities:

I am ambivalent on strengthening wing leading edges; I have yet to see
any sort of serious proposal for damage-resistance that would make a
difference in a real-world scenario. I am NOT ambivalent in in the
strong belief that enforcing top-level requirements universally is in
the best interest of ANY aerospace program. Eliminate foam shedding,
ensure bolt-capture devices are properly certified, etc. and the problem
goes away.

Huge sums of money were spent on upgrading to MEDS cockpit displays
with questionable, if any, safety benefit while known safety concerns,
such as WLE vulnerability, were left unchecked.

See above; the RCC is _known_ to be suceptible to relatively large
fragments of foam shed from the ET. It is _suspected_ of being
vulnerable to relatively large pieces of orbital debris. However, that
is true of a several parts of the orbiter including windows, radiator
panels, and so forth. Do we spec a fourth pane for the windows? Some
kind of thermally-transparent shielding for radiators? Etc., etc.

--
Herb Schaltegger, B.S., J.D.
Reformed Aerospace Engineer
"Heisenberg might have been here."
~ Anonymous

From Herb Schaltegger:

Until then, my position stands that MEDS was an unnecessary expense
that proved fatal in how it crowded out the strengthened WLE safety
upgrade.

No, it does not. Not until you provide evidence on two points.

First, that the decision process for these two upgrades was an
"either/or" situation; e.g., either MEDS or WLE upgrades (and I don't
think that you can provide ANY evidence for this whatsoever). Second,
that the WLE upgrade you described (a layer of Nextel 440 fabric inside
the RCC cavity) would have somehow prevented the deaths of the crew of
STS-107. I doubt that you can do this, either.

I remember both of these points being addressed on the original
thread. The basic gist is that there is *lots* you can buy with a
quarter of a billion dollars (that's billion with a -b-). For anyone
who disagrees with the view that stronger WLEs could have been bought
by cancelling MEDS, I have yet to see a case presented (let alone
support for such a case).

You haven't gotten it; the statement you made above REQUIRES that the
decision was an either/or. As in, "We've got this $250M; we can either
spend it on MEDS or we can spend it on increasing the resistance of the
wing leading edge to an as-yet-unquantified risk of orbital debris
damage. So, what do we do?"

Herb, your point was clear from the very beginning. Perhaps you would
like to provide evidence that MEDS funding was "use or lose".

YOUR OWN premise was that the WLE upgrade proposal made no mention of
foam shedding from the ET. And as well it didn't, for that just
underscores the fact that the ET was violating a Level 1 or 2
requirement with nearly every launch; however, you provided NO evidence
that foam damage to RCC was ever even a consideration.

To clarify, my premise at the start was that strengthened WLEs were
designed to deal with the problem of particle impacts. It was known
that the vast majority of these particles were coming from shed SOFI.

You say I've provided no evidence. I've repeatedly offered the STS-87
Foam Impact Assessment as the most glaring example. And CAIBv1 was
very clear that foam impact has been an issue on every single shuttle
launch, starting with STS-1.

The alternative you keep driving at is that WLE MMOD was designed with
*no regard* for addressing the SOFI impact problem. If you have any
evidence to support such a position then I would be glad to consider
it.

snip
Huge sums of money were spent on upgrading to MEDS cockpit displays
with questionable, if any, safety benefit while known safety concerns,
such as WLE vulnerability, were left unchecked.

See above; the RCC is _known_ to be suceptible to relatively large
fragments of foam shed from the ET. It is _suspected_ of being
vulnerable to relatively large pieces of orbital debris. However, that
is true of a several parts of the orbiter including windows, radiator
panels, and so forth. Do we spec a fourth pane for the windows? Some
kind of thermally-transparent shielding for radiators? Etc., etc.

I would advocate spending money to study that issue before spending
money on a snazzy glass cockpit upgrade.

....not that I don't *want* to buy the nice new cockpit displays. The
heart of the matter is -priorities-.


~ CT