FOBS as a Primary Motivator for Human Spaceflight

On Dec 18, 3:02 am, (Derek Lyons) wrote:
Andre Lieven wrote:
Now, its true that the US needed to use military derived manned
boosters into the mid 60s ( Atlas- Mercury; Titan 2- Gemini, plus
Agena atop an Atlas for the Gemini docking targets ), but by that
point in time, the missile gap issue had been overtaken by the
fact that at that time, the US had an ICBM superiority.

The key fact that Stuffie, and many others miss, is that by the time
manned spaceflight got rolling - civilian and military launch vehicle
(at least in the US) had diverged. The boosters you list may have
been derived from military sources, but they had also already been
largely abandoned by the military.

Agreed. Plus, the politics of them had already well diverged, which
counters Stuffed Squash's claim.

Andre

On Tue, 18 Dec 2007 13:42:09 +0000, Monte Davis wrote:

In 1954-1962 the US spent more than twice as much on ICBM and spy
satellite development as it would spend on Apollo,

A fascinating factoid.

--
One way ticket from Mornington Crescent to Tannhauser Gate please.

On Tue, 18 Dec 2007 22:10:17 +0000, Fevric J Glandules wrote:

On Tue, 18 Dec 2007 13:42:09 +0000, Monte Davis wrote:

In 1954-1962 the US spent more than twice as much on ICBM and spy
satellite development as it would spend on Apollo,

A fascinating factoid.

Umm, to clarify, I was using factoid in the "other" sense;
something that is true.


--
One way ticket from Mornington Crescent to Tannhauser Gate please.

Dave Michelson wrote:

Very true. In fact, it's astonishing to realize that the Minuteman
program effectively began even before Sputnik and that the first
Minuteman missiles were demonstrated a few months before Glenn's
flight and deployed operationally several months afterwards.

Both Minuteman and Polaris matured very quickly compared to Atlas and
the two Titan derivatives.
I was digging up information on Minuteman, and one early plan called for
deploying 10,000 of them, rather than the 1,000 that were eventually
deployed. Even that was a very high number to deploy.

Pat

Pat Flannery wrote:

Dave Michelson wrote:

Very true. In fact, it's astonishing to realize that the Minuteman
program effectively began even before Sputnik and that the first
Minuteman missiles were demonstrated a few months before Glenn's
flight and deployed operationally several months afterwards.

Both Minuteman and Polaris matured very quickly compared to Atlas and
the two Titan derivatives.
I was digging up information on Minuteman, and one early plan called for
deploying 10,000 of them, rather than the 1,000 that were eventually
deployed. Even that was a very high number to deploy.

One of the few good things that McNamara accomplished was the reining
in of some of the more fantastic plans of pretty much all the
services.

D.
--
Touch-twice life. Eat. Drink. Laugh.

http://derekl1963.livejournal.com/

-Resolved: To be more temperate in my postings.
Oct 5th, 2004 JDL

"Derek Lyons" wrote in message
...
I was digging up information on Minuteman, and one early plan called for
deploying 10,000 of them, rather than the 1,000 that were eventually
deployed. Even that was a very high number to deploy.

One of the few good things that McNamara accomplished was the reining
in of some of the more fantastic plans of pretty much all the
services.

D.

I was thinking about that while reading Skunkworks and Ben Rich bemoaning
the "cancellation" of Blackbird derivatives such as the YF-12 at the hands
of McNamara.

While fleets of Blackbirds criss-crossing the skies may be appealing to the
geeks in us, I doubt we could have afforded it.

(Though I suspect again, with such a huge fleet, individual mission costs
would have dropped quite a lot.)



--
Greg Moore
SQL Server DBA Consulting Remote and Onsite available!
Email: sql (at) greenms.com http://www.greenms.com/sqlserver.html

From Monte Davis:
Stuf4 wrote:

In years past there has been lots of discussion here about the view
that human spaceflight was funded primarily in the interest of
national defense because of the role that these rockets played as ICBM
booster demonstrations (a form of power projection)...

You really need to get clear on the distinction between "sequence" and
"causation."

Nobody would disagree if you argued that human spaceflight would not
have come along -- or at least would have been delayed many years --
without the national-defense motives and R&D spending of the Cold War.
In 1954-1962 the US spent more than twice as much on ICBM and spy
satellite development as it would spend on Apollo, coming up with most
of the core technologies and engineering essential to both unmanned
and manned space activity. And much of the rest specific to manned
spaceflight had come through X-programs funded by the USAF as well as
NACA since the late 1940s, with next-generation fighters in mind.

Nobody would disagree if you argued that human spaceflight was a
*symbolic* extension of Cold War competition. Lyndon Johnson (as key
legislative sponsor of NASA's creation) and then JFK could have talked
about the urge to explore and the questing human spirit until they
were blue in the face -- but they would never have been able to sell
Mercury, Gemini and Apollo without the added impetus of "show that our
technology, our system, our people can out-perform the Reds."

Monte, what you have stated above is an excellent encapsulation of the
position that I have been presenting to this forum. JFK made as
specific statement about it being "a test of the system", or words to
that effect. I have presented fact after fact here about how human
spaceflight was funded primarily for this symbolic role of showing how
our rockets are better than their rockets (therefore carrying the
implication that if they attack us then they will lose).

I'm glad to see this view gaining acceptance. If you were to peruse
the archives, you might be shocked to see how vehemently this view has
persistently been rejected.

But in terms of actual, practical military functions and power, DoD
(and its counterpart in Moscow) essentially had what it wanted by the
early 1960s, and human spaceflight had little to offer beyond that.
Once you can push a button and get a warhead from North Dakota to
Kazakhstan in 25 minutes... once you can get surveillance photos or
information on enemy missile activity within a few days (then hours,
then minutes)... then putting soldiers and/or weapons in orbit, or
developing Mach 10 Super Duper Hyper Skip-Bombers, really doesn't add
much to justify their high costs.

I hope you are clear that I have not been saying that human
spaceflight was funded in order to advance nuclear missile
capability. My focus has been on the psychological aspects as the
prime funding justification, with terms like "power projection"
indicating a means of intimidating psychologically.

And I don't recall presenting any of these plethora of supporting
facts as 'proof'. It is extremely difficult to prove a psychological
effect.

I am well aware of how FOBS fits into the whole timeline. It too, is
not offered as proof. It is presented as another data point in this
view of how it relates to human spaceflight. If you develop a weapons
system that requires an orbital insertion followed by a precise
deorbit, then every time you do that similar act with a cosmonaut
serves as a reminder how it could have been done with a nuke on board
instead of a person.

That cosmonaut is a walking, talking symbolic reminder of your nuclear
capability.

In fact, for all the zoomy presentations from uniformed space cadets
from Dyna-Soar and MOL to the latest breathless USMC or Delta Force
fantasy about dropping a platoon anywhere in the world in half an
hour... what's striking is how *little* those spending the big bucks
on national defense have put into manned spaceflight. Greater accuracy
and faster launch and less vulnerable basing for ICBMs, yes. More and
better *unmanned* recon and early-warning satellites, yes. But
comparable spending on manned spaceflight? No. The USAF and
defense-intelligence interest in the Shuttle was almost entirely as a
launcher for bulky spy satellites; they turned wuickly back to ELVs
when it didn't pan out for that, and talk about more speculative
functions like inspecting or snatching the other side's satellites was
just that: talk, something they were never willing to pay for on their
own.

You cite FOBS as if it proved your point, when in fact it proves the
opposite. It offered *no* role for cosmonauts or astronauts. Nor did
SDI in the 1980s. Nor does BMD or any seriously funded military space
program today.

(See above.)

There are still *symbolic* traces of the late-1950s linkage, e.g. the
current flurry over the "gap" between STS and Constellation, and how
dreadful it would be if we had to depend on Russian hardware to get
astronauts to ISS... and OMG will teh Yellow Peril beat us back to the
Moon and steal all our helium-3?!!? But in *practical* terms -- what
the hardware does and who pays the bills -- manned spaceflight and
national defense diverged more than forty years ago.

On the contrary, it is clear to me that the "Yellow Peril" is the
prime motivator to keep the US human spaceflight program going today.
Earlier above you recognized the symbolic importance, and here you are
rejecting it for the current situation.

The threat is not helium-3 competition. The threat is Long March
landing in your back yard.

I am extremely puzzled that you recognize the symbolic strategic
importance of human spaceflight from back in the 60s, but then reject
those same motivations for our current situation.

If there were no Russian AND no Chinese threat, then I would expect
the funding plug to be pulled on shuttle and station, let alone future
CEV aspirations. That means stop flying shuttle immediately, bring
the ISS crew home, and crash it into the ocean right next to Mir.

I credit the "Yellow Peril" as the reason why any of this is
continuing. National Security has always been the overriding
justification for human spaceflight. I am not aware of any other
benefits that have been deemed by the US Congress to be worth the
steep cost.


~ CT

From Monte Davis:
Stuf4 wrote:

In years past there has been lots of discussion here about the view
that human spaceflight was funded primarily in the interest of
national defense because of the role that these rockets played as ICBM
booster demonstrations (a form of power projection)...

You really need to get clear on the distinction between "sequence" and
"causation."

Nobody would disagree if you argued that human spaceflight would not
have come along -- or at least would have been delayed many years --
without the national-defense motives and R&D spending of the Cold War.
In 1954-1962 the US spent more than twice as much on ICBM and spy
satellite development as it would spend on Apollo, coming up with most
of the core technologies and engineering essential to both unmanned
and manned space activity. And much of the rest specific to manned
spaceflight had come through X-programs funded by the USAF as well as
NACA since the late 1940s, with next-generation fighters in mind.

Nobody would disagree if you argued that human spaceflight was a
*symbolic* extension of Cold War competition. Lyndon Johnson (as key
legislative sponsor of NASA's creation) and then JFK could have talked
about the urge to explore and the questing human spirit until they
were blue in the face -- but they would never have been able to sell
Mercury, Gemini and Apollo without the added impetus of "show that our
technology, our system, our people can out-perform the Reds."

Monte, what you have stated above is an excellent encapsulation of the
position that I have been presenting to this forum. JFK made as
specific statement about it being "a test of the system", or words to
that effect. I have presented fact after fact here about how human
spaceflight was funded primarily for this symbolic role of showing how
our rockets are better than their rockets (therefore carrying the
implication that if they attack us then they will lose).

I'm glad to see this view gaining acceptance. If you were to peruse
the archives, you might be shocked to see how vehemently this view has
persistently been rejected.

But in terms of actual, practical military functions and power, DoD
(and its counterpart in Moscow) essentially had what it wanted by the
early 1960s, and human spaceflight had little to offer beyond that.
Once you can push a button and get a warhead from North Dakota to
Kazakhstan in 25 minutes... once you can get surveillance photos or
information on enemy missile activity within a few days (then hours,
then minutes)... then putting soldiers and/or weapons in orbit, or
developing Mach 10 Super Duper Hyper Skip-Bombers, really doesn't add
much to justify their high costs.

I hope you are clear that I have not been saying that human
spaceflight was funded in order to advance nuclear missile
capability. My focus has been on the psychological aspects as the
prime funding justification, with terms like "power projection"
indicating a means of intimidating psychologically.

And I don't recall presenting any of these plethora of supporting
facts as 'proof'. It is extremely difficult to prove a psychological
effect.

I am well aware of how FOBS fits into the whole timeline. It too, is
not offered as proof. It is presented as another data point in this
view of how it relates to human spaceflight. If you develop a weapons
system that requires an orbital insertion followed by a precise
deorbit, then every time you do that similar act with a cosmonaut
serves as a reminder how it could have been done with a nuke on board
instead of a person.

That cosmonaut is a walking, talking symbolic reminder of your nuclear
capability.

In fact, for all the zoomy presentations from uniformed space cadets
from Dyna-Soar and MOL to the latest breathless USMC or Delta Force
fantasy about dropping a platoon anywhere in the world in half an
hour... what's striking is how *little* those spending the big bucks
on national defense have put into manned spaceflight. Greater accuracy
and faster launch and less vulnerable basing for ICBMs, yes. More and
better *unmanned* recon and early-warning satellites, yes. But
comparable spending on manned spaceflight? No. The USAF and
defense-intelligence interest in the Shuttle was almost entirely as a
launcher for bulky spy satellites; they turned wuickly back to ELVs
when it didn't pan out for that, and talk about more speculative
functions like inspecting or snatching the other side's satellites was
just that: talk, something they were never willing to pay for on their
own.

You cite FOBS as if it proved your point, when in fact it proves the
opposite. It offered *no* role for cosmonauts or astronauts. Nor did
SDI in the 1980s. Nor does BMD or any seriously funded military space
program today.

(See above.)

There are still *symbolic* traces of the late-1950s linkage, e.g. the
current flurry over the "gap" between STS and Constellation, and how
dreadful it would be if we had to depend on Russian hardware to get
astronauts to ISS... and OMG will teh Yellow Peril beat us back to the
Moon and steal all our helium-3?!!? But in *practical* terms -- what
the hardware does and who pays the bills -- manned spaceflight and
national defense diverged more than forty years ago.

On the contrary, it is clear to me that the "Yellow Peril" is the
prime motivator to keep the US human spaceflight program going today.
Earlier above you recognized the symbolic importance, and here you are
rejecting it for the current situation.

The threat is not helium-3 competition. The threat is Long March
landing in your back yard.

I am extremely puzzled that you recognize the symbolic strategic
importance of human spaceflight from back in the 60s, but then reject
those same motivations for our current situation.

If there were no Russian AND no Chinese threat, then I would expect
the funding plug to be pulled on shuttle and station, let alone future
CEV aspirations. That means stop flying shuttle immediately, bring
the ISS crew home, and crash it into the ocean right next to Mir.

I credit the "Yellow Peril" as the reason why any of this is
continuing. National Security has always been the overriding
justification for human spaceflight. I am not aware of any other
benefits that have been deemed by the US Congress to be worth the
steep cost.


~ CT

I wrote:
I am not aware of any other
benefits that have been deemed by the US Congress to be worth the
steep cost.

It is key to recall also that JFK himself did not consider Apollo to
be worth the cost. After getting the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty passed,
he presented to the UN his intent to pull the plug on Apollo, and in
its place set up a cooperative program where the cost was split with
the Soviets.

I have yet to see a space historian highlight this fact in a book. It
typically gets glossed over, if even mentioned.


~ CT

Stuf4 wrote:

I am extremely puzzled that you recognize the symbolic strategic
importance of human spaceflight from back in the 60s, but then reject
those same motivations for our current situation

Because times change, and many -- most -- human enterprises take on
different significance over time.

Your opinion, it's now clear, is an exception, not to to be changed by
fact or argument. 'Bye -- it's been fun.