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#21
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China and Robert Zubrin
In article ,
Hop David wrote: I seem to recall some sci.space.policy regulars deriding the notion of tethering the hab to a spent booster and spinning them like a bolo to provide artificial gravity. Is this one of the technical problems Zubrin dreams away? What's wrong with the bolo? The general concept is not ridiculous, indeed it makes considerable sense. He rather dreams away the problems of the dynamics of such a system; large flexible structures with little damping are not necessarily very stable. I'm sure it can be made to work, but it's not as simple as it looks. And any other specific technical problems Zubrin doesn't address would be of interest to me. A big one is the problem of spacesuit design for Mars. The existing suit technology is too heavy at 0.38G, except *perhaps* for very brief stays, and its operating life is too short (and not very predictable -- JSC has had surprise failures of flown suits retired to water-tank use). There are possible alternatives, but they are poorly developed and there are many engineering uncertainties. Like Martha, I see positive things in Zubrin's work and would like to know if I've been misled. Oh, there certainly are positive things in it, no question of that. He is definitely worth listening to; you just have to beware of taking it all at face value. In particular I very much like Zubrin's philosophy of using in-situ resources to reduce mission requirements. It's an eminently sensible idea, which Zubrin did not originate. Notably, J.R. French at JPL was exploring it very seriously in the early 1980s. What Zubrin did was to promote it well enough to make it at least semi- respectable; French got very good technical results but had little success in selling the idea within JPL. I think this philosophy may also be applicable to other missions than Martian. Yes, although in most cases it's harder. Mars is a particularly nice case because of its atmosphere, which is easily* available anywhere on the surface. Exploiting surface or subsurface resources -- notably including Martian permafrost -- is much more complicated and much harder. (* "Easily" assuming that airborne dust is a manageable problem, a large assumption whose accuracy is difficult to evaluate.) -- MOST launched 30 June; first light, 29 July; 5arcsec | Henry Spencer pointing, 10 Sept; first science, early Oct; all well. | |
#22
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China and Robert Zubrin
In article ,
George William Herbert wrote: intense focus on getting to Mars is a disastrous strategic mistake, all too likely to lead to a repetition of the post-Apollo collapse. Bob's counter to that is that done right, the Mars missions should have more internal impetus for ongoing exploration than Apollo did. He claims that, but I really don't see it in his proposals. Yes, at least the early phases make a nice logical program, but there still isn't any particular reason why somebody can't just call a halt after the first two or three expeditions. Yeah, there's a fueled return vehicle sitting there waiting for an expedition that's not going to come; so what? At a more fundamental level, this is almost exactly the same as Apollo: the argument against stopping is the investment already made, but that investment is last year's money. The only way I see to mount a Mars program which has built-in incentive for continuation is to delete the return vehicles: all trips, including the first, are one-way with no return capability. The permanent base starts with the first expedition. *That* really does make it easier to continue the program than to call a halt, given that as a matter of practical politics, the latter would demand returning everyone to Earth. But selling such a program would be difficult, even by the standards of manned Mars programs. And one of his original arguments is that Mars is the interesting place in the solar system that is most accessable to and amenable to human exploration and eventual colonization, and that a cautious program to settle 'space' in general thus misses the low-hanging fruit of a Mars program. Mitch Burnside Clapp, a couple of years ago: "I picked fruit one summer, and you pick the low-hanging fruit *last*, because you don't want to climb the tree with a heavy bag." And there's even an analogy the the heavy bag is "but you already did what you said was the easiest and most important part". It's a question of whether you want a piece or two of fruit to eat and never mind the rest, or you want to harvest the whole tree. Doing the easy part first isn't necessarily the right way to do the whole thing. -- MOST launched 30 June; first light, 29 July; 5arcsec | Henry Spencer pointing, 10 Sept; first science, early Oct; all well. | |
#24
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China and Robert Zubrin
Earl Colby Pottinger wrote: I don't know him personally at all, but an article he recently published in Analog magazine probably shows the type of problems some people have with him and his logic. Googled "Analog Zubrin" and found a number of articles Zubrin has published in that magazine but none that look like it's on the possibility of intelligent life forming. Do you have the date of the Analog magazine carrying that article? -- Hop David http://clowder.net/hop/index.html |
#25
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China and Robert Zubrin
Hop David wrote in message ...
Scott? Are you talking about Scott Lowther? Yes, Scott Lowther. He worked for Zubrin at Pioneer Astronautics. --Chris Vancil |
#26
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China and Robert Zubrin
Hop David wrote in message ...
CL Vancil wrote: And an aside: on the concept of a single mission to Mars being Flags and Footprints...I would say 1.5 to 2 years on the surface of another planet is not F&F! It may leave no useful infrastructure, but it seems not to matter here whether current infrastructure is retained. So I see this all as a red herring for those who would advocate some other mission (i.e. return to Luna, L-1, NEO or what have you)... --Chris Vancil I also hope and believe 1.5 to 2 years on another planet is not fantasy and fiction. The chief arguments for 1.5 to 2 years on mars are proximity and available in-situ resources. If you are spending 1.5 to 2 years on Mars plus a 7 month trip out and a 7 month return trip that is three years off earth. Which I think is possible. If asteroids have usable in situ resources, 3 years on a near earth asteroid is also a possibility. Yes, you could use the abilities and equipment built for manned Mars missions on many other just as useful missions. The reverse isn't true. And if you forced designs to be vastly over engineered folks here would squeal like stuck pigs about it. I'm sure Congress would also wonder at the costs. So the Moon is not a stepping stone to Mars now anymore than it was during Apollo. All the testing etc can be done on Earth or LEO or on Mars(ISRU) for a manned Mars mission. --Chris Vancil |
#27
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China and Robert Zubrin
Henry Spencer wrote:
Hop David wrote: I seem to recall some sci.space.policy regulars deriding the notion of tethering the hab to a spent booster and spinning them like a bolo to provide artificial gravity. Is this one of the technical problems Zubrin dreams away? What's wrong with the bolo? The general concept is not ridiculous, indeed it makes considerable sense. He rather dreams away the problems of the dynamics of such a system; large flexible structures with little damping are not necessarily very stable. I'm sure it can be made to work, but it's not as simple as it looks. I think he applies a somewhat simplifying "somebody else's problem" field to it; he doesn't reject them completely, but he figures that it's a detail that can be worked out later at small reasonable effort. Most of the arguments are over how much that 'small reasonable effort' really works out to be, when we get there... And any other specific technical problems Zubrin doesn't address would be of interest to me. A big one is the problem of spacesuit design for Mars. The existing suit technology is too heavy at 0.38G, except *perhaps* for very brief stays, and its operating life is too short (and not very predictable -- JSC has had surprise failures of flown suits retired to water-tank use). There are possible alternatives, but they are poorly developed and there are many engineering uncertainties. Again, I think he applied a SEP field. He has noted that it's an area requiring focus and work. He has encouraged suit stuff becoming a minor Mars Society focus area and encouraged the work that is now being funded on Mars suits from NASA. But it's not something he personally seems to feel very attached to solving. Like Martha, I see positive things in Zubrin's work and would like to know if I've been misled. Oh, there certainly are positive things in it, no question of that. He is definitely worth listening to; you just have to beware of taking it all at face value. In particular I very much like Zubrin's philosophy of using in-situ resources to reduce mission requirements. It's an eminently sensible idea, which Zubrin did not originate. Notably, J.R. French at JPL was exploring it very seriously in the early 1980s. What Zubrin did was to promote it well enough to make it at least semi- respectable; French got very good technical results but had little success in selling the idea within JPL. It is important to note that Mars Direct seems to have been really *the* first well done coherent overall ISRU architecture, from the ISRU cycle and chemistry chosen to the mission architecture / vehicle breakdowns. The concept of ISRU was certainly not something he came up with first, but the papers pre-MD were for architectures that are clearly inferior in a post-MD analysis or just looking at the chemical cycles without integrating them into a mission. He was clearly standing on a bunch of pre-existing thought and research work in formulating Mars Direct, but it was a major step forwards and stood clearly ahead of its contemporaries. And despite a lot of arguing back and forth, the architecture still seems viable today and may well still be the best choice were we to start a mission today. Warts / 'engineering details' and all... the NASA Reference Mission is another good choice with some slightly different high level philosophy / requirements. But Mars Direct hasn't faded from view, and it's not just because Bob's out there pushing the PR angle all day. -george william herbert |
#28
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China and Robert Zubrin
Henry Spencer wrote: (snip some informative stuff) In particular I very much like Zubrin's philosophy of using in-situ resources to reduce mission requirements. It's an eminently sensible idea, which Zubrin did not originate. Notably, J.R. French at JPL was exploring it very seriously in the early 1980s. What Zubrin did was to promote it well enough to make it at least semi- respectable; French got very good technical results but had little success in selling the idea within JPL. Good to know - I'll try to remember J.R. French. I think this philosophy may also be applicable to other missions than Martian. Yes, although in most cases it's harder. Mars is a particularly nice case because of its atmosphere, which is easily* available anywhere on the surface. About the only low-tech, unmanned scheme for asteroid ISRU I've seen are Kuck Mosquitoes. These would only be good for asteroids with icey interiors but I hope and believe such near earth asteroids exist. http://clowder.net/hop/railroad/KuckMosq.html Exploiting surface or subsurface resources -- notably including Martian permafrost -- is much more complicated and much harder. Isn't there a Martian crater basin that has some warm spots? perhaps geothermal (maybe "geo" is the wrong prefix) activity might make liquid water reservoirs within well drilling distance. Hop David http://clowder.net/hop/index.html |
#29
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China and Robert Zubrin
Hop David wrote:
George William Herbert wrote: Henry Spencer wrote: First, he tends to fall in love with his ideas to the point that he ignores, or casually dismisses, alternatives and practical snags. Always check with somebody else about the detailed engineering. Donna Shirley (who headed the engineering team for the Sojourner rover) on Zubrin: "He dreams away the technical issues." . . . I ran into some stuff in the book The Case for Mars which seemed wrong, bothered Bob about it, and finally wrote the paper to lay out the case in more detail and more formally. I then went on to a bunch of other points I had been fiddling with, but that's how it started. George, could you go into more specifics? Shirley's statement "He dreams away the technical issues" is very vague. And your "I ran into some stuff . . . which seemed wrong" also leaves me wondering. The specific stuff was regarding... I think it was the fuel cell versus IC engine, and rover range calculations methods he used in _The Case for Mars_ (the book). I don't know what happened to the notes I was taking when I started to go "that's not right..." and I am loath to spend the rest of the day searching my five or more year old old-account email archives for the email I exchanged with him that prompted the paper specifically, but I think that was the specific topic. Strange that I can't remember the topic for sure. I remember where I was fairly clearly. I was at a hotel south of Vancouver BC, where my wife was at a dance and music festival, and I was resting and working on some tradeoff studies on the mass and cost inefficiency of orbital assembly of small launch payloads for space habitats and for Mars lander missions specifically. I had _The Case for Mars_ with me and was re-reading sections to take breaks from the small payloads integration work when something in the Rovers section bothered me. I think it was the fuel cell / IC power and range stuff that got me going, but lacking the notes and emails I'm not sure. I seem to recall some sci.space.policy regulars deriding the notion of tethering the hab to a spent booster and spinning them like a bolo to provide artificial gravity. Is this one of the technical problems Zubrin dreams away? What's wrong with the bolo? As Henry replied, not a lot, but it needs to be tested and the dynamics may not be trivial to debug. And any other specific technical problems Zubrin doesn't address would be of interest to me. Like Martha, I see positive things in Zubrin's work and would like to know if I've been misled. ISRU details; suits; the equipment loadout for the mission; operational details; etc etc etc. Bob's fundamental work is not bad. Mars Direct is a very good mission architecture. It is not completely debugged yet. Some of the bugs are in areas Bob is not good in and has not spent a lot of effort to address, and he tends to think are minor implimentation details. He may be correct, in the total project scope they may not be worth worrying about much (who cares if it takes 5 years and $500 million to make the tether work properly and test it if the total project costs $50 billion and takes 15 years?). But he may be underestimating serious issues. In a lot of cases, we really don't know how serious the problem is, because the work to quantify how bad it is hasn't been done. The Mars Dust problem is currently in that category, as is the space suits problem, and the tethers problem, and the fractional-G biological effects problem. The latter, Bob was getting the Mars Society to work on Translife, which Elon Musk then took off and ran with for a while. But Musk is now doing Space-X as his primary focus. So I don't know where the current situation lies. Does anyone who's inside Space-X (I have been told a couple of you are reading) know what's up on Translife? Anyone? Buehler? In particular I very much like Zubrin's philosophy of using in-situ resources to reduce mission requirements. I think this philosophy may also be applicable to other missions than Martian. There is nothing wrong with ISRU other than some implimentation issues as Henry points out. Some of those may end up being very serious implimentation issues, but they aren't known to be catastrophic. -george william herbert |
#30
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China and Robert Zubrin
"CL Vancil" wrote in message
m... Hop David wrote in message ... CL Vancil wrote: And an aside: on the concept of a single mission to Mars being Flags and Footprints...I would say 1.5 to 2 years on the surface of another planet is not F&F! It may leave no useful infrastructure, but it seems not to matter here whether current infrastructure is retained. So I see this all as a red herring for those who would advocate some other mission (i.e. return to Luna, L-1, NEO or what have you)... --Chris Vancil I also hope and believe 1.5 to 2 years on another planet is not fantasy and fiction. The chief arguments for 1.5 to 2 years on mars are proximity and available in-situ resources. If you are spending 1.5 to 2 years on Mars plus a 7 month trip out and a 7 month return trip that is three years off earth. Which I think is possible. If asteroids have usable in situ resources, 3 years on a near earth asteroid is also a possibility. Yes, you could use the abilities and equipment built for manned Mars missions on many other just as useful missions. The reverse isn't true. And if you forced designs to be vastly over engineered folks here would squeal like stuck pigs about it. I'm sure Congress would also wonder at the costs. So the Moon is not a stepping stone to Mars now anymore than it was during Apollo. All the testing etc can be done on Earth or LEO or on Mars(ISRU) for a manned Mars mission. Not all the testing. We still haven't made anything out of in situ resources in space. The moon seems like a good place to start. The moon offers much better radiation shielding than ISS. ISS is boring and I don't know how much longer funding will last for it. If ISS is cancelled, there might not be any funding for testing in LEO. |
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