The Usual Suspects

In article ,
Dick Morris wrote:

John Savard wrote:

On Tue, 28 Oct 2003 01:15:29 GMT, h (Rand
Simberg) wrote, in part:

Even if it's true that a young space agency inspired some people a few
decades ago, it doesn't justify continuing to pour billions into it in
its dotage. I don't necessarily advocate ending it, but it badly
needs mending, and I saw nothing in that testimony that offered any
useful, or novel suggestions to do so.

And that is a valid comment, just as Tom Merkle made valid points.

Challenger and Columbia do indicate something is wrong with NASA. Not
because accidents never happen, but because management failures were
(at least apparently) contributory to both events.

What has happened to NASA post-Apollo? Is it doing the best it can, on
vastly reduced funding... or, has the need to make unrealistic
promises to Congress for the funding it gets led to the survivors in
NASA being the kind of people who would rather take chances with
astronauts' lives than tell Congress that certain things just _can't_
be done on the budget proposed?

Back in the 60's NASA had a clear goal and a limited amount of time in
which to accomplish it: Land a man on the moon by the end of the decade
and return him safely to Earth. They didn't have time to mess around
with a lot of fancy new technologies, like nuclear rockets or winged
reentry vehicles, so they had to use as much proven technology as
possible. Engineering excellence was the key to success.

It arguably also enjoyed an uncommon amount of luck.

Imagine what might have happened, for example, had the crew of Apollo 13
died rather than returned safely.

Similarly, had Apollo 8 ended up like the real-life Apollo 13 the
history books would now be berating NASA for its recklessness rather
than lauding it for its daring even if the crew returned safely.

snip

So here we are 17 years after Challenger and we don't even have a firm
plan for replacing the Shuttle. The main problem with NASA is not a
lack of money or technology, but a management failure of historic
proportions by virtually all concerned. Solving the problem is going to
require an entirely new organization (which could be a seperate division
within NASA) to manage the development and operation of manned
spaceflight systems entirely free from the technology development
culture of the existing laboratory system - pushing the technology
envelope is not the way to get reliable, low-cost hardware. Making the
necessary changes will probably require some firm direction from
Congress.

Won't having a second organisation simply increase the number of
bureaucrats on the government payroll some on this thread have been
complaining of?

If so, then unless somebody increases NASA's funding won't that in turn
mean less money available for spending on actual hardware etc?

--
Stephen Souter

http://www.edfac.usyd.edu.au/staff/souters/

Stephen Souter wrote:

In article ,
Dick Morris wrote:

John Savard wrote:

On Tue, 28 Oct 2003 01:15:29 GMT, h (Rand
Simberg) wrote, in part:

Even if it's true that a young space agency inspired some people a few
decades ago, it doesn't justify continuing to pour billions into it in
its dotage. I don't necessarily advocate ending it, but it badly
needs mending, and I saw nothing in that testimony that offered any
useful, or novel suggestions to do so.

And that is a valid comment, just as Tom Merkle made valid points.

Challenger and Columbia do indicate something is wrong with NASA. Not
because accidents never happen, but because management failures were
(at least apparently) contributory to both events.

What has happened to NASA post-Apollo? Is it doing the best it can, on
vastly reduced funding... or, has the need to make unrealistic
promises to Congress for the funding it gets led to the survivors in
NASA being the kind of people who would rather take chances with
astronauts' lives than tell Congress that certain things just _can't_
be done on the budget proposed?

Back in the 60's NASA had a clear goal and a limited amount of time in
which to accomplish it: Land a man on the moon by the end of the decade
and return him safely to Earth. They didn't have time to mess around
with a lot of fancy new technologies, like nuclear rockets or winged
reentry vehicles, so they had to use as much proven technology as
possible. Engineering excellence was the key to success.

It arguably also enjoyed an uncommon amount of luck.

Imagine what might have happened, for example, had the crew of Apollo 13
died rather than returned safely.

Similarly, had Apollo 8 ended up like the real-life Apollo 13 the
history books would now be berating NASA for its recklessness rather
than lauding it for its daring even if the crew returned safely.

snip

So here we are 17 years after Challenger and we don't even have a firm
plan for replacing the Shuttle. The main problem with NASA is not a
lack of money or technology, but a management failure of historic
proportions by virtually all concerned. Solving the problem is going to
require an entirely new organization (which could be a seperate division
within NASA) to manage the development and operation of manned
spaceflight systems entirely free from the technology development
culture of the existing laboratory system - pushing the technology
envelope is not the way to get reliable, low-cost hardware. Making the
necessary changes will probably require some firm direction from
Congress.

Won't having a second organisation simply increase the number of
bureaucrats on the government payroll some on this thread have been
complaining of?

NASA's culture is the problem, and creating a new organization from
scratch is probably the best way to create a new culture more attuned to
a new way of doing business. Actually an old way, since NASA created a
very functional management structure for the Apollo Program, and the new
organization would strongly resemble the old Industrial Operations
Division that ran Apollo. There will be an increase in the number of
bureaucrats on the government payroll, since many, if not most, of the
new employees will come from outside NASA, just as many of the people
who ran the Apollo program were recruited from the Air Force and
industry.

If so, then unless somebody increases NASA's funding won't that in turn
mean less money available for spending on actual hardware etc?

A modest increase may be required, at least temporarily. Phasing out
the Shuttle ASAHP will be the initial goal, so we'll save money in the
long run.
--
Stephen Souter

http://www.edfac.usyd.edu.au/staff/souters/

"Kaido Kert" wrote:
"Centurion509" wrote in message
...
"The only reason I'm interested in space is because NASA inspired me when
I was
5 years old," he says. "The only reason any of these small space companies
have
a chance of doing anything is because they get to stand on the shoulders
of
NASA's ingenuity."

This is just the opinion of one man, of course, but a man who is spending
millions on a secret rocket company...

Ok, lets throw in an opinion of the other man:
"The mere allusion to NASA sets Rutan off with the fire of a Southern
preacher talking about the devil. "NASA abandoned affordability in favor of
the shuttle, and now it's spending hundreds of millions to study frog legs.
I want to fly in space, and I'm tired of waiting for NASA. If we can show
the world we can do this safely at extremely low cost, there'll be a
renaissance in space." "

http://www.wired.com/wired/archive/11.07/space.html

I think it's a mistake to think that Bezos and Rutan hold dramatically
different opinions of NASA. Their actions speak far louder than any
of their words, and their actions do not show tremendous confidence in
and reliance upon the great and all powerful NASA. I think, rather,
that Bezos possesses and displays something that is unnatural to
Rutan, namely "tact".

Gene DiGennaro wrote:

While I am inclined to agree with you, I think if I could turn the
Wayback Machine to the time period of 1972-1986, most of us would be
pushing mighty hard for the shuttle (myself included). Yes, we would
miss the Apollo/Saturn system, but I think most of us would miss it
like an old Model T Ford while a brand new shiny 1970's Corvette sat
in the driveway.

That was certainly the way it was sold, wasn't it? Then you found that
what you had just bought had the safety, robustness, and operating
economy of the Zeppelin Hindenburg.

Pat