WashPost: “Space Station Mission Opposed”

WashPost: “Space Station Mission Opposed”
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn...2003Oct22.html
Despite Safety Concerns of Some Experts, NASA Decided to Send New Crew
By Eric Pianin and Kathy Sawyer, Washington Post Staff Writers
Thursday, October 23, 2003; Page A01
NASA's decision to launch a fresh two-man crew to the International
Space Station last weekend came over the strenuous objections of mid-level
scientists and physicians who warned that deteriorating medical equipment
and air and water monitoring devices aboard the orbiting laboratory posed
increasing safety risks for the crew, according to space agency documents
and interviews.
Two officials responsible for health and environmental conditions on the
space station refused to approve the launch of the new crew, instead signing
a dissent that warned about "the continued degradation" of the environmental
monitoring and health maintenance systems and exercise equipment vital to
the astronauts' well-being.

"Minutes of Sep 10 Meeting When Life Sciences Was 'No Go' For New Crew
Launch"

10 Sep 2003: Minutes from the Space and Life Sciences Directorate (SLSD) 7S
Stage Operations Readiness Review (SORR) Executive Session

The 7S SORR Executive Session was conducted September 10, 2003 in
Building 1, Conference Room 860, and began at 10:00 a.m. The meeting was
chaired by Ms. Mi-Mi Lau and supported by attendees on the attached list.
The Chairman called the meeting to order stating the purpose of the
Executive Session.
Ms. Lau stated that this forum would be conducted from 10-11:30 a.m. and
at 11:45 a.m. with SA/J. Davis. Dr. Davis would then meet with
OA/W.Gerstenmaier at 1:30 p.m. to discuss the SLSD position on the 7S
launch. She opened the meeting by briefly discussing the red status of each
item as it was discussed at yesterday's SORR and included the updated
Program Risk Advisory Board (PRAB) information.
SA/C. Stegemoeller's opening comments included the objectives for
today's meeting. He stated that during this session, the SLSD needed to be
clear on all the issues and that Dr. Davis would address these issues with
NASA Headquarters tomorrow.
The question was posed as to why the ISS crew remains on-orbit as well
as why a continued launch date is still set for 7S to launch a new crew to
ISS. Ms. Lau stated that based on the SORR assessment, Dr. Davis wants firm
data and an outlined planned.
SM/J. Walters briefly discussed the events that had led the SLSD to the
decision of a no go for 7S launch due to too many unknowns. He reviewed the
SORR summary chart and noted that there was some capacity to retrieve data
after the launch of Expedition 8. AC8/B. Dunbar questioned as to whether or
not the data had been received from the Russians and SF/N. Packham confirmed
that there had been some data retrieved, but that there was no acceptable
quality control certification data.
Mr. Walters reviewed details regarding the degraded modes and use of
spares for Exercise Countermeasures, and that crew health maintenance is in
a best effort mode with two crewmembers. Also, an Extravehicular Activity
(EVA) had been added to this increment which would be difficult to perform
due to the lack of resistance training and additional crew.
From an Environmental Health perspective, Mr. Walters stated that the
air and water samples were good, but that there was an immense need for
operative monitoring equipment on-board.
Dr. Packham interjected that if the Solid Sorbent Air Sampler (SSAS)
were to return on 6S, the results of the samples would be unknown for
several weeks and that crew exposure limits would not be determined until
the end of the increment. Get well options were discussed with the ultimate
solution of getting monitoring replacements on-board, but that no
capabilities exist on the allocated Progress flights. Numerous options were
discussed in length to resolve these issues, but ultimately if crew health
continues to degenerate, the only alternative would be to bring the crew
home.
Considerable deliberation continued as to which items could be restored
and to what extent the point of no return would be reached. It was noted
that the ISSP was given a "heads up" for 6S and 12P. Dr. Dunbar reiterated
as to whether or not more upmass would mitigate risk enough to continue
manning the ISS or if the crew should be put on red alert evaluating crew
health as often as possible while on-orbit. Dr. Packham stated that no
amount of upmass on 7S would cure the problems, but that 5-Grab Sample
Containers (GSC), 2-SSAS, and 3-Water Microbiology Kits (WMK) as priority
manifest items would be a potential resolution. SF/W. Langdoc stated that
this was the first increment that a visiting vehicle had not docked with ISS
in a six-month period and that currently the ISSP is flying in a contingency
mode and that no nominal situations exist.
Dr. Packham reviewed the current state of all monitoring capabilities as
follows:
Air
Two Compound Specific Analyzer - Combustion Products (CSA-CP) units on-board
differ in oxygen concentration by 1.6% absolute

No-Go for 10.2 psia ops for USOS EVA
Volatile Organic Analyzer (VOA) hard failed July 13, 2002
Validated for 75% of targeted compounds
SSAS launched on Progress 12 for sampling and return on 6 Soyuz

Microbiological
Archival microbiological sampling deleted from schedule post STS-107
WMK operations unable to meet new potable water requirements
300 colony forming units per 100 ml, versus 5,000 CFU/100 ml
Water Total Organic Carbon Analyzer (TOCA) hard failed during Expedition 6
Radiation Tissue Equivalent Proportional Counter (TEPC) (both units) hard
failed beginning with Expedition 5
No lineal energy transfer data
No alarm capability most important during loss of signal (LOS)

EV-1 is non operational, EV-2 and EV-3 are nominal
Intra-Vehicular Charge Particle Directional Spectrometer (IV-CPDS) has some
commanding issues
No radiation area monitoring during Expedition 7 (no upmass)

Acoustics
structural latch mechanism (SLM) membrane rupture, Increment 3 (fixed, and
working nominally)

Additionally, Dr. Packham reviewed the monitoring capabilities of the
Russian hardware as follows:
Air
-No acceptable quality control certification data
-AK-1 samplers

Issues with resealing of the tubes post sample acquisition
-High levels of hydrocarbons in samples from Shuttle mid-deck
-Not (never) observed in GSC's
-Indicative of Moscow air

Sample results suggest large random errors in sampling or analytical
methods -E.g. acetone - SM 0.70 mg/m3, FGB 0.28 mg/m3, Lab 0.80 mg/m3

-Drager tubes
Ammonia, HCl, HF, HCN, CO, NOx, Formaldehyde
False indications at RH's above 50-60%
-GANK
CO, HCl, HCN, ammonia, methane, formaldehyde
U.S. Side has received no data on ground-based test results (as required by
the MORD)

Water -Archival samples only
Microbiological
-On-orbit air microbiology capability
-Archival samples
Radiation -Good data transfer between US and Russian sides
Acoustics -Similar to US technology

Dr. Packham reviewed the ISS onboard monitoring levels of all possible
compounds stating that this data was originally tracked as a result of an
action assigned by OA/W. Gerstenmaier. He said that SA is currently tracking
207 items on-board ISS in the Hazardous Material Summary Tables (HMST) and
that the HMST is updated for each stage operation. Each HMST is classified
into five toxicological levels with 4 being most toxic and 0 being the
least. He also recommended development of an ISS integrated hazard analysis
to include systems and payloads if one does not exist and include fault
tolerance as part of the analysis. Dr. Packham stated that environmental
factors and Environmental Control and Life Support System (ECLSS) have
evaluated each of the 207 items individually for impacts to crew health and
to the systems that support the crew, but cannot analyze the reactions
between all 207 items.
Dr. Packham discussed in length the details of each evaluation regarding
ECLSS items, Thermal items, and Payloads. He specifically pointed out that
controls are in place to detect and respond to large releases of gases such
as oxygen, nitrogen and carbon dioxide, but that no capability exist to
monitor trace contaminant accumulation. He stated that there are early
indications that a small leak across the external/internal thermal control
system (TCS) heat exchanger exist, but controls are in place to prevent a
large release of ammonia. He said the most likely failure involves the
freezing/rupturing of the interface heat exchanger (IFHX) and that a watch
item is in place for Node 3 regenerative ECLSS.
Dr. Packham also presented details of the thermal items stating that
there had already been large releases of Freon 218 from SKV compressors, but
that there are no crew health impacts from Freon 218. Regarding Payload
releases, it was determined that there are controls in place to prevent
accidental releases from payloads.
Dr. Packham reviewed a list of off-nominal conditions detected by CHeCS
hardware as follows:
Air Quality Monitoring
-Freon leaks
-Formaldehyde issue
-Resolution of METOX regeneration issue
-Elevated atmospheric volatile organics

Water Quality Monitoring
-Cadmium in potable water above requirement (Exp 2)
-Elevated lead in water processing system
-Volatile organic loading in condensate exceeding Russian guideline

Microbiological Monitoring
-Several occurrences of SVO-ZV contamination above the current detection
limit

Not a concern from the crew health aspect
-Several occurrences of contamination of surfaces

Drove remedial action

Radiation Monitoring
-Input to IMMT moved the start of one EVA

Acoustics Monitoring
-Continued exceedances in Russian segment
-Some increases observed in US Lab

Pump Package Assembly (PPA), Common Cabin Air Assembly (CCAA)

In summation, Dr. Packham reiterated the current "squawks", what has
changed from 6S to 7S, and what was required to maintain "go"status for
Expedition 8 Environmental Monitoring.
Ms. Lau asked Mr. Stegemoeller, Dr. Dunbar, and Dr. Stansbery if they
were comfortable moving forward with the recommendation to no go for launch.
Dr. Dunbar stated that she felt additional rationale, background and the
best recommendation for corrective action were necessary. She stated that
when she sees a no go for launch, it typically indicates that there is a
problem with the spacecraft. Dr. Stansbery surmised that she only understood
the seriousness of the issues based on today's discussions.
Mr. Stegemoeller proceeded to draft up preliminary thought processes
regarding the present state as follows:
-Already contingency operations; existing degraded environment-acoustics
-Crew systems
-Loss of environmental monitoring
-No assurance for sample return
-Degraded vehicle, equipment, and tools to support crew
-Not meeting requirements for crew health and safety
-Recommend designation of contingency operations with return plan of attack
-Longest mission ever without a visiting vehicle nor sample return
-No prospect of restoring on-orbit capabilities or requirements.

He emphasized, "What is required to be acceptable?" Further discussion
ensued regarding the processes that were in place to remove the crew from
the ISS and who would be responsible for making the ultimate decision.
Additionally, it was noted the hardware for environmental hardware had been
inaccurately classified. In conclusion of this part of the meeting, it was
determined that the following items from Dr. Packham's presentation would be
reviewed when Dr. Davis arrived:
Hardware description US/Russian
MORD requirements/Traceability
Environment & trending
Exercise solution/strategy
Contingency plan/products
Chain of command for medical decisions
Hardware status: on-orbit, fabrication, certification and mean time between
failures (MTBF) processes
Environmental specifications/source
Toxicology tables and focus areas
Monitoring tools/solutions

Options:
Operate Carbon Dioxide Removal Assembly (CDRA) more often
Re-supply/return samples
Flight rules/procedures

ENTER JEFF DAVIS MEETING Mr. Stegemoeller and Ms. Lau briefly described
the chain of events that has led the SLSD to this point of the Executive
Session and discussed the intent of this particular meeting. Mr.
Stegemoeller also reviewed the summary charts regarding the current
situation as discussed previously and the state of the 7S Launch of
Expedition 8.
Additionally, he noted that there are 47 Medical Operation Requirements
not being met.
SA/S. Pool stated that it was very obvious that ISS was in a contingency
mode of operation. However, when the SLSD stated a no go for launch,
specific underlying principles must be addressed. Dr. Davis questioned as to
whether this issue could be resolved with re-supply or strictly de-manning
the spacecraft.
Atmospheric sampling, additional EVA issues, current flight rules and
procedures were discussed in length. Dr. Davis asked, "How much risk have we
already accrued and how much more can we handle?" It was noted that the
situation was very different for this increment because not all the
equipment was functioning nominally and that this was the longest increment.
He stated that a contingency plan must be put into effect whether or not the
crew remains on-board or de-manning takes place within 45-days.
Additionally, the criticality regarding the lack of samples received and
countermeasures available was reiterated.
Dr. Davis stated that the ISSP had asked the directorate for scenario
planning and that a Tiger team with multi-disciplines needed to be formed.
Crew symptoms were briefly discussed as well as certifying the hardware for
criticality 3 versus 1.
Dr. Packham reviewed his charts once more for Dr. Davis. Ms. Lau
restated the go for launch position for 12P, but that too many constraints
exist now for 7S. Dr. Packham stated that, yes things were operating
according to specification, but nothing could be validated. Discussion
ensued regarding the CoFR process for stage to stage and not Expedition.
Again, Dr. David asked the Board, if they were telling him that the crew
needed to come home today. The consensus was that no one wanted to leave the
ISS unmanned, but that, but Dr. Cintron stated that she felt uncomfortable
with the potential of surmounting risks with no monitoring capabilities.
Several options were discussed regarding driving the downmass to include the
SSAS or boost the altitude and fly the ISS during solar min until all the
problems can be fixed. Furthermore, it was discussed as to how many
re-supply missions were needed to get the ISS back to full capacity.
In conclusion, Ms. Lau stated that the objective here was to let all
parties know exactly what the concerns, issues and options were and that a
follow-on meeting would be held as to determine the approach for the 7S ISS
SORR.

/s/A. C. Bond___________
A. C. Bond
FACB Executive Secretary

281-483-8767

7S SORR Executive Meeting
7S SORR
Attendees
September 10, 2003

Chairman: Mr. Charles Stegemoeller
Alfaro, Karen
Barratt, M.
Bond, Arthur
Brekke, Michele
Caradec, Paul
Cintron, Nitza
Davis, J.
Dunbar, B.
Duncan, James
Hollman, Martha
Kaplan, D.
Langdoc, W.
Lau, C.
McCullough, J.
Ochoa, E.
Packham, Nigel
Pool, S.
Roden, S.
Rummel, J.
Seitz, Bill
Stansbery, Eileen
Tilley, Vanessa
Walters, J.
West, Eula

James Oberg wrote:
"Minutes of Sep 10 Meeting When Life Sciences Was 'No Go' For New Crew
Launch"

Thank you. Most interesting.

Mr. Walters reviewed details regarding the degraded modes and use of
spares for Exercise Countermeasures, and that crew health maintenance is in
a best effort mode with two crewmembers

Is this a case of Houston panicking because they don't get data from the
exercise equipment and not trusting that the crew will do their daily
exercises ?

They should see this as an opportunity to do REAL research in space: find out
how to exercise without a fancy multi-billion dollar threadmill.Let the crew
members experiment with various exercise methods instead of just following
sciripts like robots.

Also, an Extravehicular Activity
(EVA) had been added to this increment which would be difficult to perform
due to the lack of resistance training and additional crew.

Russians had performed 2 crew EVAs on Mir, hadn't they ? And the planned EVA
is to be done with Russian suits/Pirs, right ?

From an Environmental Health perspective, Mr. Walters stated that the
air and water samples were good, but that there was an immense need for
operative monitoring equipment on-board.

Again, it seems to me like Houston is panicking because they are blind. I
recall a malfunction of the CO2 regenerative unit in Quest. It wasn't fancy
multi-billion dollar sensing equipment that rang the alarm, it was crew
member's noses that detected the strange odours and they used their noses to
find out it came from Quest.

Also, does Zvezda have the same amount of ECLSS capabilities (especially with
regards to air purification) that Mir had ? So even if the USA segment's air
cleaners fail, shouldn't life support still be possible via the russian
segment ?

Also, so far, is it correct to state that the only ECLSS failures on the USA
segment are with monitoring equipment ?


were to return on 6S, the results of the samples would be unknown for
several weeks and that crew exposure limits would not be determined until
the end of the increment.

This may sound really stupid, but don't they trust crew member's noses to
detect anomalies ?
I realise that some ground folks rely on data from ISS to do their work on the
ground, but just because they don't get their data or get it late doesn't mean
that the station is dangerous.

discussed in length to resolve these issues, but ultimately if crew health
continues to degenerate, the only alternative would be to bring the crew
home.

"continues to degenerate". Interesting statement. Do they have hard data
that expedition 7's health has degenerated more than previous crews ? Or is
this the first time americans stay for so long, and NASA doesn't have baseline
comparisons to compare actual crew health with expected health for such a
duration flight ?


manifest items would be a potential resolution. SF/W. Langdoc stated that
this was the first increment that a visiting vehicle had not docked with ISS
in a six-month period and that currently the ISSP is flying in a contingency
mode and that no nominal situations exist.

Surely the Russians have had such experiences with Mir ?

No-Go for 10.2 psia ops for USOS EVA

Does anyone have specific information on why this is the case ? Something
broken in Quest ?

Issues with resealing of the tubes post sample acquisition
-High levels of hydrocarbons in samples from Shuttle mid-deck
-Not (never) observed in GSC's
-Indicative of Moscow air

Ok, since the Shuttle hasn't been involved with ISS in a very long time, why
this mention of shuttle air samples ?

and what is the "indicative of Moscow air" supposed to mean ?

system (TCS) heat exchanger exist, but controls are in place to prevent a
large release of ammonia.

I thought all ammonia lines were outdoors exactly to prevent any ammonia leaks
indoors ?

freezing/rupturing of the interface heat exchanger (IFHX) and that a watch
item is in place for Node 3 regenerative ECLSS.

Are they talking about the same space station as the one currently in orbit ?
As far as I know, Node3 isn't even built yet, so what would that have to do
with environment safety on the current ISS flying right now ?

Dr. Packham also presented details of the thermal items stating that
there had already been large releases of Freon 218 from SKV compressors,

Ouch. bad for the ozone layer :-)

-Not meeting requirements for crew health and safety

Are those requirements for crew health or are those requirements for the
benefit of giving tons of data to ground personel to monitor the crew's health ?

Sorry, but most humans survive a long life with just periodic visits to
doctors and no constant data gathering equipment sending data to their
doctors. Humans have enough built-in sensors to ring an alarm in the brain
when something is wrong with the body.

-Longest mission ever without a visiting vehicle nor sample return

Is that really the longest mission ever ? Wouldn't Mir have had longer
missions ?

Additionally, he noted that there are 47 Medical Operation Requirements
not being met.

"Requirements" or "Experiments" ? I think that they should have a clear line
between crew health and experiments measuring crew health. Measuring crew
health with a gazillion gadgets is not a "requirement". It is an experiment.

And in those discussions, I saw no mention that both crew members have had
experience with long space flights on Mir and that they should be able to
gauge their health more autonomously since they have personal experience to
compare with. They aren't sending 2 kids who need their parents to monitor
them constantly. They are sending 2 very experienced astronauts who can handle themselves.

It is one thing to have concerns because monitoring is degraded and they will
have to rely more on cremember's own intelligence/noses/nerves/brains. But
another to try to declare this a "no-go" situation.

If crewmembers do get sick, then they can come down. This has always been a
possibility and nothing has really changed here. And it is exactly because
they can come back down that there is no reason to oppose sending them up.

"James Oberg" wrote in message
...
"Minutes of Sep 10 Meeting When Life Sciences Was 'No Go' For New Crew
Launch"


I omitted credit that this memo was published on www.nasawatch.com