NASA Astronaut on Columbia Repair (and others)

"columbiaaccidentinvestigation"
wrote:

yet more handwaving and evasion.

I should have done this a long time ago...

plonk

D.
--
Touch-twice life. Eat. Drink. Laugh.

-Resolved: To be more temperate in my postings.
Oct 5th, 2004 JDL

Derek Lyons wrote:"yet more handwaving and evasion"

Yeah derek, you post facts on another thread, but when confronted here
you cant even back youre squawking up with some cited facts, just
usenet namecalling (as you would rather hand wave history away and
cherry pick youre way through life), so just read a little history and
try again, or don't post youre monday morning quarterbacking about what
boisjoly should have done, for you are wrong and you and historical
facts show it.

Once again I'll make it easy on you to explain "what you would have
done in roger boijsoly's place", given the following factual
history of the challenger tragedy specifically regarding srb O-ring
seal burn through problems in cold weather launch conditions, that led
to the tragic loss of the sts-51l crew, and challenger jan 28 1986.
So, Derek I would like you to correlate you're thinking in this
thread to the following historically correct documented facts from the
rogers commission where they state the following:
(*1).
"The teleconference between Marshall Space Flight Center, Kennedy
Space Center and Morton Thiokol, Incorporated, at Wasatch, Utah,
focused attention on the advisability of launching mission 51-L and
provided a clear opportunity for postponement",
and stated about nasa's flight readiness review meetings prior to
the tragic loss of sts-51l,
(*2).
"("STS 61-C (flight 24), launched on January 12, 1986, experienced
nozzle joint O-ring erosion and blow-by and field joint O-ring
erosion...." However, at the STS 51-L Level I Flight Readiness Review
On January 15, 1986, Mr. Mulloy noted that there were "No 61-C Flight
Anomalies," and that there were "No Major Problems or Issues.".

And before you start youre rant about (good vs evil) again, please
understand I have also provided the facts (and argued on a previous
thread) to show how nasa managers would directly benefit from a full
shuttle system quantitative risk assessment, in making their
professional decisions to operate and retire the space shuttle safely
within it's designed parameters and in compliance with all human
space flight procedures.

(*1)
http://history.nasa.gov/rogersrep/v2appg.htm
"Report of the PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION on the Space Shuttle
Challenger Accident
Volume 2: Appendix G - Human Factor Analysis
Managers at Risk: The Human Factors of Launch Pressures
The teleconference between Marshall Space Flight Center, Kennedy Space
Center and Morton Thiokol, Incorporated, at Wasatch, Utah, focused
attention on the advisability of launching mission 51-L and provided a
clear opportunity for postponement. The decision should have been based
on engineering judgments. However, other factors may have impeded or
prevented effective communication and exchange of information. One
factor which may have contributed significantly to the atmosphere of
the teleconference at Marshall is the effect on managers of several
days of irregular working hours and insufficient sleep.
The extent of sleep loss was documented by Commission investigators who
conducted interviews with the teleconference participants at Marshall
and Kennedy specifically to reconstruct their daily activities during
the five days preceding the accident. As shown in Figure 2, these
interviews revealed that because of the launch scrub on January 27
certain key managers obtained only minimal sleep the night before the
teleconference or had arisen so early in the morning that they had been
awake and on duty for extended periods. 25
Time pressure, particularly that caused by launch scrubs and rapid
turnarounds, increases the potential for sleep loss and judgment
errors. This could be minimized by preventing launch support personnel,
particularly managers, from combining launch support duty with office
work on the same day. The willingness of NASA employees in general to
work excessive hours, while admirable, raises serious questions when it
jeopardizes job performance, particularly when critical management
decisions are at stake."


This link contains the shuttle flight readiness reviews with
information that pertained to the o-ring problem prior to the launch of
sts-51l

(*2)
http://history.nasa.gov/rogersrep/v2apph.htm
"Report of the PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION on the Space Shuttle
Challenger Accident
Volume 2: Appendix H - Flight Readiness Review Treatment of O-ring
Problems
At the December 4, 1985 STS 61-C Shuttle Projects Board, Mr. Mulloy
noted "SRM joint O-ring performance within experience base." The
Commission's copy of the December 9, 1985 Marshall Center Board
briefing was incomplete; however, at the December 11, 1985 Level I
Flight Readiness Review, it was reported that there were "No 61-B
flight anomalies....
STS 61-C (flight 24), launched on January 12, 1986, experienced nozzle
joint O-ring erosion and blow-by and field joint O-ring erosion. The
right-hand nozzle joint primary O-ring was eroded 0.011 inches over an
8 inch span at the 162° location. There was blow-by past the primary
O-ring in the left-hand nozzle joint between the 255.6° and 334.8°
positions. The primary O-ring in the left SRM aft field joint was
eroded 0.004 inches over a 3.5 inch span at the 154° location...
The STS 51-L SRB Board Flight Readiness Review On January 3, 1986,
Shuttle Projects Board On January 8, 1986, and Marshall Center Board on
January 13, 1986, all occurred before the STS 61-C SRBs were available
for inspection. However, at the STS 51-L Level I Flight Readiness
Review On January 15, 1986, Mr. Mulloy noted that there were "No 61-C
Flight Anomalies," and that there were "No Major Problems or
Issues."...
STS 51-L (flight 25) was launched on January 28, 1986."

Open sharing of information is crucial to improving everybody's
understanding of the universe around us.
Tom

That previous RCC oxidation data were wrong and a repair like CAIB
suggested therfore impossible - thats far beyond "the sake of a silly
argument on Usenet." If your claim be true NASA would have long ago
informed the Congress and the public about it.

Managers at the program level may not necessarily have known the details.
The Orbiter Return-to-Flight Working Group was a fairly low-level
meeting. Sometimes technical presentations at that level are later
presented directly to higher level meetings, but this particular
presentation was never brought before either the PRCB or the Daily PRCB.

And as you are the only one who draw that conclusion, isn`t it your
duty to allert higher managment, Congress or even the New York Times
about it? (What some regulars here accused Boisjoly in 1986 failed to do)


Here we are. You have no data in front of you to prove your claims
to yourself. You only might have the memory of something you heard
once. But probably your memory mangled your own conclusion with
what you heard. Thats more often the case then we want it to be.

Look, face it. There is absolutly no evidence for your claim. You
are the only source of this idea. No one else has brought it up.
Even NASA data prior CAIB supports this CAIB conclusion.

Well, I can assure you that the presentation exists. It is not just
mangled memory; I have gone back and re-read it since this thread began,
and I stand by my previous statements.

So its no memory issue, fine.

I can understand your skepticism
and reluctance to take my word for it, but that is all I have to offer.
If that is insufficient, then further discussion is pointless.

Well Jorge, just to summarise it. You have an unpublished NASA report.
From wich you (so far only you) draw a conclusion. This conclusion
is not stated that way in the report. Your conclusion is that all
prior 2004 RCC oxidation data was wrong, the oxidation rate is
considerable higher. About +30 years of NASA testing/analysis on the
issue is invalid, like the 2000 report we saw, the CAIB reports and
other public statements. Meanwhile some of the loudest regulars here
thankfully accepted your find. As you understand, I`m reluctant to
join this funny club.

In my view, we sucessfully traced back at least one of the Usenet
Columbia myths. And killed another about the alleged need of a
smooth RCC repair surface. All in all it was an interesting thread
with you.


--
JRF


## CrossPoint v3.12d R ##

On Tue, 21 Nov 2006 18:20:10 GMT, (Derek Lyons)
wrote:

"columbiaaccidentinvestigation"
wrote:

yet more handwaving and evasion.

I should have done this a long time ago...

plonk

....Yeah, you should have. He's a Znkfba in drag, obviously.

OM
--
]=====================================[
] OMBlog - http://www.io.com/~o_m/omworld [
] Let's face it: Sometimes you *need* [
] an obnoxious opinion in your day! [
]=====================================[

OM wrote: bull and fluff that isnt worth anybody reading..

Gee OM, your nasty stinky bait isnt going to catch any fish today, so
go troll insome other waters.

So om let derek speak for himself, if he can, or if you can try and
attempt to explain what you would have done in roger boisjoly's place
to stop the launch of challenger the morning of jan 28 1986, with out
your cheesey usenet bullying, otherwise you are essentially playing a
game of "self stimulating your intellectual insecurities by
attempting to boost up you're own ego at the expense of others"

(*1).
"The teleconference between Marshall Space Flight Center, Kennedy
Space Center and Morton Thiokol, Incorporated, at Wasatch, Utah,
focused attention on the advisability of launching mission 51-L and
provided a clear opportunity for postponement",
and stated about nasa's flight readiness review meetings prior to
the tragic loss of sts-51l,
(*2).
"("STS 61-C (flight 24), launched on January 12, 1986, experienced
nozzle joint O-ring erosion and blow-by and field joint O-ring
erosion...." However, at the STS 51-L Level I Flight Readiness Review
On January 15, 1986, Mr. Mulloy noted that there were "No 61-C Flight
Anomalies," and that there were "No Major Problems or Issues.".

And before you start youre rant about (good vs evil) again, please
understand I have also provided the facts (and argued on a previous
thread) to show how nasa managers would directly benefit from a full
shuttle system quantitative risk assessment, in making their
professional decisions to operate and retire the space shuttle safely
within it's designed parameters and in compliance with all human
space flight procedures.

(*1)
http://history.nasa.gov/rogersrep/v2appg.htm
"Report of the PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION on the Space Shuttle
Challenger Accident
Volume 2: Appendix G - Human Factor Analysis
Managers at Risk: The Human Factors of Launch Pressures
The teleconference between Marshall Space Flight Center, Kennedy Space
Center and Morton Thiokol, Incorporated, at Wasatch, Utah, focused
attention on the advisability of launching mission 51-L and provided a
clear opportunity for postponement. The decision should have been based
on engineering judgments. However, other factors may have impeded or
prevented effective communication and exchange of information. One
factor which may have contributed significantly to the atmosphere of
the teleconference at Marshall is the effect on managers of several
days of irregular working hours and insufficient sleep.
The extent of sleep loss was documented by Commission investigators who
conducted interviews with the teleconference participants at Marshall
and Kennedy specifically to reconstruct their daily activities during
the five days preceding the accident. As shown in Figure 2, these
interviews revealed that because of the launch scrub on January 27
certain key managers obtained only minimal sleep the night before the
teleconference or had arisen so early in the morning that they had been
awake and on duty for extended periods. 25
Time pressure, particularly that caused by launch scrubs and rapid
turnarounds, increases the potential for sleep loss and judgment
errors. This could be minimized by preventing launch support personnel,
particularly managers, from combining launch support duty with office
work on the same day. The willingness of NASA employees in general to
work excessive hours, while admirable, raises serious questions when it
jeopardizes job performance, particularly when critical management
decisions are at stake."


This link contains the shuttle flight readiness reviews with
information that pertained to the o-ring problem prior to the launch of
sts-51l

(*2)
http://history.nasa.gov/rogersrep/v2apph.htm
"Report of the PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION on the Space Shuttle
Challenger Accident
Volume 2: Appendix H - Flight Readiness Review Treatment of O-ring
Problems
At the December 4, 1985 STS 61-C Shuttle Projects Board, Mr. Mulloy
noted "SRM joint O-ring performance within experience base." The
Commission's copy of the December 9, 1985 Marshall Center Board
briefing was incomplete; however, at the December 11, 1985 Level I
Flight Readiness Review, it was reported that there were "No 61-B
flight anomalies....
STS 61-C (flight 24), launched on January 12, 1986, experienced nozzle
joint O-ring erosion and blow-by and field joint O-ring erosion. The
right-hand nozzle joint primary O-ring was eroded 0.011 inches over an
8 inch span at the 162° location. There was blow-by past the primary
O-ring in the left-hand nozzle joint between the 255.6° and 334.8°
positions. The primary O-ring in the left SRM aft field joint was
eroded 0.004 inches over a 3.5 inch span at the 154° location...
The STS 51-L SRB Board Flight Readiness Review On January 3, 1986,
Shuttle Projects Board On January 8, 1986, and Marshall Center Board on
January 13, 1986, all occurred before the STS 61-C SRBs were available
for inspection. However, at the STS 51-L Level I Flight Readiness
Review On January 15, 1986, Mr. Mulloy noted that there were "No 61-C
Flight Anomalies," and that there were "No Major Problems or
Issues."...
STS 51-L (flight 25) was launched on January 28, 1986."

Open sharing of information is crucial to improving everybody's
understanding of the universe around us.
Tom

OM wrote:

...Yeah, you should have. He's a Znkfba in drag, obviously.



Ain't monomania fun? :-)

Pat

On Mon, 20 Nov 2006 23:39:29 -0600, Pat Flannery
wrote:

The Handwaving Sergeant At Arms notes the motion has been seconded, and
calls for a vote. :-)

....All in favor?

[Insert scene of all regulars whooping, hollering, stomping feet, and
otherwise doing the Delta House display of approval]

....All opposed?

[Insert scene from the "Ten Commandments", where Dathan, the sinners,
and the Golden Calf are all swallowed up as the Earth cracks open and
sends them all straight to Hell]

....They "Frack Yeahs!" have it. Congrats, Jorge! :-)

OM
--
]=====================================[
] OMBlog - http://www.io.com/~o_m/omworld [
] Let's face it: Sometimes you *need* [
] an obnoxious opinion in your day! [
]=====================================[

On Wed, 22 Nov 2006 02:34:09 -0600, Pat Flannery
wrote:

OM wrote:

...Yeah, you should have. He's a Znkfba in drag, obviously.

Ain't monomania fun? :-)

....He needs to keep that kissing disease between himself and his
******* sons, then.

OM
--
]=====================================[
] OMBlog - http://www.io.com/~o_m/omworld [
] Let's face it: Sometimes you *need* [
] an obnoxious opinion in your day! [
]=====================================[

wrote in
:

That previous RCC oxidation data were wrong and a repair like CAIB
suggested therfore impossible - thats far beyond "the sake of a
silly argument on Usenet." If your claim be true NASA would have
long ago informed the Congress and the public about it.

Managers at the program level may not necessarily have known the
details. The Orbiter Return-to-Flight Working Group was a fairly
low-level meeting. Sometimes technical presentations at that level
are later presented directly to higher level meetings, but this
particular presentation was never brought before either the PRCB or
the Daily PRCB.

And as you are the only one who draw that conclusion, isn`t it your
duty to allert higher managment, Congress or even the New York Times
about it? (What some regulars here accused Boisjoly in 1986 failed to
do)

No, not at all. I would if I thought NASA was ignoring a conclusion from
the report that bears on *future* life-or-death situations. But NASA
management has already drawn the correct conclusions from the report: RCC
repair is hard, NASA needs to pay more attention to small cracks and holes
than previously assumed. And the results of their conclusions are evident
in every facet of the current RCC inspection/repair effort. There is no
need for me to point out what they already know well.

The other conclusion I drew from that report (a hypothetical STS-107
improvised RCC repair would have been futile) is all in the past. Unlike
the Boisjoly situation, it has no bearing on any future life-or-death
scenarios. It is, like I said, just a silly argument on Usenet, all
delusions of importance aside.

In my view, we sucessfully traced back at least one of the Usenet
Columbia myths. And killed another about the alleged need of a
smooth RCC repair surface. All in all it was an interesting thread
with you.

There are indeed myths being propagated here, but they're not mine.

--
JRF

Reply-to address spam-proofed - to reply by E-mail,
check "Organization" (I am not assimilated) and
think one step ahead of IBM.

OM """
Na, he wrote such fluff defending his in ability to debate me it
deserves to be top posted, so instead he posts his candy assumptions in
the form of gossip, i wont even bother repeating his words, just
repeat the question he and others are avoiding.

Hey om here is some more information from the rogers commission,
directly pertaining to the management structure that roger boisjoly and
others were finding necessary to convince that a launch in the cold
weather morning of jan 28 1986, was not safe.
Now om what I do find interesting is calling me a troll, when it is
obvious once you were faced with real science in debating me, you
couldn't produce credible source backing you're opinions, then like
a child has used every arguing tactic in the book to save face. But OM
it is really obvious by the endless rhetorical subjective debates that
you would rather partake that you are in fact "self stimulating your
intellectual insecurities by attempting to boost up you're own ego at
the expense of others", which is not science, so don't think
you're fooling anybody but yourself. So just answer how you would
have stopped the launch of challenger jan 28, 1986, without fallacious
maneuvers, so take off the blinders and open youre eyes (get dereks and
pats help for the big words om as it seems you all are "buddys") and
just read historical facts, as this is not about calling me names, it
is about the safety and success of our space program...

(fallacious maneuver)
http://attitudeadjustment.tripod.com/Books/Logic.htm
"Why would people use these fallacious maneuvers when the results can
be so harmful? Generally, only two reasons exist:
1. The person has made a honest error in logic
2. The person has deliberately sidestepped logic in order to satisfy
his or her own ego
The first reason can generally be handled with little fanfare. Simply
point out the error in thinking, and guide the person to the correct
line of thinking while allowing the person to save face. This sort of
disagreement can sometimes be refreshing, allowing new insights and
mental connections not previously made. When fallacies are used for the
second reason, I like to call these fallacies slick maneuvers. Why?
Because they are frequently used to garner support for statements or
actions that inflate the person's ego
at the long-term expense of others."


ROGERS COMMISSION TESTIMONY
http://history.nasa.gov/rogersrep/v1ch5.htm
Report of the PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION on the Space Shuttle Challenger
Accident
Chapter V: The Contributing Cause of The Accident.
[82] The decision to launch the Challenger was flawed. Those who made
that decision were unaware of the recent history of problems concerning
the O-rings and the joint and were unaware of the initial written
recommendation of the contractor advising against the launch at
temperatures below 53 degrees Fahrenheit and the continuing opposition
of the engineers at Thiokol after the management reversed its position.
They did not have a clear understanding of Rockwell's concern that it
was not safe to launch because of ice on the pad. If the decisionmakers
had known all of the facts, it is highly unlikely that they would have
decided to launch 51-L on January 28, 1986.

Flaws In The Decision Making Process
In addition to analyzing all available evidence concerning the material
causes of the accident on January 28, the Commission examined the chain
of decisions that culminated in approval of the launch. It concluded
that the decision making process was flawed in several ways. The actual
events that produced the information upon which the approval of launch
was based are recounted and appraised in the sections of this chapter.
The discussion that follows relies heavily on excerpts from the
testimony of those involved in the management judgments that led to the
launch of the Challenger under conditions described.
That testimony reveals failures in communication that resulted in a
decision to launch 51-L based on incomplete and sometimes misleading
information, a conflict between engineering data and management
judgments, and a NASA management structure that permitted internal
flight safety problems to bypass key Shuttle managers.
The Shuttle Flight Readiness Review is a carefully planned,
step-by-step activity, established by NASA program directive SPO-PD
710.5A, 1 designed to certify the readiness of all components of the
Space Shuttle assembly. The process is focused upon the Level I Flight
Readiness Review, held approximately two weeks before a launch. The
Level I review is a conference chaired by the NASA Associate
Administrator for Space Flight and supported by the NASA Chief
Engineer, the Program Manager, the center directors and project
managers from Johnson, Marshall and Kennedy, along with senior
contractor representatives.
The formal portion of the process is initiated by directive from the
Associate Administrator for Space Flight. The directive outlines the
schedule for the Level I Flight Readiness Review and for the steps that
precede it. The process begins at Level IV with the contractors
formally certifying-in writing-the flight readiness of the elements for
which they are responsible. Certification is made to the appropriate
Level III NASA project managers at Johnson and Marshall. Additionally,
at Marshall the review is followed by a presentation directly to the
Center Director. At Kennedy the Level III review, chaired by the Center
Director, verifies readiness of the launch support elements.
The next step in the process is the Certification of Flight Readiness
to the Level II Program Manager at Johnson. In this review each Space
Shuttle program element endorses that it has satisfactorily completed
the manufacture, [83] assembly, test and checkout of the pertinent
element, including the contractors" certification that design and
performance are up to standard. The Flight Readiness Review process
culminates in the Level I review.
In the initial notice of the review, the Level I directive establishes
a Mission Management Team for the particular mission. The team assumes
responsibility for each Shuttle's readiness for a period commencing 48
hours before launch and continuing through post-landing crew egress and
the safing of the Orbiter. On call throughout the entire period, the
Mission Management Team supports the Associate Administrator for Space
Flight and the Program Manager.
A structured Mission Management Team meeting-called L-1-is held 24
hours, or one day, prior to each scheduled launch. Its agenda includes
closeout of any open work, a closeout of any Flight Readiness Review
action items, a discussion of new or continuing anomalies, and an
updated briefing on anticipated weather conditions at the launch site
and at the abort landing sites in different parts of the world. It is
standard practice of Level-I and II officials to encourage the
reporting of new problems or concerns that might develop in the
interval between the Flight Readiness Review and the L-1 meeting, and
between the L-1 and launch.
In a procedural sense, the process described... At approximately 8:45
p.m. Eastern Standard Time, Phase 2 of the teleconference commenced,
the Thiokol charts and written data having arrived at Kennedy Space
Center by telefax. (A table of teleconference participants is included
with Chronology of Events.) The charts presented a history of the
O-ring erosion and blow-by in the Solid Rocket Booster joints of
previous flights, presented the results of subscale testing at Thiokol
and the results of static tests of Solid Rocket Motors. In the
following testimony, Roger Boisjoly, Allan McDonald and Larry Mulloy
expressed their recollections of this teleconference up to the point
when an off-net caucus was requested: 9

Mr. Boisjoly: I expressed deep concern about launching at low
temperature. I presented Chart 2-1 with emphasis-now, 2-1, if you want
to see it, I have it, but basically that was the chart that summarized
the primary concerns, and that was the chart that I pulled right out of
the Washington presentation without changing one word of it because it
was still applicable, and it addresses the highest concern of the field
joint in both the ignition transient condition and the steady state
condition, and it really sets down the rationale for why we were
continuing to fly. Basically, if erosion penetrates the primary O-ring
seal, there is a higher probability of no secondary seal capability in
the steady state condition. And I had two sub-bullets under that which
stated bench testing showed O-ring not capable of maintaining contact
with metal parts, gap, opening rate to maximum operating pressure. I
had another bullet which stated bench testing showed capability to
maintain O-ring contact during initial phase (0 to 170 milliseconds of
transient). That was my comfort basis of continuing to fly under normal
circumstances, normal being within the data base we had.
I emphasized, when I presented that chart about the changing of the
timing function of the O-ring as it attempted to seal. I was concerned
that we may go from that first beginning region into that intermediate
region, from O to 170 being the first region, and 170 to 330 being the
intermediate region where we didn't have a high probability of sealing
or seating.
I then presented Chart 2-2 with added concerns related to the timing
function. And basically on that chart, I started off talking about a
lower temperature than current data base results in changing the
primary O-ring sealing timing function, and I discussed the SRM-15
[Flight 51-C, January, 1985] observations, namely, the 15A [Left SRM,
Flight 51-C] motor had 80 degrees arc black grease between the O-rings,
and make no mistake about it, when I say black, I mean black just like
coal. It was jet black. And SRM-15B [Right SRM, Flight 51-C] had a 110
degree arc of black grease between the O-rings. We would have low
O-ring squeeze due to low.....


[89] ....temperature which I calculated earlier in the day. We should
have higher O-ring Shore hardness.
Now, that would be harder. And what that material really is, it would
be likened to trying to shove a brick into a crack versus a sponge.
That is a good analogy for purposes of this discussion. I also
mentioned that thicker grease, as a result of lower temperatures, would
have a higher viscosity. It wouldn't be as slick and slippery as it
would be at room temperature. And so it would be a little bit more
difficult to move across it.
We would have higher O-ring pressure actuation time, in my opinion, and
that is what I presented.... These are the sum and substance of what I
just presented. If action time increases, then the threshold of
secondary seal pressurization capability is approached. That was my
fear. If the threshold is reached, then secondary seal may not be
capable of being pressurized, and that was the bottom line of
everything that had been presented up to that point.
Chairman Rogers: Did anybody take issue with you?
Mr. Boisjoly: Well, I am coming to that. I also showed a chart of the
joint with an exaggerated cross section to show the seal lifted off,
which has been shown to everybody. I was asked, yes, at that point in
time I was asked to quantify my concerns, and I said I couldn't. I
couldn't quantify it. I had no data to quantify it, but I did say I
knew that it was away from goodness in the current data base. Someone
on the net commented that we had soot blow-by on SRM-22 [Flight 61-A,
October, 1985] which was launched at 75 degrees. I don't remember who
made the comment, but that is where the first comment came in about the
disparity between my conclusion and the observed data because SRM-22
[Flight 61-A, October, 1985] had blow-by at essentially a room
temperature launch.
I then said that SRM-15 [Flight 51-C, January, 1985] had much more
blow-by indication and that it was indeed telling us that lower
temperature was a factor. This was supported by inspection of flown
hardware by myself. I was asked again for data to support my claim, and
I said I have none other than what is being presented, and I had been
trying to get resilience data, Arnie and I both, since last October,
and that statement was mentioned on the net.

Others in the room presented their charts, and the main telecon session
concluded with Bob Lund, who is our Vice President of....


[90] ....Engineering, presenting his conclusions and recommendations
charts which were based on our data input up to that point. Listeners
on the telecon were not pleased with the conclusions and the
recommendations.
Chairman Rogers: What was the conclusion ?
Mr. Boisjoly: The conclusion was we should not fly outside of our data
base, which was 53 degrees. Those were the conclusions. And we were
quite pleased because we knew in advance, having participated in the
preparation, what the conclusions were, and we felt very comfortable
with that.
Mr. Acheson: Who presented that conclusion?
Mr. Boisjoly: Mr. Bob Lund. He had prepared those charts. He had input
from other people. He had actually physically prepared the charts. It
was about that time that Mr. Hardy from Marshall was asked what he
thought about the MTI [Morton Thiokol] recommendation, and he said he
was appalled at the MTI decision. Mr. Hardy was also asked about
launching, and he said no, not if the contractor recommended not
launching, he would not go against the contractor and launch.
There was a short discussion that ensued about temperature not being a
discriminator between SRM-15 [Flight 51-C] and SRM-22 [Flight 61-A],
and shortly after, I believe it was Mr. Kilminster asked if- excuse me.
I'm getting confused here. Mr. Kilminster was asked by NASA if he would
launch, and he said no because the engineering recommendation was not
to launch.
Then MTI management then asked for a five-minute caucus. I'm not sure
exactly who asked for that, but it was asked in such a manner that I
remember it was asked for, a five-minute caucus, which we put on- the
line on mute and went off-line with the rest of the net.
Chairman Rogers: Mr. Boisjoly, at the time that you made the-that
Thiokol made the recommendation not to launch, was that the unanimous
recommendation as far as you knew?
Mr. Boisjoly: Yes. I have to make something clear. I have been
distressed by the things that have been appearing in the paper and
things that have been said in general, and there was never one
positive, pro-launch statement ever made by anybody. There have been
some feelings since then that folks have expressed that they would
support the decision, but there was not one positive statement for
launch ever made in that room.

Open sharing of information is crucial to improving everybody's
understanding of the universe around us.
Tom