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Tales of the IGY--was The Non-Innovator's Dilemma
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#43
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Tales of the IGY--was The Non-Innovator's Dilemma
In article ,
Len wrote: ...The U.S. was trying to preserve the "research" heritage by deriving the first stage from the Viking, rather than from a ballistic missile. The Vanguard was a rather sophisticated vehicle for its time... I note with interest that in his book, Kurt Stehling (Vanguard's head of propulsion) says that if the Vanguard launcher had really *been* what it was frequently billed as -- a slightly improved Viking plus a slightly improved Aerobee-Hi plus a solid third stage -- it would probably have been flying a year earlier and probably *would* have launched the first satellite, although only a rather small one. He thought much of Vanguard's grief came from the rather drastic revisions made to increase the performance of both the "existing" stages (the all-new third stage was ready on schedule and never gave the slightest trouble), and that if the Stewart committee had really understood how much new development was involved, it might well have chosen Jupiter C instead. (I'm less sure. I see signs of a familiar pattern: valuing promises of greater immediate science return over getting something flying quickly and then improving it to increase science return. It's terribly tempting to think that there is no need to experiment and evolve if you are smart enough to do it right the first time. As it was, three generations of successively-improved Explorers flew before the first instrumented Vanguard.) official recognition for Jupiter C--which was derived from the Redstone and had a "tub" of, if I recall correctly, 11 solid rockets derived from the WAC Corporal by JPL, surrounding three more of these solid rockets, and topped off with a similar, single, final, fourth rocket stage... Correct. The solid rockets don't seem to have had a name of their own; a JPL paper on them described the design as "a 6-in. OD scale model of an early version of the powerplant of the Sergeant missile", with minor modifications, notably structural reinforcements to the second-stage nozzles to keep them from deflecting outward under spin loads (180G at the design spin rate). ...The modified Redstone could reach orbital altitude, at which point the "tub" of solid rockets was to be spun up to 700 rpm for spin stabilization. Small correction: the tub was already spinning at launch, although the spin rate was actively controlled (and in fact was varied in flight, to stay away from the first-stage body-bending vibration-mode frequencies). I don't know why they did it that way; Vanguard's approach of spinning up the third stage just before ignition was better, although unproven until its flight test on Vanguard TV-1. -- MOST launched 1015 EDT 30 June, separated 1046, | Henry Spencer first ground-station pass 1651, all nominal! | |
#44
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Tales of the IGY--was The Non-Innovator's Dilemma
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#45
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Tales of the IGY--was The Non-Innovator's Dilemma
John Penta wrote in message . ..
On Mon, 22 Sep 2003 14:48:57 CST, (Len) wrote: [Great snippage by me - John Penta] Sir...May I humbly bow and claim my unworthiness? Well, OK...That's probably directed at most people here. I'm just some 19 year old geek with technical skills that are bad enough that I'm majoring in history and polisci (and have never taken even precalc, I'm so bad at math), plus an interest in space that won't go away... And yet I get to read stories from people who were working on space during the early days of the Mercury missions. grovels I'm not worthy, I'm not worthy... Don't grovel. A lot of good things happen from just being at the right place at the right time. I've had my share of the wrong places and wrong times. I've also had my share of not-so-good grades for various reasons, including lack of interest in the subject at the time. So don't sell yourself short on being able to tackle anything that you are really interested in, and willing to put some real effort into. Best regards, Len (Cormier) Thanks for the stories.:-) Glad you enjoyed them. I kind of enjoyed recounting them myself--after all these years. John Penta |
#46
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The Non-Innovator's Dilemma
On Mon, 22 Sep 2003 22:43:20 CST, in a place far, far away,
(Kent Betts) made the phosphor on my monitor glow in such a way as to indicate that: I think you could get 1000 people per year to spend a million on a flight. The hard part is the 20 person capsule on a $20M rocket The dollar cost of operating the service exceeds the market demand. That's an interesting assertion. It would be very interesting to put it to the test. -- simberg.interglobal.org * 310 372-7963 (CA) 307 739-1296 (Jackson Hole) interglobal space lines * 307 733-1715 (Fax) http://www.interglobal.org "Extraordinary launch vehicles require extraordinary markets..." Swap the first . and @ and throw out the ".trash" to email me. Here's my email address for autospammers: |
#47
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The Non-Innovator's Dilemma
"Jon Berndt
I wish them luck and success. I was thinking about the space tourism thing. If you have one person a year at $20 million, fine. But its not an industry. That is what you would call an accomodation. So say you want 1000 people a year. At that point you have to have a dedicated vehicle. 20 per flight x 50 flights at $20M per flight is $1 billion is $1M per ticket. I think you could get 1000 people per year to spend a million on a flight. The hard part is the 20 person capsule on a $20M rocket The dollar cost of operating the service exceeds the market demand. |
#48
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The Non-Innovator's Dilemma
"Kent Betts" schrieb im Newsbeitrag om... "Jon Berndt So say you want 1000 people a year. At that point you have to have a dedicated vehicle. 20 per flight x 50 flights at $20M per flight is $1 billion is $1M per ticket. I think you could get 1000 people per year to spend a million on a flight. The hard part is the 20 person capsule on a $20M rocket next question ist for how long do you have 1000 people per year, who is willing to pay $ 1M for a let`s say 4 hour joyride. |
#49
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The Non-Innovator's Dilemma
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#50
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The Non-Innovator's Dilemma: talk is cheap, innovation is hard.
h (Rand Simberg) wrote in message . ..
http://www.techcentralstation.com/091903E.html cheaper (although it may be *more* expensive, as your article OSP isn't about making it incredibly cheap for anyone else, it's about making it "less" expensive for NASA and the US and (now) much safer than the Shuttle. The problem is, as my column points out, it won't. At least not the less expensive part. Whether it will be safer remains to be seen. I have my doubts, but I also think that safety shouldn't trump everything else, so that's another dumb reason to do OSP. The problem with this column is that it rests on so many false assumptions and strawmen that it makes GuthVenus look rational. Let's start with your main point in the article: "On the other hand, if the agency continues to ignore the pent-up demand for public space travel, it risks irrelevancy, and having its high-cost myths exposed as private entities start to show the way to affordable and safe human spaceflight." Rand, what planet are you from? What is the agency doing that frustrates the "pent-up demand for public space travel?" (Cue dodging that direct question with a vague response that inverts the issue, to something along the lines of 'not encouraging the private sector... enough...')Let me preemptively ask you a follow-up: WHAT COULD NASA ACTUALLY DO BETTER OR DIFFERENT THAT WOULD HELP PUBLIC SPACE TRAVEL? I can only assume from your article that you would like the agency to start by discontinuing OSP and performing any remaining government human role in space with a shuttle that returns to flight. Your own justification for this scheme, however, is contradictory even within the article itself. In one paragraph your explanation of why OSP is a bad idea says that it will require two, maybe three times as many launches to accomplish the same amount in space--and yet two paragraphs later your 'generous' economic analysis RESTS on the assumption that OSP flight rates will be the same as pre-Columbia shuttle flight rates. Consistency, please! Not to mention the drastically reduced flight opportunities for shuttle due to new daytime photo requirements--all the sudden that shuttle flight rate looks much lower and the OSP flight rate looks a lot higher. It would take too long to go into detail about how shaky the rest of your 'generous' economic analysis of shuttle vs. OSP is, but regardless of the exact numbers, it's based on two ENTIRELY false assumptions-- 1) that shuttle costs are fixed--obviously way wrong. Shuttle operating costs have already been projected to rise drastically in the coming years due to Post-Columbia changes and orbiter airframe aging. 2) that shuttle represents "sunk costs" that are essentially free, while OSP will be starting from scratch. BS! NASA knows this isn't true, based on the billions it spends on overhauling and maintaining the orbiters--that's right, all those people are paid for actually doing something! Development costs for the shuttle cannot be considered to be 'sunk,' since we have spent more than their development cost maintaining them since their construction. Development costs are sunk, but still sinking further, if you want to look at it that way. OSP is not starting from scratch, either. The main booster work has already been done and is waiting on man-rating. And if a capsule design is actually chosen (as growing rumors seem to indicate), development will draw extensively on the mountain of data from Gemini and Apollo capsules. This is not new technology. We know exactly what it takes to build. In fact, the whole idea of using commercial production model economics on what is still an experimental government platform is pretty silly, as is the notion of waiting for the eventual successor to X-prize contestants to return man to orbital space. (Actually, that's not silly, it's sad. That's burning your 1480 Portugese caravel while you wait for the commercial development of an 1860 Yankee Clipper. It might happen eventually--but you'll miss out on 400 years of exploration in the meantime.) Is thinking that everyone else is wrong a sign of schizophrenia--or merely arrogance? I quote: "Much of NASA's "culture" problem is in fact a symptom rather than a cause -- a symptom of too many years of believing that all wisdom about things space resides at the agency, a belief nurtured by an often fawning and ignorant press and a political establishment that values pork over progress." In this view, everyone else is stupid--NASA, a 'fawning and ignorant press,' the political establishment. It's fun to complain, and cheap too. But the real innovator's dilemma is that technical innovation, and exploration, are both hard--talk, on the other hand is cheap. Which is why the only actual concrete solution this article offers is more talk. Perhaps you're unwilling to admit that complaining is a lot less risky than coming up with solutions: "It will require a much broader discussion of national space policy, far beyond NASA's role. Ultimately, only by addressing the true issues that hold us back in space, and expanding and encouraging the role of the private sector to pursue the dreams of individuals, rather than those of a monolithic space bureaucracy" So it's NASA's job to encourage the private sector to pursue the dreams of private individuals? Isn't that a little selfish? That's using public funds to accomplish private ends. Shouldn't our 'monolithic' public agencies accomplish public ends, for the public good? In a free society, we generally leave the "dreams of individuals" up to individuals in the private sector. Why do anything different with regards to space? Tom Merkle |
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