she will comprise conceptual heels, do you flood them

of the OECD that the risks of
key escrow encryption be considered before key escrow infrastructures are
established. The report concludes "The deployment of a global key-recovery-
based encryption infrastructure to meet law enforcement's stated specifications
will result in substantial sacrifices in security and greatly increased costs
to the end-user."


http://www.crypto.com/key_study/report.shtml

The Risks of Key Recovery, Key Escrow,
and Trusted Third-Party Encryption

Hal Abelson[1]
Ross Anderson[2]
Steven M. Bellovin[3]
Josh Benaloh[4]
Matt Blaze[5]
Whitfield Diffie[6]
John Gilmore[7]
Peter G. Neumann[8]
Ronald L. Rivest[9]
Jeffrey I. Schiller[10]
Bruce Schneier[11]

Final Report -- 27 May 1997[12]

Executive Summary

A variety of ``key recovery,'' ``key escrow,'' and ``trusted third-party''
encryption requirements have been suggested in recent years by government
agencies seeking to conduct covert surveillance within the changing environ-
ments brought about by new technologies. This report examines the fundamental
properties of these requirements and attempts to outline the technical risks,
costs, and implications of deploying systems that provide government access to
encryption keys.

The