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New Columbia loss report out today
Stuf4 wrote:
From Craig Fink: When I heard the none, zero, of the occupants had the presents of mind to close their visors, it just sound right. A real time, new, procedure implemented as a last ditch effort to get hydraulic pressure, while working formal procedures to restart two APUs? And, the passengers with nothing to do, other than lock your visor and pray, don't? Impressive presents of mind by some, yet a lack of it by all, just doesn't sound right. You don't climb to that pinnacle of the pyramid without having a keen presence of mind in extremely stressful situations. More so for the pilots, considering the dozens of selection levels they succeeded in through the military and then NASA. I myself tend to think that they all had a solid understanding of how far outside of their egress survivability envelope they were, and that suit pressure would have just passed their survival along to the next fatal wicket. One of many. Ahh, I see, your visor would have been open, a conscious logical decision. Mine would have been closed, ever hopeful that someone with an infinite improbability drive just might happen along... Well, that is if I wasn't Shuttle Surfing at the time... Is that the proper NASA term for standing throughout entry? Interesting x-link discussion, page 2-37 through 2-45, looks like Titanium performed well and it didn't. It caught fire too, along with all the aluminum. (the aluminum fire seems to be absent from the discussion)... http://www.nasa.gov/pdf/298870main_SP-2008-565.pdf .... So, the best choice for an ascent/entry vehicle seems to be graphite, silicon-carbonate or glass. The fiberglass performed really well Page 3-51, Figure 3.2-22. I wonder what material NASA chose for the upcoming Apollo Capsule v2.0? Here is an intersting video... http://www.popsci.com/node/30347 The aluminum is stripping oxygen from the titanium-dioxide to make titanium metal. -- Craig Fink Courtesy E-Mail Welcome @ |
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New Columbia loss report out today
Craig Fink wrote:
Ahh, I see, your visor would have been open, a conscious logical decision. Mine would have been closed, ever hopeful that someone with an infinite improbability drive just might happen along... Would middeck crewmembers have had ANY indication (verbal or otherwise) or anomalies being worked upstairs before decompression began ? Would they have had any sensation that the shuttle was in an unusual attitude with nose way up ? Any unusual sensation of G force (especially if this was their first flight) ? If not, then they would have had no reason to drop their visor. (Middeck crew would have only seen a orange glow in the side hatch, no horizon to give them any hint of attitude. Another aspect not dealt with the report is that of "macho" behaviour. This is pure specualtion on my part, but is it possible that a crew member lowering his visor would be seen as being "chicken" and exhibiting fear and that there would be some resistance of crew members to lower their visors at the first sign of what they may see as trouble but what might be perfectly normal ? (especially for first time fliers) The report has also repeated many times that lowered visor are not "OK" for the shuttle because it causes the release of too much O2 for cabin. Looks to me like there are dis-incentives to lower the visor. If one crew member was still busy getting into his seat at the time power went out, it is likely that the crew member next to him might have had his hands busy trying to help him, holding straps etc. And without sufficient light, they may not have had sufficient visual cues on decompression. (I assume there would have been instant fog in the cabin as humidity would have condensed ?) Obviously, there would have been immense noise of air flowing out. Is it fair to assume that this would have been heard upstairs as well ? Would the CDR/PLT have had visual indication of bad attitude (nose way up) looking out the windows ? Or does the plasma glow pretty much obliterate any view of the horizon ? |
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New Columbia loss report out today
On Jan 2, 6:45�pm, John Doe wrote:
Craig Fink wrote: Ahh, I see, your visor would have been open, a conscious logical decision. Mine would have been closed, ever hopeful that someone with an infinite improbability drive just might happen along... Would middeck crewmembers have had ANY indication (verbal or otherwise) or anomalies being worked upstairs before decompression began ? Would they have had any sensation that the shuttle was in an unusual attitude with nose way up ? Any unusual sensation of G force (especially if this was their first flight) ? If not, then they would have had no reason to drop their visor. (Middeck crew would have only seen a orange glow in the side hatch, no horizon to give them any hint of attitude. Another aspect not dealt with the report is that of "macho" behaviour. This is pure specualtion on my part, but is it possible that a crew member lowering his visor would be seen as being "chicken" and exhibiting fear and that there would be some resistance of crew members to lower their visors at the first sign of what they may see as trouble but what might be perfectly normal ? (especially for first time fliers) The report has also repeated many times that lowered visor are not "OK" for the shuttle because it causes the release of too much O2 for cabin. Looks to me like there are dis-incentives to lower the visor. If one crew member was still busy getting into his seat at the time power went out, it is likely that the crew member next to him might have had his hands busy trying to help him, holding straps etc. And without sufficient light, they may not have had sufficient visual cues on decompression. (I assume there would have been instant fog in the cabin as humidity would have condensed ?) Obviously, there would have been immense noise of air flowing out. Is it fair to assume that this would have been heard upstairs as well ? Would the CDR/PLT have had visual indication of bad attitude (nose way up) looking out the windows ? Or does the plasma glow pretty much obliterate any view of the horizon ? As soyuz proved a fast depressurization can occur at any time. Future astronauts should be fully suited visors down, totally sealed with emergency oxygen connected. Columbia was terrible but imagine a normal flight that quickly depressurized and killed the crew because a line blew or seal failed. the shuttle would likely still land on auto pilot, but with no one to push gear down a belly landing with hydrazine and other volatiles would likely have produced a belly landing and fireball. NASA still has a failed safety structure, gloves off, visors up should of never been permitted |
#4
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New Columbia loss report out today
John Doe wrote:
Craig Fink wrote: Ahh, I see, your visor would have been open, a conscious logical decision. Mine would have been closed, ever hopeful that someone with an infinite improbability drive just might happen along... Would middeck crewmembers have had ANY indication (verbal or otherwise) or anomalies being worked upstairs before decompression began ? Would they have had any sensation that the shuttle was in an unusual attitude with nose way up ? Any unusual sensation of G force (especially if this was their first flight) ? If not, then they would have had no reason to drop their visor. (Middeck crew would have only seen a orange glow in the side hatch, no horizon to give them any hint of attitude. Another aspect not dealt with the report is that of "macho" behaviour. This is pure specualtion on my part, but is it possible that a crew member lowering his visor would be seen as being "chicken" and exhibiting fear and that there would be some resistance of crew members to lower their visors at the first sign of what they may see as trouble but what might be perfectly normal ? (especially for first time fliers) The report has also repeated many times that lowered visor are not "OK" for the shuttle because it causes the release of too much O2 for cabin. Looks to me like there are dis-incentives to lower the visor. If one crew member was still busy getting into his seat at the time power went out, it is likely that the crew member next to him might have had his hands busy trying to help him, holding straps etc. And without sufficient light, they may not have had sufficient visual cues on decompression. (I assume there would have been instant fog in the cabin as humidity would have condensed ?) Obviously, there would have been immense noise of air flowing out. Is it fair to assume that this would have been heard upstairs as well ? Would the CDR/PLT have had visual indication of bad attitude (nose way up) looking out the windows ? Or does the plasma glow pretty much obliterate any view of the horizon ? I'm sure the passengers on the middeck would have had plenty of information about their situation, starting with the loss of tire pressured discussion. The Commander and Pilot most likely would have noticed the diverging control surface trim as the aerodynamics slowly changed, possibly some discussion about it. Watching the trims would have been like watching a countdown clock to loss of control. When the trim hits it's limit of movement, 1, 2, and 3 degrees, their out of control. Towards the end, yaw jets comming on, the last ditch effort of the flight control system. Prior to loss of control, the Commander may have asked someone to take a look behind to see if they could see anything in the plasma trail. A logical and reasonable request. A view out the upper windows, back towards the tail might (probably would) have revealed differences in the plasma between the left and right side. Burning aluminum and disturbed flow, possibly even super bright white flashes as globs of liquid aluminum get instantly dispersed and burn in the slipstream. The bright flashes might have even been visible to those in their seat, like a giant flash bulb going off behind them, flashing through the upper windows and on to the floor. There was quite a bit of time between the first indications of something amiss and loss of control. After loss of control, during the initial pitch up and yaw, he may have been able to get back in his seat and buckle his lap belt. But, apparently not enough time to get his shoulder straps or helmet on before the gyrations built up. Shuttle Surfing during a normal entry, walking around the cabin would be like walking around an airline's cabin, except the gee force would be very small initially, then slowly build. The equivalent of walking on an asteroid for a little while, then the Moon for a bit, then Mars, Earth, and a mega-Earth. And all this fun would start at entry interface as the vehicle began to decelerate. The time in each regime would be fairly long. A planetary simulator. Kind of surprising we don't hear about more astronauts taking this opportunity to experience walking around on other planets, especially the ones on the middeck who normally have nothing to do, and lots of space to do it in. An interesting environment. Just a bunch of speculation. -- Craig Fink Courtesy E-Mail Welcome @ |
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New Columbia loss report out today
Craig Fink wrote:
I'm sure the passengers on the middeck would have had plenty of information about their situation, starting with the loss of tire pressured discussion. From what I read, it wasn't until loss of APU that thy started to realise something wrong other than faulty sensors was happening. The Commander and Pilot most likely would have noticed the diverging control surface trim as the aerodynamics slowly changed, The report mentions the opposite. Same with the RCS firing continually. There is small light on a button, but apparently, this is not something they focus on. And they would have been focusing on alarms, initially the tire pressure one which was seen as a glitch, then something to worry about because it was more than one faulty sensor, and then the APU failure. In terms of CRM, I a not sure how the PLT/CDR split the tasks under such circumstances. But the report did reveal that they did try to fix the APU problem at a time after loss of communication. Prior to loss of control, the Commander may have asked someone to take a look behind to see if they could see anything in the plasma trail. Is that something they are trained to do ? I would think that what was more likely was that *IF* any of the aft deck crewmembers had had previous experiece and *IF* they noticed unusual plasma over the top windows, that they would then volunteer that information to CDR/PLT. But doubt that the CDR/PLT would distract themseves by asking such a question. between the left and right side. Burning aluminum and disturbed flow, possibly even super bright white flashes as globs of liquid aluminum get instantly dispersed and burn in the slipstream. It is not clear that the "burning aluminium" would have been begun before they lost consciousness. Looks to me that the tiles would have continued to protect the crew module until first breach. This report seems to have pinpointed the location of the first pressure vessel breach, under the E locker below middeck. Until this point, the report mentioned many times that the crew cabin was still very normal and intact. floor. There was quite a bit of time between the first indications of something amiss and loss of control. Not that much time. Initially, they were focused on a glitch (loss of sensors on landing gear). This was something way in the back of the shuttle, not the crew cabin. Losing a tire would have made a bad landing, but woudln't have caused crew cabin depressurisation. By the time they lost radio contact, it really wasn't long until power was lost. And remember that initially, loss of radio was not abnormal since it happens during normal re-entry. Shuttle Surfing during a normal entry, walking around the cabin would be like walking around an airline's cabin, except the gee force would be very small initially, then slowly build. I am not sure NASA would take too kindly if astronauts started to have such a non-chalant attitude during re-entry. And remember that while during this phase, the G forces may be mild, the question is whether the crew member will have time to get properly strapped in before serious G forces are felt. planets, especially the ones on the middeck who normally have nothing to do, and lots of space to do it in. An interesting environment. Middeck of Colubia didn't have lots of space. Remember that Columbia still had the internal airlock. And once you put the seats up, I am not sure there is much floor space left. |
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New Columbia loss report out today
mJohn Doe wrote:
Craig Fink wrote: I'm sure the passengers on the middeck would have had plenty of information about their situation, starting with the loss of tire pressured discussion. From what I read, it wasn't until loss of APU that thy started to realise something wrong other than faulty sensors was happening. The Commander and Pilot most likely would have noticed the diverging control surface trim as the aerodynamics slowly changed, The report mentions the opposite. Same with the RCS firing continually. There is small light on a button, but apparently, this is not something they focus on. And they would have been focusing on alarms, initially the tire pressure one which was seen as a glitch, then something to worry about because it was more than one faulty sensor, and then the APU failure. In terms of CRM, I a not sure how the PLT/CDR split the tasks under such circumstances. But the report did reveal that they did try to fix the APU problem at a time after loss of communication. Prior to loss of control, the Commander may have asked someone to take a look behind to see if they could see anything in the plasma trail. Is that something they are trained to do ? I would think that what was more likely was that *IF* any of the aft deck crewmembers had had previous experiece and *IF* they noticed unusual plasma over the top windows, that they would then volunteer that information to CDR/PLT. But doubt that the CDR/PLT would distract themseves by asking such a question. between the left and right side. Burning aluminum and disturbed flow, possibly even super bright white flashes as globs of liquid aluminum get instantly dispersed and burn in the slipstream. It is not clear that the "burning aluminium" would have been begun before they lost consciousness. Looks to me that the tiles would have continued to protect the crew module until first breach. This report seems to have pinpointed the location of the first pressure vessel breach, under the E locker below middeck. Until this point, the report mentioned many times that the crew cabin was still very normal and intact. floor. There was quite a bit of time between the first indications of something amiss and loss of control. Not that much time. Initially, they were focused on a glitch (loss of sensors on landing gear). This was something way in the back of the shuttle, not the crew cabin. Losing a tire would have made a bad landing, but woudln't have caused crew cabin depressurisation. By the time they lost radio contact, it really wasn't long until power was lost. And remember that initially, loss of radio was not abnormal since it happens during normal re-entry. Shuttle Surfing during a normal entry, walking around the cabin would be like walking around an airline's cabin, except the gee force would be very small initially, then slowly build. I am not sure NASA would take too kindly if astronauts started to have such a non-chalant attitude during re-entry. And remember that while during this phase, the G forces may be mild, the question is whether the crew member will have time to get properly strapped in before serious G forces are felt. planets, especially the ones on the middeck who normally have nothing to do, and lots of space to do it in. An interesting environment. Middeck of Colubia didn't have lots of space. Remember that Columbia still had the internal airlock. And once you put the seats up, I am not sure there is much floor space left. Much of what I wrote was just pure conjecture. What they knew or didn't, will never be known. If you don't like it, don't believe it, that's fine, because it's conjecture. No one knows if they saw, or heard the yaw jets firing. But, it's something they could have heard or seen before loss of control. No one knows if they noticed the control surfaces (trim) slowly diverging towards there limit. But again, it's something that was there. I somewhat doubt the crew took the tire pressure loss as a sensor error, because they *did* know about the wing impact on ascent. But again, nobody will ever know what they thought of the loss of pressure. Loss of communications occurred quite a bit before loss of control when the APUs went down. I don't think they can see out the top windows when seated???? Maybe they can, or at least turn the camera around... http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hK1RxQKCmCE ....or use a mirror...notice the debris flying off the crew cabin past the window. Prior to loss of control, the burning aluminum would have been coming from the wing. One camera on the ground was saturated by a bright flash. Such a bright flash might have been a much brighter closer up. Although one or two bright flashes among all the APU flashes might not have been noticed. Prior to loss of control any debris falling off the wing would have create it's own plasma trail visible in the Orbiters plasma trail. Visible out the top windows looking back. As to if anyone *actually* saw any of them, no one will ever know. One astronaut may have been out of his seat, highly unusual as I've only heard of one astronaut Shuttle Surfing. And then again maybe he wasn't, no one will ever know. You know, quite a bit of this report is just conjecture or educated guesses, including some of the simulations, analysis and conclusions. Much of it is reporting of the known fact, but it also continues past the facts into the realm of conjecture. Take it with a grain of salt. What I wrote about was what I thought was available prior to loss of control that might have been observed. I'm sure there may have been other thing that prior to loss of control that might have gotten their attention. But, no one will ever know what they knew. Feel free to write your own fiction posting, if you don't like mine. -- Craig Fink Courtesy E-Mail Welcome @ |
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New Columbia loss report out today
Craig Fink wrote: Much of what I wrote was just pure conjecture. What they knew or didn't, will never be known. The crew on the flight deck would certainly known that something was seriously wrong as prior to break-up the Orbiter had gone into a flat spin belly-first into its line of trajectory, so the view out of the cockpit windows would have shown the sky and the ground alternately as the vehicle spun through a nose-up/nose down attitude. Also, the RCS system isn't quiet when it's in operation (one astronaut described it as sounding like howitzers going off, and that it would wake up anyone who was sleeping when it fired) so the fact that it was continuously firing would have very noticeable, even over the sound of the air passing over the Orbiter, or at least had a different type of sound associated with it. I don't think they can see out the top windows when seated???? No, they can look through the top windows from the rear seats on the flight deck. A lot of years back one of the crew in the rear seat during reentry took video of the plasma above the Orbiter, the results of which came as a surprise to NASA as it showed that the plasma converged above the Orbiter rather than just forming a hole in the atmosphere behind it. In fact, one of the Columbia crew took the same type of video on the doomed last flight that was recovered; here's a still from it: http://tinyurl.com/8lsxad Even in the enlarged version you can't see any debris being shed. Pat |
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New Columbia loss report out today
John Doe wrote:
I would think that what was more likely was that IF any of the aft deck crewmembers had had previous experiece and IF they noticed unusual plasma over the top windows, that they would then volunteer that information to CDR/PLT. But *doubt that the CDR/PLT would distract themseves by asking such a question. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hK1RxQKCmCE Yeah, after thinking about the entry video a bit, I like your fictional senario better. That's a seems to be a common thing to do, watch the trailing plasma. -- Craig Fink Courtesy E-Mail Welcome @ |
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New Columbia loss report out today
Pat Flannery wrote:
The crew on the flight deck would certainly known that something was seriously wrong as prior to break-up the Orbiter had gone into a flat spin belly-first into its line of trajectory, Even on the middeck it would have been very dramatic. I can imagine prior to having entry suits, an astronaut could have gotten up and used the toilet during entry, just like passengers on an airliner. During the initial pitch up, they would have felt it in the seat of their pants. And, the Y force is alway very small during nominal entry. Getting jerked sideways at a gee or two.... No, they can look through the top windows from the rear seats on the flight deck. I was think their helmet might block their view and they used mirrors or the video camera to look back. In the video I linked too, one astronaut mentions to the other to grab a mirror. Getting out of the seat to get a better view... There was quite a bit of debris that left prior to loss of control, which would have been pretty impressive in the plasma trail. -- Craig Fink Courtesy E-Mail Welcome @ |
#10
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New Columbia loss report out today
About the crews's knowledge of the problem. During the flight, Houston
had told the crew that the media had been told of a piece of foam falling off and not to be susprised if media asked about it, but that this was not a concern for the orbiter. Timeline: (GMT) [delta time] 13:44:09 Start of Entry Interface EI (400,000 feet alt, mach 24) 13:48:45 Video shows all 4 on flight deck seated/strapped in. 13:51:46 Negative trend begins 13:52:05 Yaw moment change due to increase drag. 13:52:17 Left brake line temp off nominal increase begins 13:53:10 4 Hydraulic temp sensors progressively offscale 13:53:36 4 Hydraulic temp sensors offscale. MCC realises problem. 13:53:38 Trend exceeds flight experience, but within the norm 13:53:45 Estimate of first debris shedding (ground video) 13:54:30 Some crew testing suit pressurisation. 13:58:19 Sharp divergence from previous flight experience 13:58:39 First fault message to crew. (Tire deflation) 13:58:48 Crew attemts to speak to Houston. Call broken. 13:59:06 Telemetry shows left main landing ger down. 13:59:32 Crew acknowledges call from MCC with "Roger, uh..." 13:59:32 Loss of Signal LOS 13:59:33 master alarm: FCS channel 4 bypassed 13:59:36 3rd RCD jet fires continuously. aileron trim 3° 13:59:36 Estimated time of loss of hydraulics. 13:59:37 3rd RCS jet fires continuously. 13:59:37 Ground video shows brightening event 13:59:37 Loss of Control LOC 13:59:46 Max pitch up 13:59:46 ROLL REF alarm. 14:00:01 RHC (hand controller/yoke) moved. 14:00:03 Autopilot re-engaged after the RHC move. 14:00:04 Cabin pressure still normal 14:00:18 Orbiter Breakup (Castrophic Event CE) 14:00:18 Loss of electrical power. 14:00:18 Probable start of depressurization. 14:00:25 Ground video: fore and aft bodies disctinct. 14:00:35 Latest start of depressurisation. [00:35] 14:00:53 Crew Module Castrophic Event CMCE 14:00:59 Latest time for total depressurisation. [00:17] 14:01:10 Crew module Total Dispersal TD [33:50] 14:35:00 Ground impact (approx time) CE: orbiter breaking apart in big chunks CMCE: Crew module breakup Between LOC and CE, cabin pressure was known to be normal and crew capable of conscious actions. From EI until LOS, normal G forces of up to 0.8 were experienced, crews typically experience heaviness, dizziness and soetimes stomach awareness or mild nausea. At 13:48:45, the flight deck video indicates that the crew was not aware of any problems. At 13:52:05: Neither the yaw moment change nor the aileron trim change was obvious to either the MCC or the crew as an off-nominal condition, although post-accident analysis concluded that this was the first indication of the orbiter’s response to the changing aerodynamic properties brought about by the left wing damage. For the hydraulic temperature sensors (from 13:53:10 to 13:53:36): These temperature data were not available to the crew and the crew was not notified of these indications. The loss of sensors generated concern in the MCC, and investigation by the flight control team began immediately. At 13:58:39, crew got 4 alarms about tire deflation for main left landing gear. Failure would be familiar and dealt with breaker reset. At 13:59:06, the "main landing gear down" was detected as error with a barberpole indicator. (doors still closed, but gear down indicated). Based on training experience, the crew was probably attempting to diagnose the situation given that it involved the same landing gear as the tire pressure messages and indicated a potential landing gear deployment problem. To all on-board appearances, Columbia only had a potential issue with landing gear deployment; a non-trivial event, but the crew had time to troubleshoot the problem. Changing drag on the left wing was just beginning to develop into a potentially recognizable problem. For the 13:59:33 event, report states crew are trained to handle the message about FCS-4 being taken out of the loop. But they may have started to associate this with other problems. It is unknown whether the increasing aileron trim and thruster firings were noticed by the flight deck crew members. At GMT 13:59:36 (EI+927), the third RCS yaw jet, R4R, began firing continuously and aileron trim exceeded 3 degrees. There is no alarm associated with a deviating trim condition, and the crew is not expected to monitor the trim during this period of entry. At GMT 13:59:37 (EI+928), the fourth and last RCS yaw jet, R1R, began firing continuously. the 13:59:46 ROLL REF alarm indicates above normal orbiter drag. ## For the crew, the first strong indications of the LOC would be lighting and horizon changes seen through the windows and changes on the vehicle attitude displays. Additionally, the forces experienced by the crew changed significantly and began to differ from the nominal, expected accelerations. The accelerations were translational (due to aerodynamic drag) and angular (due to rotation of the orbiter). The translational acceleration due to drag was dominant, and the direction was changing as the orbiter attitude changed relative to the velocity vector (along the direction of flight). ## These motions might induce nausea, dizziness, and disorientation in crew members, but they were not incapacitating. The total acceleration experienced by the crew increased from approximately 0.8 G at LOC to slightly more than 3 G by the CE ## At LOC, one middeck crewmember was not yet fully strapped in. He would have just completed post de-orbit tasks. Shuttle dynamics would have likely forced other crewmembers to brace. The middeck crewmember did ot fully strap in, and did not don his/her helmet. Switches recovered from ground show the PLT was trying to fix the APU problem. The latest time for total depressurisation at 14:00:59 is not really realistic since they state the crew module catastrophic event is at 14:00:53. The text does mention that total depressurisation likely happened much earlier. ## The change (from the crew's vantage point) from a nominal entry profile to the LOC and subsequent separation of the forebody from the orbiter all occurred in approximately 40 seconds. Experience shows that this is not sufficient time to don gloves and helmets. ## |
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