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#11
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Space Program Needs The Right Stuff
In article ,
Rand Simberg wrote: No mas. Que? -- Greg Rose 232B EC8F 44C6 C853 D68F E107 E6BF CD2F 1081 A37C Qualcomm Australia: http://www.qualcomm.com.au |
#12
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Space Program Needs The Right Stuff
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#13
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Space Program Needs The Right Stuff
Jim Kingdon wrote:
Now, I don't happen to know just where the X-1 and X-15 score on those metrics. Just to pick one I could quickly find: 199 missions over 10 years ( http://www.hq.nasa.gov/office/pao/Hi...15/chrono.html ) isn't much by aircraft standards, but it is still more than just about any launcher (with the possible exception of a few Russian models). No, sorry. Various Atlas models flew 342 times during the same period that the X-15 was flying. Various Thor/Delta models flew 318 times. Jim Davis |
#15
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Space Program Needs The Right Stuff
(Tom Merkle) wrote:
(Derek Lyons) wrote in message ... h (Rand Simberg) wrote: Fox: "In avoiding risk, we almost ensure failure." In some ways, that's the most important message. And of course, the Langley vs Wright theme (analogy with government versus private theme) prevailed throughout. Hyman Rickover may debate you on that. The conspicuous *lack* of failure in Naval Reactors compared with the well documented failures[1] of commercial reactors provides an interesting counterpart to your themes. frickin' nukes. Always worshipping at the altar of Hyman G. First off, I wasn't a nuke, I was a coner. Specifically I was a strategic weaponeer. (And believe me, there's even less love lost between weaponeers and nukes than between the sonar girls and the evap operator. If you ever draw SSBN duty, you'll be in for a surprise. Or probably not in today's kinder/gentler Navy.) Also, I was enlisted, not O-ganger, and things look different down on the deckplates. The point wasn't really a government vs. private thing, it's a focused, incremental effort thing vs. a 'perfect end product on the first try' thing. Both government and private programs are easily capable of selling out this way. However, Naval Reactors was *both*. Focused incremental development of components, then a leap to full scale testing with the MKI/STR/S1W, then a leap to a 'perfect on the first try' MKII/S2W. (Was the MKI the SIR or the STR? I could fetch the book, but it does not really matter.) There was nothing incremental about Rickover's program, it more resembled the Saturn V [1] than the Wright Flyer. [1] Test and verify components, build and operate a full scale prototype, commit humans to ride the third SV, the second nuclear power plant. D. -- The STS-107 Columbia Loss FAQ can be found at the following URLs: Text-Only Version: http://www.io.com/~o_m/columbia_loss_faq.html Enhanced HTML Version: http://www.io.com/~o_m/columbia_loss_faq_x.html Corrections, comments, and additions should be e-mailed to , as well as posted to sci.space.history and sci.space.shuttle for discussion. |
#16
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Space Program Needs The Right Stuff
h (Rand Simberg) wrote:
On Thu, 18 Dec 2003 10:24:21 -0800 (PST), in a place far, far away, (Derek Lyons) made the phosphor on my monitor glow in such a way as to indicate that: (Rand Simberg) wrote: Fox: "In avoiding risk, we almost ensure failure." In some ways, that's the most important message. And of course, the Langley vs Wright theme (analogy with government versus private theme) prevailed throughout. Hyman Rickover may debate you on that. The conspicuous *lack* of failure in Naval Reactors compared with the well documented failures[1] of commercial reactors provides an interesting counterpart to your themes. Mostly because they were so heavily regulated, they weren't really commercial, and no innovation was allowed. That was the cost of the Price-Anderson act. Mostly because the Price-Anderson act lead to the political failure of the industry, and has absolutely zero bearing on the operator and designer failures I noted. D. -- The STS-107 Columbia Loss FAQ can be found at the following URLs: Text-Only Version: http://www.io.com/~o_m/columbia_loss_faq.html Enhanced HTML Version: http://www.io.com/~o_m/columbia_loss_faq_x.html Corrections, comments, and additions should be e-mailed to , as well as posted to sci.space.history and sci.space.shuttle for discussion. |
#17
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Space Program Needs The Right Stuff
Jim Kingdon wrote:
For instance; SS1's current demonstrated performance barely matches the X-1 (nearly fifty years ago), and in it's final form will barely match the X-15 (over forty years ago). Simple bald facts, but embarrassing to the 'four legs/two legs' mindset. Ah, but much of this debate is about changing the figures of merit away from performance and towards measures such as cost per flight, reliability (only demonstrable with large numbers of flights), turnaround time between flights, size of ground crew, etc. These are important metrics, I agree. But let's not allow that to change focus from the basic facts; without performance those other metrics are meaningless as there won't be a company flying them. D. -- The STS-107 Columbia Loss FAQ can be found at the following URLs: Text-Only Version: http://www.io.com/~o_m/columbia_loss_faq.html Enhanced HTML Version: http://www.io.com/~o_m/columbia_loss_faq_x.html Corrections, comments, and additions should be e-mailed to , as well as posted to sci.space.history and sci.space.shuttle for discussion. |
#18
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Space Program Needs The Right Stuff
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#19
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Space Program Needs The Right Stuff
"Derek Lyons" wrote in message
... Jim Kingdon wrote: [1]For instance; SS1's current demonstrated performance barely matches the X-1 (nearly fifty years ago), and in it's final form will barely match the X-15 (over forty years ago). Simple bald facts, but embarrassing to the 'four legs/two legs' mindset. You're ignoring the crucial fact that NASA walked away from this technology and refused to even reconsider it because it would make subsequent decisions look bad. This sort of situation doesn't exist in a competitive market - any company that refuses to face reality about failing projects will eventually go out of business. Can you imagine any comercial entity flying an aircraft that failed to meet it's design criteria as miserably as the shuttle has? It's not all that strange that it took a bunch of bootstrap organizations 40 years to catch up to the state-of-the-art, with NASA effectively blocking all commercial incentive to do so and thereby driving away any potential investors. |
#20
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Space Program Needs The Right Stuff
h (Rand Simberg) wrote:
On Fri, 19 Dec 2003 17:40:50 -0800 (PST), in a place far, far away, (Derek Lyons) made the phosphor on my monitor glow in such a way as to indicate that: Mostly because they were so heavily regulated, they weren't really commercial, and no innovation was allowed. That was the cost of the Price-Anderson act. Mostly because the Price-Anderson act lead to the political failure of the industry, and has absolutely zero bearing on the operator and designer failures I noted. It was the direct cause. Once the industry gave up its autonomy in exchange for freedom from liability, there was no room for innovative techiques. Right. And innovation would have prevented Fermi 2 how? (Since that Fermi 2 was a fabrication error.) How would innovation have prevented Browns Ferry? (Since Browns Ferry was a management and common sense failure.) How would innovation have prevented TMI? (Since TMI was a managment and operational error.) If Price-Anderson prevented innovation, why is virtually every reactor in the country built to different designs? Why is there a constant increase in the size of the plants? These are serious questions BTW. We've seen the same thing in the aircraft industry, in which the FAA tells everyone how to design and operate aircraft. Even before the FAA, we saw airplanes lost to operator, maintenance, design, and construction problems. After the FAA, we see airplanes lost to the same cause. The FAA has changed what exactly? D. -- The STS-107 Columbia Loss FAQ can be found at the following URLs: Text-Only Version: http://www.io.com/~o_m/columbia_loss_faq.html Enhanced HTML Version: http://www.io.com/~o_m/columbia_loss_faq_x.html Corrections, comments, and additions should be e-mailed to , as well as posted to sci.space.history and sci.space.shuttle for discussion. |
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