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Space Program Needs The Right Stuff
That's Fox News' title for my column. I just called it "Daring."
The third in a trilogy, and I think that I'm overwraught, or at least overWrighted... http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,106062,00.html No mas. |
#2
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Space Program Needs The Right Stuff
The third in a trilogy, and I think that I'm overwraught, or at least
overWrighted... http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,106062,00.html It does seem like a bit much to read them all 3 in a row. Like, "haven't I seen this part before"? The Fox News one may be the best of the bunch, going into the bits about incremental testing and such. Although the Tech Central Station musings about whether the Wrights or Langley were more scientific is also good. |
#3
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Space Program Needs The Right Stuff
On Wed, 17 Dec 2003 21:31:55 -0800 (PST), in a place far, far away,
Jim Kingdon made the phosphor on my monitor glow in such a way as to indicate that: The third in a trilogy, and I think that I'm overwraught, or at least overWrighted... http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,106062,00.html It does seem like a bit much to read them all 3 in a row. Like, "haven't I seen this part before"? If you think reading them was tough, think about writing them all (about thirty-five hundred words total) inside forty-eight hours... It was a challenge to come up with three essays on the same topic right on top of each other without being somewhat redundant, and obviously it was somewhat insurmountable. But I did try to have a different theme for each one. National Review: "The Wright's achievement wasn't flying an airplane, but landing one." TCS: "The difference between science and engineering, and why rocket scientists generally aren't, but the Wrights were airplane scientists." Fox: "In avoiding risk, we almost ensure failure." In some ways, that's the most important message. And of course, the Langley vs Wright theme (analogy with government versus private theme) prevailed throughout. Just a little excursion into what passes for the writer's mind... The Fox News one may be the best of the bunch, going into the bits about incremental testing and such. Although the Tech Central Station musings about whether the Wrights or Langley were more scientific is also good. The Fox one was the last. The other two were written to be published this morning, when I wasn't sure what the president was going to say. My Fox deadline was a little later, and I'd had time to digest everything else I'd been thinking about before writing it. Also, I managed to slip in at the last minute the news about SpaceShipOne, even though there was nothing notable about Bush's speech (though I enjoyed his little dig at the NYT about "a million years." It doesn't quite top their Goddard gaffe, which was basic physics, but the timing of it was delectable). |
#4
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Space Program Needs The Right Stuff
On or about Wed, 17 Dec 2003 21:42:24 -0800 (PST), Rand Simberg
made the sensational claim that: If you think reading them was tough, think about writing them all (about thirty-five hundred words total) inside forty-eight hours... That's how I've written every paper in my life. -- This is a siggy | To E-mail, do note | This space is for rent It's properly formatted | who you mean to reply-to | Inquire within if you No person, none, care | and it will reach me | Would like your ad here |
#6
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Space Program Needs The Right Stuff
(Derek Lyons) wrote in message ...
h (Rand Simberg) wrote: Fox: "In avoiding risk, we almost ensure failure." In some ways, that's the most important message. And of course, the Langley vs Wright theme (analogy with government versus private theme) prevailed throughout. Hyman Rickover may debate you on that. The conspicuous *lack* of failure in Naval Reactors compared with the well documented failures[1] of commercial reactors provides an interesting counterpart to your themes. frickin' nukes. Always worshipping at the altar of Hyman G. The point wasn't really a government vs. private thing, it's a focused, incremental effort thing vs. a 'perfect end product on the first try' thing. Both government and private programs are easily capable of selling out this way. Actually Rickover probably would have gotten on exceptionally well with the Wrights, as they approached difficult engineering problems following the same basic steps: 1. identify a moderately ambitious goal. For rickover it was a safe, working reactor. For the Wrights it was a working airplane. 2. postulate a design to meet that goal. The Wrights sketched out a rectangular glider with propellers. Rickover sketched out a working reactor design. 3. analyze smaller, less risky versions of that design to find flaws. The Wrights built & tested different airfoils, as well as smaller, unpowered humn gliders. Rickover's program analyzed non nuclear versions of their design to thermal, hydraulic, and material properties. They invented new methods of testing metal samples to determine vessel strength. 4. Figure out the underlying scientific cause of these flaws. If insufficient scientific knowledge exists, create small scale experiments to provide the necessary data. Numerous examples from the Wrights, including insufficient propeller force (the wrights designed a more efficient propeller), too much engine weight (The wrights developed a engine 4 times lighter per horsepower than any previous), unstable turns (wrights developed coordinated rudder/bank turn). Rickover's program did countless experiements on metal samples and non-nuclear heat exchangers to maximize their design effectiveness. 5. exercise excessive micromanagerial control over the end product to ensure that compromises made do not compromise the overall design. Rickover's micromanaging was legendary, but he kept the design as simple as he wanted, which turned out best. The Wrights were obsessive with details and secretive to the point that they were unable to turn their revolution into a successful company. 6. build and test. Tom Merkle |
#7
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Space Program Needs The Right Stuff
(Tom Merkle) wrote:
(Derek Lyons) wrote in message ... h (Rand Simberg) wrote: Fox: "In avoiding risk, we almost ensure failure." In some ways, that's the most important message. And of course, the Langley vs Wright theme (analogy with government versus private theme) prevailed throughout. Hyman Rickover may debate you on that. The conspicuous *lack* of failure in Naval Reactors compared with the well documented failures[1] of commercial reactors provides an interesting counterpart to your themes. frickin' nukes. Always worshipping at the altar of Hyman G. First off, I wasn't a nuke, I was a coner. Specifically I was a strategic weaponeer. (And believe me, there's even less love lost between weaponeers and nukes than between the sonar girls and the evap operator. If you ever draw SSBN duty, you'll be in for a surprise. Or probably not in today's kinder/gentler Navy.) Also, I was enlisted, not O-ganger, and things look different down on the deckplates. The point wasn't really a government vs. private thing, it's a focused, incremental effort thing vs. a 'perfect end product on the first try' thing. Both government and private programs are easily capable of selling out this way. However, Naval Reactors was *both*. Focused incremental development of components, then a leap to full scale testing with the MKI/STR/S1W, then a leap to a 'perfect on the first try' MKII/S2W. (Was the MKI the SIR or the STR? I could fetch the book, but it does not really matter.) There was nothing incremental about Rickover's program, it more resembled the Saturn V [1] than the Wright Flyer. [1] Test and verify components, build and operate a full scale prototype, commit humans to ride the third SV, the second nuclear power plant. D. -- The STS-107 Columbia Loss FAQ can be found at the following URLs: Text-Only Version: http://www.io.com/~o_m/columbia_loss_faq.html Enhanced HTML Version: http://www.io.com/~o_m/columbia_loss_faq_x.html Corrections, comments, and additions should be e-mailed to , as well as posted to sci.space.history and sci.space.shuttle for discussion. |
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Space Program Needs The Right Stuff
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#9
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Space Program Needs The Right Stuff
h (Rand Simberg) wrote in message . ..
On Thu, 18 Dec 2003 10:24:21 -0800 (PST), in a place far, far away, (Derek Lyons) made the phosphor on my monitor glow in such a way as to indicate that: (Rand Simberg) wrote: Fox: "In avoiding risk, we almost ensure failure." In some ways, that's the most important message. And of course, the Langley vs Wright theme (analogy with government versus private theme) prevailed throughout. Hyman Rickover may debate you on that. The conspicuous *lack* of failure in Naval Reactors compared with the well documented failures[1] of commercial reactors provides an interesting counterpart to your themes. Mostly because they were so heavily regulated, they weren't really commercial, and no innovation was allowed. That was the cost of the Price-Anderson act. Yeah, that and the basic fact that failed nuclear innovation==huge mess and innocent bystanders contaminated... &;o ahhh Tom Merkle |
#10
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Space Program Needs The Right Stuff
h (Rand Simberg) wrote:
On Thu, 18 Dec 2003 10:24:21 -0800 (PST), in a place far, far away, (Derek Lyons) made the phosphor on my monitor glow in such a way as to indicate that: (Rand Simberg) wrote: Fox: "In avoiding risk, we almost ensure failure." In some ways, that's the most important message. And of course, the Langley vs Wright theme (analogy with government versus private theme) prevailed throughout. Hyman Rickover may debate you on that. The conspicuous *lack* of failure in Naval Reactors compared with the well documented failures[1] of commercial reactors provides an interesting counterpart to your themes. Mostly because they were so heavily regulated, they weren't really commercial, and no innovation was allowed. That was the cost of the Price-Anderson act. Mostly because the Price-Anderson act lead to the political failure of the industry, and has absolutely zero bearing on the operator and designer failures I noted. D. -- The STS-107 Columbia Loss FAQ can be found at the following URLs: Text-Only Version: http://www.io.com/~o_m/columbia_loss_faq.html Enhanced HTML Version: http://www.io.com/~o_m/columbia_loss_faq_x.html Corrections, comments, and additions should be e-mailed to , as well as posted to sci.space.history and sci.space.shuttle for discussion. |
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