NYT on shuttle risk

The New York Times
July 26, 2005
NASA Puts Shuttle Mission's Risk at 1 in 100
By WILLIAM J. BROAD

With a new realism born of disaster, NASA says that the risk of
catastrophic failure during the space shuttle Discovery's mission is
about 1 in 100 - more than twice as great as an upbeat estimate issued
before the loss of the Columbia in 2003.

While the space agency is still working on an official estimate, a
spokesman, Allard Beutel, said, it has devised a rough one that will be
refined by insights from the investigation of the Columbia disaster, in
which seven astronauts died as the ship broke up during its re-entry
into Earth's atmosphere.

The rise in estimated danger, Mr. Beutel said, came about "because we
have a better understanding" of the craft's workings and limitations.
He emphasized, though, that "it's a statistical probability, as opposed
to what is going to happen." (The actual rate of catastrophic failure -
as opposed to the calculated risk - now stands at 2 flights in 113, or
1 in 57.)

The estimate, known formally as the shuttle's Probabilistic Risk
Assessment, combines the findings of flight experience, computer
simulations and expert judgment to assess how the shuttle's millions of
parts will work or fail in varying situations.

The most dangerous times are seen as the shuttle's ascent, when its
powerful engines fire, and the descent, when it plunges though the
atmosphere and maneuvers to a landing.

The risk estimate has swung sharply over the years.

Before the explosion of the shuttle Challenger in January 1986, agency
officials regularly put the odds of disaster at 1 flight in 100,000,
much closer to that of commercial jets. The Air Transport Association
has estimated the chance of an airline disaster at 1 flight in
2,000,000.

After the Challenger disaster, the National Aeronautics and Space
Administration was widely faulted for lack of candor.

"NASA exaggerates the reliability of its product to the point of
fantasy," Richard P. Feynman, the Nobel Prize-winning physicist, wrote
in a federal report on the disaster.

When shuttle missions resumed in September 1988, NASA officials
estimated the overall risk of catastrophic failure at 1 flight in 50.

But over the years, as the agency regained confidence in the spaceships
and worked hard at improving their performance, it slowly decreased its
estimates for the odds of catastrophe: 1 flight in 145, 1 in 161, then,
in 1998, 1 in 254.

Early this decade, a wave of new, more realistic assessments brought
the figure back down to 1 in 123.

The Columbia disaster threw all those estimates into question. Mr.
Beutel of NASA said the agency now put the odds of disaster at roughly
1 flight in 100, adding that engineers were still working to refine
their risk calculations.

Private experts note that NASA's desire to retire the shuttles as soon
as possible because of their riskiness has led to the cancellation of
some plans for safety upgrades. For instance, last year the agency
dropped a program to toughen spaceship surfaces that endure the highest
heats during re-entry.

Seymour C. Himmel, a retired engineer who served for more than two
decades on the Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel, a group that advises
NASA on the shuttle, said that lack of adequate financing constantly
undercut agency plans for improving shuttle reliability.

But Mr. Himmel cautioned that no matter how much money went into the
spaceships, their temperamental nature meant that the risk of disaster
would always remain high.

"You'd like to go to 1 in 1,000," he said in an interview. "But you're
never going to get there. Too many things can go wrong."

Hi Thom,

With most of the systems still relying on late or mid 70's technology
this assessment is correct.

But, uhnn, how many microchip redundancies can you fit on the head of a
pin these days? There should be enough post-engineering to make the
Shuttles never fail due to electronics, computational, or software factors.

The reason why the Shuttles will fail is because of the fatiguing of
their ALUMINUM frames. I don't think this was mentioned enough during
the Columbia Disaster hearing. TITANIUM.??

The Defense Department under Ford said NO to NASA wanting to use Ti for
chassis and flight surfaces? It wasn't that NASA couldn't afford it -
it was the Military Industrial Complex that lobbied and created a
special law of "restricted materials" of which Titanium became one.

NASA engineers quickly realized that building the Shuttle of aluminum
was insane - but since they had worked under other insane Republican
administrations (NIXON) and had great success - I guess they didn't
bother to think the whole thing through. Plus, at that time the efforts
of NASA were more seen as anti-Russki patriotic and suck-it-up (this
mindset existed for another decade and a half because of a load of CIA
****s put into middle management at NASA Houston..)

Well - when you get most of your reality from NAZI's who read an
American's rocket science works from 20 years earlier that were that
were still being ridiculed by "advanced propulsion" engineers of the
USA's military. The NAZI's really almost won WWII with advanced
technology (luckily they had a totally egotistical fool in complete
control (sounds strangely familiar to me))..

But I guess God knows what He's doing.

Thanks,

Rick





wrote:


The New York Times
July 26, 2005
NASA Puts Shuttle Mission's Risk at 1 in 100
By WILLIAM J. BROAD

With a new realism born of disaster, NASA says that the risk of
catastrophic failure during the space shuttle Discovery's mission is
about 1 in 100 - more than twice as great as an upbeat estimate issued
before the loss of the Columbia in 2003.

While the space agency is still working on an official estimate, a
spokesman, Allard Beutel, said, it has devised a rough one that will be
refined by insights from the investigation of the Columbia disaster, in
which seven astronauts died as the ship broke up during its re-entry
into Earth's atmosphere.

The rise in estimated danger, Mr. Beutel said, came about "because we
have a better understanding" of the craft's workings and limitations.
He emphasized, though, that "it's a statistical probability, as opposed
to what is going to happen." (The actual rate of catastrophic failure -
as opposed to the calculated risk - now stands at 2 flights in 113, or
1 in 57.)

The estimate, known formally as the shuttle's Probabilistic Risk
Assessment, combines the findings of flight experience, computer
simulations and expert judgment to assess how the shuttle's millions of
parts will work or fail in varying situations.

The most dangerous times are seen as the shuttle's ascent, when its
powerful engines fire, and the descent, when it plunges though the
atmosphere and maneuvers to a landing.

The risk estimate has swung sharply over the years.

Before the explosion of the shuttle Challenger in January 1986, agency
officials regularly put the odds of disaster at 1 flight in 100,000,
much closer to that of commercial jets. The Air Transport Association
has estimated the chance of an airline disaster at 1 flight in
2,000,000.

After the Challenger disaster, the National Aeronautics and Space
Administration was widely faulted for lack of candor.

"NASA exaggerates the reliability of its product to the point of
fantasy," Richard P. Feynman, the Nobel Prize-winning physicist, wrote
in a federal report on the disaster.

When shuttle missions resumed in September 1988, NASA officials
estimated the overall risk of catastrophic failure at 1 flight in 50.

But over the years, as the agency regained confidence in the spaceships
and worked hard at improving their performance, it slowly decreased its
estimates for the odds of catastrophe: 1 flight in 145, 1 in 161, then,
in 1998, 1 in 254.

Early this decade, a wave of new, more realistic assessments brought
the figure back down to 1 in 123.

The Columbia disaster threw all those estimates into question. Mr.
Beutel of NASA said the agency now put the odds of disaster at roughly
1 flight in 100, adding that engineers were still working to refine
their risk calculations.

Private experts note that NASA's desire to retire the shuttles as soon
as possible because of their riskiness has led to the cancellation of
some plans for safety upgrades. For instance, last year the agency
dropped a program to toughen spaceship surfaces that endure the highest
heats during re-entry.

Seymour C. Himmel, a retired engineer who served for more than two
decades on the Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel, a group that advises
NASA on the shuttle, said that lack of adequate financing constantly
undercut agency plans for improving shuttle reliability.

But Mr. Himmel cautioned that no matter how much money went into the
spaceships, their temperamental nature meant that the risk of disaster
would always remain high.

"You'd like to go to 1 in 1,000," he said in an interview. "But you're
never going to get there. Too many things can go wrong."

Rick Nelson wrote:




Well - when you get most of your reality from NAZI's who read an
American's rocket science works from 20 years earlier that were that
were still being ridiculed by "advanced propulsion" engineers of the
USA's military.


Is it just me, or is this posting a strong contender for 'The World's
Fastest Godwin" award? ;-)

The NAZI's really almost won WWII with advanced technology (luckily
they had a totally egotistical fool in complete control (sounds
strangely familiar to me))..

But I guess God knows what He's doing.


He certainly does; he made the NAZI's faces melt and Belloq's head
explode- which shows the can of major league whup-ass the NAZI's opened
when they decided to go up against the God Of The Israelites!
I'd like to see a Bachem Natter take on an archangel sometime- there'd
just be sawdust left.
Don't even get me started about a seraphim duking it out with the
Antipodal Bomber.
Wouldn't that make a great chess set though? On one side the forces of
Jehovah; on the other...NAZI secret weapons!
"Maus tank to Eva's Triebflugel four...I think you will find that
Jehovah is in check ..."
"I'm afraid you missed it...Moses to Metatron's six...checkmate, mein
Fuhrer!" :-D

Pat