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Russian space program -- book chapter conclusions
I'm doing a big book chapter for a DoD 'space power' book, my chapter is on the russian program. Here are my conclusions, and I'd like to open them up to discussion, critique, and suggestions. The material remains copyright by me, 2007, etc etc etc... and it's a draft. Conclusion For the foreseeable future, Russia appears committed to internationalization of its main non-military space activities, mainly as a crutch in obtaining services disproportionate to contributed resources ("For 5% of the investment we get 30% of the resources" is a frequent comment in justification of the space station partnership) and as a badge of 'major player' status in the world. At the same time, Russia shows no signs of developing a capability for major innovation in spacecraft engineering or of demonstrating more than lip-service interest in quantum advances in space operations capabilities. Incremental progress has been the watchword for decades, usually not by choice but out of necessity because all previous attempts at break-out projects (human lunar flight, advanced robotic Mars probes, the 'Buran' shuttle, the Polyus-Skif family of orbital battle stations) ended in humiliating frustration. Providing commercial launch services for foreign customers has provided multi-dimensional benefits to Russia. Beyond the significant cash flow, such activities fund booster upgrades and, in the case of converted military missiles, fund validation of lifetime extension efforts for still-deployed missile weapons. Military applications of space systems remain uninspired, with critical constellations (such as the missile early warning net) still significantly degraded and likely to remain so for many years. Russian officials have evidently decided that, despite any public posturings over US military threats, there is essentially no prospect of actual hostilities in the foreseeable future and hence little pressure to reconstitute military space assets to a Soviet-era level. Russia retains an operational anti-missile system around Moscow that, with hit-to-kill guidance, could provide significant anti-satellite capability; it is also developing small robotic rendezvous spacecraft similar to US projects that have potential anti-satellite capabilities at any altitude they can be launched into. Attempts at domestic commercialization of space-related services, including communications, navigation, and mapping, remain seriously - perhaps irremediably - hamstrung by the recent resurgence of a traditional Russian top-down structure of authority. Bureaucrats are being ordered to implement wider use of space infrastructure, and after many years of rosy reports of progress, Moscow may realize that it is almost all, as usual, a sham. There is still little indication of successful exploitation of space discoveries and space-developed technologies (what NASA and the Europeans call "spin-offs") as a means of improving the technological skills of Russian industry. The space industry, as a component of the national defense industry, remains strictly compartmentalized from Russia's civil economy, and the resurgence of broad espionage laws (and several recent highly-publicized convictions) will keep this ghettoization in force. This in turn may require other government measures, from patent purchase to industrial espionage, to acquire technologies that some Russian industries may already possess but are in practice forbidden to share internally. Russian space-related scientific and exploratory research, after hitting rock bottom a decade ago, is showing signs of a modest rebound. Russian space scientists may be able to resume making respectable contributions to the world scientific literature in the coming decade, another ticket to world-class status that spreads prestige to all of Russia's science reputation.. But even if the main values of the Russian space program remain symbolic, these symbols have computable value to the nation's self-confidence and to the reputation of its technology - either for commercial export or as a reflection of the efficacy of its weapons. The modest but steady resource commitment to the space program reflects the government's assessment of the degree of value, now and in the foreseeable future. However, none of these intentions have much chance of success unless the Russians find a way out of the looming demographic crisis that mass mortality is confronting them with. In a society and an industry where monopolization of knowledge was power, and sharing it often led to legal prosecution, behavior must change, and fast. This must be done so that space workers a decade from now, without the in-the-flesh guidance and advice of the old-timers, will be able to draw on their 'team knowledge' that survived the passing of its original owners and was preserved in an accessible, durable form. The alternative is a return to the 'learning curve' of more frequent oversights, mistakes, and inadequate problem solving of the dawn of the Space Age - with its daunting costs in time, treasure, prestige, and even human lives. |
#2
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Russian space program -- book chapter conclusions
"Jim Oberg" wrote:
Here are my conclusions, and I'd like to open them up to discussion, critique, and suggestions. The material remains copyright by me, 2007, etc etc etc... and it's a draft. It's hard to really discuss them without the supporting material Jim. One thing that does spring to mind from reading them however is this; In some ways, Russia reminds me of Britain in the 20's and 30's - a nation fallen on hard times that desperately wants to keep her seat at the table of Great Nations. The key product of this, on the space side of the house, has been a flood of glossy presentations on ambitious projects that Russia intends to do Real Soon Now. Or are these glossies the result of the (confusingly varied) space authorities trying to remain relevant and current? D. -- Touch-twice life. Eat. Drink. Laugh. -Resolved: To be more temperate in my postings. Oct 5th, 2004 JDL |
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Russian space program -- book chapter conclusions
Jim: I read your summary chapter and have only a few comments. I think I'm a
light-weight to be critiquing your work in this area, but here goes. What strikes me is Russians total reliance on the Soyuz technology of the 1960's. Here is a heavy "capsule" style space craft which has a superb success history, yet all technical revisions have been based on standard U.S. space development. Light weight components are hardly Russian developments. If history serves me well, was the major upgrade in Soyuz a trade-off by the USA as a mean of killing MIR and dragging the Russians into the ISS program? You make an important point about more modern space ventures, such as "Buran" being a total loss, even as the Russian (at least as of my last trip over, in 94) maintained the face saving official story that it was merely postponed. Even the bulk of their relics are gone, history, dust, toastski. Now that the shuttle has almost finished it's risky use to the United States, there appears to be an even wider technology gap between the Russian engineers and their counterparts in the west. They needn't put capital into development, what we develop will likely be shared for free. Still there is an adage that says, "use it or lose it", and I think Russian aerospace engineers must feel like fifth wheels. "Orion" is going to bring back older design technogy to the USA, which could be argues as a giant leap backwards. There are those who will say the Soviets/Russians side-stepped the folly of a fixed wing orbiter. I would disagree. If Soyuz was to become obsolete today, I wonder if they'd have the capacity to engineer a new orbital vehicle from scratch? Furthermore, isn't Soyuz obsolete already? It will never have the capacity of "Orion", and "Orion" technology may not be made available to every friendly nation that wants to use it. It's difficult to imagine the great state that produced Sputnik, Gagarin, and Korolev, reduced to a taxi company, picking up wealthy business people for a ride to the glory they once, for a short time, monopolized. Khruschev is spinning in his gave, no doubt. Richard (Dick) Glueck Winterport, Maine BTW, any new writing on Soviet and Russian submarine operations or losses due out from you? up to discussion, critique, and suggestions. The material remains copyright by me, 2007, etc etc etc... and it's a draft. Conclusion For the foreseeable future, Russia appears committed to internationalization of its main non-military space activities, mainly as a crutch in obtaining services disproportionate to contributed resources ("For 5% of the investment we get 30% of the resources" is a frequent comment in justification of the space station partnership) and as a badge of 'major player' status in the world. At the same time, Russia shows no signs of developing a capability for major innovation in spacecraft engineering or of demonstrating more than lip-service interest in quantum advances in space operations capabilities. Incremental progress has been the watchword for decades, usually not by choice but out of necessity because all previous attempts at break-out projects (human lunar flight, advanced robotic Mars probes, the 'Buran' shuttle, the Polyus-Skif family of orbital battle stations) ended in humiliating frustration. Providing commercial launch services for foreign customers has provided multi-dimensional benefits to Russia. Beyond the significant cash flow, such activities fund booster upgrades and, in the case of converted military missiles, fund validation of lifetime extension efforts for still-deployed missile weapons. Military applications of space systems remain uninspired, with critical constellations (such as the missile early warning net) still significantly degraded and likely to remain so for many years. Russian officials have evidently decided that, despite any public posturings over US military threats, there is essentially no prospect of actual hostilities in the foreseeable future and hence little pressure to reconstitute military space assets to a Soviet-era level. Russia retains an operational anti-missile system around Moscow that, with hit-to-kill guidance, could provide significant anti-satellite capability; it is also developing small robotic rendezvous spacecraft similar to US projects that have potential anti-satellite capabilities at any altitude they can be launched into. Attempts at domestic commercialization of space-related services, including communications, navigation, and mapping, remain seriously - perhaps irremediably - hamstrung by the recent resurgence of a traditional Russian top-down structure of authority. Bureaucrats are being ordered to implement wider use of space infrastructure, and after many years of rosy reports of progress, Moscow may realize that it is almost all, as usual, a sham. There is still little indication of successful exploitation of space discoveries and space-developed technologies (what NASA and the Europeans call "spin-offs") as a means of improving the technological skills of Russian industry. The space industry, as a component of the national defense industry, remains strictly compartmentalized from Russia's civil economy, and the resurgence of broad espionage laws (and several recent highly-publicized convictions) will keep this ghettoization in force. This in turn may require other government measures, from patent purchase to industrial espionage, to acquire technologies that some Russian industries may already possess but are in practice forbidden to share internally. Russian space-related scientific and exploratory research, after hitting rock bottom a decade ago, is showing signs of a modest rebound. Russian space scientists may be able to resume making respectable contributions to the world scientific literature in the coming decade, another ticket to world-class status that spreads prestige to all of Russia's science reputation.. But even if the main values of the Russian space program remain symbolic, these symbols have computable value to the nation's self-confidence and to the reputation of its technology - either for commercial export or as a reflection of the efficacy of its weapons. The modest but steady resource commitment to the space program reflects the government's assessment of the degree of value, now and in the foreseeable future. However, none of these intentions have much chance of success unless the Russians find a way out of the looming demographic crisis that mass mortality is confronting them with. In a society and an industry where monopolization of knowledge was power, and sharing it often led to legal prosecution, behavior must change, and fast. This must be done so that space workers a decade from now, without the in-the-flesh guidance and advice of the old-timers, will be able to draw on their 'team knowledge' that survived the passing of its original owners and was preserved in an accessible, durable form. The alternative is a return to the 'learning curve' of more frequent oversights, mistakes, and inadequate problem solving of the dawn of the Space Age - with its daunting costs in time, treasure, prestige, and even human lives. ----== Posted via Newsfeeds.Com - Unlimited-Unrestricted-Secure Usenet News==---- http://www.newsfeeds.com The #1 Newsgroup Service in the World! 120,000+ Newsgroups ----= East and West-Coast Server Farms - Total Privacy via Encryption =---- |
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Russian space program -- book chapter conclusions
A few years ago it seemed that each new Russian glossy presentation
included the element "Europe / America / whomever will fund it, and we'll build it! They have the money, and we have the experience and know-how!" Of course both Europe and America have considerable experience and know-how. In both cases, politics dictate that the money and jobs go where the voters are, and that ain't Russia. Russia seems to have learned this more recently, especially with Europe not jumping on board with Clipper. Roger Strong Winnipeg, Canada Space Station Tracking http://www.rogerstrong.ca/tle_lookup.aspx Enter a desired date/time since launch to get the lat/long of the station. It allows for normal decay, reboosts and orbit shifts. |
#5
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Russian space program -- book chapter conclusions
Are you so afraid of those MIB shadows?
Why don't you share and share alike about our mutually perpetrated cold-war(s)? - Brad Guth |
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Russian space program -- book chapter conclusions
On May 22, 3:58 pm, "R.Glueck" wrote:
What strikes me is Russians total reliance on the Soyuz technology of the 1960's. Here is a heavy "capsule" style space craft which has a superb success history, yet all technical revisions have been based on standard U.S. space development. Light weight components are hardly Russian developments. If history serves me well, was the major upgrade in Soyuz a trade-off by the USA as a mean of killing MIR and dragging the Russians into the ISS program? There is a more-than-slight redolence of obsolete Cold War rivalry in this comment. If globalization means anything, it means that nations build upon their specialties and unique advantages. Maybe the Russians can't do lightweight components very well. But can we beat the Russians in costs to put a given mass into orbit? No. We have the high tech. They have the cheap labor. If you've got something against cheap labor, inspect all tags next time you go to Walmart. You won't be able to buy very much Made in America. You make an important point about more modern space ventures, such as "Buran" being a total loss, even as the Russian (at least as of my last trip over, in 94) maintained the face saving official story that it was merely postponed. Even the bulk of their relics are gone, history, dust, toastski. Now that the shuttle has almost finished it's risky use to the United States, there appears to be an even wider technology gap between the Russian engineers and their counterparts in the west. They needn't put capital into development, what we develop will likely be shared for free. Well, what about licensing it to them commercially, rather than simply offering it for free? Still there is an adage that says, "use it or lose it", and I think Russian aerospace engineers must feel like fifth wheels. One might say much the same for Japanese engineers. Companies like Canon and Sony have very thick patent portfolios, but on closer inspection, much of the real innovation is being done for them in foreign subsidiaries. One need not originate technology to benefit by it, learn from it, build upon it. Ah, the mortifying shame of being a mere "technician" -- but then look at all those Japanese corporations blushing all the way to the bank. A technological showcase is basis for little more than nationalistic chest-thumping. The real winners aren't the ones with the smartest engineers and scientists, they are the ones who seek and exploit opportunities most energetically. And that comes only of doing business in do-or-die mode. "Orion" is going to bring back older design technogy to the USA, which could be argues as a giant leap backwards. There are those who will say the Soviets/Russians side-stepped the folly of a fixed wing orbiter. I would disagree. If Soyuz was to become obsolete today, I wonder if they'd have the capacity to engineer a new orbital vehicle from scratch? Who cares? Very little has come from engineering from scratch in almost any technological domain you can think of. Successful launchers all have heritage. Much of the Industrial Revolution was copy-paste from blueprints, reusing design knowledge in ignorance of what fundamentally made things work in the first place. (Sometimes science explained it only long after the fact.) Was the Shuttle a success? Perhaps in some sense, but certainly not in the economic sense. Great payload bay, and all that, but it's clearly not necessary to build a space station. Mir was proof enough of that. If we had to do Shuttle all over again from scratch (*shudder* ... in some inner circle of Hell), could *we* do it? America has its own demographic crisis in space expertise -- it's not just for Russians anymore. Furthermore, isn't Soyuz obsolete already? It will never have the capacity of "Orion", and "Orion" technology may not be made available to every friendly nation that wants to use it. Capacity in what sense? How much you can put up in one throw? Or how much you can put up for a fixed number of dollars? So long as Russian engineers, factory workers and technicians are making 1/10th as much as their western counterparts, Russia will be the low-cost leader. It's difficult to imagine the great state that produced Sputnik, Gagarin, and Korolev, reduced to a taxi company, picking up wealthy business people for a ride to the glory they once, for a short time, monopolized. Gee, that's a profoundly anti-capitalist sentiment if I ever heard one. Ever had to make payroll? Ever pick up an underutilized asset and turn a profit on it? Or for that matter, ever pick one up with high hopes, only to make a loss on it, getting a hard lesson that sobered you and humbled you and made you a better business operator in the end? Khruschev is spinning in his gave, no doubt. No doubt. He's thinking, "Gee, what little of Soviet Socialism that didn't get thrown into the dustbin of history is now being criticized by people from capitalist nations for being crassly profit-oriented. Hey, maybe I was wrong. But at least I was never a hypocrite." -michael turner http://www.transcendentalbloviation.blogspot.com |
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Russian space program -- book chapter conclusions
"R.Glueck" wrote:
...there appears to be an even wider technology gap between the Russian engineers and their counterparts in the west... "Orion" is going to bring back older design technogy to the USA, which could be argues as a giant leap backwards... ... I wonder if they'd have the capacity to engineer a new orbital vehicle from scratch?Furthermore, isn't Soyuz obsolete already?... Dick: I'd be interested to know what you consider to be the important "new technologies" of the last few decades in space? And -- beyond that -- why you think that "new technology," rather than changes in operations, is the most productive avenue to pursue? |
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Russian space program -- book chapter conclusions
"Michael Turner" wrote in message oups.com... There is a more-than-slight redolence of obsolete Cold War rivalry in this comment. Michael, I was last in Russia, in 1994. At that time, I was at the Gagarin training facilites, talking to numerous engineers. It that context, my remarks reflect what they expressed to me concerning their technology and where it was going. The Russian aerospace engineers are very proud people, and my observation was their desire to forge ahead of the United States as soon as they could. Remember, at that time MIR was still the USA's only hope of getting long term experience in orbit using the shuttle technology. Having the USSR collapse, and then swallowing the extremely bitter pill of a humbled space program was very, very, tough for those people. I do recall a 1980's Nat. Geographic based solely on the superiority of the Soviet space program. Falling before a worthy advisary is one thing, having the advisary gloat is another. Well, what about licensing it to them commercially, rather than simply offering it for free? The capital for new technological development isn't there. It just isn't. "No bucks, no Buck Rogers." Who cares? I think a great number of Russian engineers care. I think developing, proving, and implementing is what engineers do best and long to do more of. So long as Russian engineers, factory workers and technicians are making 1/10th as much as their western counterparts, Russia will be the low-cost leader. Only if they can produce a quality product that will hold up to the standards being set for long term presence in space. Spacecraft must become lightweight, durable, and reliable. I think that will be the rule in the coming (predicted) space age. Gee, that's a profoundly anti-capitalist sentiment if I ever heard one. Yes it was. I'm not endorsing Communism or Socialism; I'm reflecting upon what I saw and experienced while I was doing research at Zvezdny-Gorodk. Khruschev is spinning in his gave, no doubt. What can I say beyond this? Khruschev loved, relished, everything about his space triumphs, and thus pumped huge amounts of funding into space development. He did it for the wrong reasons, I'd say, but his funding made things happen, both in the Soviet Union and in the United States. If you've not been into Russia to talk to the people who were there after the fall of the Soviet Union, your perspective might be different. That said, I haven't been there in over a decade. My reference might well be out of date, and I'll be the first t admit it. ----== Posted via Newsfeeds.Com - Unlimited-Unrestricted-Secure Usenet News==---- http://www.newsfeeds.com The #1 Newsgroup Service in the World! 120,000+ Newsgroups ----= East and West-Coast Server Farms - Total Privacy via Encryption =---- |
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Russian space program -- book chapter conclusions
Jim Oberg wrote:
Here are my conclusions, and I'd like to open them up to discussion, critique, and suggestions. For the foreseeable future, Russia appears committed to internationalization of its main non-military space activities, mainly as a crutch in obtaining services disproportionate to contributed resources ("For 5% of the investment we get 30% of the resources" is a frequent comment in justification of the space station partnership) and as a badge of 'major player' status in the world. That may well be true, however, given its failure to meet some module deadlines in connection with the ISS, it's not clear if they will find any international partners willing to play any more, so its commitment in this regard is likely to be a moot point. Providing commercial launch services for foreign customers has provided multi-dimensional benefits to Russia. Beyond the significant cash flow, such activities fund booster upgrades and, in the case of converted military missiles, fund validation of lifetime extension efforts for still-deployed missile weapons. This is certainly true enough. As recent discussion in this newsgroup has illustrated, China is becoming a significant cut-rate competitor to Russia in this sphere as well. Russian officials have evidently decided that, despite any public posturings over US military threats, there is essentially no prospect of actual hostilities in the foreseeable future and hence little pressure to reconstitute military space assets to a Soviet-era level. This is certainly good news. While someone here wrote of "obsolete Cold War" thinking, it does look as though Russia has fallen into a form of government not particularly democratic or friendly to the world's democracies (well, at least to the United States in particular), even if it is still an improvement over Communism. This is regrettable, but the economic collapse of Russia after abandoning Communism can only be expected to produce an imperfect result. Attempts at domestic commercialization of space-related services, including communications, navigation, and mapping, remain seriously - perhaps irremediably - hamstrung by the recent resurgence of a traditional Russian top-down structure of authority. Russian bureaucrats are unlikely to be the *main* obstacle to this. Russia is in a very difficult economic condition, so there is not much of a market for any exotic goods or services there. The limited capital there is goes into small-scale projects with quick return under such conditions. Unusual and innovative enterprises are few and far between. John Savard |
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Russian space program -- book chapter conclusions
On May 23, 8:16 am, Monte Davis wrote:
"R.Glueck" wrote: ...there appears to be an even wider technology gap between the Russian engineers and their counterparts in the west... "Orion" is going to bring back older design technogy to the USA, which could be argues as a giant leap backwards... ... I wonder if they'd have the capacity to engineer a new orbital vehicle from scratch?Furthermore, isn't Soyuz obsolete already?... Dick: I'd be interested to know what you consider to be the important "new technologies" of the last few decades in space? And -- beyond that -- why you think that "new technology," rather than changes in operations, is the most productive avenue to pursue? Let's imagine no changes in Russian launchers, or maybe just a little tinkering around the edges. Let's also imagine one Soyuz flight per week, with two paying passengers, bringing in $50m per flight. Of course, this means a more factory style of construction and operation for the Russians, but that gives them economies of scale. So then we've got a potential revenue pictu about $2.5b per year. But what about costs? Not just the cost of launch (maybe half the revenue, minus a little for periodic resupply -- call it $1.3b.) Let's say ISS gets finished enough to house 6 people continuously. And let's also say that science on ISS gets largely triaged, and for the obvious reason: there's really not much microgravity science left to do anymore, and most of it can be done more cheaply in other ways, or by letting paying passengers perform the experiments so that they can call themselves "private astronaut/researchers" rather than "tourists". How much does maintenance burden that eat into what might otherwise be a nice 50% profit margin? (I admit: various nations, not least among them the US, might challenge Russia, complaining about all the tax monies that got poured into ISS. But possession is 9/10s of the law, and when you're squatting remote territory that nobody else has much reason to visit anymore (and no cheap way to visit that you yourself don't provide), squatting is 9/10s of possession. But let's not go there for now -- I'm talking 10 years in the future anyway.) Can you show an operation in the black under reasonable assumptions? Then the International Space Station becomes the Russian Space Hotel. But does it? How much does bare-bones no-science maintenance of ISS cost? Let's say that Russia has acquired all the schematics for all of the equipment, and either makes its own replacement parts or orders them from abroad. Can they turn a profit? Can they turn a handsome profit? If so, it's not really about technological improvement, is it? If it's profitable enough, the capital requirements for improvements can be met, eventually if not sooner. All that matters is markets. Might real demand be made a factor of 20 or more greater than current traffic? Is it sustainable demand? What are the elasticity characteristics of that demand -- does a lower price mean reaching significantly more customers? Depending on how much profit they can make, the Russians might go for steady improvements in economies -- maybe ion thrusters not only for station/hotel reboost but for transfer to a more equatorial orbit. Maybe launching from Brazil, once the ISS-RSH is in a more equatorial orbit. Maybe bullet- proofing docking procedures so that the capsule no longer requires a pilot, and can seat *three* paying customers. Consider marketing innovation, not just technical innovation. Spending months training at Star City is a real customer objection, I'm sure. As much as it might surprise some people here (who might see the current ticket price as far more than enough to live on for the rest of their lives) several Space Adventures customers view themselves as people who work for a living. Dennis Tito essentially had to ask permission from his partners at his firm. From what I understand, Charles Simonyi has hardly slackened pace on software -- he's just working for himself now. What if training in Russian were unnecessary, because crew were bilingual? What if most training facilities were reachable by plane within six hours, and roughly within the same time zone range as the major market concentrations? You might put one facility in Honduras to save costs for the North American market, one in Vietnam for Asians, one in Tunisia for Europeans. Get training (and training costs) down to the minimum, and conduct it three weekends a month for a year, not too far from the customer's home base, to make it more available. Can it be done? Well, we just don't know the answers to these questions, do we? But I think we can say with some confidence that none of the answers require major technological breakthroughs, even if they nevertheless keep a lot of engineers busy. Boring? "The Russian space industry -- just a job, not an adventure?" Yeah, but if you want sustainable space development, you have to turn exciting cost sinks into a boring profit centers. That -- not making fixed-wing orbiters work or any other technological frontier -- is the real long-haul challenge. -michael turner http://www.transcendentalbloviation.blogspot.com |
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