NASA Astronaut on Columbia Repair (and others)

"Danny Dot" wrote in message
...


I have worked for several other large organizations, I found NASA to be
the worst. Recall two commissions have found a problem with NASA's
culture.

True, but I think it's by no means unique or even unusual. I worked for a
large bank until recently, and it was just as bad.

Well Rand, I do, I care. I find it interesting reading, to hear about how
people found out about the Disaster. Even the ones who weren't
connected to NASA and just happened to be watching the landing, maybe even
yours. Jim Oberg's story, which he hasn't told yet, as far as I know,
would be interesting to me and maybe some others who read this news group.
He had a posting here before the Disaster that was intriguing to me.
Enough time has passed so that telling the story might not be too
painful. This posting is going to sci.space.shuttle and sci.space.history,
and Jim actually did hear hints of what was going on at NASA at the time.
Historians might find his story interesting at some point in the future
too. How I found out about Columbia really isn't that interesting.

How I found out about the Challenger Disaster might be considered a bit
more interesting to the group. I found out about that Disaster when I
heard a gasp coming from the other side of the room. From over in the
corner where the ARD people were. I couldn't see the video monitor in the
room, so I had to lean around the console, all those stagnant numbers,
to see the television. I can still see the image of the lone SRB flying by
itself. The flash of hope, followed by the realization, nudging my
coworker, stop looking at the stagnant data, look up at the only real data
in the room, the live video feed.

That story might be interesting to others, as Jim's story about Columbia
might be interesting. Maybe not news worthy, but a personal interest type
story, his thoughts and feelings. I was kind of hoping he would share.

--
Craig Fink
Courtesy E-Mail Welcome @
--

On Tue, 14 Nov 2006 13:33:57+0000, Rand Simberg wrote:

On Tue, 14 Nov 2006 12:45:26 GMT, in a place far, far away, Craig Fink
made the phosphor on my monitor glow in such a
way as to indicate that:

I totally disagree with you.

Who cares?

I can imagine you have a lot of personal investment in your point of view,
as you actually knew about the impact to the wing a long time (many days)
before the Disaster. And, choose to believe what you were being told by
your sources that everything was fine. I can totally understand your
baggage leading to your conclusions. You were hoodwinked like many of the
NASA engineers, that NASA management wouldn't stick their heads in the
ground. Me, I first heard about the Disaster in WalMart, when I overheard
someone talking about the destruction of Columbia.

Again, who cares? How is where you heard about it relevant to the
discussion?

But, any repair, wet towels or tortillas would have been much better than
leaving a gapping hole in the leading edge of the wing. Entry heating is a
time function, just like thawing your Thanksgiving Turkey. It takes days
to thaw a Turkey in the fridge. A day outside the fridge on your counter.
And with a blow torch, probably well over an hour. Plenty of time to make
it to the runway.

You don't know what you're talking about. Show us the calculations.

What calculations? It's an experiment, and not a very realistic one, they
didn't have a Turkey with them. There is a really, really big difference
between have the bow shock in front of the wing and having it inside the
wing. I'm sorry you can't see that.

"Story Musgrave's standing reentry really set a bad example in that
regard. "

Sorry whats that all about? Did he stand for a reentry and why did he?

Rgrds
John John

On Tue, 14 Nov 2006 14:11:24 GMT, in a place far, far away, Craig Fink
made the phosphor on my monitor glow in such a
way as to indicate that:

That story might be interesting to others, as Jim's story about Columbia
might be interesting. Maybe not news worthy, but a personal interest type
story, his thoughts and feelings. I was kind of hoping he would share.

Whether it is or not has nothing to do with whether or not Columbia
could have been rescued. It's a non sequitur.

Gutierrez is wrong. And it turns out, so were NASA's results from the CAIB
report. The three years of work that have gone into RCC repair capability
since that report have made clear that the in-flight repair options for
Columbia would not have worked.

It's not even clear whether the proposals would have delayed breakup

Jim, Gutierrez looks not like a guy who gives such a statement light handed.
Thats why I copied his credentials (engineer, AF testpilot, now at Sandia)
from the article. He has some more knowledge on the subject then we have.
He may well have some insider knowledge NASA was eager to supress.
Remember the clandestine knowledge path from the astronaut corps to
Feynman after Challenger?

The statement

He said something as simple as wet towels forming a several-inches-thick
layer of ice would have been enough to keep hot gasses from burning into
the crack in the leading edge.

could be read as slight exageration by mentioning wet towels. Meaning
anything could have worked. Its not my impression that it was intented
that way. Wet towels are indeed an interesting option to fix it. Its
better then a plastic bag of ice. The towels gives the pack cohesion even
past melting. It protects liquid from blown away and forces better
vapourization. And it may carbonize to give some further flow protection.

Remember that the main element of the destruction of Columbia was not
the shock front at the RCC but the flow of plasma from the RCC cavity
out of small venting holes behind the leading edge. To prevent this
plasma flow from the RCC cavity to the outside would already be a crucial
step.

a few minutes, or hastened it due to higher drag. I'd like to believe that
an attempted repair would have given the ship another minute or two
to get lower and slower, and perhaps cross the boundary where
suited crewmembers thrown free by the cabin break-up might, might,
just might have survived to low enough that their parachutes would
have saved them. But at any altitude, co-existing even briefly with a
debris cloud of jagged metal is problematical. It's what I was saying the
first hour of the live coverage with ABC, when I talked on-air from my
home: the odds of survival were low but not zero and in the initial hours

yea, had the crew cabin survived the heat somewhat longer they had
had a real chance.

post-breakup all efforts must focus and looking for parachutes on the
ground because anybody getting out of the ship alive would need help
really bad.

Had there been warning, you also bet that there wouldn't have been
anybody in the ship doing entry without helmets and gloves -- an

yes, good point. I see it that way too.

appalling failure of safety practices, in real life, but sadly consistent
with safety standards that had crept up on some (not all, or even most)
of the team.

I think thats not realy fair. This issue did not affect their chance for
survival, the CAIB was very clear on it. And I assume the astronauts
were aware of their chances. Almost any failure during this phase of
reentry would lead to a break up of the orbiter. The crew compartment
would survive the initial break up. Thats probably a design reminescent
of early structural development were the crew compartent was thought as
survival capsule. But the Columbia compartment had no thermal protection
at its rear break up side. As it tumbled in the hypersonic plasma the
aluminium structure there was fast penetrated. Those without helmets
and gloves had more luck than.

## CrossPoint v3.12d R ##

Remember the question why NASA did not release their results on the
in orbit repair options for Columbia?

Incorrect. The results were released with the CAIB report, both as a
chapter in the main report and as an appendix.

The only "results" they released was a statement that their tests were
inconclusive. No report what they tested, how they tested neither
the results they got.


It seems the results were too
unwanted obvious:

Gutierrez is wrong. And it turns out, so were NASA's results from the CAIB
report. The three years of work that have gone into RCC repair capability
since that report have made clear that the in-flight repair options for
Columbia would not have worked.

What is your source? Was it you who said something the same line over a
year ago claiming some knowledge of NASA tests not yet released? As
we got no source it was dismissed as one of the many Columbia Usenet myths.
But maybe there is a report out now. I`m not the only one eager to read it!

--
JRF



## CrossPoint v3.12d R ##

"Neil Gerace" wrote in message
...
"Danny Dot" wrote in message
...


I have worked for several other large organizations, I found NASA to be
the worst. Recall two commissions have found a problem with NASA's
culture.

True, but I think it's by no means unique or even unusual. I worked for a
large bank until recently, and it was just as bad.



If the bully process was as bad as it is at NASA, I can understand why you
don't work there anymore ;-)

Danny Dot
www.mobbinggonemad.org

"columbiaaccidentinvestigation"
wrote in message
ups.com...
http://www.stpns.net/view_article.ht...43251064362304
Gutierrez said the fault lies in two words - engineering arrogance.
"NASA engineers were confident that they did everything right,"
Gutierrez said. "They were so sure everything would work as planned
they didn't think an escape system was necessary. The fact is, if
there had been an escape system on Columbia and Challenger, the crews
could have survived."

snip

Good information in you post. If you look up the definition of
narcissistic, you will get a feel for how NASA management acts. It is
impossible for NASA management to admit it has a problem or has made an
error. Classic narcissistic behavior. Any NASA employee that attempts to
fix a problem is put down because "NASA doesn't have any problems".

OK. I over state the situation, but it is almost this bad, and I do think
NASA is getting better. Wayne Hale, the Shuttle Program Manager, is a good
example. Mr. Hale has enough honesty to admit there is a problem. If NASA
keeps putting people like him in possition of responsibility, NASA engineers
might someday be comfortable speaking up against a management decision.

Danny Dot
www.mobbinggonemad.org

Sid emails me that most of the article was really trash,
but his comments on in-orbit repair, he stands by.

"Craig Fink" wrote:

Well Rand, I do, I care. I find it interesting reading, to hear about how
people found out about the Disaster. Even the ones who weren't
connected to NASA and just happened to be watching the landing, maybe even
yours. Jim Oberg's story, which he hasn't told yet, as far as I know,
would be interesting to me and maybe some others who read this news group.
He had a posting here before the Disaster that was intriguing to me.
Enough time has passed so that telling the story might not be too
painful. This posting is going to sci.space.shuttle and sci.space.history,
and Jim actually did hear hints of what was going on at NASA at the time.
Historians might find his story interesting at some point in the future
too. How I found out about Columbia really isn't that interesting.

How I found out about the Challenger Disaster might be considered a bit
more interesting to the group. I found out about that Disaster when I
heard a gasp coming from the other side of the room. From over in the
corner where the ARD people were. I couldn't see the video monitor in the
room, so I had to lean around the console, all those stagnant numbers,
to see the television. I can still see the image of the lone SRB flying by
itself. The flash of hope, followed by the realization, nudging my
coworker, stop looking at the stagnant data, look up at the only real data
in the room, the live video feed.

That story might be interesting to others, as Jim's story about Columbia
might be interesting. Maybe not news worthy, but a personal interest type
story, his thoughts and feelings. I was kind of hoping he would share.

No offense, but you just wasted a couple long redundant paragraphs about
something totally unconnected to the original thread, which was an
astronaut's somewhat incorrect opinion about surviving the two Shuttle
disasters.

And while it is irrelevant to this thread, I'll add that among a few people
who closely monitor the shuttle flights, there was clearly hints from
several posts on usenet aside form anything Oberg may have said which can be
found using Google to view newsgroup postings that NASA was looking into the
foam strike several days before the mission ended.

T.B.