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New Columbia loss report out today



 
 
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  #1  
Old January 2nd 09, 10:55 PM posted to sci.space.history,sci.space.policy,sci.space.shuttle
Craig Fink
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Posts: 1,858
Default New Columbia loss report out today

Stuf4 wrote:

From Craig Fink:

When I heard the none, zero, of the occupants had the presents of mind to
close their visors, it just sound right. A real time, new, procedure
implemented as a last ditch effort to get hydraulic pressure, while
working formal procedures to restart two APUs? And, the passengers with
nothing to do, other than lock your visor and pray, don't?

Impressive presents of mind by some, yet a lack of it by all, just
doesn't sound right.


You don't climb to that pinnacle of the pyramid without having a keen
presence of mind in extremely stressful situations. More so for the
pilots, considering the dozens of selection levels they succeeded in
through the military and then NASA. I myself tend to think that they
all had a solid understanding of how far outside of their egress
survivability envelope they were, and that suit pressure would have
just passed their survival along to the next fatal wicket. One of
many.


Ahh, I see, your visor would have been open, a conscious logical decision.
Mine would have been closed, ever hopeful that someone with an infinite
improbability drive just might happen along... Well, that is if I wasn't
Shuttle Surfing at the time... Is that the proper NASA term for standing
throughout entry?

Interesting x-link discussion, page 2-37 through 2-45, looks like Titanium
performed well and it didn't. It caught fire too, along with all the
aluminum. (the aluminum fire seems to be absent from the discussion)...
http://www.nasa.gov/pdf/298870main_SP-2008-565.pdf
.... So, the best choice for an ascent/entry vehicle seems to be graphite,
silicon-carbonate or glass. The fiberglass performed really well Page 3-51,
Figure 3.2-22. I wonder what material NASA chose for the upcoming Apollo
Capsule v2.0?

Here is an intersting video...
http://www.popsci.com/node/30347
The aluminum is stripping oxygen from the titanium-dioxide to make titanium
metal.
--
Craig Fink
Courtesy E-Mail Welcome @
  #2  
Old January 3rd 09, 12:45 AM posted to sci.space.shuttle
John Doe
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Posts: 1,134
Default New Columbia loss report out today

Craig Fink wrote:

Ahh, I see, your visor would have been open, a conscious logical decision.
Mine would have been closed, ever hopeful that someone with an infinite
improbability drive just might happen along...



Would middeck crewmembers have had ANY indication (verbal or otherwise)
or anomalies being worked upstairs before decompression began ?

Would they have had any sensation that the shuttle was in an unusual
attitude with nose way up ? Any unusual sensation of G force (especially
if this was their first flight) ? If not, then they would have had no
reason to drop their visor. (Middeck crew would have only seen a orange
glow in the side hatch, no horizon to give them any hint of attitude.

Another aspect not dealt with the report is that of "macho" behaviour.
This is pure specualtion on my part, but is it possible that a crew
member lowering his visor would be seen as being "chicken" and
exhibiting fear and that there would be some resistance of crew members
to lower their visors at the first sign of what they may see as trouble
but what might be perfectly normal ? (especially for first time fliers)

The report has also repeated many times that lowered visor are not "OK"
for the shuttle because it causes the release of too much O2 for cabin.
Looks to me like there are dis-incentives to lower the visor.


If one crew member was still busy getting into his seat at the time
power went out, it is likely that the crew member next to him might have
had his hands busy trying to help him, holding straps etc. And without
sufficient light, they may not have had sufficient visual cues on
decompression. (I assume there would have been instant fog in the cabin
as humidity would have condensed ?)

Obviously, there would have been immense noise of air flowing out. Is it
fair to assume that this would have been heard upstairs as well ?

Would the CDR/PLT have had visual indication of bad attitude (nose way
up) looking out the windows ? Or does the plasma glow pretty much
obliterate any view of the horizon ?


  #3  
Old January 3rd 09, 06:27 AM posted to sci.space.shuttle
bob haller safety advocate
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Posts: 615
Default New Columbia loss report out today

On Jan 2, 6:45�pm, John Doe wrote:
Craig Fink wrote:
Ahh, I see, your visor would have been open, a conscious logical decision.
Mine would have been closed, ever hopeful that someone with an infinite
improbability drive just might happen along...


Would middeck crewmembers have had ANY indication (verbal or otherwise)
or anomalies being worked upstairs before decompression began ?

Would they have had any sensation that the shuttle was in an unusual
attitude with nose way up ? Any unusual sensation of G force (especially
if this was their first flight) ? If not, then they would have had no
reason to drop their visor. (Middeck crew would have only seen a orange
glow in the side hatch, no horizon to give them any hint of attitude.

Another aspect not dealt with the report is that of "macho" behaviour.
This is pure specualtion on my part, but is it possible that a crew
member lowering his visor would be seen as being "chicken" and
exhibiting fear and that there would be some resistance of crew members
to lower their visors at the first sign of what they may see as trouble
but what might be perfectly normal ? (especially for first time fliers)

The report has also repeated many times that lowered visor are not "OK"
for the shuttle because it causes the release of too much O2 for cabin.
Looks to me like there are dis-incentives to lower the visor.

If one crew member was still busy getting into his seat at the time
power went out, it is likely that the crew member next to him might have
had his hands busy trying to help him, holding straps etc. And without
sufficient light, they may not have had sufficient visual cues on
decompression. (I assume there would have been instant fog in the cabin
as humidity would have condensed ?)

Obviously, there would have been immense noise of air flowing out. Is it
fair to assume that this would have been heard upstairs as well ?

Would the CDR/PLT have had visual indication of bad attitude (nose way
up) looking out the windows ? Or does the plasma glow pretty much
obliterate any view of the horizon ?


As soyuz proved a fast depressurization can occur at any time.

Future astronauts should be fully suited visors down, totally sealed
with emergency oxygen connected.

Columbia was terrible but imagine a normal flight that quickly
depressurized and killed the crew because a line blew or seal failed.

the shuttle would likely still land on auto pilot, but with no one to
push gear down a belly landing with hydrazine and other volatiles
would likely have produced a belly landing and fireball.

NASA still has a failed safety structure, gloves off, visors up should
of never been permitted
  #4  
Old January 3rd 09, 02:01 PM posted to sci.space.shuttle,sci.space.policy,sci.space.history
Craig Fink
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Posts: 1,858
Default New Columbia loss report out today

John Doe wrote:

Craig Fink wrote:

Ahh, I see, your visor would have been open, a conscious logical
decision. Mine would have been closed, ever hopeful that someone with an
infinite improbability drive just might happen along...



Would middeck crewmembers have had ANY indication (verbal or otherwise)
or anomalies being worked upstairs before decompression began ?

Would they have had any sensation that the shuttle was in an unusual
attitude with nose way up ? Any unusual sensation of G force (especially
if this was their first flight) ? If not, then they would have had no
reason to drop their visor. (Middeck crew would have only seen a orange
glow in the side hatch, no horizon to give them any hint of attitude.

Another aspect not dealt with the report is that of "macho" behaviour.
This is pure specualtion on my part, but is it possible that a crew
member lowering his visor would be seen as being "chicken" and
exhibiting fear and that there would be some resistance of crew members
to lower their visors at the first sign of what they may see as trouble
but what might be perfectly normal ? (especially for first time fliers)

The report has also repeated many times that lowered visor are not "OK"
for the shuttle because it causes the release of too much O2 for cabin.
Looks to me like there are dis-incentives to lower the visor.


If one crew member was still busy getting into his seat at the time
power went out, it is likely that the crew member next to him might have
had his hands busy trying to help him, holding straps etc. And without
sufficient light, they may not have had sufficient visual cues on
decompression. (I assume there would have been instant fog in the cabin
as humidity would have condensed ?)

Obviously, there would have been immense noise of air flowing out. Is it
fair to assume that this would have been heard upstairs as well ?

Would the CDR/PLT have had visual indication of bad attitude (nose way
up) looking out the windows ? Or does the plasma glow pretty much
obliterate any view of the horizon ?


I'm sure the passengers on the middeck would have had plenty of information
about their situation, starting with the loss of tire pressured discussion.
The Commander and Pilot most likely would have noticed the diverging
control surface trim as the aerodynamics slowly changed, possibly some
discussion about it. Watching the trims would have been like watching a
countdown clock to loss of control. When the trim hits it's limit of
movement, 1, 2, and 3 degrees, their out of control. Towards the end, yaw
jets comming on, the last ditch effort of the flight control system.

Prior to loss of control, the Commander may have asked someone to take a
look behind to see if they could see anything in the plasma trail. A
logical and reasonable request. A view out the upper windows, back towards
the tail might (probably would) have revealed differences in the plasma
between the left and right side. Burning aluminum and disturbed flow,
possibly even super bright white flashes as globs of liquid aluminum get
instantly dispersed and burn in the slipstream. The bright flashes might
have even been visible to those in their seat, like a giant flash bulb
going off behind them, flashing through the upper windows and on to the
floor. There was quite a bit of time between the first indications of
something amiss and loss of control. After loss of control, during the
initial pitch up and yaw, he may have been able to get back in his seat and
buckle his lap belt. But, apparently not enough time to get his shoulder
straps or helmet on before the gyrations built up.

Shuttle Surfing during a normal entry, walking around the cabin would be
like walking around an airline's cabin, except the gee force would be very
small initially, then slowly build. The equivalent of walking on an
asteroid for a little while, then the Moon for a bit, then Mars, Earth, and
a mega-Earth. And all this fun would start at entry interface as the
vehicle began to decelerate. The time in each regime would be fairly long.
A planetary simulator. Kind of surprising we don't hear about more
astronauts taking this opportunity to experience walking around on other
planets, especially the ones on the middeck who normally have nothing to
do, and lots of space to do it in. An interesting environment.

Just a bunch of speculation.
--
Craig Fink
Courtesy E-Mail Welcome @
  #5  
Old January 3rd 09, 08:58 PM posted to sci.space.shuttle
John Doe
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Posts: 1,134
Default New Columbia loss report out today

Craig Fink wrote:

I'm sure the passengers on the middeck would have had plenty of information
about their situation, starting with the loss of tire pressured discussion.


From what I read, it wasn't until loss of APU that thy started to
realise something wrong other than faulty sensors was happening.




The Commander and Pilot most likely would have noticed the diverging
control surface trim as the aerodynamics slowly changed,


The report mentions the opposite. Same with the RCS firing continually.
There is small light on a button, but apparently, this is not something
they focus on.

And they would have been focusing on alarms, initially the tire pressure
one which was seen as a glitch, then something to worry about because it
was more than one faulty sensor, and then the APU failure.

In terms of CRM, I a not sure how the PLT/CDR split the tasks under such
circumstances. But the report did reveal that they did try to fix the
APU problem at a time after loss of communication.


Prior to loss of control, the Commander may have asked someone to take a
look behind to see if they could see anything in the plasma trail.


Is that something they are trained to do ?

I would think that what was more likely was that *IF* any of the aft
deck crewmembers had had previous experiece and *IF* they noticed
unusual plasma over the top windows, that they would then volunteer that
information to CDR/PLT. But doubt that the CDR/PLT would distract
themseves by asking such a question.

between the left and right side. Burning aluminum and disturbed flow,
possibly even super bright white flashes as globs of liquid aluminum get
instantly dispersed and burn in the slipstream.


It is not clear that the "burning aluminium" would have been begun
before they lost consciousness. Looks to me that the tiles would have
continued to protect the crew module until first breach.

This report seems to have pinpointed the location of the first pressure
vessel breach, under the E locker below middeck.

Until this point, the report mentioned many times that the crew cabin
was still very normal and intact.

floor. There was quite a bit of time between the first indications of
something amiss and loss of control.


Not that much time. Initially, they were focused on a glitch (loss of
sensors on landing gear). This was something way in the back of the
shuttle, not the crew cabin. Losing a tire would have made a bad
landing, but woudln't have caused crew cabin depressurisation.

By the time they lost radio contact, it really wasn't long until power
was lost. And remember that initially, loss of radio was not abnormal
since it happens during normal re-entry.


Shuttle Surfing during a normal entry, walking around the cabin would be
like walking around an airline's cabin, except the gee force would be very
small initially, then slowly build.


I am not sure NASA would take too kindly if astronauts started to have
such a non-chalant attitude during re-entry. And remember that while
during this phase, the G forces may be mild, the question is whether the
crew member will have time to get properly strapped in before serious G
forces are felt.

planets, especially the ones on the middeck who normally have nothing to
do, and lots of space to do it in. An interesting environment.


Middeck of Colubia didn't have lots of space. Remember that Columbia
still had the internal airlock. And once you put the seats up, I am not
sure there is much floor space left.

  #6  
Old January 3rd 09, 10:56 PM posted to sci.space.shuttle,sci.space.policy,sci.space.history
Craig Fink
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Posts: 1,858
Default New Columbia loss report out today

mJohn Doe wrote:

Craig Fink wrote:

I'm sure the passengers on the middeck would have had plenty of
information about their situation, starting with the loss of tire
pressured discussion.


From what I read, it wasn't until loss of APU that thy started to
realise something wrong other than faulty sensors was happening.




The Commander and Pilot most likely would have noticed the diverging
control surface trim as the aerodynamics slowly changed,


The report mentions the opposite. Same with the RCS firing continually.
There is small light on a button, but apparently, this is not something
they focus on.

And they would have been focusing on alarms, initially the tire pressure
one which was seen as a glitch, then something to worry about because it
was more than one faulty sensor, and then the APU failure.

In terms of CRM, I a not sure how the PLT/CDR split the tasks under such
circumstances. But the report did reveal that they did try to fix the
APU problem at a time after loss of communication.


Prior to loss of control, the Commander may have asked someone to take a
look behind to see if they could see anything in the plasma trail.


Is that something they are trained to do ?

I would think that what was more likely was that *IF* any of the aft
deck crewmembers had had previous experiece and *IF* they noticed
unusual plasma over the top windows, that they would then volunteer that
information to CDR/PLT. But doubt that the CDR/PLT would distract
themseves by asking such a question.

between the left and right side. Burning aluminum and disturbed flow,
possibly even super bright white flashes as globs of liquid aluminum get
instantly dispersed and burn in the slipstream.


It is not clear that the "burning aluminium" would have been begun
before they lost consciousness. Looks to me that the tiles would have
continued to protect the crew module until first breach.

This report seems to have pinpointed the location of the first pressure
vessel breach, under the E locker below middeck.

Until this point, the report mentioned many times that the crew cabin
was still very normal and intact.

floor. There was quite a bit of time between the first indications of
something amiss and loss of control.


Not that much time. Initially, they were focused on a glitch (loss of
sensors on landing gear). This was something way in the back of the
shuttle, not the crew cabin. Losing a tire would have made a bad
landing, but woudln't have caused crew cabin depressurisation.

By the time they lost radio contact, it really wasn't long until power
was lost. And remember that initially, loss of radio was not abnormal
since it happens during normal re-entry.


Shuttle Surfing during a normal entry, walking around the cabin would be
like walking around an airline's cabin, except the gee force would be
very small initially, then slowly build.


I am not sure NASA would take too kindly if astronauts started to have
such a non-chalant attitude during re-entry. And remember that while
during this phase, the G forces may be mild, the question is whether the
crew member will have time to get properly strapped in before serious G
forces are felt.

planets, especially the ones on the middeck who normally have nothing to
do, and lots of space to do it in. An interesting environment.


Middeck of Colubia didn't have lots of space. Remember that Columbia
still had the internal airlock. And once you put the seats up, I am not
sure there is much floor space left.


Much of what I wrote was just pure conjecture. What they knew or didn't,
will never be known. If you don't like it, don't believe it, that's fine,
because it's conjecture. No one knows if they saw, or heard the yaw jets
firing. But, it's something they could have heard or seen before loss of
control. No one knows if they noticed the control surfaces (trim) slowly
diverging towards there limit. But again, it's something that was there. I
somewhat doubt the crew took the tire pressure loss as a sensor error,
because they *did* know about the wing impact on ascent. But again, nobody
will ever know what they thought of the loss of pressure. Loss of
communications occurred quite a bit before loss of control when the APUs
went down. I don't think they can see out the top windows when seated????
Maybe they can, or at least turn the camera around...
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hK1RxQKCmCE
....or use a mirror...notice the debris flying off the crew cabin past the
window.

Prior to loss of control, the burning aluminum would have been coming from
the wing. One camera on the ground was saturated by a bright flash. Such a
bright flash might have been a much brighter closer up. Although one or two
bright flashes among all the APU flashes might not have been noticed. Prior
to loss of control any debris falling off the wing would have create it's
own plasma trail visible in the Orbiters plasma trail. Visible out the top
windows looking back. As to if anyone *actually* saw any of them, no one
will ever know. One astronaut may have been out of his seat, highly unusual
as I've only heard of one astronaut Shuttle Surfing. And then again maybe
he wasn't, no one will ever know.

You know, quite a bit of this report is just conjecture or educated guesses,
including some of the simulations, analysis and conclusions. Much of it is
reporting of the known fact, but it also continues past the facts into the
realm of conjecture. Take it with a grain of salt. What I wrote about was
what I thought was available prior to loss of control that might have been
observed. I'm sure there may have been other thing that prior to loss of
control that might have gotten their attention. But, no one will ever know
what they knew.

Feel free to write your own fiction posting, if you don't like mine.
--
Craig Fink
Courtesy E-Mail Welcome @
  #7  
Old January 3rd 09, 11:34 PM posted to sci.space.shuttle
Pat Flannery
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Posts: 18,465
Default New Columbia loss report out today



Craig Fink wrote:

Much of what I wrote was just pure conjecture. What they knew or didn't,
will never be known.

The crew on the flight deck would certainly known that something was
seriously wrong as prior to break-up the Orbiter had gone into a flat
spin belly-first into its line of trajectory, so the view out of the
cockpit windows would have shown the sky and the ground alternately as
the vehicle spun through a nose-up/nose down attitude.
Also, the RCS system isn't quiet when it's in operation (one astronaut
described it as sounding like howitzers going off, and that it would
wake up anyone who was sleeping when it fired) so the fact that it was
continuously firing would have very noticeable, even over the sound of
the air passing over the Orbiter, or at least had a different type of
sound associated with it.
I don't think they can see out the top windows when seated????


No, they can look through the top windows from the rear seats on the
flight deck.
A lot of years back one of the crew in the rear seat during reentry took
video of the plasma above the Orbiter, the results of which came as a
surprise to NASA as it showed that the plasma converged above the
Orbiter rather than just forming a hole in the atmosphere behind it.
In fact, one of the Columbia crew took the same type of video on the
doomed last flight that was recovered; here's a still from it:
http://tinyurl.com/8lsxad
Even in the enlarged version you can't see any debris being shed.

Pat
  #8  
Old January 4th 09, 12:16 PM posted to sci.space.shuttle
Craig Fink
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Posts: 1,858
Default New Columbia loss report out today

John Doe wrote:

I would think that what was more likely was that IF any of the aft
deck crewmembers had had previous experiece and IF they noticed
unusual plasma over the top windows, that they would then volunteer that
information to CDR/PLT. But *doubt that the CDR/PLT would distract
themseves by asking such a question.


http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hK1RxQKCmCE

Yeah, after thinking about the entry video a bit, I like your fictional
senario better. That's a seems to be a common thing to do, watch the
trailing plasma.
--
Craig Fink
Courtesy E-Mail Welcome @
  #9  
Old January 4th 09, 12:41 PM posted to sci.space.shuttle
Craig Fink
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Posts: 1,858
Default New Columbia loss report out today

Pat Flannery wrote:




The crew on the flight deck would certainly known that something was
seriously wrong as prior to break-up the Orbiter had gone into a flat
spin belly-first into its line of trajectory,


Even on the middeck it would have been very dramatic. I can imagine prior to
having entry suits, an astronaut could have gotten up and used the toilet
during entry, just like passengers on an airliner. During the initial pitch
up, they would have felt it in the seat of their pants. And, the Y force is
alway very small during nominal entry. Getting jerked sideways at a gee or
two....

No, they can look through the top windows from the rear seats on the
flight deck.


I was think their helmet might block their view and they used mirrors or the
video camera to look back. In the video I linked too, one astronaut
mentions to the other to grab a mirror. Getting out of the seat to get a
better view...

There was quite a bit of debris that left prior to loss of control, which
would have been pretty impressive in the plasma trail.
--
Craig Fink
Courtesy E-Mail Welcome @
  #10  
Old January 4th 09, 01:33 PM posted to sci.space.shuttle
John Doe
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Posts: 1,134
Default New Columbia loss report out today

About the crews's knowledge of the problem. During the flight, Houston
had told the crew that the media had been told of a piece of foam
falling off and not to be susprised if media asked about it, but that
this was not a concern for the orbiter.

Timeline: (GMT) [delta time]

13:44:09 Start of Entry Interface EI (400,000 feet alt, mach 24)
13:48:45 Video shows all 4 on flight deck seated/strapped in.
13:51:46 Negative trend begins
13:52:05 Yaw moment change due to increase drag.

13:52:17 Left brake line temp off nominal increase begins
13:53:10 4 Hydraulic temp sensors progressively offscale
13:53:36 4 Hydraulic temp sensors offscale. MCC realises problem.
13:53:38 Trend exceeds flight experience, but within the norm
13:53:45 Estimate of first debris shedding (ground video)
13:54:30 Some crew testing suit pressurisation.
13:58:19 Sharp divergence from previous flight experience
13:58:39 First fault message to crew. (Tire deflation)
13:58:48 Crew attemts to speak to Houston. Call broken.
13:59:06 Telemetry shows left main landing ger down.
13:59:32 Crew acknowledges call from MCC with "Roger, uh..."
13:59:32 Loss of Signal LOS
13:59:33 master alarm: FCS channel 4 bypassed
13:59:36 3rd RCD jet fires continuously. aileron trim 3°
13:59:36 Estimated time of loss of hydraulics.
13:59:37 3rd RCS jet fires continuously.
13:59:37 Ground video shows brightening event
13:59:37 Loss of Control LOC
13:59:46 Max pitch up
13:59:46 ROLL REF alarm.
14:00:01 RHC (hand controller/yoke) moved.
14:00:03 Autopilot re-engaged after the RHC move.
14:00:04 Cabin pressure still normal
14:00:18 Orbiter Breakup (Castrophic Event CE)
14:00:18 Loss of electrical power.
14:00:18 Probable start of depressurization.
14:00:25 Ground video: fore and aft bodies disctinct.
14:00:35 Latest start of depressurisation.
[00:35]
14:00:53 Crew Module Castrophic Event CMCE
14:00:59 Latest time for total depressurisation.
[00:17]
14:01:10 Crew module Total Dispersal TD
[33:50]
14:35:00 Ground impact (approx time)



CE: orbiter breaking apart in big chunks
CMCE: Crew module breakup

Between LOC and CE, cabin pressure was known to be normal and crew
capable of conscious actions.

From EI until LOS, normal G forces of up to 0.8 were experienced, crews
typically experience heaviness, dizziness and soetimes stomach awareness
or mild nausea.


At 13:48:45, the flight deck video indicates that the crew was not aware
of any problems.

At 13:52:05: Neither the yaw moment change nor the aileron trim change
was obvious to either the MCC or the crew as an off-nominal condition,
although post-accident analysis concluded that this was the first
indication of the orbiter’s response to the changing aerodynamic
properties brought about by the left wing damage.


For the hydraulic temperature sensors (from 13:53:10 to 13:53:36):
These temperature data were not available to the crew and the crew was
not notified of these indications. The loss of sensors generated
concern in the MCC, and investigation by the flight control team began
immediately.


At 13:58:39, crew got 4 alarms about tire deflation for main left
landing gear. Failure would be familiar and dealt with breaker reset.

At 13:59:06, the "main landing gear down" was detected as error with a
barberpole indicator. (doors still closed, but gear down indicated).

Based on training experience, the crew was probably attempting to
diagnose the situation given that it involved the same landing gear as
the tire pressure messages and indicated a potential landing gear
deployment problem.


To all on-board appearances, Columbia only had a potential issue with
landing gear deployment; a non-trivial event, but the crew had time to
troubleshoot the problem. Changing drag on the left wing was just
beginning to develop into a potentially recognizable problem.


For the 13:59:33 event, report states crew are trained to handle the
message about FCS-4 being taken out of the loop. But they may have
started to associate this with other problems.

It is unknown whether the increasing aileron
trim and thruster firings were noticed by the flight deck crew members.

At GMT 13:59:36 (EI+927), the third RCS yaw jet, R4R, began firing
continuously and aileron trim exceeded 3 degrees. There is no alarm
associated with a deviating trim condition, and the crew is not
expected to monitor the trim during this period of entry. At GMT
13:59:37 (EI+928), the fourth and last RCS yaw jet, R1R, began firing
continuously.

the 13:59:46 ROLL REF alarm indicates above normal orbiter drag.

##
For the crew, the first strong indications of the LOC would be lighting
and horizon changes seen through the windows and changes on the vehicle
attitude displays. Additionally, the forces experienced by the crew
changed significantly and began to differ from the nominal, expected
accelerations. The accelerations were translational (due to aerodynamic
drag) and angular (due to rotation of the orbiter). The translational
acceleration due to drag was dominant, and the direction was changing as
the orbiter attitude changed relative to the velocity vector (along the
direction of flight).
##
These motions might induce nausea, dizziness, and disorientation in crew
members, but they were not incapacitating. The total acceleration
experienced by the crew increased from approximately 0.8 G at LOC to
slightly more than 3 G by the CE
##


At LOC, one middeck crewmember was not yet fully strapped in. He would
have just completed post de-orbit tasks. Shuttle dynamics would have
likely forced other crewmembers to brace. The middeck crewmember did ot
fully strap in, and did not don his/her helmet.


Switches recovered from ground show the PLT was trying to fix the APU
problem.



The latest time for total depressurisation at 14:00:59 is not really
realistic since they state the crew module catastrophic event is at
14:00:53. The text does mention that total depressurisation likely
happened much earlier.


##
The change (from the crew's vantage point) from a nominal entry profile
to the LOC and subsequent separation of the forebody from the orbiter
all occurred in approximately 40 seconds. Experience shows that this is
not sufficient time to don gloves and helmets.
##




 




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