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Former Astronaut Says Shuttles Unfit for Service
(http://www.hindu.com/seta/2005/07/14...1400101600.htm)
Three-time shuttle astronaut George `Pinky' Nelson had the unique experience of flying the missions immediately before and after the 1986 Challenger accident, which saw a space shuttle dramatically break apart on lift-off. An astrophysicist by training, Nelson left NASA in 1989 and now directs the Science, Mathematics and Technology Education program at Western Washington University in Bellingham. .. . . . . WHAT WAS different about the first flight after an accident from the crew's point of view? Did your perception of the risk change? No. Actually, the flight before Challenger was really ragged. We had five launch attempts on the pad, and all kinds of technical problems. You could see things weren't going real well at that point. But when you're in the cockpit, you just want to go fly. And the flight after Challenger, we certainly knew that bad things can happen, but I felt that they had looked at everything twice and it was going to be a pretty safe mission. I had full confidence that if something got us, it wasn't going to be the O-rings (which failed on Challenger). So it's unlikely to be debris striking the wing this time, as it was on Columbia two years ago? Yes, that was really a fluke. (While NASA knew that debris often falls during launch, this was a big piece that hit a particularly vulnerable spot.) But there's no excuse for flying either Challenger when they knew the O-rings were a problem or Columbia when they knew they were losing material off the external tank. I don't fault the engineers, I fault management. This problem of debris falling is a problem that got them once. If they don't think they've got the problem fixed, I would worry. But they feel like they do. Do you think the shuttle programme is really fixed? No. It should have been put to bed 10 years ago. I mean, the shuttle's a marvellous machine, but it never worked out to be the operational spacecraft they hoped it would be, and they should have moved on. Are you happy with NASA's plan to build another vehicle to send people to the Moon and Mars? Yes. I don't think much of the space station, which has been NASA's focus for the past decade, and it will be nice to have another vehicle. I think the station's a marvellous engineering achievement, but it was sold as something else. There's no science being done on the space station. If anything, they should have built a platform around the moon or some place interesting. What about the current astronaut corps? There aren't many flight opportunities, but there are something like 100 active astronauts. Not very active (laughs). That's something they really ought to think hard about. How many astronauts do they really need for what they're trying to do? They still have the skill mix for their initial fantasies about the shuttle and the space station. That's what NASA hired them for, but they know it's not true. I feel sorry for those guys \u2014 the world's most talented people just going to meetings, sweating, living in the world's worst climate there in Houston. It doesn't seem right; they ought to at least move them to San Diego or something . I don't know what I would do if I were in their shoes, although there are still interesting things to do from an astronaut's point of view. Building the space station's got to be a hoot, a great mission. And servicing the Hubble Space Telescope \u2014 I think NASA administrator Mike Griffin will make a good call on that. What do you mean by "a good call?" I think if you're going to fly the shuttle at all, you ought to service the Hubble Space Telescope. It's got to be the number one priority. Here's something you can do for to science. I had no respect for former administrator Sean O'Keefe's decision-making on that (when he scrapped the servicing mission). He got burned by Columbia, and was trying to get rid of every mission he could. I don't think he realised NASA was an agency that actually did things. Can NASA be revitalised? I don't know. Right now NASA's getting by on inertia. Its centers are spread all over the country, and money's being spent, and the aerospace industry needs people. That's what's driving it all. They have no mission like saving the world from communism, like in the past. I would like to see the moon-Mars exploration programme happen. But we're spending a lot of money blowing up stucco in Iraq. It's hard to send aluminium into space when you're sending bricks and mortar 50 feet up. TONY REICHHARDT Nature News Service Printed in "The Hindu" newspaper sci-tech section 7/14/2005 .. . . . . . Words of a qualified, experienced insider - worth heeding. Ok ... the machines are overly complex and fragile, the engineers keep getting ignored by the management, the program has spread itself out so far and wide that it's becoming dissipated and there is no longer any sense of "mission" keeping everyone focused. This is all very BAD. Sounds as if we dumped twice as much money into this we'd just double the number of screwups (or do screwups scale exponentially, I can never remember). So the big question becomes "What Next ?". The shuttles never came close to living up to expectations. Dreadful attempts at "Do-it-all - but nothing well" committee and pork-barrel-driven engineering. Now, after a fraction of their supposed utility life they're creaky falling-apart death-traps that NASA hopes can be held together for a few more flight, given enough duct tape and super-glue. Two years of fixes, and they didn't even bother to replace those worn-out fuel sensors. "Oh we worried about problems with those ..." - well you had TWO YEARS guys ..... Clearly the fleet should be quickly decommissioned and shipped off to amusement parks for the kiddies to play on. Unfortunately it seems nobody actually has a decent REPLACEMENT in development, much less ready for timely deployment. Seeing everything that goes wrong with shuttles, any sane person would seek to employ the KISS principle when it comes to designing replacement lifter and passenger rockets. Alas, the whole thing is run by politicians, not engineers ... Maybe if China starts outshining us, maybe ... In any event, I'll hazard a few general proposals. First of all, have two kinds of vehicles - a big un-manned lifter and a passenger carrier - both of 'disposable' design. Sounds expensive, but then how much time and money get spent trying to refurbish shuttles ? Modular components could allow some systems and instrumentation to be re-used on the passenger carrier - strip the old one and put the parts into the new shell. The heavy lifter ... think something like an updated, simplfied, Saturn 1-B with an option for adding two or three SRBs for extra boost. Big booster, small 2nd stage, big cargo pod with maneuvering jets - all remote/program-controlled. Aim at something like 150% of the current shuttles lifting capability. The advances in materials and techniques OUGHT to yeild a booster that's essentially 100% reliable for the few minutes it has to operate and cheap enough (again, think modular & mass-manufacturing) that you don't mind dunking it into the ocean afterwards. The passenger lifter ... think of a really big Apollo or Soyuz that can carry up to ten people and enough supplies for three weeks. Use the same booster hardware as the heavy lifter as much as possible ... uniformity reduces errors because everyone knows what it's SUPPOSED to look/act like. Also reduces costs. Various mission-specific add-ons could be included - manipulating arms, satellite capture thingies, docking devices, whatever. If you don't need the arm, don't bring it. If you do, it should fit into a standard socket and electronic harness just like the other accessories. And KEEP IT SIMPLE STUPID ! Spartan, minimial, rugged, reparable, dependable. Don't try to make the vehicles do it all. It's quite possible to launch specialty packages - construction hardware and such - seperately, perhaps on Delta/Titan-class rockets if they're not too big. That way you will have what you need where you need it, when you need it without screwing-up your main work vehicles with ten thousand messy options that will screw up on you. In short, decide what you need early on and then STICK with the designs no matter what kind of political pressure is applied. The KISS fleet can be justified, defended and popularized. Americans like 'space' - they just don't like spending endless gigabucks on questionable, dangerous junk. Now I know American engineers can DO this ... but will their employers go along with programs that won't produce the lucrative cost-overruns they're used to ? IMHO these ideas can be sold in terms of profit derived from VOLUME production. Aerospace Inc has been doing much like early automobile makers did - build one-off machines one at a time, no two quite alike, everything hand-made and hand-fitted. This has got to END and more of a mass-production philosophy is desperately required. Instead of making one super-expensive billion-dollar vehicle a year, make ten or twenty fifty-million- dollar ones that are assembled largely by robots. The cost-savings in the manufacturing process will increase profits - resulting in manufacturers making MORE money than they get for the single super-expensive rocket. Finally, NASA needs to be re-organized, streamlined and concentrated on space missions. Dump as many bureaucrats as possible and try to find the kinds of practical can-do engineers that were around in the 60s (may have to import them from Russia and India, alas). Right now NASA is into too many kinds of projects. The projects may be worthy, but many should be handed-off to groups OTHER than NASA. Keep NASA "on-mission". Such focus will pay off. We CAN make space utilization both much cheaper AND much safer. We've put a fortune into the space program and now it's either time to make it PRACTICAL or just pretty much abandon the whole thing until warp-drive or whatever comes along. |
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Blackwater wrote: (http://www.hindu.com/seta/2005/07/14...1400101600.htm) Three-time shuttle astronaut George `Pinky' Nelson had the unique experience of flying the missions immediately before and after the 1986 Challenger accident, which saw a space shuttle dramatically break apart on lift-off. An astrophysicist by training, Nelson left NASA in 1989 and now directs the Science, Mathematics and Technology Education program at Western Washington University in Bellingham. . . . . . WHAT WAS different about the first flight after an accident from the crew's point of view? Did your perception of the risk change? No. Actually, the flight before Challenger was really ragged. We had five launch attempts on the pad, and all kinds of technical problems. You could see things weren't going real well at that point. But when you're in the cockpit, you just want to go fly. And the flight after Challenger, we certainly knew that bad things can happen, but I felt that they had looked at everything twice and it was going to be a pretty safe mission. I had full confidence that if something got us, it wasn't going to be the O-rings (which failed on Challenger). So it's unlikely to be debris striking the wing this time, as it was on Columbia two years ago? Yes, that was really a fluke. (While NASA knew that debris often falls during launch, this was a big piece that hit a particularly vulnerable spot.) But there's no excuse for flying either Challenger when they knew the O-rings were a problem or Columbia when they knew they were losing material off the external tank. I don't fault the engineers, I fault management. This problem of debris falling is a problem that got them once. If they don't think they've got the problem fixed, I would worry. But they feel like they do. Do you think the shuttle programme is really fixed? No. It should have been put to bed 10 years ago. I mean, the shuttle's a marvellous machine, but it never worked out to be the operational spacecraft they hoped it would be, and they should have moved on. Are you happy with NASA's plan to build another vehicle to send people to the Moon and Mars? Yes. I don't think much of the space station, which has been NASA's focus for the past decade, and it will be nice to have another vehicle. I think the station's a marvellous engineering achievement, but it was sold as something else. There's no science being done on the space station. If anything, they should have built a platform around the moon or some place interesting. What about the current astronaut corps? There aren't many flight opportunities, but there are something like 100 active astronauts. Not very active (laughs). That's something they really ought to think hard about. How many astronauts do they really need for what they're trying to do? They still have the skill mix for their initial fantasies about the shuttle and the space station. That's what NASA hired them for, but they know it's not true. I feel sorry for those guys \u2014 the world's most talented people just going to meetings, sweating, living in the world's worst climate there in Houston. It doesn't seem right; they ought to at least move them to San Diego or something . I don't know what I would do if I were in their shoes, although there are still interesting things to do from an astronaut's point of view. Building the space station's got to be a hoot, a great mission. And servicing the Hubble Space Telescope \u2014 I think NASA administrator Mike Griffin will make a good call on that. What do you mean by "a good call?" I think if you're going to fly the shuttle at all, you ought to service the Hubble Space Telescope. It's got to be the number one priority. Here's something you can do for to science. I had no respect for former administrator Sean O'Keefe's decision-making on that (when he scrapped the servicing mission). He got burned by Columbia, and was trying to get rid of every mission he could. I don't think he realised NASA was an agency that actually did things. Can NASA be revitalised? I don't know. Right now NASA's getting by on inertia. Its centers are spread all over the country, and money's being spent, and the aerospace industry needs people. That's what's driving it all. They have no mission like saving the world from communism, like in the past. I would like to see the moon-Mars exploration programme happen. But we're spending a lot of money blowing up stucco in Iraq. It's hard to send aluminium into space when you're sending bricks and mortar 50 feet up. TONY REICHHARDT Nature News Service Printed in "The Hindu" newspaper sci-tech section 7/14/2005 . . . . . . Words of a qualified, experienced insider - worth heeding. Ok ... the machines are overly complex and fragile, the engineers keep getting ignored by the management, the program has spread itself out so far and wide that it's becoming dissipated and there is no longer any sense of "mission" keeping everyone focused. This is all very BAD. Sounds as if we dumped twice as much money into this we'd just double the number of screwups (or do screwups scale exponentially, I can never remember). So the big question becomes "What Next ?". The shuttles never came close to living up to expectations. That's not true. NASA got whacked by severe and probably unfair budget cuts. In spite of that, they still managed to send a vehicle to space, that could return. This is no small achievement. But, yeah, we have to make space exploration a priority again to keep growing as a people. It takes a lot of focus and consensus. And what is the final goal? To explore and learn. And why is this bad? What happened to the concept of gaining knowledge? Oh yeah, the spreadsheet.... Dreadful attempts at "Do-it-all - but nothing well" committee and pork-barrel-driven engineering. Now, after a fraction of their supposed utility life they're creaky falling-apart death-traps that NASA hopes can be held together for a few more flight, given enough duct tape and super-glue. Two years of fixes, and they didn't even bother to replace those worn-out fuel sensors. "Oh we worried about problems with those ..." - well you had TWO YEARS guys ..... And they don't want it to happen again. Maybe they just need to be refreshed, reenergized. A little rock and roll music, if you please. Clearly the fleet should be quickly decommissioned and shipped off to amusement parks for the kiddies to play on. Unfortunately it seems nobody actually has a decent REPLACEMENT in development, much less ready for timely deployment. Seeing everything that goes wrong with shuttles, any sane person would seek to employ the KISS principle when it comes to designing replacement lifter and passenger rockets. Alas, the whole thing is run by politicians, not engineers ... Maybe if China starts outshining us, maybe ... In any event, I'll hazard a few general proposals. First of all, have two kinds of vehicles - a big un-manned lifter and a passenger carrier - both of 'disposable' design. Sounds expensive, but then how much time and money get spent trying to refurbish shuttles ? Modular components could allow some systems and instrumentation to be re-used on the passenger carrier - strip the old one and put the parts into the new shell. The heavy lifter ... think something like an updated, simplfied, Saturn 1-B with an option for adding two or three SRBs for extra boost. Big booster, small 2nd stage, big cargo pod with maneuvering jets - all remote/program-controlled. Aim at something like 150% of the current shuttles lifting capability. The advances in materials and techniques OUGHT to yeild a booster that's essentially 100% reliable for the few minutes it has to operate and cheap enough (again, think modular & mass-manufacturing) that you don't mind dunking it into the ocean afterwards. The passenger lifter ... think of a really big Apollo or Soyuz that can carry up to ten people and enough supplies for three weeks. Use the same booster hardware as the heavy lifter as much as possible ... uniformity reduces errors because everyone knows what it's SUPPOSED to look/act like. Also reduces costs. Various mission-specific add-ons could be included - manipulating arms, satellite capture thingies, docking devices, whatever. If you don't need the arm, don't bring it. If you do, it should fit into a standard socket and electronic harness just like the other accessories. And KEEP IT SIMPLE STUPID ! Spartan, minimial, rugged, reparable, dependable. Don't try to make the vehicles do it all. It's quite possible to launch specialty packages - construction hardware and such - seperately, perhaps on Delta/Titan-class rockets if they're not too big. That way you will have what you need where you need it, when you need it without screwing-up your main work vehicles with ten thousand messy options that will screw up on you. In short, decide what you need early on and then STICK with the designs no matter what kind of political pressure is applied. The KISS fleet can be justified, defended and popularized. Americans like 'space' - they just don't like spending endless gigabucks on questionable, dangerous junk. Now I know American engineers can DO this ... but will their employers go along with programs that won't produce the lucrative cost-overruns they're used to ? IMHO these ideas can be sold in terms of profit derived from VOLUME production. Aerospace Inc has been doing much like early automobile makers did - build one-off machines one at a time, no two quite alike, everything hand-made and hand-fitted. This has got to END and more of a mass-production philosophy is desperately required. Instead of making one super-expensive billion-dollar vehicle a year, make ten or twenty fifty-million- dollar ones that are assembled largely by robots. NO, by humans. Building spacecraft is an art. Duh. The cost-savings in the manufacturing process will increase profits - resulting in manufacturers making MORE money than they get for the single super-expensive rocket. See, cost controls are a good thing, but this driven by business is what ****ed them up in the first place. Work _with_the_creative_people, not against them. No one wants sloppy engineering or cost overuns, but you let business drive the art, and pretty soon you have businessman's art: see the record business. They killed it. SO the businessmen have to know their place. Finally, NASA needs to be re-organized, streamlined and concentrated on space missions. Dump as many bureaucrats as possible and try to find the kinds of practical can-do engineers that were around in the 60s (may have to import them from Russia and India, alas). Right now NASA is into too many kinds of projects. The projects may be worthy, but many should be handed-off to groups OTHER than NASA. Keep NASA "on-mission". Such focus will pay off. We CAN make space utilization both much cheaper AND much safer. We've put a fortune into the space program and now it's either time to make it PRACTICAL or just pretty much abandon the whole thing until warp-drive or whatever comes along. We must always explore, always expand. We die inside as a people when we stop learning, stop growing, stop exploring. Just look at any over 40 white American man.... |
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On 19 Jul 2005 12:40:59 -0700, "Miles and Carol Silverberg"
wrote: Blackwater wrote: (http://www.hindu.com/seta/2005/07/14...1400101600.htm) Three-time shuttle astronaut George `Pinky' Nelson had the unique experience of flying the missions immediately before and after the 1986 Challenger accident, which saw a space shuttle dramatically break apart on lift-off. An astrophysicist by training, Nelson left NASA in 1989 and now directs the Science, Mathematics and Technology Education program at Western Washington University in Bellingham. . . . . . WHAT WAS different about the first flight after an accident from the crew's point of view? Did your perception of the risk change? No. Actually, the flight before Challenger was really ragged. We had five launch attempts on the pad, and all kinds of technical problems. You could see things weren't going real well at that point. But when you're in the cockpit, you just want to go fly. And the flight after Challenger, we certainly knew that bad things can happen, but I felt that they had looked at everything twice and it was going to be a pretty safe mission. I had full confidence that if something got us, it wasn't going to be the O-rings (which failed on Challenger). So it's unlikely to be debris striking the wing this time, as it was on Columbia two years ago? Yes, that was really a fluke. (While NASA knew that debris often falls during launch, this was a big piece that hit a particularly vulnerable spot.) But there's no excuse for flying either Challenger when they knew the O-rings were a problem or Columbia when they knew they were losing material off the external tank. I don't fault the engineers, I fault management. This problem of debris falling is a problem that got them once. If they don't think they've got the problem fixed, I would worry. But they feel like they do. Do you think the shuttle programme is really fixed? No. It should have been put to bed 10 years ago. I mean, the shuttle's a marvellous machine, but it never worked out to be the operational spacecraft they hoped it would be, and they should have moved on. Are you happy with NASA's plan to build another vehicle to send people to the Moon and Mars? Yes. I don't think much of the space station, which has been NASA's focus for the past decade, and it will be nice to have another vehicle. I think the station's a marvellous engineering achievement, but it was sold as something else. There's no science being done on the space station. If anything, they should have built a platform around the moon or some place interesting. What about the current astronaut corps? There aren't many flight opportunities, but there are something like 100 active astronauts. Not very active (laughs). That's something they really ought to think hard about. How many astronauts do they really need for what they're trying to do? They still have the skill mix for their initial fantasies about the shuttle and the space station. That's what NASA hired them for, but they know it's not true. I feel sorry for those guys \u2014 the world's most talented people just going to meetings, sweating, living in the world's worst climate there in Houston. It doesn't seem right; they ought to at least move them to San Diego or something . I don't know what I would do if I were in their shoes, although there are still interesting things to do from an astronaut's point of view. Building the space station's got to be a hoot, a great mission. And servicing the Hubble Space Telescope \u2014 I think NASA administrator Mike Griffin will make a good call on that. What do you mean by "a good call?" I think if you're going to fly the shuttle at all, you ought to service the Hubble Space Telescope. It's got to be the number one priority. Here's something you can do for to science. I had no respect for former administrator Sean O'Keefe's decision-making on that (when he scrapped the servicing mission). He got burned by Columbia, and was trying to get rid of every mission he could. I don't think he realised NASA was an agency that actually did things. Can NASA be revitalised? I don't know. Right now NASA's getting by on inertia. Its centers are spread all over the country, and money's being spent, and the aerospace industry needs people. That's what's driving it all. They have no mission like saving the world from communism, like in the past. I would like to see the moon-Mars exploration programme happen. But we're spending a lot of money blowing up stucco in Iraq. It's hard to send aluminium into space when you're sending bricks and mortar 50 feet up. TONY REICHHARDT Nature News Service Printed in "The Hindu" newspaper sci-tech section 7/14/2005 . . . . . . Words of a qualified, experienced insider - worth heeding. Ok ... the machines are overly complex and fragile, the engineers keep getting ignored by the management, the program has spread itself out so far and wide that it's becoming dissipated and there is no longer any sense of "mission" keeping everyone focused. This is all very BAD. Sounds as if we dumped twice as much money into this we'd just double the number of screwups (or do screwups scale exponentially, I can never remember). So the big question becomes "What Next ?". The shuttles never came close to living up to expectations. That's not true. NASA got whacked by severe and probably unfair budget cuts. In spite of that, they still managed to send a vehicle to space, that could return. This is no small achievement. But, yeah, we have to make space exploration a priority again to keep growing as a people. It takes a lot of focus and consensus. And what is the final goal? To explore and learn. And why is this bad? What happened to the concept of gaining knowledge? Oh yeah, the spreadsheet.... Dreadful attempts at "Do-it-all - but nothing well" committee and pork-barrel-driven engineering. Now, after a fraction of their supposed utility life they're creaky falling-apart death-traps that NASA hopes can be held together for a few more flight, given enough duct tape and super-glue. Two years of fixes, and they didn't even bother to replace those worn-out fuel sensors. "Oh we worried about problems with those ..." - well you had TWO YEARS guys ..... And they don't want it to happen again. But can they prevent it ? Will the political administrators allow them, even if it's a technical possibility ? Maybe they just need to be refreshed, reenergized. A little rock and roll music, if you please. Less head-banger music please, more Bach ... Clearly the fleet should be quickly decommissioned and shipped off to amusement parks for the kiddies to play on. Unfortunately it seems nobody actually has a decent REPLACEMENT in development, much less ready for timely deployment. Seeing everything that goes wrong with shuttles, any sane person would seek to employ the KISS principle when it comes to designing replacement lifter and passenger rockets. Alas, the whole thing is run by politicians, not engineers ... Maybe if China starts outshining us, maybe ... In any event, I'll hazard a few general proposals. First of all, have two kinds of vehicles - a big un-manned lifter and a passenger carrier - both of 'disposable' design. Sounds expensive, but then how much time and money get spent trying to refurbish shuttles ? Modular components could allow some systems and instrumentation to be re-used on the passenger carrier - strip the old one and put the parts into the new shell. The heavy lifter ... think something like an updated, simplfied, Saturn 1-B with an option for adding two or three SRBs for extra boost. Big booster, small 2nd stage, big cargo pod with maneuvering jets - all remote/program-controlled. Aim at something like 150% of the current shuttles lifting capability. The advances in materials and techniques OUGHT to yeild a booster that's essentially 100% reliable for the few minutes it has to operate and cheap enough (again, think modular & mass-manufacturing) that you don't mind dunking it into the ocean afterwards. The passenger lifter ... think of a really big Apollo or Soyuz that can carry up to ten people and enough supplies for three weeks. Use the same booster hardware as the heavy lifter as much as possible ... uniformity reduces errors because everyone knows what it's SUPPOSED to look/act like. Also reduces costs. Various mission-specific add-ons could be included - manipulating arms, satellite capture thingies, docking devices, whatever. If you don't need the arm, don't bring it. If you do, it should fit into a standard socket and electronic harness just like the other accessories. And KEEP IT SIMPLE STUPID ! Spartan, minimial, rugged, reparable, dependable. Don't try to make the vehicles do it all. It's quite possible to launch specialty packages - construction hardware and such - seperately, perhaps on Delta/Titan-class rockets if they're not too big. That way you will have what you need where you need it, when you need it without screwing-up your main work vehicles with ten thousand messy options that will screw up on you. In short, decide what you need early on and then STICK with the designs no matter what kind of political pressure is applied. The KISS fleet can be justified, defended and popularized. Americans like 'space' - they just don't like spending endless gigabucks on questionable, dangerous junk. Now I know American engineers can DO this ... but will their employers go along with programs that won't produce the lucrative cost-overruns they're used to ? IMHO these ideas can be sold in terms of profit derived from VOLUME production. Aerospace Inc has been doing much like early automobile makers did - build one-off machines one at a time, no two quite alike, everything hand-made and hand-fitted. This has got to END and more of a mass-production philosophy is desperately required. Instead of making one super-expensive billion-dollar vehicle a year, make ten or twenty fifty-million- dollar ones that are assembled largely by robots. NO, by humans. Building spacecraft is an art. Duh. In case you didn't notice, most 'artists' are BAD artists ... Rockets and spacecraft should be cookie-cutter, modular, mass-producable, assembled almost entirely by machines that get it right and don't suffer from hang-overs or girfriend problems. My old man got a first-hand look at the smouldering wiring nightmare that was Apollo 1 shortly after they pulled out the corpses ... 'art' failed badly. Rocket science should be SCIENCE - Duh. The cost-savings in the manufacturing process will increase profits - resulting in manufacturers making MORE money than they get for the single super-expensive rocket. See, cost controls are a good thing, but this driven by business is what ****ed them up in the first place. Work _with_the_creative_people, not against them. Sounds great, but in PRACTICE it never seems to work out that way. Too many managers and politicians involved. So much money and prestige involved. Doing it right, employing creative solutions - those get lost in the process. The only solution is to build systems that are difficult to screw up even IF bureaucrats get involved. Indeed there needs to be a conspiracy on the part of the engineers to build bureaucrat-proof systems - from the harware on up. The answer to "We could save time/money by doing it this way ..." has to be "No, everything's arranged around doing it the RIGHT way and you can't change one part without changing everything else at a cost of years and billions". No one wants sloppy engineering or cost overuns, but you let business drive the art, and pretty soon you have businessman's art: see the record business. They killed it. SO the businessmen have to know their place. Unfortunately, businessmen control the MONEY ... so they often get determined to run things THEIR way even if it means engineers are expected to now say 2+2=5. Finally, NASA needs to be re-organized, streamlined and concentrated on space missions. Dump as many bureaucrats as possible and try to find the kinds of practical can-do engineers that were around in the 60s (may have to import them from Russia and India, alas). Right now NASA is into too many kinds of projects. The projects may be worthy, but many should be handed-off to groups OTHER than NASA. Keep NASA "on-mission". Such focus will pay off. We CAN make space utilization both much cheaper AND much safer. We've put a fortune into the space program and now it's either time to make it PRACTICAL or just pretty much abandon the whole thing until warp-drive or whatever comes along. We must always explore, always expand. Yea, but in a DC-3, not the Hindenburg ... We die inside as a people when we stop learning, stop growing, stop exploring. Just look at any over 40 white American man.... Moi ? I'm on my Harley every weekend, exploring new backroads and byways out in the boonies ... strange new worlds ..... |
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Blackwater wrote: (http://www.hindu.com/seta/2005/07/14...1400101600.htm) One reason the shuttle is an engineering nightmare was that funding was approved during the Vietnam War. Nixon would not approve any design which required R&D funding that exceeded 1.5 billion in any year. The original design had a piloted fly-back 1st stage attached in the same way as the External Tank. OTOH, it possibly wouldn't have worked for the same reason the AeroStar was cancelled: they couldn't design a re-usable LH2 tank. Three-time shuttle astronaut George `Pinky' Nelson had the unique experience of flying the missions immediately before and after the 1986 Challenger accident, which saw a space shuttle dramatically break apart on lift-off. An astrophysicist by training, Nelson left NASA in 1989 and now directs the Science, Mathematics and Technology Education program at Western Washington University in Bellingham. . . . . . WHAT WAS different about the first flight after an accident from the crew's point of view? Did your perception of the risk change? No. Actually, the flight before Challenger was really ragged. We had five launch attempts on the pad, and all kinds of technical problems. You could see things weren't going real well at that point. But when you're in the cockpit, you just want to go fly. And the flight after Challenger, we certainly knew that bad things can happen, but I felt that they had looked at everything twice and it was going to be a pretty safe mission. I had full confidence that if something got us, it wasn't going to be the O-rings (which failed on Challenger). So it's unlikely to be debris striking the wing this time, as it was on Columbia two years ago? Yes, that was really a fluke. (While NASA knew that debris often falls during launch, this was a big piece that hit a particularly vulnerable spot.) But there's no excuse for flying either Challenger when they knew the O-rings were a problem or Columbia when they knew they were losing material off the external tank. I don't fault the engineers, I fault management. This problem of debris falling is a problem that got them once. If they don't think they've got the problem fixed, I would worry. But they feel like they do. Do you think the shuttle programme is really fixed? No. It should have been put to bed 10 years ago. I mean, the shuttle's a marvellous machine, but it never worked out to be the operational spacecraft they hoped it would be, and they should have moved on. Are you happy with NASA's plan to build another vehicle to send people to the Moon and Mars? Yes. I don't think much of the space station, which has been NASA's focus for the past decade, and it will be nice to have another vehicle. I think the station's a marvellous engineering achievement, but it was sold as something else. There's no science being done on the space station. If anything, they should have built a platform around the moon or some place interesting. What about the current astronaut corps? There aren't many flight opportunities, but there are something like 100 active astronauts. Not very active (laughs). That's something they really ought to think hard about. How many astronauts do they really need for what they're trying to do? They still have the skill mix for their initial fantasies about the shuttle and the space station. That's what NASA hired them for, but they know it's not true. I feel sorry for those guys \u2014 the world's most talented people just going to meetings, sweating, living in the world's worst climate there in Houston. It doesn't seem right; they ought to at least move them to San Diego or something . I don't know what I would do if I were in their shoes, although there are still interesting things to do from an astronaut's point of view. Building the space station's got to be a hoot, a great mission. And servicing the Hubble Space Telescope \u2014 I think NASA administrator Mike Griffin will make a good call on that. What do you mean by "a good call?" I think if you're going to fly the shuttle at all, you ought to service the Hubble Space Telescope. It's got to be the number one priority. Here's something you can do for to science. I had no respect for former administrator Sean O'Keefe's decision-making on that (when he scrapped the servicing mission). He got burned by Columbia, and was trying to get rid of every mission he could. I don't think he realised NASA was an agency that actually did things. Can NASA be revitalised? I don't know. Right now NASA's getting by on inertia. Its centers are spread all over the country, and money's being spent, and the aerospace industry needs people. That's what's driving it all. They have no mission like saving the world from communism, like in the past. I would like to see the moon-Mars exploration programme happen. But we're spending a lot of money blowing up stucco in Iraq. It's hard to send aluminium into space when you're sending bricks and mortar 50 feet up. TONY REICHHARDT Nature News Service Printed in "The Hindu" newspaper sci-tech section 7/14/2005 . . . . . . Words of a qualified, experienced insider - worth heeding. Ok ... the machines are overly complex and fragile, the engineers keep getting ignored by the management, the program has spread itself out so far and wide that it's becoming dissipated and there is no longer any sense of "mission" keeping everyone focused. This is all very BAD. Sounds as if we dumped twice as much money into this we'd just double the number of screwups (or do screwups scale exponentially, I can never remember). So the big question becomes "What Next ?". The shuttles never came close to living up to expectations. Dreadful attempts at "Do-it-all - but nothing well" committee and pork-barrel-driven engineering. Now, after a fraction of their supposed utility life they're creaky falling-apart death-traps that NASA hopes can be held together for a few more flight, given enough duct tape and super-glue. Two years of fixes, and they didn't even bother to replace those worn-out fuel sensors. "Oh we worried about problems with those ..." - well you had TWO YEARS guys ..... As many others have pointed out, the early years of aviation is filled with crashes that killed pilots and crews, and early passenger flying also killed thousands of civilians. The real problem with the shuttle isn't its inherent dangerousness, it's the cost of each accident. The military still suffers non-combat aviation accidents but no one demands an end to this dangerous technology. You're one of those kinds who walks into a dark room, lights a match, and yells, "Fire, fire." IOW, you know better than the drivel you post, you just like playing arsonist. Clearly the fleet should be quickly decommissioned and shipped off to amusement parks for the kiddies to play on. Unfortunately it seems nobody actually has a decent REPLACEMENT in development, much less ready for timely deployment. Seeing everything that goes wrong with shuttles, any sane person would seek to employ the KISS principle when it comes to designing replacement lifter and passenger rockets. Alas, the whole thing is run by politicians, not engineers ... Maybe if China starts outshining us, maybe ... In any event, I'll hazard a few general proposals. First of all, have two kinds of vehicles - a big un-manned lifter and a passenger carrier - both of 'disposable' design. Sounds expensive, but then how much time and money get spent trying to refurbish shuttles ? Modular components could allow some systems and instrumentation to be re-used on the passenger carrier - strip the old one and put the parts into the new shell. The heavy lifter ... think something like an updated, simplfied, Saturn 1-B with an option for adding two or three SRBs for extra boost. Big booster, small 2nd stage, big cargo pod with maneuvering jets - all remote/program-controlled. Aim at something like 150% of the current shuttles lifting capability. The advances in materials and techniques OUGHT to yeild a booster that's essentially 100% reliable for the few minutes it has to operate and cheap enough (again, think modular & mass-manufacturing) that you don't mind dunking it into the ocean afterwards. The passenger lifter ... think of a really big Apollo or Soyuz that can carry up to ten people and enough supplies for three weeks. Use the same booster hardware as the heavy lifter as much as possible ... uniformity reduces errors because everyone knows what it's SUPPOSED to look/act like. Also reduces costs. Various mission-specific add-ons could be included - manipulating arms, satellite capture thingies, docking devices, whatever. If you don't need the arm, don't bring it. If you do, it should fit into a standard socket and electronic harness just like the other accessories. And KEEP IT SIMPLE STUPID ! Spartan, minimial, rugged, reparable, dependable. Don't try to make the vehicles do it all. It's quite possible to launch specialty packages - construction hardware and such - seperately, perhaps on Delta/Titan-class rockets if they're not too big. That way you will have what you need where you need it, when you need it without screwing-up your main work vehicles with ten thousand messy options that will screw up on you. In short, decide what you need early on and then STICK with the designs no matter what kind of political pressure is applied. The KISS fleet can be justified, defended and popularized. Americans like 'space' - they just don't like spending endless gigabucks on questionable, dangerous junk. Now I know American engineers can DO this ... but will their employers go along with programs that won't produce the lucrative cost-overruns they're used to ? IMHO these ideas can be sold in terms of profit derived from VOLUME production. Aerospace Inc has been doing much like early automobile makers did - build one-off machines one at a time, no two quite alike, everything hand-made and hand-fitted. This has got to END and more of a mass-production philosophy is desperately required. Instead of making one super-expensive billion-dollar vehicle a year, make ten or twenty fifty-million- dollar ones that are assembled largely by robots. The cost-savings in the manufacturing process will increase profits - resulting in manufacturers making MORE money than they get for the single super-expensive rocket. Finally, NASA needs to be re-organized, streamlined and concentrated on space missions. Dump as many bureaucrats as possible and try to find the kinds of practical can-do engineers that were around in the 60s (may have to import them from Russia and India, alas). Right now NASA is into too many kinds of projects. The projects may be worthy, but many should be handed-off to groups OTHER than NASA. Keep NASA "on-mission". Such focus will pay off. We CAN make space utilization both much cheaper AND much safer. We've put a fortune into the space program and now it's either time to make it PRACTICAL or just pretty much abandon the whole thing until warp-drive or whatever comes along. |
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On 20 Jul 2005 09:48:44 -0700, "Name Redacted"
wrote: Blackwater wrote: (http://www.hindu.com/seta/2005/07/14...1400101600.htm) One reason the shuttle is an engineering nightmare was that funding was approved during the Vietnam War. Nixon would not approve any design which required R&D funding that exceeded 1.5 billion in any year. The original design had a piloted fly-back 1st stage attached in the same way as the External Tank. OTOH, it possibly wouldn't have worked for the same reason the AeroStar was cancelled: they couldn't design a re-usable LH2 tank. Frankly, a piloted (or even auto/remote-piloted) fly-back 1st stage seems ridiculous. Some engineers were told to run with the 'reusability' concept as far as they could possibly go ... and this is what emerged. Three-time shuttle astronaut George `Pinky' Nelson had the unique experience of flying the missions immediately before and after the 1986 Challenger accident, which saw a space shuttle dramatically break apart on lift-off. An astrophysicist by training, Nelson left NASA in 1989 and now directs the Science, Mathematics and Technology Education program at Western Washington University in Bellingham. . . . . . WHAT WAS different about the first flight after an accident from the crew's point of view? Did your perception of the risk change? No. Actually, the flight before Challenger was really ragged. We had five launch attempts on the pad, and all kinds of technical problems. You could see things weren't going real well at that point. But when you're in the cockpit, you just want to go fly. And the flight after Challenger, we certainly knew that bad things can happen, but I felt that they had looked at everything twice and it was going to be a pretty safe mission. I had full confidence that if something got us, it wasn't going to be the O-rings (which failed on Challenger). So it's unlikely to be debris striking the wing this time, as it was on Columbia two years ago? Yes, that was really a fluke. (While NASA knew that debris often falls during launch, this was a big piece that hit a particularly vulnerable spot.) But there's no excuse for flying either Challenger when they knew the O-rings were a problem or Columbia when they knew they were losing material off the external tank. I don't fault the engineers, I fault management. This problem of debris falling is a problem that got them once. If they don't think they've got the problem fixed, I would worry. But they feel like they do. Do you think the shuttle programme is really fixed? No. It should have been put to bed 10 years ago. I mean, the shuttle's a marvellous machine, but it never worked out to be the operational spacecraft they hoped it would be, and they should have moved on. Are you happy with NASA's plan to build another vehicle to send people to the Moon and Mars? Yes. I don't think much of the space station, which has been NASA's focus for the past decade, and it will be nice to have another vehicle. I think the station's a marvellous engineering achievement, but it was sold as something else. There's no science being done on the space station. If anything, they should have built a platform around the moon or some place interesting. What about the current astronaut corps? There aren't many flight opportunities, but there are something like 100 active astronauts. Not very active (laughs). That's something they really ought to think hard about. How many astronauts do they really need for what they're trying to do? They still have the skill mix for their initial fantasies about the shuttle and the space station. That's what NASA hired them for, but they know it's not true. I feel sorry for those guys \u2014 the world's most talented people just going to meetings, sweating, living in the world's worst climate there in Houston. It doesn't seem right; they ought to at least move them to San Diego or something . I don't know what I would do if I were in their shoes, although there are still interesting things to do from an astronaut's point of view. Building the space station's got to be a hoot, a great mission. And servicing the Hubble Space Telescope \u2014 I think NASA administrator Mike Griffin will make a good call on that. What do you mean by "a good call?" I think if you're going to fly the shuttle at all, you ought to service the Hubble Space Telescope. It's got to be the number one priority. Here's something you can do for to science. I had no respect for former administrator Sean O'Keefe's decision-making on that (when he scrapped the servicing mission). He got burned by Columbia, and was trying to get rid of every mission he could. I don't think he realised NASA was an agency that actually did things. Can NASA be revitalised? I don't know. Right now NASA's getting by on inertia. Its centers are spread all over the country, and money's being spent, and the aerospace industry needs people. That's what's driving it all. They have no mission like saving the world from communism, like in the past. I would like to see the moon-Mars exploration programme happen. But we're spending a lot of money blowing up stucco in Iraq. It's hard to send aluminium into space when you're sending bricks and mortar 50 feet up. TONY REICHHARDT Nature News Service Printed in "The Hindu" newspaper sci-tech section 7/14/2005 . . . . . . Words of a qualified, experienced insider - worth heeding. Ok ... the machines are overly complex and fragile, the engineers keep getting ignored by the management, the program has spread itself out so far and wide that it's becoming dissipated and there is no longer any sense of "mission" keeping everyone focused. This is all very BAD. Sounds as if we dumped twice as much money into this we'd just double the number of screwups (or do screwups scale exponentially, I can never remember). So the big question becomes "What Next ?". The shuttles never came close to living up to expectations. Dreadful attempts at "Do-it-all - but nothing well" committee and pork-barrel-driven engineering. Now, after a fraction of their supposed utility life they're creaky falling-apart death-traps that NASA hopes can be held together for a few more flight, given enough duct tape and super-glue. Two years of fixes, and they didn't even bother to replace those worn-out fuel sensors. "Oh we worried about problems with those ..." - well you had TWO YEARS guys ..... As many others have pointed out, the early years of aviation is filled with crashes that killed pilots and crews, and early passenger flying also killed thousands of civilians. The real problem with the shuttle isn't its inherent dangerousness, it's the cost of each accident. The military still suffers non-combat aviation accidents but no one demands an end to this dangerous technology. The cost of each accident IS extremely high ... but the CAUSES of each accident (and nearly-averted ones) point to weaknesses in the design, be they structural, conceptural or systemic. It is a VASTLY more complicated machine than a 737 jetliner and the consequences of many kinds of failures can be spectacular. A 737 can usually limp to an airport if something goes wrong (in truth, a ancient DC3 is even more robust). Yes, spacecraft ARE going to be more complex than a jetliner, no getting around that. Thing is that every added speck of complexity is something else to go wrong, something else that's hard to predict or diagnose. We reach a point where it's just not PRACTICAL to do everything necessary to keep each part and system in perfect running order. You're one of those kinds who walks into a dark room, lights a match, and yells, "Fire, fire." IOW, you know better than the drivel you post, you just like playing arsonist. Well, I *am* shouting 'fire' ... because there IS a fire, so to speak. Junk 'em. Start again. Do better. That's what they did for all those not-so-good aircraft designs and that's what they need to do with the shuttle fleet. Clearly the fleet should be quickly decommissioned and shipped off to amusement parks for the kiddies to play on. Unfortunately it seems nobody actually has a decent REPLACEMENT in development, much less ready for timely deployment. Seeing everything that goes wrong with shuttles, any sane person would seek to employ the KISS principle when it comes to designing replacement lifter and passenger rockets. Alas, the whole thing is run by politicians, not engineers ... Maybe if China starts outshining us, maybe ... In any event, I'll hazard a few general proposals. First of all, have two kinds of vehicles - a big un-manned lifter and a passenger carrier - both of 'disposable' design. Sounds expensive, but then how much time and money get spent trying to refurbish shuttles ? Modular components could allow some systems and instrumentation to be re-used on the passenger carrier - strip the old one and put the parts into the new shell. The heavy lifter ... think something like an updated, simplfied, Saturn 1-B with an option for adding two or three SRBs for extra boost. Big booster, small 2nd stage, big cargo pod with maneuvering jets - all remote/program-controlled. Aim at something like 150% of the current shuttles lifting capability. The advances in materials and techniques OUGHT to yeild a booster that's essentially 100% reliable for the few minutes it has to operate and cheap enough (again, think modular & mass-manufacturing) that you don't mind dunking it into the ocean afterwards. The passenger lifter ... think of a really big Apollo or Soyuz that can carry up to ten people and enough supplies for three weeks. Use the same booster hardware as the heavy lifter as much as possible ... uniformity reduces errors because everyone knows what it's SUPPOSED to look/act like. Also reduces costs. Various mission-specific add-ons could be included - manipulating arms, satellite capture thingies, docking devices, whatever. If you don't need the arm, don't bring it. If you do, it should fit into a standard socket and electronic harness just like the other accessories. And KEEP IT SIMPLE STUPID ! Spartan, minimial, rugged, reparable, dependable. Don't try to make the vehicles do it all. It's quite possible to launch specialty packages - construction hardware and such - seperately, perhaps on Delta/Titan-class rockets if they're not too big. That way you will have what you need where you need it, when you need it without screwing-up your main work vehicles with ten thousand messy options that will screw up on you. In short, decide what you need early on and then STICK with the designs no matter what kind of political pressure is applied. The KISS fleet can be justified, defended and popularized. Americans like 'space' - they just don't like spending endless gigabucks on questionable, dangerous junk. Now I know American engineers can DO this ... but will their employers go along with programs that won't produce the lucrative cost-overruns they're used to ? IMHO these ideas can be sold in terms of profit derived from VOLUME production. Aerospace Inc has been doing much like early automobile makers did - build one-off machines one at a time, no two quite alike, everything hand-made and hand-fitted. This has got to END and more of a mass-production philosophy is desperately required. Instead of making one super-expensive billion-dollar vehicle a year, make ten or twenty fifty-million- dollar ones that are assembled largely by robots. The cost-savings in the manufacturing process will increase profits - resulting in manufacturers making MORE money than they get for the single super-expensive rocket. Finally, NASA needs to be re-organized, streamlined and concentrated on space missions. Dump as many bureaucrats as possible and try to find the kinds of practical can-do engineers that were around in the 60s (may have to import them from Russia and India, alas). Right now NASA is into too many kinds of projects. The projects may be worthy, but many should be handed-off to groups OTHER than NASA. Keep NASA "on-mission". Such focus will pay off. We CAN make space utilization both much cheaper AND much safer. We've put a fortune into the space program and now it's either time to make it PRACTICAL or just pretty much abandon the whole thing until warp-drive or whatever comes along. |
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Name Redacted wrote:
One reason the shuttle is an engineering nightmare was that funding was approved during the Vietnam War. Nixon would not approve any design which required R&D funding that exceeded 1.5 billion in any year. The original design had a piloted fly-back 1st stage attached in the same way as the External Tank. OTOH, it possibly wouldn't have worked for the same reason the AeroStar was cancelled: they couldn't design a re-usable LH2 tank. There were many designs looked at. The one you see the most pictures of had the first stage (winged) under the second stage. The first stage burned RP-1 (a kind of kerosene), not hydrogen. BTW, even the shuttle that was built had a real hard time justifying its development cost; the more expensive completely reusable version would have been an even tougher sell. Of course, even the shuttle-as-built never lived up to the grossly overblown promises. It could have been that a reusable first stage with an expendable second stage could have stayed within budget, and actually have been useful. Paul |
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Paul F. Dietz wrote: Name Redacted wrote: One reason the shuttle is an engineering nightmare was that funding was approved during the Vietnam War. Nixon would not approve any design which required R&D funding that exceeded 1.5 billion in any year. The original design had a piloted fly-back 1st stage attached in the same way as the External Tank. OTOH, it possibly wouldn't have worked for the same reason the AeroStar was cancelled: they couldn't design a re-usable LH2 tank.. There were many designs looked at. The one you see the most pictures of had the first stage (winged) under the second stage. I've see those, but the design I understood had been submitted to Nixon had a much larger shuttle-like fly-back first stage and a second stage orbiter. They were connected underbelly to underbelly. I don't recall fuels but I assume they'd be the same: it seemed like plan called for to the first stage pump replacement fuel into the orbiter's fuel tanks until disconnect. The first stage burned RP-1 (a kind of kerosene), not hydrogen. BTW, even the shuttle that was built had a real hard time justifying its development cost; the more expensive completely reusable version would have been an even tougher sell. Of course, even the shuttle-as-built never lived up to the grossly overblown promises. It could have been that a reusable first stage with an expendable second stage could have stayed within budget, and actually have been useful. Kind of a reinforced Saturn V first stage? Didn't it have little wings on the bottom??? (Ok, that was a joke.) Paul |
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Paul F. Dietz wrote: It could have been that a reusable first stage with an expendable second stage could have stayed within budget, and actually have been useful. I don't know about that- the orbital stage would have had all the TPS concerns and high maintenance requirements of our present Shuttle Orbiter, and the winged first stage would have still needed a pretty sophisticated TPS at its descent speeds, after separating from the orbiter. Between the two you would have had a great deal of between flight maintenance time to check everything out, and that might have more that equaled the costs associated with the expendable ET and (semi-reusable) SRBs. Although you could have made the lower component into one hell of a suborbital bomber or reconnaissance aircraft. I wonder if the lower component itself could have achieved orbit if unencumbered by the weight and drag of the orbiter? Given the usual weight growth associated with orbital spaceplanes (Dyna-Soar and Hermes come immediately to mind), the whole project might have flopped due to too-optimistic calculations regarding the weight of both components. The lower booster component would have been a very major engineering challenge in its own right, and the orbiter's cargo bay size was nothing to get excited about, due to the need for the orbiter to carry its propellants internally. I still think the Lockheed Star Clipper would have been the way to go. |
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Name Redacted wrote: I've see those, but the design I understood had been submitted to Nixon had a much larger shuttle-like fly-back first stage and a second stage orbiter. They were connected underbelly to underbelly. I don't recall fuels but I assume they'd be the same: it seemed like plan called for to the first stage pump replacement fuel into the orbiter's fuel tanks until disconnect. There's an illustrated discussion of the layouts he http://history.nasa.gov/SP-4221/ch5.htm Pat |
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