Ronald Reagan mostly responsible for the space shuttle challenger tragedy. Gotta beat those Ruskies

[ Newsgroups: trimmed to s.s.h. ]

LaDonna Wyss wrote:

(LaDonna Wyss) wrote in message

[ snip ]

Like it or not, Challenger is on NASA.

I was scanning through to see what other "intelligent" posts have been
made in the past 24 hours, and I notice NO ONE has posted to this one
since I wrote this reply.

Because there was no particular reason to.

NASA screwed up big time on Challenger, that's well documented, it's been
discussed, and it's not in doubt.


Amazing how the Peanut Gallery shuts up when they can no longer defend
NASA....

Let's see, today you wrote ...

I don't have time, energy, nor desire at the moment to play games;
I've got too much going on with the fire today to deal with it.

.... and you have not answered the technical questions put to you about Apollo
AS-204.

But you wish to know talk about Challenger and expect responses to that?

If it makes you feel better, NASA screwed up on AS-204, STS-107, MPL, MCO,
WIRE, Galileo, MER, ...

.... and you can read about lots more screwups in their public NASA Lessons
Learned database, on their history pages, etc. to maximize your enjoyment.

Now, please answer the technical questions about your "investigation."


--
rk, Just an OldEngineer
"Dealing properly with very rare events is one of the attributes that
distinguishes a design that is fit for safety-critical systems from one that
is not." -- John Rushby in "A Comparison of Bus Architectures for Safety-
Critical Embedded Systems," March 2003

"Scott Hedrick" wrote in message ...
"LaDonna Wyss" wrote in message
om...
I HATE like you-know-what to be a NASA apologist
here

But you're so *good* at being an apologist- just ask Betty!

Forget for a moment
about o-rings and other theories. IT WAS TOO COLD!!!

At the time, there was no data that it was too cold to launch, and without
such data that would not have been a good reason to cancel the launch. What
*would* have been a good reason, and in fact was the reason why some
engineers pushed for the cancellation, was that there was no data (not even
test data) that supported launches under the existing temperature
conditions. In short, it's not that there was no data against it, it was a
bad idea to launch because there was no data *for* it. If, for example, it
was humidity and not temperature that was the issue, there would rightfully
have been less concern, because humidity hadn't shown itself to be a factor.
There *was* data showing the effects of differing temperatures, but there
was none for as low as the temperature was that morning. Perhaps it's the
engineer in my soul, but with the launch conditions outside of the known
range of success, if the boring eggheads had been in charge, Challenger
would still be flying. Whoever said "take off your engineering hat and put
on your management hat" should have been forced to personally crawl from
whereever he said that to the home of each of the relatives of the
astronauts and personally deliver an apology. Something you might seriously
consider spending some time contemplating, LaToya, is that changing hats
doesn't change the data. *That* is why we ask for verifiable references. We
want to see the data *without* your spin. A refusal to consider the evidence
against the preferred result then killed people, and in your case, it makes
you look like a kook.

Like it or not, Challenger is on NASA.

And some of it was on the beach, and some of it was in the water, and some
of it is on the sea floor...

You have just proven beyond question your stupidity. Protocol is
there for a reason. It is not up to anyone at NASA to decide whether
or not he "doesn't know" it's too cold. PROTOCOL SAID IT WAS TOO
COLD! Protocol says don't launch, you DON'T LAUNCH! (Don't tell me
YOU were the dimwit who made that call?)
LaDonna

From Scott Hedrick:
"LaDonna Wyss" wrote
I HATE like you-know-what to be a NASA apologist
here

But you're so *good* at being an apologist- just ask Betty!

Forget for a moment
about o-rings and other theories. IT WAS TOO COLD!!!

At the time, there was no data that it was too cold to launch, and without
such data that would not have been a good reason to cancel the launch. What
*would* have been a good reason, and in fact was the reason why some
engineers pushed for the cancellation, was that there was no data (not even
test data) that supported launches under the existing temperature
conditions. In short, it's not that there was no data against it, it was a
bad idea to launch because there was no data *for* it. If, for example, it
was humidity and not temperature that was the issue, there would rightfully
have been less concern, because humidity hadn't shown itself to be a factor.
There *was* data showing the effects of differing temperatures, but there
was none for as low as the temperature was that morning. Perhaps it's the
engineer in my soul, but with the launch conditions outside of the known
range of success, if the boring eggheads had been in charge, Challenger
would still be flying. Whoever said "take off your engineering hat and put
on your management hat" should have been forced to personally crawl from
whereever he said that to the home of each of the relatives of the
astronauts and personally deliver an apology. Something you might seriously
consider spending some time contemplating, LaToya, is that changing hats
doesn't change the data. *That* is why we ask for verifiable references. We
want to see the data *without* your spin. A refusal to consider the evidence
against the preferred result then killed people, and in your case, it makes
you look like a kook.

I happen to see:

"IT WAS TOO COLD!!!", and

"...it was a bad idea to launch because there was no data *for* it."

as one and the same argument.

There is definite agreement in finding fault with MOD. Why they have
never been pressed to this extent (formally, at least) is astounding.


As far as the statement about switching hats from engineering to
management, I see that as *perfectly legitimate*. If you honor every
engineering concern about hazards to launch, you will NEVER LAUNCH.
Engineers get paid to look at all the details. Managers get paid to
decide what details are important and which need to be ignored so that
the job can get done.

People who are dismayed by that famous quote are ignorant to the
necessities of proper management.

Engineers define the risk. Managers accept the risk.


The problem with 51-L is that managers accepted the risk that
engineers defined as *out of bounds*. THAT is the travesty of
Challenger. What makes it worse is that MOD went along with that
horrendous management decision.

What makes it worse ^2 is that no one seems to care about MOD's
culpability.



One can speculate that if MOD was not exhonorated in 51-L, then they
might have felt more accountability about the -107 launch decision.

In this light, fault for Columbia can be placed in part on the Rogers
Commission themselves. If Neil, Sally and the gang had any
reservations about their report being sanitized with respect to MOD, I
expect that on the moring of February 1st, 2003, they felt a pang of
regret for not having squawked louder about it.


~ CT

"LaDonna Wyss" wrote in message
om...
I was scanning through to see what other "intelligent" posts have been
made in the past 24 hours, and I notice NO ONE has posted to this one
since I wrote this reply.

That's because, when checking for intelligent posts, it gets filtered out.

How's your "team" these days?

"LaDonna Wyss" wrote in message
om...
You have just proven beyond question your stupidity.

Yeah, I guess it was stupid of me to assume you were intelligent enough to
understand my post, which actually supported you.

Protocol is
there for a reason.

Yes, it is- why don't you follow it?

PROTOCOL SAID IT WAS TOO
COLD!

Which protocol? If you know what the protocol said, then you must have read
it. Please provide a reference.

"Stuf4" wrote in message
om...

Engineers define the risk. Managers accept the risk.



Assuming that's true (and I think there's a good argument for it), you don't
have the same group play both roles.

(for example, in most (perhaps all?) med-flight operations, the pilot is
required to make a go/no-go decision regarding weather conditions/safety,
etc. BEFORE learning of the patient and status. One too many cases of,
"well, it's a little boy dying, let's push the limits.)

"LaDonna Wyss" wrote
You have just proven beyond question your stupidity. Protocol is
there for a reason. It is not up to anyone at NASA to decide whether
or not he "doesn't know" it's too cold. PROTOCOL SAID IT WAS TOO
COLD! Protocol says don't launch, you DON'T LAUNCH! (Don't tell me
YOU were the dimwit who made that call?)
LaDonna

This is not the way that responsible operators understand and use these
concepts.

The reason not to launch that morning was that it had not been shown by
testing
that it would be safe to launch under such conditions.

There was no existing protocol or 'flight rule' or
'launch commit criterion that said "Do NOT launch".

Your obvious sincerity is matched by your obvious ignorance and
self-certainty.

But your contribution to understanding this and the Apollo-204 catastrophe
so far is zero,
because of overwhelming flaws in your attitude.

Jim O
www.jamesoberg.com

(Stuf4) wrote in message . com...
From Scott Hedrick:
"LaDonna Wyss" wrote
I HATE like you-know-what to be a NASA apologist
here

But you're so *good* at being an apologist- just ask Betty!

Forget for a moment
about o-rings and other theories. IT WAS TOO COLD!!!

At the time, there was no data that it was too cold to launch, and without
such data that would not have been a good reason to cancel the launch. What
*would* have been a good reason, and in fact was the reason why some
engineers pushed for the cancellation, was that there was no data (not even
test data) that supported launches under the existing temperature
conditions. In short, it's not that there was no data against it, it was a
bad idea to launch because there was no data *for* it. If, for example, it
was humidity and not temperature that was the issue, there would rightfully
have been less concern, because humidity hadn't shown itself to be a factor.
There *was* data showing the effects of differing temperatures, but there
was none for as low as the temperature was that morning. Perhaps it's the
engineer in my soul, but with the launch conditions outside of the known
range of success, if the boring eggheads had been in charge, Challenger
would still be flying. Whoever said "take off your engineering hat and put
on your management hat" should have been forced to personally crawl from
whereever he said that to the home of each of the relatives of the
astronauts and personally deliver an apology. Something you might seriously
consider spending some time contemplating, LaToya, is that changing hats
doesn't change the data. *That* is why we ask for verifiable references. We
want to see the data *without* your spin. A refusal to consider the evidence
against the preferred result then killed people, and in your case, it makes
you look like a kook.

I happen to see:

"IT WAS TOO COLD!!!", and

"...it was a bad idea to launch because there was no data *for* it."

as one and the same argument.

There is definite agreement in finding fault with MOD. Why they have
never been pressed to this extent (formally, at least) is astounding.


As far as the statement about switching hats from engineering to
management, I see that as *perfectly legitimate*. If you honor every
engineering concern about hazards to launch, you will NEVER LAUNCH.
Engineers get paid to look at all the details. Managers get paid to
decide what details are important and which need to be ignored so that
the job can get done.

People who are dismayed by that famous quote are ignorant to the
necessities of proper management.

Engineers define the risk. Managers accept the risk.


The problem with 51-L is that managers accepted the risk that
engineers defined as *out of bounds*. THAT is the travesty of
Challenger. What makes it worse is that MOD went along with that
horrendous management decision.

What makes it worse ^2 is that no one seems to care about MOD's
culpability.



One can speculate that if MOD was not exhonorated in 51-L, then they
might have felt more accountability about the -107 launch decision.

In this light, fault for Columbia can be placed in part on the Rogers
Commission themselves. If Neil, Sally and the gang had any
reservations about their report being sanitized with respect to MOD, I
expect that on the moring of February 1st, 2003, they felt a pang of
regret for not having squawked louder about it.


~ CT

Agreed.
LaDonna

(Stuf4) wrote in message
. com...
From Scott Hedrick:
I happen to see:

"IT WAS TOO COLD!!!", and

"...it was a bad idea to launch because there was no data *for* it."

as one and the same argument.

*Almost*. It was not wrong to launch because it was too cold- it was wrong
to launch because there was no data to support a launch decision, since the
temperature was out of the known range of prior launches. It's the lack of
data, not the temperature itself, which is important in this case- the same
no-go condition would exist if the temperature was greater than that
experienced during previous launches. Considering the potential results, a
proper decision mode would be to *not* launch *unless* the known data
supports launching. NASA had started launching until the data said don't
launch, which may or may not be good for an unmanned experimental launcher
(how else do you get data?), but is very bad for a manned, operational
launcher. Changing hats doesn't change the existing data or create new data.

"LaDonna Wyss" wrote in message
om...
(Stuf4) wrote in message
. com...
The problem with 51-L is that managers accepted the risk that
engineers defined as *out of bounds*. THAT is the travesty of
Challenger. What makes it worse is that MOD went along with that
horrendous management decision.

Agreed.

LaDumbass, TRIM YOUR QUOTES!

Otherwise, it looks like I have to concur with you and Stuffie. This is what
happens when an intelligent, reasonable argument is presented.

I wonder how much of management's attitude came from the decision to declare
the shuttle operational?