US intelligence on USSR, 1967

This is kind of interesting and even somewhat relevant to space
matters to the extent it indicates the general quality and
limitations of US intelligence in the middle of the "moon race"
era. In particular, it does seem to indicate the absence of
high-level penetrations in the government and military. Not
surprising given other information, but it never hurts to have
all the evidence you can get, even if it is NEGINT.


http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ho/frus/johnsonlb/x/9098.htm

US INTELLIGENCE CAPABILITIES TO MONITOR CERTAIN LIMITATIONS
ON SOVIET STRATEGIC WEAPONS PROGRAMS

SNIE 11-10-67
TCS 6228-67
Washington, February 14, 1967.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, National
Intelligence Estimates, 11-67--USSR, Box 4. Top Secret; Ruff;
Trine; Zarf. Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency and
concurred in by the U.S. Intelligence Board. A title page and
table of contents are not printed.


Conclusions

A. In the continued absence of a large-scale Soviet program
of deception and concealment we believe that we would almost
certainly detect any extensive new deployment in strategic
forces, although the Soviets could probably effect small-scale
increases without our knowledge. The timing of detection and
identification would vary with the nature and size of the
program. We probably would identify a land-mobile offensive
system, for example, but perhaps only after it had become
operational in substantial numbers.

B. We would almost certainly detect any large-scale test
program, but we could not always expect to assess accurately
the test objectives or even the precise nature of the system
being tested. Our capabilities are generally better in the
case of offensive than of defensive weapons. We believe, for
example, that we could detect and identify Soviet testing of
multiple, independently-targeted reentry vehicles (MIRVs); we
could probably also detect test activity associated with an
ABM system, but are not confident that we could identify it
as such before it became operational.

C. Our capabilities for detecting qualitative improvements
in the deployed forces are better in the case of defensive
weapons than offensive ones. Our chances of determining
whether a SAM system had been provided with significant ABM
capabilities are at present about even, but we think that
they will improve. On the other hand, we see no prospect of
determining whether MIRVs (if developed) or other significant
improvements had been incorporated in deployed offensive
missiles.

D. Soviet employment of deception and concealment on a large-
scale would, of course, degrade our capabilities. The principal
effect would be that of delay. Thus, while we still believe that
substantial new deployment would almost certainly be detected,
detection would come later in the program, perhaps not until
after significant deployment had occurred. Some of the
deception and concealment measures which the Soviets could
employ would probably be recognizable as such, but their
purpose might not be readily apparent. Additionally, we
assume that the Soviets will not interfere actively with
US collection systems.

E. Factors affecting intelligence collection will vary over
the period of this estimate but intelligence is not expected
to be able to guarantee that the Soviets have not violated
one or more provisions of the agreement under consideration.

F. Finally, we wish to note that the demonstration of
violations of the arms control agreement under
consideration would almost certainly involve the use and
possibly the compromise of very costly and highly
sophisticated intelligence collection methods.

(Allen Thomson) wrote in message . com...
This is kind of interesting and even somewhat relevant to space
matters to the extent it indicates the general quality and
limitations of US intelligence in the middle of the "moon race"
era. In particular, it does seem to indicate the absence of
high-level penetrations in the government and military. Not
surprising given other information, but it never hurts to have
all the evidence you can get, even if it is NEGINT.


http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ho/frus/johnsonlb/x/9098.htm

US INTELLIGENCE CAPABILITIES TO MONITOR CERTAIN LIMITATIONS
ON SOVIET STRATEGIC WEAPONS PROGRAMS

This looks like somebody asked the CIA "If we enter into an arms
control agreement with the Soviet's, would we be able to tell if they
are cheating?"

I've found that through the 60's and 70's, Soviet military power was
vastly overestimated. The Mig-25 is the most prominent example, but
the SS-20's mobility, range, payload, and accuracy were all
overestimated by an order of magnitude.

Even in the 80's, I remember all sorts of panic over the appearance of
a Super-Fighter (called RAM-L) which later turned out to be the Su-27.

(Airyx) wrote in message . com...
(Allen Thomson) wrote in message . com...
This is kind of interesting and even somewhat relevant to space
matters to the extent it indicates the general quality and
limitations of US intelligence in the middle of the "moon race"
era. In particular, it does seem to indicate the absence of
high-level penetrations in the government and military. Not
surprising given other information, but it never hurts to have
all the evidence you can get, even if it is NEGINT.


http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ho/frus/johnsonlb/x/9098.htm

US INTELLIGENCE CAPABILITIES TO MONITOR CERTAIN LIMITATIONS
ON SOVIET STRATEGIC WEAPONS PROGRAMS

This looks like somebody asked the CIA "If we enter into an arms
control agreement with the Soviet's, would we be able to tell if they
are cheating?"

I've found that through the 60's and 70's, Soviet military power was
vastly overestimated. The Mig-25 is the most prominent example, but
the SS-20's mobility, range, payload, and accuracy were all
overestimated by an order of magnitude.


May I insert a comment based on experience but without any facts to
substantiate what I say? The MiG 25 was a pet of the US Air Force,
with it they could obtain any amount of budget money for any project
based it's rather frightening performance over a short distance.

The SS-20 was involved in a piece of Soviet deception, possibly not
intended as such. The capabilities of the missile had been estimated
fairly accurately when the Scaleboard transporter-launcher was shown.
Then someone in Red Star (Krasnaya Zvezda) decided to do an article on
the Scaleboard and said the missile had a range of "thousands" (sic)
of kilometers. Some people decided that the Red Star never lied about
such things and gave the SS-12/Scaleboard capabilities beyond its
obvious performance envelope. When it appear in the Far East and
eventually Europe the underwear laundry went into extra hours.

Even in the 80's, I remember all sorts of panic over the appearance of
a Super-Fighter (called RAM-L) which later turned out to be the Su-27.