Jim O exclusive facts/analysis of spacewalk

Thanks! I sure wish i could have rechecked some of this stuff with a few
more trustworthy experts, discretely, in advance. I did do checking, and got
expert opinions, but it seems they were inadequate. Help me do better next
time.

Jim

281-337-2838 voice/fax

I can meet with folks in Clear Lake, or pick up dropped documents at
specified locations, as needed, on short notice.



"cache" wrote in message
om...
"JimO" wrote in message
...
My new msnbc analysis at http://msnbc.msn.com/id/4424650
and also see Friday's 'Daily Planet' (www.discovery.ca) show for
video of my interview on the walk.

It seems to me that the Orlan equivalent of Caution & Warning
parameters should have been available by engineers in Houston for both
spacewalkers. If this is not so, then Houston would have to rely on
communication from Russia for indications of problems. Otherwise,
they would have been able to independently monitor cooling status.
[But I forget whether the Orlan transmits this info once the umbilical
is disconnected]

Also, at least during training on the ground (in Houston), Russians
are notorious for poopooing any problem. If cooling goes away, well
who needs cooling? Not that this happened here, but it might have.
How could the crewmember not know if he's not receiving proper
cooling? Once it starts raining in your suit is a little late to be
saying you have a problem. But, manly men will do menly things.

-Cache!

"JimO" wrote:

YOU argue that "the purpose of the PCS rule is to provide the IVA crew a way
to list C&W events and react to them", and suggest the rule is a holdover
from 3-crewmember ops when there is one IVA crewman for EVA -- but if so, my
simple question is: WHY were these laptops then STILL on the EVA-9 MINIMUM
EQUIPMENT LIST?

Why should they not be? I'd argue the best way to prepare for a
risky, and previously unperformed activity, is to deviate the minimum
amount necessary from known and tested procedures. It's also
arguable, that the systems were setup not only to cover the EVA
period, but the time immediately after.

In other words, it's best to leave the system in a reasonably known
condition before jumping into the unknown, in order that you have a
reasonable probability of being able to restore normal conditions when
you 'land' with minimum fuss and bother.

D.
--
Touch-twice life. Eat. Drink. Laugh.

"Derek Lyons" wrote
It's also arguable, that the systems were setup not only to cover the
EVA
period, but the time immediately after.

This seems to be the direction we are heading. You want to leave the station
in configuration so that if you had to return in an emergency, you will find
a laptop (or two) displaying all the C&W information you need to know RIGHT
AWAY.

But if you can count on ground comm as backup, you are safe to go with ONE
laptop operating.

Now, why didn't the flight rule say that from the beginning?

I'm waiting to get confirmation from our pseudonymous experts, then I'll
make repairs to the msnbc.com piece.

John Doe wrote in message ...
jeff findley wrote:

I remain unconvinced that there was really a real danger. The only question
that should be asked is whether ground put pressure on the crewmember to
continyeu the spacewalk and ignore the problem
My impression (from listening to the not entirely clear translation on
NASA TV) was quite the opposite. The crew wanted to keep doing stuff,
and ground controllers prodded them a bit to wrap up and go back
inside.
, or whether the crewmember felt
comfortable enough to continue and the minute he signaled it was no longer
confortable, then they returned. That is the real issue.
Sasha seemed to indicate that the heat was not severe. He said the sun
was noticable, but not like sunbathing on a beach. He then ammended
that to "well, maybe sunbathing in a temperate climate". He also joked
that he could see better with the liquid film on his helmet, because
it made fogging impossible.

Another thing I caught from NASA TV (which was the first indication I
had that there was trouble) was Sasha reporting some kind of cooling
C&W light on his Orlan. The ground then asked him how he felt, and
what position he had his cooling setting on. That was not too long
after I started watching, so it is possible there were previous
communications that I missed.

On or about Wed, 03 Mar 2004 14:06:37 GMT, JimO
made the sensational claim that:
Thanks for this and your earlier history of excellent postings, by the way.

Especially the one about how much TP is needed for masturbation sessions? :-)

You're not fooling anyone JF Mezei, you dumb fsck.
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This is a siggy | To E-mail, do note | Just because something
It's properly formatted | who you mean to reply-to | is possible, doesn't
No person, none, care | and it will reach me | mean it can happen

JimO wrote:
"John Doe" wrote in message ...
Those laptops are not watchdogs. They are glorified dumb terminals that
display stuff and allow commands to be entered.

what do you suppose NASA knew about them, that you don't?


If you read the space station familiarization manual, the role of the laptops
is very well explained. They provide a user interface to the real (faceless)
computers (MDMs in case of US segment).

There is a valid reason to require at least two functional laptops where there
are crewmembers on board. They need quick/assured access to alarm descriptions
(which smoke detector caused the fire alarm to ring ?) and they need ability
to send commands quickly.

When crewmembers are outside the station, there is nobody inside the station
to read or act on any warming message displayed on a laptop. Also, many
systems had been shutdown prior to the EVA to minimise the risk of anything
going wrong during the EVA.

To me, the biggest mistake was that the Russians seemed to have feathered the
wrong solar array, and the one between the truss camera and the EVA cremembers
was still visibly moving to track the sun, blocking the view a lot of the
time. It may not be "critical", but it is the fact that nobody called Moscow
to tell them to fix the arrays.

Thank you for your VERY helpful clarification, even in light of my somewhat
snotty rejoinder.

Let me get a fix into the story text.

John Doe wrote in message ...

To me, the biggest mistake was that the Russians seemed to have feathered the
wrong solar array, and the one between the truss camera and the EVA cremembers
was still visibly moving to track the sun, blocking the view a lot of the
time. It may not be "critical", but it is the fact that nobody called Moscow
to tell them to fix the arrays.

Well, that wasn't a mistake. The Russians already had to position SM
arrays to clear translation paths, I'm sure they couldn't take the
power hit from feathering the FGB arrays as well (the reason we're all
debating on this topic is that they shut down laptops to conserve
power!). The Russians are fully aware of the camera views (and the
associated array blockage of the camera on the S1 truss from the FGB
arrays) - they make considerable use of US video for external
operations.

Nobody needed to call Moscow to tell them that the view was blocked,
they could see it for themselves - after all, the video was for them -
it was their EVA.

JoeDoe, we continue to appreciate your contributions and insights. Please
hang around.

"Joe Doe" wrote in
Nobody needed to call Moscow to tell them that the view was blocked,
they could see it for themselves - after all, the video was for them -
it was their EVA.