Flight Director mandate/authority

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In the Spectrum article http://spectrum.ieee.org/apr05/2697/3i on A-13:


Kranz's word was law. "The flight director probably has the simplest
mission job description in all America," Kranz told Spectrum. "It's only
one sentence long: 'The flight director may take any action necessary for
crew safety and mission success.' " The only way for NASA to overrule a
flight director during a mission was to fire him on the spot.

The rule vesting ultimate authority in the flight director during a
mission was on the books thanks to Chris Kraft, who founded mission
control as NASA's first flight director and who was deputy director of
the Manned Spacecraft Center during Apollo 13. He had written the rule
following an incident during the Mercury program when Kraft, as flight
director, had been second-guessed by management.
....

Was this accurate, & if so, WHAT incident?

--
A host is a host from coast to
& no one will talk to a host that's close........[v].(301) 56-LINUX
Unless the host (that isn't close).........................pob 1433
is busy, hung or dead....................................20915-1433

On Sun, 23 Dec 2007 02:32:39 +0000 (UTC), David Lesher
wrote:

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In the Spectrum article http://spectrum.ieee.org/apr05/2697/3i on A-13:


Kranz's word was law. "The flight director probably has the simplest
mission job description in all America," Kranz told Spectrum. "It's only
one sentence long: 'The flight director may take any action necessary for
crew safety and mission success.' " The only way for NASA to overrule a
flight director during a mission was to fire him on the spot.

The rule vesting ultimate authority in the flight director during a
mission was on the books thanks to Chris Kraft, who founded mission
control as NASA's first flight director and who was deputy director of
the Manned Spacecraft Center during Apollo 13. He had written the rule
following an incident during the Mercury program when Kraft, as flight
director, had been second-guessed by management.
...

Was this accurate, & if so, WHAT incident?


It was John Glen's flight . During orbit, a warning light told them
that the landing bag had deployed, meaning that the heat shield was
gone or at least loose and wouldn't be there for entry. Kraft and
Kranz thought it was a faulty reading, but engineers decided to keep
retro pack on for entry, figuring it would hold on the heat shield if
it was loose. It turned out to be a faulty reading and nothing was
really wrong. That's when Kraft gave the flight director total
authority. No one, up to the president, could change the flight
director's decision.

David Lesher wrote:

In the Spectrum article http://spectrum.ieee.org/apr05/2697/3i on A-13:

Kranz's word was law. "The flight director probably has the simplest
mission job description in all America," Kranz told Spectrum. "It's only
one sentence long: 'The flight director may take any action necessary for
crew safety and mission success.' " The only way for NASA to overrule a
flight director during a mission was to fire him on the spot.

The rule vesting ultimate authority in the flight director during a
mission was on the books thanks to Chris Kraft, who founded mission
control as NASA's first flight director and who was deputy director of
the Manned Spacecraft Center during Apollo 13. He had written the rule
following an incident during the Mercury program when Kraft, as flight
director, had been second-guessed by management.
...

Was this accurate, & if so, WHAT incident?

Yes. Kraft was overuled by Williams and Faget during the heatshield
incident on Glenn's flight, and, after the capsule was inspected, it
turned out that Kraft had been right - it was just a faulty switch.
As far as Kraft was concerned, the risk incured by keeping the
retrorocket pack strapped on during re-entry was considerable so he
responded in the manner described by IEEE Spectrum.

--
Dave Michelson

David Lesher wrote:

Was this accurate, & if so, WHAT incident?


Glenn's flight:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Christopher_C._Kraft,_Jr.

From that:

Mercury-Atlas 6, the flight of John Glenn, proved to be a testing
experience both for Mission Control and for Kraft. One book on the
history of the Apollo program calls it "the single event that decisively
shaped Flight Operations."[18] The mission, the first orbital flight by
an American, unfolded normally until Glenn began his second orbit. At
that point Kraft's systems controller, Don Arabian, reported that
telemetry was showing a "Segment 51" indicator. This suggested that the
capsule's landing bag, which was meant to deploy upon splashdown in
order to provide a cushion, might have deployed early. Kraft believed
that the Segment 51 indicator was due to faulty instrumentation rather
than to an actual early deployment. However, if he was wrong, it would
mean that the capsule's heat shield, which fitted on top of the landing
bag, was now loose. A loose heat shield could cause the capsule to burn
up during re-entry.[19]
On consulting with his flight controllers, Kraft became convinced that
the indication was false, and that no action was needed. However, his
superiors, including Mercury capsule designer Max Faget, felt
differently. They overruled Kraft, telling him to instruct Glenn to
leave the capsule's retrorocket package on during re-entry. The
reasoning was that the package, which was strapped over the heatshield,
would hold the heatshield in place if it was loose. Kraft, however, felt
that this was an unacceptable risk. "I was aghast," he remembered. "If
any of three retrorockets had solid fuel remaining, an explosion could
rip everything apart."[20] Yet he agreed to follow the plan advocated by
Faget and by Walt Williams, his superior in the flight operations
division. The retrorockets would be kept on.

I'd never though about that residual solid fuel problem on the retros.

Pat