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Russian space program -- book chapter conclusions
I'm doing a big book chapter for a DoD 'space power' book, my chapter is on the russian program. Here are my conclusions, and I'd like to open them up to discussion, critique, and suggestions. The material remains copyright by me, 2007, etc etc etc... and it's a draft. Conclusion For the foreseeable future, Russia appears committed to internationalization of its main non-military space activities, mainly as a crutch in obtaining services disproportionate to contributed resources ("For 5% of the investment we get 30% of the resources" is a frequent comment in justification of the space station partnership) and as a badge of 'major player' status in the world. At the same time, Russia shows no signs of developing a capability for major innovation in spacecraft engineering or of demonstrating more than lip-service interest in quantum advances in space operations capabilities. Incremental progress has been the watchword for decades, usually not by choice but out of necessity because all previous attempts at break-out projects (human lunar flight, advanced robotic Mars probes, the 'Buran' shuttle, the Polyus-Skif family of orbital battle stations) ended in humiliating frustration. Providing commercial launch services for foreign customers has provided multi-dimensional benefits to Russia. Beyond the significant cash flow, such activities fund booster upgrades and, in the case of converted military missiles, fund validation of lifetime extension efforts for still-deployed missile weapons. Military applications of space systems remain uninspired, with critical constellations (such as the missile early warning net) still significantly degraded and likely to remain so for many years. Russian officials have evidently decided that, despite any public posturings over US military threats, there is essentially no prospect of actual hostilities in the foreseeable future and hence little pressure to reconstitute military space assets to a Soviet-era level. Russia retains an operational anti-missile system around Moscow that, with hit-to-kill guidance, could provide significant anti-satellite capability; it is also developing small robotic rendezvous spacecraft similar to US projects that have potential anti-satellite capabilities at any altitude they can be launched into. Attempts at domestic commercialization of space-related services, including communications, navigation, and mapping, remain seriously - perhaps irremediably - hamstrung by the recent resurgence of a traditional Russian top-down structure of authority. Bureaucrats are being ordered to implement wider use of space infrastructure, and after many years of rosy reports of progress, Moscow may realize that it is almost all, as usual, a sham. There is still little indication of successful exploitation of space discoveries and space-developed technologies (what NASA and the Europeans call "spin-offs") as a means of improving the technological skills of Russian industry. The space industry, as a component of the national defense industry, remains strictly compartmentalized from Russia's civil economy, and the resurgence of broad espionage laws (and several recent highly-publicized convictions) will keep this ghettoization in force. This in turn may require other government measures, from patent purchase to industrial espionage, to acquire technologies that some Russian industries may already possess but are in practice forbidden to share internally. Russian space-related scientific and exploratory research, after hitting rock bottom a decade ago, is showing signs of a modest rebound. Russian space scientists may be able to resume making respectable contributions to the world scientific literature in the coming decade, another ticket to world-class status that spreads prestige to all of Russia's science reputation.. But even if the main values of the Russian space program remain symbolic, these symbols have computable value to the nation's self-confidence and to the reputation of its technology - either for commercial export or as a reflection of the efficacy of its weapons. The modest but steady resource commitment to the space program reflects the government's assessment of the degree of value, now and in the foreseeable future. However, none of these intentions have much chance of success unless the Russians find a way out of the looming demographic crisis that mass mortality is confronting them with. In a society and an industry where monopolization of knowledge was power, and sharing it often led to legal prosecution, behavior must change, and fast. This must be done so that space workers a decade from now, without the in-the-flesh guidance and advice of the old-timers, will be able to draw on their 'team knowledge' that survived the passing of its original owners and was preserved in an accessible, durable form. The alternative is a return to the 'learning curve' of more frequent oversights, mistakes, and inadequate problem solving of the dawn of the Space Age - with its daunting costs in time, treasure, prestige, and even human lives. |
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