[FAQ] Complete List of CAIB "Return To Flight" Recommendations

"OM" om@our_blessed_lady_mary_of_the_holy_NASA_researc h_facility.org wrote
in message ...
...Preaching to the choir, but fodder for discussion:

--------------------------------------------------------------

It is the Board's opinion that good leadership can direct a culture to
adapt to new realities. NASA's culture must change, and the Board
intends the following recommendations to be steps toward effecting
this change.

Recommendations have been put forth in many of the chapters. In this
chapter, the recommendations are grouped by subject area with the
Return-to-Flight [RTF] tasks listed first within the subject area.
Each Recommendation retains its number so the reader can refer to the
related section for additional details. These recommendations are not
listed in priority order.

PART ONE - THE ACCIDENT

[SNIP]

OM


Thanks OM ! Better than Reader's Digest !

gb

....Preaching to the choir, but fodder for discussion:

--------------------------------------------------------------

It is the Board's opinion that good leadership can direct a culture to
adapt to new realities. NASA's culture must change, and the Board
intends the following recommendations to be steps toward effecting
this change.

Recommendations have been put forth in many of the chapters. In this
chapter, the recommendations are grouped by subject area with the
Return-to-Flight [RTF] tasks listed first within the subject area.
Each Recommendation retains its number so the reader can refer to the
related section for additional details. These recommendations are not
listed in priority order.

PART ONE - THE ACCIDENT

Thermal Protection System

R3.2-1 Initiate an aggressive program to eliminate all External Tank
Thermal Protection System debris- shedding at the source with
particular emphasis on the region where the bipod struts attach to the
External Tank. [RTF]

R3.3-2 Initiate a program designed to increase the Orbiter's ability
to sustain minor debris damage by measures such as improved
impact-resistant Reinforced Carbon-Carbon and acreage tiles. This
program should determine the actual impact resistance of current
materials and the effect of likely debris strikes. [RTF]

R3.3-1 Develop and implement a comprehensive inspection plan to
determine the structural integrity of all Reinforced Carbon-Carbon
system components. This inspection plan should take advantage of
advanced non-destructive inspection technology. [RTF]

R6.4-1 For missions to the International Space Station, develop a
practicable capability to inspect and effect emergency repairs to the
widest possible range of damage to the Thermal Protection System,
including both tile and Reinforced Carbon- Carbon, taking advantage of
the additional capabilities available when near to or docked at the
International Space Station.

For non-Station missions, develop a comprehensive autonomous
(independent of Station) inspection and repair capability to cover the
widest possible range of damage scenarios.

Accomplish an on-orbit Thermal Protection System inspection, using
appropriate assets and capabilities, early in all missions.

The ultimate objective should be a fully autonomous capability for all
missions to address the possibility that an International Space
Station mission fails to achieve the correct orbit, fails to dock
successfully, or is damaged during or after undocking. [RTF]

R3.3-3 To the extent possible, increase the Orbiter's ability to
successfully re-enter Earth's atmosphere with minor leading edge
structural sub-system damage.

R3.3-4 In order to understand the true material characteristics of
Reinforced Carbon-Carbon components, develop a comprehensive database
of flown Reinforced Carbon-Carbon material characteristics by
destructive testing and evaluation.

R3.3-5 Improve the maintenance of launch pad structures to minimize
the leaching of zinc primer onto Reinforced Carbon-Carbon components.

R3.8-1 Obtain sufficient spare Reinforced Carbon-Carbon panel
assemblies and associated support components to ensure that decisions
on Reinforced Carbon-Carbon maintenance are made on the basis of
component specifications, free of external pressures relating to
schedules, costs, or other considerations.

R3.8-2 Develop, validate, and maintain physics-based computer models
to evaluate Thermal Protection System damage from debris impacts.
These tools should provide realistic and timely esti-mates of any
impact damage from possible de-bris from any source that may
ultimately impact the Orbiter. Establish impact damage thresholds that
trigger responsive corrective action, such as on-orbit inspection and
repair, when indicated.

Imaging

R3.4-1 Upgrade the imaging system to be capable of providing a minimum
of three useful views of the Space Shuttle from liftoff to at least
Solid Rocket Booster separation, along any expected ascent azimuth.
The operational status of these assets should be included in the
Launch Commit Criteria for future launches. Consider using ships or
aircraft to provide additional views of the Shuttle during ascent.
[RTF]

R3.4-2 Provide a capability to obtain and downlink high-resolution
images of the External Tank after it separates. [RTF]

R3.4-3 Provide a capability to obtain and downlink high-resolution
images of the underside of the Orbiter wing leading edge and forward
section of both wings' Thermal Protection System. [RTF]

R6.3-2 Modify the Memorandum of Agreement with the National Imagery
and Mapping Agency to make the imaging of each Shuttle flight while on
orbit a standard requirement. [RTF]

Orbiter Sensor Data

R3.6-1 The Modular Auxiliary Data System instrumentation and sensor
suite on each Orbiter should be maintained and updated to include
current sensor and data acquisition technologies.

R3.6-2 The Modular Auxiliary Data System should be redesigned to
include engineering performance and vehicle health information, and
have the ability to be reconfigured during flight in order to allow
certain data to be recorded, telemetered, or both as needs change.

Wiring

R4.2-2 As part of the Shuttle Service Life Extension Program and
potential 40-year service life, develop a state-of-the-art means to
inspect all Orbiter wiring, including that which is inaccessible.

Bolt Catchers

R4.2-1 Test and qualify the flight hardware bolt catchers. [RTF]

Closeouts

R4.2-3 Require that at least two employees attend all final closeouts
and intertank area hand-spraying procedures. [RTF]

Micrometeoroid and Orbital Debris

R4.2-4 Require the Space Shuttle to be operated with the same degree
of safety for micrometeoroid and orbital debris as the degree of
safety calculated for the International Space Station. Change the
micrometeoroid and orbital debris safety criteria from guidelines to
requirements.

Foreign Object Debris

R4.2-5 Kennedy Space Center Quality Assurance and United Space
Alliance must return to the straightforward, industry-standard
definition of "Foreign Object Debris" and eliminate any al-ternate or
statistically deceptive definitions like "processing debris." [RTF]

PART TWO - WHY THE ACCIDENT OCCURRED

Scheduling

R6.2-1 Adopt and maintain a Shuttle flight schedule that is consistent
with available resources. Although schedule deadlines are an important
management tool, those deadlines must be regularly evaluated to ensure
that any additional risk incurred to meet the schedule is recognized,
understood, and acceptable. [RTF]

Training

R6.3-1 Implement an expanded training program in which the Mission
Management Team faces potential crew and vehicle safety contingencies
beyond launch and ascent. These contingencies should involve potential
loss of Shuttle or crew, contain numerous uncertainties and unknowns,
and require the Mission Management Team to assemble and interact with
support organiza-tions across NASA/Contractor lines and in various
locations. [RTF]

Organization

R7.5-1 Establish an independent Technical Engineering Authority that
is responsible for technical requirements and all waivers to them, and
will build a disciplined, systematic approach to identifying,
analyzing, and controlling hazards throughout the life cycle of the
Shuttle System. The independent technical authority does the following
as a minimum:


Develop and maintain technical standards for all Space Shuttle Program
projects and elements
Be the sole waiver-granting authority for all technical standards
Conduct trend and risk analysis at the sub- system, system, and
enterprise levels
Own the failure mode, effects analysis and hazard reporting systems
Conduct integrated hazard analysis
Decide what is and is not an anomalous event
Independently verify launch readiness
Approve the provisions of the recertification program called for in
Recommendation R9.1-1.

The Technical Engineering Authority should be funded directly from
NASA Headquarters, and should have no connection to or responsibility
for schedule or program cost.

R7.5-2 NASA Headquarters Office of Safety and Mission Assurance should
have direct line authority over the entire Space Shuttle Program
safety organization and should be independently resourced.

R7.5-3 Reorganize the Space Shuttle Integration Office to make it
capable of integrating all elements of the Space Shuttle Program,
including the Orbiter.

PART THREE - A LOOK AHEAD

Organization

R9.1-1 Prepare a detailed plan for defining, establishing,
transitioning, and implementing an independent Technical Engineering
Authority, independent safety program, and a reorganized Space Shuttle
Integration Office as described in R7.5-1, R7.5- 2, and R7.5-3. In
addition, NASA should submit annual reports to Congress, as part of
the budget review process, on its implementation activities. [RTF]

Recertification

R9.2-1 Prior to operating the Shuttle beyond 2010, develop and conduct
a vehicle recertification at the material, component, subsystem, and
system levels. Recertification requirements should be included in the
Service Life Extension Program.

Closeout Photos/Drawing System

R10.3-1 Develop an interim program of closeout photographs for all
critical sub-systems that differ from engineering drawings. Digitize
the closeout photograph system so that images are immediately
available for on-orbit troubleshooting. [RTF]

R10.3-2 Provide adequate resources for a long-term program to upgrade
the Shuttle engineering drawing system including:

Reviewing drawings for accuracy
Converting all drawings to a computer-aided drafting system
Incorporating engineering changes

OM

--

"No ******* ever won a war by dying for | http://www.io.com/~o_m
his country. He won it by making the other | Sergeant-At-Arms
poor dumb ******* die for his country." | Human O-Ring Society

- General George S. Patton, Jr

"OM" om@our_blessed_lady_mary_of_the_holy_NASA_researc h_facility.org wrote in message
...
...Preaching to the choir, but fodder for discussion:
PART ONE - THE ACCIDENT

http://tinyurl.com/lbjw

http://tinyurl.com/lbjx


PART TWO - WHY THE ACCIDENT OCCURRED

http://tinyurl.com/lbk2

PART THREE - A LOOK AHEAD

My crystal ball predicts OM trying to regain credibility to new comers here
as an innocent person who will gain notoriety by his FAQ's but lost it completely
and has gone beyond regaining it. I think *this* FAQ should be posted to newcomers to
see the real OM so they don't get fooled by this new attempt.


Organization

IO.com Illuminati in Texas (not hard to figure that out.)

OM

--

"No ******* ever won a war by dying for | http://www.io.com/~o_m
his country. He won it by making the other | Sergeant-At-Arms
poor dumb ******* die for his country." | Human O-Ring Society

- General George S. Patton, Jr

On Tue, 26 Aug 2003 19:05:37 -0600, OM wrote:

Thermal Protection System

R3.2-1 Initiate an aggressive program to eliminate all External Tank
Thermal Protection System debris- shedding at the source with
particular emphasis on the region where the bipod struts attach to the
External Tank. [RTF]

R3.3-2 Initiate a program designed to increase the Orbiter's ability
to sustain minor debris damage by measures such as improved
impact-resistant Reinforced Carbon-Carbon and acreage tiles. This
program should determine the actual impact resistance of current
materials and the effect of likely debris strikes. [RTF]

I just noticed that the wording of these two recommendations is
interesting. Note that the board calls for these two programs to be
INITIATED before return to flight, which means that they don't necessarily
need to be completed.

Closeouts

R4.2-3 Require that at least two employees attend all final closeouts
and intertank area hand-spraying procedures. [RTF]

It's interesting that this one came from a concern for security rather
than quality.