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NASA Astronaut on Columbia Repair (and others)
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NASA Astronaut on Columbia Repair (and others)
"Neil Gerace" wrote in message ... "Danny Dot" wrote in message ... "Jim Oberg" wrote in message ... "Brian Gaff" wrote in message . uk... Yes, but hindsight is a wonderful thing, isn't it? the sad part is how the people who were worried AT THAT TIME were bullied before the disaster, and side-lined afterwards out of embarrassment. Bullied is the right word. That is what I have been saying. NASA culture is a bully culture. In that case it shares it with every other large organisation. People just protecting their jobs. I have worked for several other large organizations, I found NASA to be the worst. Recall two commissions have found a problem with NASA's culture. Perhaps the problems is work place bullies. It is certainly worth a look at in my opinion. See, www.mobbinggonemad.org Danny Dot |
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NASA Astronaut on Columbia Repair (and others)
Pat Flannery wrote: so you might have been jumping into a cloud of hydrazine and UDMH, which wouldn't have helped your pressure suit or parachute any. Note how I managed to equip the Shuttle with a monopropellant RCS? :-) Pat |
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NASA Astronaut on Columbia Repair (and others)
On Mon, 13 Nov 2006 19:22:24 -0600, Pat Flannery wrote:
Pat Flannery wrote: so you might have been jumping into a cloud of hydrazine and UDMH, which wouldn't have helped your pressure suit or parachute any. Note how I managed to equip the Shuttle with a monopropellant RCS? :-) Fortunately, the resulting toxic cloud whizzed harmlessly over everybody's heads Dale |
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NASA Astronaut on Columbia Repair (and others)
http://www.stpns.net/view_article.ht...43251064362304
Gutierrez said the fault lies in two words - engineering arrogance. "NASA engineers were confident that they did everything right," Gutierrez said. "They were so sure everything would work as planned they didn't think an escape system was necessary. The fact is, if there had been an escape system on Columbia and Challenger, the crews could have survived." Actually the design shortcomings of the shuttle system had been known for along time before the challenger tragedy, (ie no crew escape system for more than a small percentage of the crew if in place, and only usable for a small percentage of the flight) and therefore it is the responsibility of managers and engineers to operate the space shuttle system safely within it's known parameters, (ie launching on jan 28 1986 was a managerial decision to launch in the coldest wheather despite engineers recommendations not to launch, and inspite of evidence of srb "o-ring" burnthrough on the previous launch sts-61c). Roger Boijoly has been quite outspoken through the years describing what happened to the challenger and how the disaster could have been avoided, (his story can be found at onlineethics.org posted below *5) describing the nasa managerial disregard to his (and colleages) recomendations not to launch challenger and the sts 51-L crew on jan 28, 1986 led to the tragedy. The push by nasa to make the shuttle stack lift more payload weight was implemented with sts-8, by modifying the solid rocket boosters. A srb thrust modification was implemented to increase payload lift capability resulting from a stronger solid fuel propellant coupled with a lighter rocket casing. The rogers commission concluded the information demonstrating a pattern of "O ring" burn through was available (*1), but this information was not integrated into the decision making process by nasa managers, Boisjoly and others were disregareded by nasa officials, and sts-51l was tragically launched on the morning of January 28, 1986. STS-61a, sts-61b and specifically sts-61c the programs 24th flight srb post flight inspection completed on January 12, demonstrated a pattern of obvious problems with srb casing burn through and o ring failures (NSTS-22301 *3). STS-61C flight landed January 18, 1986, just 10 days prior to the last flight of challenger, and the death of the sts-51L crew. The two records set that ill fated launch day of Jan 28, 1986, still stand today, the commonly known coldest launch temp of , and the lesser known fact that sts-51l utilized a lightweight srb casing and still was the heaviest shuttle stack to launch at 4,529,681 lbs (*4). The rogers commission concluded the lightweight SRB casings aggravated the "joint rotation", a spacing in the O ring seal area that would allow the hot gases a path to the rocket casing if filler putty had suffered blow through, a common problem. The O ring failure occurred after nasa managers clearly disregarded the Morton Thiokol engineer Roger Boijoly's recommendation to not launch, demonstrating humans erorred in the decision making process (a failure mode not demonstrated in the stated risk analysis). But another the fact is the lightweight srb casings utilized for challengers ascent jan 28, 1986 launching the heaviest shuttle stack ever used in flight history were concluded to being "aggravating" to the O ring failure which resulted in the death of the sts-51L crew (Rogers commission report chapter VII Casing Joint Design) (*2) citations (*1) http://history.nasa.gov/rogersrep/v1ch4.htm The Dynamic Characteristics of the Field Joint Seal "The discussion of static factors which affect joint performance is based on the assumption that motor segments remain perfectly round, and that stacked segments are always a perfectly straight column. At launch the boosters are subjected to forces which bend and twist them. These forces cause physical changes in the shape of the boosters, actually squashing them out-of-round and bending them along their entire length. The dynamic effects of this out-of-roundness are most significant just after booster ignition when the hold-down bolts have been released because in the previous 6.6 seconds the boosters have actually been bent forward by the thrust from the main engines. The elastic energy stored in the entire system is then released, inducing a bending vibration in the boosters. This bending causes the case to change its shape from circular to elliptical, the maximum out-of-roundness occurring on the 045-315 degree line on the outside of the right booster. This deflection is a consequence of a vibration and occurs at a frequency of about 3 cycles per second. The same occurs in the left booster, only the deflection axis is oriented differently, being a mirror image of that which takes place in the right side. The dynamic effects cause an increase in the joint rotation, and, hence, increase the gap between the tang and clevis by about 10 percent. Another dynamic load results from the geometry of the struts which attach the booster to the external tank. Strut P 12 is attached to the booster at about the 314 degree point and imposes additional inertial forces on the booster which tend to additionally increase the gap by 10 to 21 percent." (*2) Rogers commission report chapter VII Casing Joint Design page 192 & 193 par "Upon ignition of the Solid Rocket Motor fuel the operating pressure increases to 922 psi at 40 degrees F within a little over one half second (0.648 sec).16 The effect of this pressure increase is to cause the casings to bulge out around their midsections while being constrained by the thicker steel sections at the ends, much like a can of soda after freezing. The casings change shape during the buildup of motor pressure. This bulging has an effect on the joint. As in the case of the frozen soda can, the wall of the casing near the joint is no longer vertical, or perpendicular to the bottom, but angles out to meet the larger diameter in the center of the casing. NASA calls this change in angle at the joint "joint rotation." This joint rotation is a component of an overall spacing problem that includes: changes caused by casing wear and tear experienced during refurbishment; case growth (swelling) from pressurizing the casings; distortion that occurs during shipment of the loaded casings; and the physical handling of the casings during stacking operations. The joint rotation problem was aggravated when the steel casings were made thinner to achieve a reduction in weight and thus an increase in payload. The rotation problem was further aggravated by changing the design of the propellant geometry to achieve greater thrust. This increased the pressure within the casings and thereby increased the "gap opening"17. These changes compromised the integrity of the joint seals because joint rotation increases the spacing (gap) between the tang and the O-ring grooves in the clevis" 17. The Light Weight Casings, first used on STS-6, had thinner casing walls than the standard steel casings. Light weight casings permitted flight with heavier payloads. On STS-8, NASA began using the High Performance Motor (HPM) which developed higher internal pressures while using the light weight casings. The purpose of the HPM was to further increase payload capacity" 18 , "Evaluation of TWR-12690 CD, Test Plan for Space Shuttle SRM Lightweight inter Segment Joint Verification, dated June 10,1980", EP 25 (80-70), June 16, 1980, p. 2." (*3) http://ntrs.nasa.gov/archive/nasa/ca...992075284..pdf NSTS-22301, page 4 "SOLID ROCKET BOOSTER The STS 61-C flight utilized lightweight solid rocket motor (SRM) cases. SRM propulsion performance was normal and within specification limits, with propellant burn rates for both SRM's near predicted values. Solid rocket booster (SRB) thrust differentials were within specification throughout the flight.... A postflight evaluation of the SRM structure to determine the extent of damage revealed the following significant items: a. A gas path was noted at the 154-degree position of the aft field joint of the left S_M. Soot was found from the 140-degree to the 178-degree position, and soot was found in the primary groove from the 68-degree to the 183-degree (115 degrees arc) position. C-ring damagewas noted at the 154-degree position with a maximumerosion depth of 0.00_ inch and erosion length of 3.5 inches. The 0-ring was affected by heat over a 14-inch length in this area. b. A gas path was found from the 273.6-degree to the 309.6-degree (36 degrees arc) position of the left S_Mnozzle joint. Soot was found in the primary 0-ring groove over the entire 360-degree circumference. A potential impingement point was located at the 302.4-degree point; however, no 0-ring damage was found. c. A gas path was found at the 162-degree point with soot in the primary 0-ring groove from the lOS-degree to the 220-degree (112 degrees arc) point on the right SRM nozzle joint. 0-ring damage was found at the 162-degree point with the maximum erosion depth being 0.011 inch and the erosion length being 8 inches. The 0-rlng was affected by heat over a 26-1nch length in this area. d. A gas path was found on the outer surface of the igniter at the 130-degree point of the left SRM. Soot was found on the aft side of the outer Gaskoseal, approaching the primary sea! over a 70-degree arc (130 to 200 degrees), and on the outer edge of the inner Gasko seal over a 130-degree arc (ii0 to 240 degrees), however, no seal damage was found. e. A gas path was found on the outer surface of the igniter at the 250-degree point of the right S_. Soot was found on the inside edge of the outer Gasko seal over the entire 360-degree circumference, however, it did not progress beyond the edge of the seal. There was a slight discoloration of the metal on both sides of the seal over the entire 360-degree circumference." *4 http://www.nasa.gov/columbia/caib/PD...BOOK2/G11A.PDF page 105 *5 Boijoly's information http://www.onlineethics.org/moral/bo.../RB-intro.html Open sharing of information is crucial to improving everybody's understanding of the universe around us. Tom wrote: Remember the question why NASA did not release their results on the in orbit repair options for Columbia? It seems the results were too unwanted obvious: http://www.stpns.net/view_article.ht...43251064362304 Astronaut Talks Of Shuttle Disasters, Life In Space By John Larson for Mountain Mail, November 09, 2006 Both space shuttle disasters, Challenger in 1986 and Columbia in 2003, could have been survivable, said former NASA astronaut and aeronautical engineer Sid Gutierrez of Albuquerque. ... As an Air Force instructor, fighter, and test pilot, he flew over 30 different types of airplanes, sailplanes, balloons and rockets. He logged more than 4,500 hours of flying time. Gutierrez is a native New Mexican born in Albuquerque, and currently a department manager at Sandia National Laboratories. ... Gutierrez said the fault lies in two words: "engineering arrogance". ôNASA engineers were confident that they did everything right,ö Gutierrez said. ôThey were so sure everything would work as planned they didnÆt think an escape system was necessary. The fact is, if there had been an escape system on Columbia and Challenger, the crews could have survived.ö ... As a NASA astronaut Gutierrez was pilot of Space Shuttle Columbia on STS-40 in June, 1991, and commander of Endeavor on STS-59 in April, 1994. In February 2003 Columbia disintegrated above Texas while re-entering the earthÆs atmosphere. ôIf the engineers at NASA had looked closer at the video that showed the foam hitting the orbiterÆs wing, the crew could have done something about the hole in the leading edge of the wing once they were in orbit,ö he said. He said something as simple as wet towels forming a several-inches-thick layer of ice would have been enough to keep hot gasses from burning into the crack in the leading edge. ôThere was no escape system in place on the Columbia, either,ö Gutierrez said. ôThe breakup started at about 200,000 feet. With oxygen masks, the crew wouldÆve at least had some chance at surviving if theyÆd had a parachute system.ö He said the shuttle is the most dangerous space vehicle ever flown. ## CrossPoint v3.12d R ## |
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NASA Astronaut on Columbia Repair (and others)
On 13 Nov 2006 16:35:03 -0800, wrote:
Who are you kidding? You pray for another disaster each launch so you can get off seeing the grieving family members, and then hope it happens again. You're sick. ....Which is why most of the sane people around here have killfiled Bbo Hallr long ago. I suggest you do the same and put him out of our misery once again. OM -- ]=====================================[ ] OMBlog - http://www.io.com/~o_m/omworld [ ] Let's face it: Sometimes you *need* [ ] an obnoxious opinion in your day! [ ]=====================================[ |
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NASA Astronaut on Columbia Repair (and others)
Dale wrote: Fortunately, the resulting toxic cloud whizzed harmlessly over everybody's heads Next time I use N2O4 and RFNA. :-) Pat |
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NASA Astronaut on Columbia Repair (and others)
I totally disagree with you.
I can imagine you have a lot of personal investment in your point of view, as you actually knew about the impact to the wing a long time (many days) before the Disaster. And, choose to believe what you were being told by your sources that everything was fine. I can totally understand your baggage leading to your conclusions. You were hoodwinked like many of the NASA engineers, that NASA management wouldn't stick their heads in the ground. Me, I first heard about the Disaster in WalMart, when I overheard someone talking about the destruction of Columbia. But, any repair, wet towels or tortillas would have been much better than leaving a gapping hole in the leading edge of the wing. Entry heating is a time function, just like thawing your Thanksgiving Turkey. It takes days to thaw a Turkey in the fridge. A day outside the fridge on your counter. And with a blow torch, probably well over an hour. Plenty of time to make it to the runway. I'd suggest that some NASA Engineers should take a frozen Turkey this year and stick it in their nice arc jet facility for Thanksgiving. To see just how long it takes to thaw a Turkey heated with a Shuttle Entry profile. I think by the time their done, they'll find their Turkey is crispy on the outside, and still raw or frozen on the inside. A Turkey might even be a relatively accurate frozen thermal mass representative of the size that would have been inside the leading edge. I think they would have been standing on the runway, instead of spread out all over Texas. -- Craig Fink Courtesy E-Mail Welcome @ -- On Mon, 13 Nov 2006 16:36:01+0000, Jim Oberg wrote: "Jorge R. Frank" wrote Gutierrez is wrong. And it turns out, so were NASA's results from the CAIB report. The three years of work that have gone into RCC repair capability since that report have made clear that the in-flight repair options for Columbia would not have worked. It's not even clear whether the proposals would have delayed breakup a few minutes, or hastened it due to higher drag. I'd like to believe that an attempted repair would have given the ship another minute or two to get lower and slower, and perhaps cross the boundary where suited crewmembers thrown free by the cabin break-up might, might, just might have survived to low enough that their parachutes would have saved them. But at any altitude, co-existing even briefly with a debris cloud of jagged metal is problematical. It's what I was saying the first hour of the live coverage with ABC, when I talked on-air from my home: the odds of survival were low but not zero and in the initial hours post-breakup all efforts must focus and looking for parachutes on the ground because anybody getting out of the ship alive would need help really bad. Had there been warning, you also bet that there wouldn't have been anybody in the ship doing entry without helmets and gloves -- an appalling failure of safety practices, in real life, but sadly consistent with safety standards that had crept up on some (not all, or even most) of the team. |
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NASA Astronaut on Columbia Repair (and others)
wrote: Nothing even vaguely resembling an answer to the question he promised to answer three years ago: WHat verifiable evidence do you have to support your claims that, had NASA held the meetings you say were required by the rules, even though the people who would have participated in such meetings have said that holding the meetings would have been a waste of time, the events surrounding the demise of Columbia *would have* (as opposed to simply *might have*) turned out differently? You've already demonstrated what your word is worth, but that won't make the question go away. The only way to do that would be for you to keep your promise and answer it. |
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NASA Astronaut on Columbia Repair (and others)
On Tue, 14 Nov 2006 12:45:26 GMT, in a place far, far away, Craig Fink
made the phosphor on my monitor glow in such a way as to indicate that: I totally disagree with you. Who cares? I can imagine you have a lot of personal investment in your point of view, as you actually knew about the impact to the wing a long time (many days) before the Disaster. And, choose to believe what you were being told by your sources that everything was fine. I can totally understand your baggage leading to your conclusions. You were hoodwinked like many of the NASA engineers, that NASA management wouldn't stick their heads in the ground. Me, I first heard about the Disaster in WalMart, when I overheard someone talking about the destruction of Columbia. Again, who cares? How is where you heard about it relevant to the discussion? But, any repair, wet towels or tortillas would have been much better than leaving a gapping hole in the leading edge of the wing. Entry heating is a time function, just like thawing your Thanksgiving Turkey. It takes days to thaw a Turkey in the fridge. A day outside the fridge on your counter. And with a blow torch, probably well over an hour. Plenty of time to make it to the runway. You don't know what you're talking about. Show us the calculations. |
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