The next generation, a plan

This is very back of the envelope.

I'll start by saying I have no major objections to Orion per se. I do
wonder if it's all worth it. But as a capsule, eh, it's ok.

I do think Ares I is a waste.

My suggestion. We drop back 20 (maybe even 40) and punt.

Let's keep the shuttle flying at least through 2015 (and consider plans for
beyond).

In the meantime, let's rescope Orion to a 4.5m or so diameter capsule so it
can be carried in the shuttle.

First use would be an ACRV for the station. Let's get of depending
completely on the Russians.

Then later move towards launching it on an EELV for lunar and NEA missions.

Ares V can continue to move forward at a slow pace. There's nothing resting
on it.

But in the meantime, we continue to use the shuttle to resupply the ISS and
start to consider a station at a much lower latitude to be used as a fuel
depot. This can be man-tended at first and have 3-4 pressurized modules and
then larger tanks attached over time.

Nothing revolutionary here (and a lot of it subject to criticism) but I
think politically it's got more chance than the current Ares I/V boondoggle.



--
Greg Moore
SQL Server DBA Consulting Remote and Onsite available!
Email: sql (at) greenms.com http://www.greenms.com/sqlserver.html

I think that if we are to consider a new space station at a lower
orbital inclination, I would suggest building one from some ISS-
derived hardware; the gyroscopes, truss, solar arrays, connecting node
modules, ect, but use the large Bigelow Aerospace inflatable modules
for research, fuel storage, and crew quarters.
-Mike

wrote in message
...
I think that if we are to consider a new space station at a lower
orbital inclination, I would suggest building one from some ISS-
derived hardware; the gyroscopes, truss, solar arrays, connecting node
modules, ect, but use the large Bigelow Aerospace inflatable modules
for research, fuel storage, and crew quarters.
-Mike

That's sort of my thinking. For one thing, we need to stop thinking in
terms of space station and start thinking in terms of space stations.

We don't need something on the scale of another ISS for this. I'm thinking
something like the Propulsion module (not built I know), a Node and then 1-2
Bigelow modules and then fuel tanks.

Main goal would be on-orbit fuel supply and assembly. Start out man-tended
and build up over time.




--
Greg Moore
SQL Server DBA Consulting Remote and Onsite available!
Email: sql (at) greenms.com http://www.greenms.com/sqlserver.html

On Tue, 2 Sep 2008 21:44:45 -0400, "Greg D. Moore \(Strider\)"
wrote:

We don't need something on the scale of another ISS for this. I'm thinking
something like the Propulsion module (not built I know),

An ATV should be adaptable for this.

Brian

You also need to plan for an unpopular event, namely the loss of another
orbiter. These are old craft, and short of building new ones, something is
likely to break, I feel. Someone needs to grasp the nettle and decide what
to do if this occurs. Is the iss worth it? Should you perhaps flog the
realestate to the other partners?

Brian

--
Brian Gaff....Note, this account does not accept Bcc: email.
graphics are great, but the blind can't hear them
Email:
__________________________________________________ __________________________________________________ __________


"Greg D. Moore (Strider)" wrote in message
m...

This is very back of the envelope.

I'll start by saying I have no major objections to Orion per se. I do
wonder if it's all worth it. But as a capsule, eh, it's ok.

I do think Ares I is a waste.

My suggestion. We drop back 20 (maybe even 40) and punt.

Let's keep the shuttle flying at least through 2015 (and consider plans
for beyond).

In the meantime, let's rescope Orion to a 4.5m or so diameter capsule so
it can be carried in the shuttle.

First use would be an ACRV for the station. Let's get of depending
completely on the Russians.

Then later move towards launching it on an EELV for lunar and NEA
missions.

Ares V can continue to move forward at a slow pace. There's nothing
resting on it.

But in the meantime, we continue to use the shuttle to resupply the ISS
and start to consider a station at a much lower latitude to be used as a
fuel depot. This can be man-tended at first and have 3-4 pressurized
modules and then larger tanks attached over time.

Nothing revolutionary here (and a lot of it subject to criticism) but I
think politically it's got more chance than the current Ares I/V
boondoggle.



--
Greg Moore
SQL Server DBA Consulting Remote and Onsite available!
Email: sql (at) greenms.com
http://www.greenms.com/sqlserver.html

On Wed, 03 Sep 2008 07:54:13 GMT, "Brian Gaff"
wrote:

You also need to plan for an unpopular event, namely the loss of another
orbiter. These are old craft, and short of building new ones, something is
likely to break, I feel.

The Air Force is flying hundreds of C-130s, B-52s and KC-135s that are
much older than the Shuttle. Northwest Airlines is flying DC-9s much
older than the Shuttle. Age is not a problem with proper maintenance.
The real danger is a problem appearing but management ignoring their
engineers, which is what caused the two Shuttle accidents. That could
happen with a brand new vehicle just as easily.

Brian

"Greg D. Moore \(Strider\)" wrote:


This is very back of the envelope.


It's a half generation at best - as the question of what to launch
Orion on when the Shuttle does retire isn't really addressed, just
deferred. From a programmatic point of view, if you want a new
booster in 2015 you need to be getting a good start on it right about
now.

I'm not certain that a commercial booster is a fully workable
solution, as that means betting that they will be available in their
current form in eight years, and that they will _remain_ available
across the (currently uncertain) life of Orion.

Betting on a commercial solution can possibly leave you hanging when
the market changes.

D.
--
Touch-twice life. Eat. Drink. Laugh.

http://derekl1963.livejournal.com/

-Resolved: To be more temperate in my postings.
Oct 5th, 2004 JDL

Brian Thorn wrote:

On Wed, 03 Sep 2008 07:54:13 GMT, "Brian Gaff"
wrote:

The Air Force is flying hundreds of C-130s, B-52s and KC-135s that are
much older than the Shuttle. Northwest Airlines is flying DC-9s much
older than the Shuttle.

As I mentioned in another thread, those aircraft are in fact much
'younger' than you suppose. (Especially for the -130's which have
been subject to an ongoing procurement program.)

Age is not a problem with proper maintenance.

And that maintenance gets ever more expensive with age, as ever more
maintenance is required.

The real danger is a problem appearing but management ignoring their
engineers, which is what caused the two Shuttle accidents.

I don't know of any Shuttle accidents in which the engineers were not
also complicit.

D.
--
Touch-twice life. Eat. Drink. Laugh.

http://derekl1963.livejournal.com/

-Resolved: To be more temperate in my postings.
Oct 5th, 2004 JDL

"Derek Lyons" wrote in message
...
Brian Thorn wrote:

On Wed, 03 Sep 2008 07:54:13 GMT, "Brian Gaff"
wrote:

The Air Force is flying hundreds of C-130s, B-52s and KC-135s that are
much older than the Shuttle. Northwest Airlines is flying DC-9s much
older than the Shuttle.

As I mentioned in another thread, those aircraft are in fact much
'younger' than you suppose. (Especially for the -130's which have
been subject to an ongoing procurement program.)

Age is not a problem with proper maintenance.

And that maintenance gets ever more expensive with age, as ever more
maintenance is required.

The real danger is a problem appearing but management ignoring their
engineers, which is what caused the two Shuttle accidents.

I don't know of any Shuttle accidents in which the engineers were not
also complicit.

If you have read the entire Roger's Commission Report on the Challenger
disaster, then you came away with far different conclusions than I. For
different reasons, engineers at both Thiokol and Rockwell were convinced
that the Challenger should not launch that day. At the very top, the actual
managers making the go/no go decision didn't know about those concerns. The
failure was in middle management and with the safety decision making
processes being applied.

Report of the PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION on the Space Shuttle Challenger
Accident
http://history.nasa.gov/rogersrep/genindex.htm

The good stuff is in Chapter 5 and 7:

Chapter V: The Contributing Cause of The Accident.
http://history.nasa.gov/rogersrep/v1ch5.htm

Chapter VII: The Silent Safety Program.
http://history.nasa.gov/rogersrep/v1ch7.htm

Here's the first paragraph from Chapter 7:

The Commission was surprised to realize after many hours of
testimony that NASA's safety staff was never mentioned. No
witness related the approval or disapproval of the reliability
engineers, and none expressed the satisfaction or dissatisfaction
of the quality assurance staff. No one thought to invite a safety
representative or a reliability and quality assurance engineer to
the January 27, 1986, teleconference between Marshall and Thiokol.
Similarly, there was no representative of safety on the Mission
Management Team that made key decisions during the countdown on
January 28, 1986. The Commission is concerned about the symptoms
that it sees.

Jeff
--
A clever person solves a problem.
A wise person avoids it. -- Einstein

"Jeff Findley" wrote:
If you have read the entire Roger's Commission Report on the Challenger
disaster, then you came away with far different conclusions than I.

I have, but then I have also studied the other accounts and pondered
upon them and thus reached my conclusions based on facts rather than
seeking the bits the reinforce my biases.

For different reasons, engineers at both Thiokol and Rockwell were convinced
that the Challenger should not launch that day. At the very top, the actual
managers making the go/no go decision didn't know about those concerns. The
failure was in middle management and with the safety decision making
processes being applied.

Of course it never occurs to you to ask why middle management failed.
It nevers occurs to ask why the judgement of the engineers was
questioned.

Soundbites are easy. Thinking is hard.

D.
--
Touch-twice life. Eat. Drink. Laugh.

http://derekl1963.livejournal.com/

-Resolved: To be more temperate in my postings.
Oct 5th, 2004 JDL