NASA Astronaut on Columbia Repair (and others)

jacob navia wrote:
robert casey a écrit :


For example, most of the mass that NASA will have to lift into LEO for
its
return-to-the-Moon plans will be fuel. Griffin has officially expressed
interest in commercial fuel delivery to LEO. But NASA is building its
own
immensely-costly heavylift launcher, whose payload will be mostly fuel....
so it's not hard to figure out that they won't be buying fuel from a
commercial depot, even if it's cheaper.


There is a possibility that all private companies may decide that they
cannot make any money doing it, so then nobody does it. And then NASA
has a problem getting the fuel it needs. So NASA may want to have a
backup plan in place if that happens.

EXACTLY!

Who is going to fly that fuel? The "private investors"?

For NASA they would have more or less the same costs as NASA +
profit for the investors. NASA can do it cheaper since it doesn't
need to pay any dividends to anyone.

Not the right thread, as the original post was pertaining to an
astronauts statements,

http://www.stpns.net/view_article.ht...43251064362304

Gutierrez said the fault lies in two words - engineering arrogance.
"NASA engineers were confident that they did everything right,"
Gutierrez said. "They were so sure everything would work as planned
they didn't think an escape system was necessary. The fact is, if there
had been an escape system on Columbia and Challenger, the crews could
have survived."

Actually the design shortcomings of the shuttle system had been known
for along time before the challenger tragedy, (ie no crew escape system
for more than a small percentage of the crew if in place, and only
usable for a small percentage of the flight) and therefore it is the
responsibility of managers and engineers to operate the space shuttle
system safely within it's known parameters, (ie launching on jan 28
1986 was a managerial decision to launch in the coldest wheather
despite engineers recommendations not to launch, and inspite of
evidence of srb "o-ring" burnthrough on the previous launch sts-61c).

tom

in article , Rand Simberg at
h wrote on 11/30/06 3:30 PM:

On Thu, 30 Nov 2006 17:03:08 -0600, in a place far, far away, Herb
Schaltegger made the
phosphor on my monitor glow in such a way as to indicate that:

On Thu, 30 Nov 2006 14:50:31 -0600, Henry Spencer wrote
(in article ):

... so it's not hard to figure out that they won't be buying fuel from a
commercial depot, even if it's cheaper.

Aye, there's the rub. There's no evidence that fuel from any putative
commercial depot would be cheaper.

What does that mean?

How does one put forth "evidence" for future activities?

Exactly.

George Evans

in article ,
columbiaaccidentinvestigation at
wrote on 11/30/06 9:15 PM:


George Evans wrote:
in article ,
columbiaaccidentinvestigation at
wrote on 11/29/06 4:44 PM:

George Evans wrote: "Amen. These European socialists make me laugh.
They never have quite grasped the concept of "private".

Go troll some place else george, as the original topic was concerning
the following article.

http://www.stpns.net/view_article.ht...43251064362304

Gutierrez said the fault lies in two words - engineering arrogance.

You're confused. You're mixing up this thread with the one entitled "NASA
Astronaut on Columbia Repair (and others)." I read your post there without
responding.

If that is the case george you might want to keep this topic posted in
sci.space.policy only, as this is part of the thread that is cross posting to
sci.space.shuttle and sci.space.history in a discussion that is not the same
as this one, and therefore your posts are not relevant to the direction the
discussion is going in those groups. So if you would please remove the above
two groups in you're replies to the thread a letter to the nasa administrator
discussing private vs government base space exploration as it would be most
appreciated for the usenet discussions to stay on topic.

Discussing the merits of private vs government base space exploration is an
interesting debate with many specific details, but perhaps starting with the
fyo7 nasa fiscal budget numbers, and then figure out how insurance costs, and
risk analysis for the private sector would cost and factor that in as a fixed
costs for the private entity.

No, but thanks for the advice. And you should be talking to Craig who cross
posted it.

George Evans

in article , Pat Flannery at
wrote on 11/30/06 9:43 PM:



George Evans wrote:



Yes, but we showed them what Corporals could do! :-)



Right over my head. :-/



Both Napoleon and Hitler were nicknamed "The Little Corporal".
See...European socialism...private...corporal... :-)

Pat
Pat

I see. The risk of freedom of thought.

George Evans

George Evans wrote:
in article , Pat Flannery at
wrote on 11/30/06 9:43 PM:



George Evans wrote:



Yes, but we showed them what Corporals could do! :-)



Right over my head. :-/



Both Napoleon and Hitler were nicknamed "The Little Corporal".
See...European socialism...private...corporal... :-)

Pat
Pat

I see. The risk of freedom of thought.

George Evans

Not the right thread, as the original post was pertaining to an
astronauts statements,

http://www.stpns.net/view_article.ht...43251064362304

Gutierrez said the fault lies in two words - engineering arrogance.
"NASA engineers were confident that they did everything right,"
Gutierrez said. "They were so sure everything would work as planned
they didn't think an escape system was necessary. The fact is, if there
had been an escape system on Columbia and Challenger, the crews could
have survived."

Actually the design shortcomings of the shuttle system had been known
for along time before the challenger tragedy, (ie no crew escape system
for more than a small percentage of the crew if in place, and only
usable for a small percentage of the flight) and therefore it is the
responsibility of managers and engineers to operate the space shuttle
system safely within it's known parameters, (ie launching on jan 28
1986 was a managerial decision to launch in the coldest wheather
despite engineers recommendations not to launch, and inspite of
evidence of srb "o-ring" burnthrough on the previous launch sts-61c).

tom

Alan Jones wrote:


One of the saddest examples of private investment and development was
the case of the Northrop F-20. The investment, economic development,
etc., was laudable, but the US government said essentially, "Very
nice, but it is not quite good enough for us to buy, and too good for
us to allow you to build and sell them to anyone else." That could
have killed the company.



They did try to sell them overseas, but a combination of the crashes and
the fact that the aircraft, capable though it was, was looked at as "a
poor man's F-16" sure didn't help.
It was the same problem the F-5 ran into... everyone wanted
Starfighters, not Freedom Fighters.
The one I would've been interested to see go into production was The
Israeli twin PW 1120 engine powered Phantom II.
Descriptions of that said it was really something to see in action; a
balls-to-the-walls rocketship of a plane in comparison with the standard
Phantom II.

A successful example is the Pegasus launch vehicle. The key to
success was not simply technical innovation, but a careful analysis of
the market, and securing the US government as an anchor customer,
essentially securing purchase orders for the first few launches. They
also arranged to lease a B-52 from the US government until their
privately purchased L-1011 was ready. This "helping hand", mitigated
just enough risk for private development of Pegasus.




A very clever vehicle, embodying something of the Scout design approach
to a low-cost booster.
I still haven't been fully convinced that the thing didn't have a touch
of "Skybolt Mk. II" in its concept, as you could turn it into a
air-launched ICBM without much trouble.

Pat

Pat Flannery wrote:
Alan Jones wrote:


One of the saddest examples of private investment and development was
the case of the Northrop F-20. The investment, economic development,
etc., was laudable, but the US government said essentially, "Very
nice, but it is not quite good enough for us to buy, and too good for
us to allow you to build and sell them to anyone else." That could
have killed the company.



They did try to sell them overseas, but a combination of the crashes and
the fact that the aircraft, capable though it was, was looked at as "a
poor man's F-16" sure didn't help.
It was the same problem the F-5 ran into... everyone wanted
Starfighters, not Freedom Fighters.
The one I would've been interested to see go into production was The
Israeli twin PW 1120 engine powered Phantom II.
Descriptions of that said it was really something to see in action; a
balls-to-the-walls rocketship of a plane in comparison with the standard
Phantom II.

A successful example is the Pegasus launch vehicle. The key to
success was not simply technical innovation, but a careful analysis of
the market, and securing the US government as an anchor customer,
essentially securing purchase orders for the first few launches. They
also arranged to lease a B-52 from the US government until their
privately purchased L-1011 was ready. This "helping hand", mitigated
just enough risk for private development of Pegasus.




A very clever vehicle, embodying something of the Scout design approach
to a low-cost booster.
I still haven't been fully convinced that the thing didn't have a touch
of "Skybolt Mk. II" in its concept, as you could turn it into a
air-launched ICBM without much trouble.

Pat

Not the right thread, as the original post was pertaining to an
astronauts statements in the below article.

http://www.stpns.net/view_article.ht...43251064362304

Gutierrez said the fault lies in two words - engineering arrogance.
"NASA engineers were confident that they did everything right,"
Gutierrez said. "They were so sure everything would work as planned
they didn't think an escape system was necessary. The fact is, if there
had been an escape system on Columbia and Challenger, the crews could
have survived."


Here are two pages with some information directly pertaining to nasa
culture, and how recomnedations from the Diaz report to the caib are
being implemented to improve the issues (raised by both the columbia
and challenger tragedy investigatory bodies) inside nasa.


http://www.onenasa.nasa.gov/NEWS/Archives_of_News.htm
Release of Implementation Plan for Diaz Team Report
An Agency-wide team, under the leadership of Mr. Al Diaz, former
Director of the Goddard Space Flight Center, was commissioned to assess
the broader implications of the Columbia Accident Investigation Board's
(CAIB) Report on activities across the agency. The final Diaz Team
Report is entitled "A Renewed Commitment to Excellence: An Assessment
of the NASA Agency-wide Applicability of the Columbia Accident
Investigation Board Report and was released on January 30, 2004
(problematic viewing report in Netscape's older versions).
During the NASA Update conducted on February 9, 2004, the Administrator
indicated that the One NASA Team would be responsible for creation of
the Implementation Plan for the Diaz Team Report. On March 30, 2004,
the One NASA Team, along with members of senior management and their
staff who served as Action Leads, completed the implementation plan -
"The Implementation of the NASA Agency-wide Application of the Columbia
Accident Investigation Board Report: Our Renewed Commitment to
Excellence."
The Implementation Plan was put into effect and many of the Actions of
the plan were completed. A follow-up detailed review of the Actions
was performed and it found that ten of the 24 actions were completed
(see briefing to Operations Management Council). Three were terminated
because their focus had been adopted by other studies. Ten actions
were converted to functional organization activities and one action,
#5, remains pending a briefing by OSMA to the Operations Management
Council. The Deputy Administrator's memo of March 27, 2005 documents
the disposition of the actions."


http://www.onenasa.nasa.gov/NEWS/SMS...mary_Final.pdf

"Safety and Mission Success Week Agency-Wide Summary Executive Summary
Safety and Mission Success Week was designed to facilitate open
communication, and to engage the entire NASA community in addressing
the CAIB Report. Each Center Director was asked to champion the week's
events and collect feedback from their workforce. After holding the
work unit discussions, Center Directors were asked
facilitate a data rollup into the main ideas from their Center. Data
roll up validated the results of the CAIB and the Diaz Forty Actions.
Data from center roll ups were analyzed by a subset of the One NASA
Team. The "One NASA Data Team" included members from ARC, GSFC, GRC,
and JSC. The team examined the final Center reports and after
completing their three-phase analysis arrived at summary descriptions
of the themes submitted by the Centers as well as the following 12
cross-cutting themes. Each cross cutting theme was a major idea or
theme in at least two Center Reports.
1. NASA should willfully seek out and understand minority opinions.
This includes establishing a process to collect anonymous feedback, and
holding meetings that encourage open discussion.
2. Resources including time, human capital, and cash flow should be
allocated realistically and according to the design standards set forth
at project conception.
3. Strategic planning should be relevant for every employee, include
human capabilities needed for the future, and be the baseline for on
going initiatives.
4. The Agency needs a strategy for leadership development that
includes/supports a specific set of skills for all levels of
management. These skills should then be used for evaluating performance
and making personnel decisions such as promotions and awards.
5. Decisions should be made based on what is best for the Agency, be
placed in context using Agency priorities, guide allocation of
resources, and be fully rationalized and communicated to the workforce.

6. NASA needs a truly independent safety organization as described in
the CAIB report. This organization should serve as a clearinghouse for
any safety related concerns from any employee.
7. NASA needs to clarify the organizational structure of the Agency.
Current matrix system is too complex and is not perceived as a useful
management tool.
8. Safety expertise should exist for every specific discipline within
the Agency.
9. NASA needs an increased value on respect for others. All those
affected by the decision should be part of the decision making process.
Leaders should have the responsibility to provide employees with full
information regarding decisions, including options considered, and
rationale for making final choice.

10. NASA needs more emphasis on the entire lifespan of projects to
avoid being tied up in unnecessary processes, or lengthy approvals that
draw resources away from goal achievement. Appropriate procedures
should be established, and followed from project conception to
completion.
11. NASA should use/design ONE tool to capture expertise and lessons
learned in all areas. The tool should be easily accessible, and
actively used by the workforce.
12. Contractors should not be used to supply core competency expertise.
Building from an inclusive strategic plan the Agency should determine
what capabilities should be kept in house, and what capabilities should
be provided by contractors.

The themes were mapped against the 7 Diaz Team goals outlined in: A
Renewed Commitment to Excellence: An Assessment of the NASA Agency-wide
Applicability of the Columbia Accident Investigation Board Report. This
document is intended to provide a clear picture of the steps taken to
analyze the Safety and Mission Success Week...."

tom

"George Evans" wrote in message
...
in article , Pat Flannery at


I see. The risk of freedom of thought.

Yep. It stops a soldier from becoming a sergeant.

Neil Gerace wrote:
"George Evans" wrote in message
...
in article , Pat Flannery at


I see. The risk of freedom of thought.

Yep. It stops a soldier from becoming a sergeant.

maybe this is more trolls attempting to change the subject lets see,
please neil tell me how youre post is on topic with the below article,
if you cannot youre attempts to change the direction and name of this
thread are obvious.

http://www.stpns.net/view_article.ht...43251064362304

Gutierrez said the fault lies in two words - engineering arrogance.
"NASA engineers were confident that they did everything right,"
Gutierrez said. "They were so sure everything would work as planned
they didn't think an escape system was necessary. The fact is, if there
had been an escape system on Columbia and Challenger, the crews could
have survived."

tom

On Fri, 01 Dec 2006 21:35:23 GMT, Alan Jones
wrote:

You would not drain your cars tank of $3 gasoline
just so you could refill it with $2.30 gasoline.

....No, but if you sold a used car that had been sitting with a full
tank since gas was 90 cents/gal at a time when it was just reaching
$3/gal, you damn sure wouldn't tell the guy you're selling it to that
the reason the cost was $50 higher was that you were charging him the
current gas rate and not what you paid for it.

As to what *that* has to do with your point. who knows? All I'm doing
is bragging about how I unloaded my old gas guzzler last year and got
an extra $50 for my trouble...:-P

OM
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